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2005 DIGILAW 284 (ORI)

Sheik Mohammad Amin v. Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Orissa

2005-04-27

M.M.DAS

body2005
JUDGMENT M. M. DAS, J. : The petitioner-workman in this writ application has called in question the Award passed by the Indus¬trial Tribunal dated 10.1.2003 in I.D. Case No.8 of 1990 and has further prayed for a direction for payment of consequential service benefits to the petitioner. 2. The case has a chequered career. It is the case of the petitioner that in the year 1975, he joined as a Site Supervisor in the office of M/s. B. C. Bose & Company Pvt. Ltd. - Opp.Party No.2. On 25.10.1976, the petitioner met with an accident in course of his employment and consequently he was hospitalized for the injuries sustained by him at the S.C.B. Medical College Hospital, Cuttack. After recovery, the petitioner alleges, he was not allowed to join in his duty. It appears that the petitioner also claimed compensation for the injuries before the Commission¬er for the Workmen’s compensation, which came up to this Court in Appeal. Bereft of all unnecessary details, it would suffice to say that the petitioner on being not permitted to resume his duty after recovery form the injuries sustained in the accident, approached the Regional Asst. Labour Commissioner (Central) under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). Conciliation having failed a failure report was sub¬mitted to the Government of India. An Industrial dispute was referred to the Industrial Tribunal under Section 10 of the Act. After hearing, the Industrial Tribunal on 12.2.1993 passed an ex parte award directing reinstatement of the petitioner in service with back wages. It appears at that stage, the Management did not file any written statement and failed to appear before the Tribu¬nal for which the ex parte award was passed. The award was pub¬lished as required under the Act on 27.3.1993, after which the management i.e. Opp.Party No.2 filed a petition before the Tribu¬nal to set aside the ex parte Award. The said application having been rejected, Opp.Party No.2 filed OJC No.4270 of 1993 in which an order of interim stay of the Award was passed. It further appears that for non-implementation of the ex parte Award, the petitioner also filed OJC No.4339 of 1993. The said application having been rejected, Opp.Party No.2 filed OJC No.4270 of 1993 in which an order of interim stay of the Award was passed. It further appears that for non-implementation of the ex parte Award, the petitioner also filed OJC No.4339 of 1993. The interim order of stay passed in OJC No.4270 of 1993 was subsequently modified to the following effect : “Having head Sri Nayak for the petitioner in O.J.C. No.4339/93 and Sri T. K. Sahu for the petitioner in O.J.C. No.4270/93, as an interim measure, we direct the workman S.M. Amin, to report for duty to B.C. Bose & Company Pvt. Ltd. on 15th November, 1993. We make it clear that if the workman fails to report for duty on 15th, it may be that he may not be allowed to join thereafter. Place this case for admission on 18.11.93 to know whether the petitioner has reported for duty on 15th or not. Misc. Case No.5830/93 shall also be put up along with this case.” Thereafter, both the above writ petitions were disposed of by a common order dated 18.11.1993 of this Court, in which the impugned ex parte award was set aside and the matter was remitted back to the Industrial Tribunal for reconsideration by giving opportunity of hearing to the party concerned. It was further directed in the said order that since the workman has been har¬assed sufficiently on account of laches on the part of the em¬ployer, the said order of setting aside the ex parte order would be subject to payment of costs of Rs.1500/- within two weeks failing which the impugned order shall remain unaltered. Form the allegations made in the writ petition, it appears that the cost as imposed by the above order was not paid in due time and as such, the petitioner alleges, it should be deemed that the ex parte award has not been set aside and the Tribunal had no fur¬ther jurisdiction to decide the case afresh. The order of this Court passed in the aforementioned two writ petitions have been annexed to this writ petition as Annexure-2. The order of this Court passed in the aforementioned two writ petitions have been annexed to this writ petition as Annexure-2. It would be clear form the said order that since a question was raised by the employer-Opp.Party No.2 before this Court that though an objec¬tion was filed before the Industrial Tribunal by the employer raising the question of jurisdiction on the ground that the Gov¬ernment of India is not the appropriate authority to make the reference to the Tribunal and it was only the State Government which had power to make such a reference and though the Tribunal passed an order that the competency of the Government of India in making the reference will be considered at the time of final disposal of the matter, but the same was not answered in the ex parte award passed by the Tribunal, the Tribunal was directed to reconsider the case bearing in mind the observations made in the said order. Therefore, the petitioner alleges that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to decide any other issue except the issue on which the matter was remitted back. In spite of the above, it appears that the Industrial Tribunal passed a fresh Award on 21.8.1995 (Annexure-3) holding that the reference is maintain¬able, the management has not refused employment, but the workman has abandoned the job offered to him on flimsy pretext and that payment of Rs.7,000/- towards litigation expenses by the manage¬ment would meet the ends of justice. The said Award was challenged by the petitioner before this Court in OJC No.8184 of 1995. 3. In course of hearing of OJC No.8184 of 1995, by order dated 9.10.1996, this Court while holding that there is no merit in the findings of the Tribunal that the petitioner avoided to join in his duty as offered by the employer, categorically held that the petitioner is entitled to be reinstated and taking note of the fact that the management had no objection to permit the petitioner to join in his duty, directed the petitioner to report to duty before Opp.Party No.2 within ten days. The ques¬tion with regard to payment of back wages was directed to be considered later. Copy of the order sheet in the said writ peti¬tion has been annexed as Annexure-4 and 5 to the writ petition. The ques¬tion with regard to payment of back wages was directed to be considered later. Copy of the order sheet in the said writ peti¬tion has been annexed as Annexure-4 and 5 to the writ petition. Form the order dated 4.1.2000 of this Court, it appears that while disposing of the writ petition, it was observed that as is reflected form the affidavit dated 27.4.1999 the petitioner has already been reinstated and is being paid his regular salary. With above observation, the writ petition was dismissed. Civil Review No.29 of 2000 was preferred by the petitioner for review of the order dated 4.1.2000 by which the writ petition was dis¬missed. The said review application was allowed by the judgment dated 17.5.2002 and the order dated 4.1.2000 passed in OJC No.8184 of 1995 was recalled and the order of dismissal recorded in the said writ application was modified by stating that the writ application is disposed of by setting aside the judgment and award of the Tribunal and further the matter was again sent back to the Tribunal for the purpose of considering whether the em¬ployer offered the petitioner a job as its own employee or placed him under a contractor, as an employee of the said contractor. The Tribunal was further directed to consider the question with regard to the claim for back wages in accordance with law on the basis of its finding about the nature of the employment stated to have been offered by the employer. The Industrial Tribunal, thereafter, heard the matter and has passed an Award 10.1.2003 holding that as the petitioner-workman has left the service suo motu in the year 1988, he is not entitled to any back wages. Being aggrieved by the said award dated 10.1.2003, the petitioner has preferred this writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution for appropriate relief. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Tribunal has gone beyond the order passed by this Court in fram¬ing questions and answering those which were not directed by this Court while remitting the matter. Being aggrieved by the said award dated 10.1.2003, the petitioner has preferred this writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution for appropriate relief. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Tribunal has gone beyond the order passed by this Court in fram¬ing questions and answering those which were not directed by this Court while remitting the matter. He further submitted that this Court in judgment dated 17.5.2002 passed in Civil Review No.29 of 2000 directed as follows : “We, accordingly, allow this review petition recall the order dated January 4, 2000 and dispose of the writ petition by setting aside the judgment and award of the Tribunal and sending the case back to the Industrial Tribunal for the purpose of considering whether the employer offered the petitioner-employee a job as its own employee or placed him under a contractor as an employee of the said contractor. The Tribunal will also consider the question of the petitioner’s claim for back wages in accord¬ance with law on the basis of its finding about the nature of the employment stated to have been offered by the employer. The Tribunal will allow both the parties to adduce further evidence on the said question, if they so like. As this case is an old one, the Tribunal will try to dispose of the case as expeditious¬ly as possible.” 5. In view of the above direction, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the Tribunal should have confined its award to the question as to whether the employer offered a job to the petitioner as its own employee or placed him under a contractor as an employee of the said contractor. The Tribunal was further directed to consider the claim of the peti¬tioner for back wages in accordance with law on the basis of the finding about the nature of the employment. It is, therefore, contended by the petitioner that there being no issue before the Tribunal regarding abandonment of service by the petitioner, the Tribunal travelled beyond the direction of this Court in holding that the petitioner suo motu left the service in the year 1988. It is, therefore, contended by the petitioner that there being no issue before the Tribunal regarding abandonment of service by the petitioner, the Tribunal travelled beyond the direction of this Court in holding that the petitioner suo motu left the service in the year 1988. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that this Court by order dated 9.10.1996 having come to a categorical finding that the petitioner is entitled to be reinstated and having disbelieved the case of opp.party No.2 that the petitioner refused to join in service on some pretext or other, it was no more open for the Tribunal to hold that the petitioner left the service suo motu in the year, 1988. 6. Learned counsel appearing for opp.party No.2, on the contrary while supporting the impugned award submitted that the Tribunal after taking into consideration the evidence on record and all the materials available therein, having come to the conclusion that the petitioner is not entitled to back wages, such findings of fact are not amenable to be interfered with in this writ application. 7. This Court in order dated 9.10.1996 passed in OJC No.8184 of 1995 has held thus : “We do not find any merit on the finding of the Tribunal. If the workman has been fighting form 1978 till date and moving form one Court to another and seeking to get employment, it would be difficult to accept that he would refuse to join and he would avoid on some pretext or other. It is made clear that if the employer at any time asked the workman to work under any contrac¬tor under any contingencies, the relationship of the employer and the employee between the Management and the workman had not ceased and any direction of the Management to work under the contractor would be always presumed that the relationship of the employer and employee subsisted. Moreover, it was not proper on the part of opposite party No.2, the employer to leave the em¬ployee at the mercy of a contractor. Be that as it may, on the basis of the record, we hold that the petitioner is entitled to be reinstated. x x x.” 8. In view of the above finding of this Court, it was not open for the Tribunal to hold that the petitioner left the serv¬ice suo motu. Be that as it may, on the basis of the record, we hold that the petitioner is entitled to be reinstated. x x x.” 8. In view of the above finding of this Court, it was not open for the Tribunal to hold that the petitioner left the serv¬ice suo motu. Finding that the petitioner is entitled to be ‘reinstated’, in the above order passed by this Court, pre-supposes that the petitioner was prevented form joining his duties or was thrown out of service illegally. Thus, if a workman is deprived of his service and such deprivation has been found to be illegal and the employee is directed to be reinstated, in ordinary course, he would be entitled to back wages and other service benefits. The petitioner has, therefore, prayed in the present writ application for such consequential service benefits with back wages along with reinstatement in service. It appears that the petitioner, pursuant to orders passed by this Court was allowed to join. However, it further appears that in the meantime the petitioner has been superannuated. 9. On the above premises, I allow the writ application, quash the finding of the Industrial Tribunal in I.D. Case No.8 of 1988 holding that the petitioner-workman left the service suo motu in the year, 1988 and is not entitled to any back wages. I further direct that the petitioner being entitled to back wages and other service benefits, opp.party No.2 on calculating the same nationally for the period for which the petitioner was out of service, shall make payment of the said amount to the peti¬tioner within a period of three months form the date of communi¬cation of this order along with all other service benefits to which the petitioner would have been entitled to, if he would not have been thrown out of service. The petitioner shall file requi¬sites for communication of this order to opp.party No.2 within a period of one week form today. 10. The writ application is, accordingly, allowed but in the circumstances, without costs. Application allowed.