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2005 DIGILAW 2858 (RAJ)

Banshilal Samariya v. Union of India

2005-10-28

BHAGABATI PRASAD BANERJEE, VINEET KOTHARI

body2005
Honble KOTHARI, J.–We are seized in the set of these writ petitions, with an important question of law as to validity and constitutionality of Section 3-J of the National Highways Act, 1956 (in short ``the Act of 1956 hereinafter) inserted in the said Act by the National Highway Laws Amendment) Act, 1997 w.e.f. 24.1.1997. (2). Section 3-J of the Act of 1956 excludes the applicability of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to the acquisitions made under the National Highways Act. The provisions contained in Section 3, 3- A, 3-B, 3-C, 3-D, 3-E, 3-F, 3-G, 3-H, 3-I and 3-J were inserted in the Act of 1956 by the said Amending Act of 1997 so as to provide for quicker and smoother acquisitions under the Act of 1956 of the land acquired for the said purpose as it was found that inordinate delay in the acquisition of the lands under the Land Acquisition Act was one of the main impediments in the speedy implementation of highways project and therefore, the said amendment was legislated by the Parliament in 1997. (3). From the averments made in the writ petition of Banshi Lal Samariya, the facts of the said lead case taken into consideration for deciding the batch of these writ petitions are like this. (4). The petitioner is the owner of land comprised in Khasra No. 951 of village Raila, Tehsil Banera, district Bhilwara. The lands in question measuring 605756 Sq. feets and the same are said to be non-agriculture i.e. ``Abadi lands situated in the said village in the close vicinity of Railway Station and the said lands also adjoin the said National Highway. The said land in question was acquired under the provisions of the Act of 1956 and award under the said Act was passed by the competent authority on 28.2.2003 vide Annexure 2 filed by the petitioner alongwith writ petitioner awarding compensation @ Rs. 60,000/- per bigha. The said compensation appears to have been paid to the petitioners. However, the petitioners have sought further enhancement of compensation before the Arbitrator as provided in Section 3-G(2) of the Act, which is said to be still pending. 60,000/- per bigha. The said compensation appears to have been paid to the petitioners. However, the petitioners have sought further enhancement of compensation before the Arbitrator as provided in Section 3-G(2) of the Act, which is said to be still pending. The claim of the petitioners is that they are also entitled to be given solatium and interest as provided under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, which Act also should be held equally applicable simultaneously with the provisions of the Act of 1956 to the petitioners and the exclusion of applicability of the said Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by virtue of Section 3-J of the Act of 1956 should be held to be ultra-vires and illegal. (5). The said writ petition has been contended by the National Highway Authority, respondent No. 3, who has filed a statement of objections in this Court as also by the respondents No. 2 and 4, who have also filed the separate replies to the writ petition. The Union of India though, served and represented has however not filed any reply to the writ petition. The petitioners have filed separate rejoinders to the aforesaid replies of the respondents. (6). After hearing the learned counsel at length and going through the relevant record and case law cited before us, we proceed to decide the aforesaid question as below. (7). The first objection raised by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners Shri M.D. Purohit, Senior Advocate is that there cannot be two legislations by the same legislature on the same subject matter providing for discriminatory provisions and existence of two enactments on the same subject gives power to the State to give different treatment to land owners similarly situated and therefore, there is violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. (8). We find ourselves unable to agree with the said submission of the learned counsel. The legislation, Parliament in the present case, is free to enact laws within its jurisdiction, which is described and delineated in the constitutional entries in the seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India, list First being for the Parliament or Union, list Second for the State legislations and list Three being a Concurrent list. It is not even the case of the petitioners that power to enact the National Highway Act including the Amending Act of 1997 is not within the legislative competence of the Parliament. It is not even the case of the petitioners that power to enact the National Highway Act including the Amending Act of 1997 is not within the legislative competence of the Parliament. What is under challenge is that exclusion of earlier enactment i.e. Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by the Amending Act of 1997 incorporating Section 3 to 3-J in the Act of 1956 excluding the applicability of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to the acquisitions made for the purpose of construction of national highways under the Act of 1956, as amended. The Act of 1956 being the special law for speedy construction of national highways has excluded the applicability of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and there is no earthly valid reason to stop the Parliament from doing so. Special and emergent need of the day which are assessed and determined within the exclusive domain and wisdom of the legislative bodies giving birth to special laws from time to time is legislative function and the Courts can hardly interfere in that unless such laws are questioned and tested on the anvil of well settled constitutional para-meters. We do not see any such ground for striking down the said Amendment in the Act of 1956 including the amendment which excludes the applicability of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. As a matter of fact, the amendments introduced by the Act No. 16 of 1997 is a self contained code providing for speedy and expeditious acquisition of land for the purpose of construction of national highways. (9). Section 3 of the Act of 1956 defines ``competent authority and ``land. Section 3-A gives power to Central Government to acquire land for the purpose of building, maintenance, management or operation of a national highway or a part thereof. Section 3-B gives power to enter for survey etc. Section 3-C incorporates the principles of natural justice and provides for hearing of objections by any person interested in the land within 21 days from the date of publication of the notification under sub- section(1) of Section 3-A, which objections shall be decided by the competent authority after hearing such objections and making such further enquiry as such competent thinks necessary. Section 3-D enables the Central Government to declare by notification in the Official Gazette that land should be acquired for the purpose or purposes mentioned in Section 3-A and Section 3-D (2) provides that on publication of the declaration under sub-section (1), the land shall vest absolutely in the Central Government free from all encumbrances. Section 3-E provides that where any land has vested in the Central Government u/S. 3-D(2) and amount determined by the competent authority under Section 3-G with respect to such land has been deposited with the competent authority by the Central Government, the competent authority, say by notice in writing direct the owner as well as any of the person, who may be in possession of such land to surrender or deliver possession thereof to the competent authority or any person duly authorised by it within 60 days of the service of the notice. On refusal to hand over the possession appropriate coercive measures can be taken. Section 3-F provides for right to enter into the land where the land had vested in the Central Government. Section 3-G provides for determination of amount payable as compensation. Sub-section (7) of Section 3-G clearly lays down the guidelines for determination of the compensation and the market value of the land on the date of publication of the notification u/S. 3-A of the Act is the principal criteria for award of compensation. The damages, if any, sustained by any person interested at the time of taking possession of the land by reason of the severing of such land from other land or such acquisition rhhulting in any damage to the other immovable property or even for shifting the place of residence or business, the expenses incurred for the same are taken into consideration for determining the amount payable under Section 3-G of the Act, which may be determined by the competent authority or upon further reference under sub-section (5) of Section 3-G by the Arbitrator. Section 3-H provides for depositing and payment of the amount of compensation. Section 3-I gives powers of civil Court to the competent authority and Section 3-J provides that nothing in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, shall apply to acquisition under this Act. (10). The above is the scheme of this part of the Act of 1956, which was inserted by Amendment Act No. 16 of 1997. (11). Section 3-I gives powers of civil Court to the competent authority and Section 3-J provides that nothing in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, shall apply to acquisition under this Act. (10). The above is the scheme of this part of the Act of 1956, which was inserted by Amendment Act No. 16 of 1997. (11). The main thrust of the challenge of the petitioners in the present litigation is that the petitioners have been deprived of their lands under compulsory acquisition for the purpose of construction of national highway but, they have been deprived also of the benefit of solatium and interest which would have been payable to them besides market value of the lands in question under Sections 23(1)(a) and 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 had the acquisition taken place under that Act. (12). The word ``solatium has not been defined in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. But, the dictionary meaning of the said term ``Solatium is like this. The New Shorter Oxford Dictionary defines the word ``Solatium, ``a sum of money or other compensation given to a person to make up for loss, inconvenience, injured feelings etc., ``in Law, such an amount awarded to litigant over and above the actual loss. Similarly, the Webseters Collegiate Dictionary defines the said term ``Solatium as ``a compensation (as money) as given solace for suffering, loss or injured feelings. The Random House Dictionary defines the said term ``Solatium in the field of law as ``damages awarded to a plaintiff to compensate him for personal suffering or grief arising from any injury, ``comfort. ``relief, see solace. From the above definitions, it is clear that ``solatium money is a comfort money and though, it bears statutory character under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, it cannot be claimed as a matter of right for all land acquisitions compulsory or otherwise under other Statutes. The examples are not lacking where such compulsory acquisitions are made either under Defence of India Act, 1971 or Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952. As a matter of fact, this very ground of attack to the provisions of such enactments has been subject matter of consideration before the Apex Court and a Constitution Bench of the Honble Supreme Court recently in the case of Union of India vs. Chajju Ram (Dead) by L.Rs. and Ors. As a matter of fact, this very ground of attack to the provisions of such enactments has been subject matter of consideration before the Apex Court and a Constitution Bench of the Honble Supreme Court recently in the case of Union of India vs. Chajju Ram (Dead) by L.Rs. and Ors. ( AIR 2003 SC 2339 ) clearly held that such enactment cannot be struck down merely on this ground that the said Act does not provide for payment of any solatium and interest thereon and there is no violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India in such cases. It would be worthwhile to reproduce paras 15, 16 and 17 of the said judgment in extenso, which are as under:- ``15. Section 31 provides for compensation for acquisition of requisitioned property. The compensation ++ ayble for the acquisition of any property under Section 30 shall be the price which the requisitioned property would have fetched in the open market if it had remained in the same condition as it was at the time of requisitioning and been sold on the date of acquisition. 16. The said Act is a self contained code. It lays down the procedure as well as machinery for determining the amount of compensation. It is not in dispute that the provisions for payment of compensation under the Land Acquisition Act would not ipso facto apply to the acquisition made under the said Act. The provisions of the two acts do not also provide for the same scheme for acquisition. 17. In Hari Krishnan Khosla (supra), a Bench of 3-Judges of this Court while considering the provisions of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952 clearly held that the provisions for grant of solatium and interest under the Land Acquisition Act cannot be read into the provisions of the said Act. Having regard to the provision of Section 8(3) of the 1952 Act, this Court opined that the provisions thereof should be aimed at for giving the owner just compensation on the acquisition of his land whereas under the Land Acquisition Act, lands can be acquired in terms of the doctrine of Eminent Domain so long there exists an underlying purpose therefor and in that view of the matter the factors for determination of compensation thereunder need not be similar. The Court concluded in para 30 as under:- ``30. The Court concluded in para 30 as under:- ``30. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the classification sought to be made for determination of the amount of compensation for acquisition of the land under the said Act vis-a-vis the Land Acquisition Act is a reasonable and valid one. The said classification is founded on the intelligible differentia and had a rational relation with the object sought to be achieved by, the legislation in question. (13). On earlier occasion, a 3-Judges bench of the Honble Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Hari Krishan Khosla, (1993 Supp (2) SCC 149) while dealing with a question of constitutionality of Section 8(3)(a) of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952 on similar grounds of attack, as raised in the present case, held that the failure to provide solatium @ 15% and interest @ 6% u/S. 8(3)(a) of the Act does not make it discriminatory. The comparison of acquisition under this Act to an acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act seems to be odious in view of the dissimilarities between the two Acts. Though under the Act as well as under the Land Acquisition Act unless and until there is a public purpose, acquisition cannot be resorted to but in the case purpose, acquisition cannot be resorted to but in the case of requisition, one of the important rights in the bundle of rights emanating from ownership, namely, the right to possession and enjoyment has been deprived of, when the property was requisitioned. It is minus that right for which the compensation is provided under Section 8(2), the remaining rights come to be acquired. In contradistinction, under the Land Acquisition Act the sum total of the rights, the ownership itself comes to be acouired. Then again, under the Act, the acquisition even though it is for a public purpose is restricted to the two clauses of Section 8(3) of the Act which constitute statutory embargo. Under the Land Acquisition Act, the power of eminent domain could be exercised without any embargo so long as there is an underlying public purpose. These vital distinctions must be kept in mind while dealing with the question of violation of Article 14 and considered in this light Section 8(3)(a) is not, in any way, violative of Article 14. Under the Land Acquisition Act, the power of eminent domain could be exercised without any embargo so long as there is an underlying public purpose. These vital distinctions must be kept in mind while dealing with the question of violation of Article 14 and considered in this light Section 8(3)(a) is not, in any way, violative of Article 14. While saying so, the Court relied on an earlier decisions given in Union of India vs. Kamlabhai Harjiwandas Parekh ( AIR 1968 SC 377 ) and Salmond on Jurisprudence (1966) 12th edition, Chapter 8, PP. 246-247. Learned counsel for the respondents further relief upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Dayal Singh & Ors. vs. U.O.I., (2003) 2 SCC 593 ) and U.O.I. vs. Dhanwanti Devi & Ors. (1996) 6 SCC 44 ) as also the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Prakash Amichand Shah vs. State of Gujarat & Ors. (1986) 1 SCC 581 ) in support of their submission that the provisions of earlier Land Acquisition Act, 1894 cannot be read into the special matter relating to national highways namely under the Act of 1956 and that the provisions of the said Act of 1956 cannot be held to be ultra vires or illegal, merely because they do not provide for payment of solatium or interest thereon. (14). As against this, settled position of law impressively canvassed before us by Shri Rajendra Mehta and Shri Vikas Balia, learned counsels appearing for the National Highway Authority, the sheet anchor of learned counsel appearing for the petitioners Shri Purohit was pited in the form of a Single Bench decision of Karnataka High Court in the case of Lalita & Anr. vs. Union of India & Ors. (AIR 2003 Kant. 165), wherein the learned Single Judge dealing exactly with the question, with which we are concerned in the present set of cases namely, the validity of Section 3-J of the Act of 1956, held that the exclusion of applicability of Land Acquisition Act by Section 3-J of the said Act of 1956 results in discrimination between similarly situated land owners and therefore, Section 3-J was struck down by the learned Single Judge of Karnataka High Court. (15). (15). We do not find any reference or discussion of the aforesaid two Supreme Court decisions in the said judgment of the learned Single Judge of Karnataka High Court. It is also informed to us by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents that the appeal against such judgment is pending before Division Bench of that Court and operation of judgment of learned Single Judge is stated to have been stayed by the Division Bench in Writ Appeal in 6115-17 of 2002. The reasoning given by the learned Single Judge of Karnataka High Court in paras 16, 17 and 18 of the said judgment and with which, with great respects, we find ourselves unable to subscribe to, is reproduced hereunder:- ``16. In the instant case, the acquisition is under the Highways Act, for a public purpose. Prior to the coming into force of the Act 16 of 1997 all acquisition of land for the purpose required for the Highways was to be made under the provisions of the LA Act. But in order to avoid inordinate delay because of the lengthy process to be adopted for acquisition of the land, Act 16/1997 came into force. Both the Highways Act and LA Act are by the Union of India. If that is so, the source of authority to legislate the law in both the cases is by the Union of India. Therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court, in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh vs. G.C. Mandaawar, AIR 1954 SC 493 both the enactments are to be treated as one law. Since the acquisition under both the Acts, is for public purpose and is compulsory in nature there is no reason to exclude the application of L.A. Act insofar as it relates to payment of compensation as it results in discrimination between the land owners who are similarly situated. Further the classification if any, is not founded on any intelligible differentia and has no rational nexus with the objects to be achieved. 17. Further, in almost all enactments which provides for acquisition of land whether it is under a Central Act or State Act, normally the provisions of the LA Act are made applicable insofar as compensation is concerned. Further the classification if any, is not founded on any intelligible differentia and has no rational nexus with the objects to be achieved. 17. Further, in almost all enactments which provides for acquisition of land whether it is under a Central Act or State Act, normally the provisions of the LA Act are made applicable insofar as compensation is concerned. In the instant case, since the acquisition of land is for public purpose and it is compulsory in nature, the exclusion of the provisions of LA Act, under S. 3-J of the Highways Act, is held to be unconstitutional as the land owner is deprived of the benefit to which he is entitled to, if his land is acquired under the LA Act. Hence, I am of the considered view that S. 3-J of the Highways Act, is unconstitutional and hit by Art. 14 of the Constitution of India. Further, as the petitioner are deprived of their land against their will for a public purpose, I hold the land owners as entitled for additional market value under S. 23(1-A), solatium under S. 23(2) and interest as provided under Sec. 28 of the LA Act. 18. In the result, I pass the following order: Writ petitions are disposed of in the following terms: Section 3-J of the Highways Act as amendment by Act 16 of 1997 is declared as unconstitutional and accordingly struck down. The petitioners are entitled for additional market value under S. 23 (1-A), solatium under S. 23(2) and interest under S. 28 of the LA Act, in additional to the market value. (16). We find ourselves unable to agree to the aforesaid reasons and conclusion of learned Single Judge Karnataka High Court. (17). Learned counsel for the petitioners Shri M.D. Purohit also took us through the judgments in the cases of The State of Madhya Pradesh vs. G.C. Mandawar ( AIR 1954 SC 493 ), State of West Bengal vs. Mrs. Bella Banerjee & Ors. ( AIR 1954 SC 170 ), Nandeshwar Prasad & Ors. vs. U.P. Government & Ors. ( AIR 1964 SC 1217 ), P. Vajravelu Mudaliar vs. The Special Deputy Collector for Land Acquisition, West, Madras & Anr. ( AIR 1965 SC 1017 ), Om Prakash & Anr. vs. State of U.P. and Ors. ( AIR 1974 SC 1202 ), U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad vs. Jainulislam and Anr. vs. U.P. Government & Ors. ( AIR 1964 SC 1217 ), P. Vajravelu Mudaliar vs. The Special Deputy Collector for Land Acquisition, West, Madras & Anr. ( AIR 1965 SC 1017 ), Om Prakash & Anr. vs. State of U.P. and Ors. ( AIR 1974 SC 1202 ), U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad vs. Jainulislam and Anr. (1998) 2 SCC 467 ), Nagpur Improvement Trust vs. Vasantrao & Ors. (2002) 7 SCC 657 ), Savitri Cairae vs. U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad & Anr. (2003) 6 SCC 255 ) and Nagpur Improvement Trust & Anr. vs. Vithal Rao & Ors. ( AIR 1973 SC 689 ). The emphasis on these judgments has again been laid by the learned counsel for the petitioners in the written submissions filed on behalf of the petitioners and learned counsel has sought to distinguish the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Chajju Ram (supra). Learned counsel has also urged in those written submissions that the case law decided by the Honble Supreme Court under the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952 are distinguishable because, under that Act during the period of requisition, the land remains in the actual possession of the owner and the possession does not pass to the acquiring authority and the owner continues to enjoy the usufruct of the said land for the number of years for which the land is in symbolic possession of the acquiring/requisitioning authority and therefore, non payment of solatium and interest under that Act cannot be compared with the situation obtaining in the present case. Where the land was acquired for construction of national highways. With great respect, we are unable to accept to is submission. (18). All these judgments were dealing with the cases arising on acquisitions either made under Land Acquisition Act, 1894 or under the respective State enactments enacted by the State Legislatures, wherein the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 were either incorporated or incorporated by reference and thus, the Court held that the benefit of solatium and interest for the respective acquisitions was allowable to the land owners. In none of these cases, the situation like arising in the present case namely, that both the enactments being by the same legislative body and one excluding the applicability of another was available in in these judgments cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners and therefore, they are in our opinion, with great respect, distinguishable from the controversy arising before us and we find ourselves more convinced to follow the law laid down by the Honble Supreme Court in two cases cited above namely, Chhajju Rams case (supra) and Hari Krishan Khoslas case (supra). (19). Learned counsel for the petitioners also argued that even the term ``National Highway is not defined in the National Highways Act, 1956 and therefore, the said Act gives unguided powers to the Central Government for making acquisitions for the said purpose. We are unable to accept this submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners also. Firstly, the said term ``National Highways is not a word of art or science, which requires a very deeper or specialised knowledge of any subject to ascertain the meaning of the said term. It is a common word and in common understanding, it would mean a road link between two States or passing through more than one State, which may be constructed, maintained or developed by any agency of Central Government. The construction of national highways in our country has been a priority in national development and significant development in this area mainly in the past few years has brought susceptible changes in the national economy. Moreover, if one has a look at several allied enactments and rules concerned with the national highways, one would find that there is a conspectus of laws in this regard and National Highways Act, 1956 is not the only legislation in this respect. In fact, a perusal of the National Highways Authority of India Act, 1988 would reveal that Section 2(e) of that Act defines ``National Highway to mean any highway for the time being declared as ``National Highway under Section 2 of the National Highways Act, 1956. Section 2 of the Act of 1956 provides that each of the highways specified in the Schedule is hereby declared to be a National Highway. Section 2 of the Act of 1956 provides that each of the highways specified in the Schedule is hereby declared to be a National Highway. Sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the said Act further empowers the Central Government to declare any other highway to be a National Highway by a Notification in the Official Gazette. Thus, we are satisfied that mere absence of any specific or separate definition of National Highway in the National Highways Act, 1956, it does not support the case of the petitioners in any way. (20). The right to property is no longer a fundamental right in our Constitution. Even since deletion of Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution by 44th Amendment Act, 1978 and simultaneous shifting of right to property in the form of 300 A which says that ``no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law has made a sea change in the right of property under our Constitutional scheme. Now, if any Law is made by a competent legislature depriving a person of his property, he will no longer be entitled to question the reasonableness of the restriction imposed by such law as was available to him under articles 19(5) read with 19(1)(f) and 31(1) of the Constitution of India prior to 44th Amendment Act, 1978 and what is now required is authority of law for such property right to be taken away. Of course, in view of Article 300 A of the Constitution of India, a citizen cannot be deprived of his property by an executive fiat. There must be a law for it. The Land Acquisition law for special purpose for construction of national highways is the National Highways Act, 1956 as amended by the Act of 1997. The said Act as amended, in our opinion fulfils the constitutional obligation, as provided under Article 300 A of the Constitution of India. The said Act provides for assessment and payment of fair, adequate and reasonable compensation on account of acquisition of land for the purpose of construction of national highways. The concept of adequate compensation specially, comfort money in the form of solatium and interest thereon, as provided under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 should be deemed to have been done away with the deletion of Article 31(2) from the Constitution of India by the 44th Amendment, 1978 w.e.f. 20.6.1979. The concept of adequate compensation specially, comfort money in the form of solatium and interest thereon, as provided under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 should be deemed to have been done away with the deletion of Article 31(2) from the Constitution of India by the 44th Amendment, 1978 w.e.f. 20.6.1979. With the deletion of Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution of India from Chapter III relating to fundamental rights and omission of obligation to pay compensation which was provided under repealed Article 31(2), the question is can a law in this regard enacted by Parliament still be struck down on the anvil of Article 14 of the Constitution of India standing alone. In our opinion, though, a law tested on the anvil of Article 14 alone can also be struck down by courts if, such law is found to be arbitrary and unreasonable or without legislative competence but, in the present case, no such case has been made out that the Amendment of 1997 in the Act of 1956 can be said to be arbitrary or unreasonable in any manner and therefore, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. There is no question of discrimination as between different property owners under the Act of 1956 as the said Act treats all the owners, whose land is acquired under the said special law equally inasmuch as the said law gives equal compensation determined on equally applicable criteria of market value of land to all such owners and no such ground of alleged discrimination can be said to have been made out on the comparison with those land owners whose land was acquired under general Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as the two classes of owners would definitely be different classes and it is well settled that classification as such is not hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the Act of 1956 which provides for fair, reasonable and adequate compensation on the basis of market value of the land acquired for construction of national highways cannot be said to be unreasonable or arbitrary law in any manner. (21). There is yet another aspect of the matter, which supports our conclusion of upholding the said law. Article 31-C of the Constitution of India provides for saving of laws giving effect to the directive principles of said policy contained in Part IV of the Constitution of India. (21). There is yet another aspect of the matter, which supports our conclusion of upholding the said law. Article 31-C of the Constitution of India provides for saving of laws giving effect to the directive principles of said policy contained in Part IV of the Constitution of India. Article 31(c) says that ``notwithstanding anything contained in Article 13, no law giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing all or any of the principles laid down in Part IV shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by article 14 or article 19 and no law containing a declaration that it is for giving effect to such policy shall be called in question in any court on the ground that it does not give effect to such policy. Article 39(b) of the Constitution mandates that the State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing that the ownership and control of the ``material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good. The land of the private land owners acquired for construction of national highways falls within the expression ``material resources of the community. Undoubtedly, the construction of national highways for development of national economy gives effect to the said directive principles contained in Article 39(b) of the Constitution of India. Reliance in the connection is placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in State of Maharashtra & Anr. vs. Basanti Bai Mohanlal Khetan & Ors. (1986) 2 SCC 516 ). In view of this, Article 31(c) of the Constitution also saves this land and further supports the general presumption of constitutionality in favour of any law. The heavy burden lies upon the petitioner, who challenges the vires of such law to rebut such presumption, which in the present case, in our considered opinion, the petitioners have utterly failed to do so. (22). The heavy burden lies upon the petitioner, who challenges the vires of such law to rebut such presumption, which in the present case, in our considered opinion, the petitioners have utterly failed to do so. (22). Consequently, we are unable to persuade ourselves to grant any relief to the petitioners in the present case and we do not find any infirmity in Section 3-J or any other provisions of the National Highways Act, 1956 as amended by the Act No. 16 of 1997, which inserted a self contained code in the Act of 1956 and which passes the test of constitutionality at the anvil of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. (23). Consequently, the challenge to the vires of Section 3-J of the National Highways Act, 1956 fails and these writ petitions are dismissed with no orders as to costs. The Arbitrator, before whom the claim of petitioners for enhancement of compensation is said to be pending under the Act of 1956 is however expected to decide the claim of the petitioners expeditiously and objectively in accordance with law.