ELIPE DHARMA RAO, J. ( 1 ) THIS Civil Revision Petition is filed under section 22 of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (for short "the Act" ). The petitioner herein who is the landlord, seeks to assail the judgment, dated 20-8-2003, passed in R. C. A. No. 3 of 1999, on the file of the Court of appellate Authority under Rent Control Act (Principal Senior Civil Judge, Guntur), allowing the R. C. A. , by setting aside the order dated 18-1-1999 in R. C. C. No. 55/93 on the file of the Rent Controller-cum-Principal junior Civil Judge, Guntur, whereby the learned Rent Controller allowed the R. C. C. filed by the petitioner-landlord under section 10 (2) (i) and (iii), 10 (3) (a) (iii) (a) and (c) of the Act, and ordered eviction of the tenant from the schedule premises on the ground of personal requirement. ( 2 ) THE petitioner is the owner of the premises bearing No. 3-11-9/5, situated at main Road, Pattabhipuram, Guntur (hereinafter referred to as the petition schedule premises ). The petitioner let out the schedule premises to the respondent in 1981 for a monthly rent of Rs. 275/-, payable before the 5th of every succeeding month, and subsequently, from March 1993, the rental amount was enhanced to Rs. 425/- per month. It is the case of the petitipner that the respondent-tenant has committed default in paying the rents for the months of August, september, and October 1993 in spite of repeated demands made by the petitioner. It is further case of the petitioner that he is running Kirana Business, fancy stores, hardware, Electrical goods and paints business etc. , in the non-residential premises which is located adjacent to the petition schedule premises and since the said premises is not sufficient for his business, he is in requirement of the petition schedule premises. ( 3 ) THE respondent-tenant filed counter denying the claim of the petitioner. It is stated that he has been regular in paying the rents of the schedule premises but the petitioner- landlord did not issue receipts promptly. It is further stated that he tendered the rent of august, September and October 1993, but the petitioner refused to receive the same ana demanded to enhance the rent at rs. 600/- per month. It is stated that he has been regular in paying the rents of the schedule premises but the petitioner- landlord did not issue receipts promptly. It is further stated that he tendered the rent of august, September and October 1993, but the petitioner refused to receive the same ana demanded to enhance the rent at rs. 600/- per month. It is his further case that the petitioner also refused to receive the rents for the said three months, sent through money Order. Thereafter, the respondent had got issued a notice dated 22-11-1993 calling upon the petitionerto furnish the details of his bank account so as to enable him to deposit the rents and he also sent a cheque for Rs. 1,275/- towards rent for the said three months. It is further case of the respondent that the petitioner has three shops situated towards the North of the petition schedule premises and he owns five shops near S. V. N. Colony and 11 portions in Brodipet, Guntur. Therefore, requirement of the petition schedule premises by the petitioner is not bona fide and is only for the purpose of extracting enhanced rents. ( 4 ) IN view of the above pleadings, the trial court framed following issues: (1) Whether the respondent has committed wilful default in paying the rents? (2) Whetherthe petitioner s requirement of the petition schedule property is bona fide? (3) Whether the respondent has committed acts of waste in the petition schedule property? (4) To what relief? ( 5 ) TO substantiate the claim, the petitioner himself was examined as P. W. 1 and exs. A-1 and A-2 were marked on his behalf. On behalf of the respondent R. Ws. 1 to 3 were examined and Exs. B-1 to B-17 were marked. ( 6 ) THE Trial Court, while dealing with the issue of wilful default, held that the respondent-tenant made repeated attempts to convey the rents of the disputed period of the petitioner, but the petitioner himself had refused to receive the same and therefore, there is no wilful default committed by the respondent-tenant. B-1 to B-17 were marked. ( 6 ) THE Trial Court, while dealing with the issue of wilful default, held that the respondent-tenant made repeated attempts to convey the rents of the disputed period of the petitioner, but the petitioner himself had refused to receive the same and therefore, there is no wilful default committed by the respondent-tenant. In this regard, the trial court placed reliance on the decision of this Court in B. Lakshmi Kanthamma v. G. Narayana Setty\ wherein it was held that whether the tenant has committed wilful default in paying the rents or not can be gauged by the intention and state of mind of the tenant in failing to pay the rents in time. The Trial Court, in order to gauge the intention and state of mind of the tenant in paying the rents, had taken into consideration Ex. B-2, office copy of the notice dated 1-2-1993 addressed to the petitioner by the respondent stating that though he had tendered the rents of November and December 1992, the petitioner refused to receive the same making demand for enhancement of rent to rs. 600/-, and Ex. B-5 office copy of another notice dated 22-11-1993 addressed to the petitioner by the respondent stating that the petitioner had not been issuing the receipts promptly and when questioned about the same, the petitioner had refused to receive the rents of August, September, and October, 1993 and also considering the Ex. B-11, money order receipt which indicates that rents were sent by the respondent for the months of August, September and October 1993, held that the respondent had actually tendered the rents of the disputed period and did not neglect his obligation of tendering the rents, but the petitioner, for the reasons best known to him, refused to receive the same and as such, there is no wilful default committed by the respondent. ( 7 ) WHILE considering the issue of bona fide requirement of the petitioner, the trial court held that even though the landlord owns several properties, he can seek possession of any of them according to his need and that the tenant cannot question the same. The trial Court arrived at a conclusion that petitioner s requirement of the schedule premises is bona fide and therefore, ordered eviction of the tenant from the schedule premises within three months from the date of the order. The trial Court arrived at a conclusion that petitioner s requirement of the schedule premises is bona fide and therefore, ordered eviction of the tenant from the schedule premises within three months from the date of the order. ( 8 ) AGGRIEVED by the order of the trial Court the respondent-tenant preferred an appeal before the appellate authority under the Act, viz. , Principal Senior Civil Judge and the appellate Court set aside the order of the trial court on the ground that the way in which the petitioner refused to receive the rents tendered by the respondent-tenant and the circumstances which made the respondent- tenant in filing R. C. C. No. 58 of 1993 seeking permission to deposit the rents into the Court and the other circumstances throw doubt on the bona fide requirement of the petition schedule property by the petitioner-landlord. The appellate Court, while dealing with the aspect of bona fide requirement, placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in smt. Vidyavathi Bai and another v. Shankarlap wherein their Lordships held as follows: "it is our considered opinion that under s. 10 (3) (a) (iii), a landlord in occupation of a non-residential building is not entitled, for carrying on his business or for commencing a business to get back the possession of another non- residential building in occupation of a tenant, the Bar underthe section against securing eviction of tenant of such non- residential building is absolute; suitability, convenience and sufficiency of the non-residential building already in the occupation of the landlord for carrying on the business of the applicant (landlord) or to meet the bona fide need of any other member of the family of the applicant (landlord) or are, in our view, irrelevant considerations in the context of considering the provisions in sec. 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act, which in clear terms, interdicts the landlord, in absolute terms, from seeking recovery of the non-residential building belonging to him in the occupation of the tenant. " ( 9 ) RELIANCE was also placed on Savani transport v. Venkateswara Rao3 wherein their Lordships held as follows: "it is now well settled that forthe purpose of obtaining eviction from a non- residential premises, it must be established that the landlord must not be occupying any other non-residential premises, which is his own or to the possession of which he is entitled. " ( 10 ) THEREFORE, in view of the principles laid down in the above mentioned judgments, the appellate Court held that the petitioner- landlord is not entitled for possession of the schedule premises since, he is having number of non-residential premises in and around the petition schedule premises. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner-landlord filed the present civil revision petition. ( 11 ) HEARD the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the respondent. ( 12 ) IT is contended by the leawed counsel for the petitioner that the trial Court had erroneously negatived the point that the tenant had not committed wilful default in payment of rents and held the point against the landlord. It is his case that the respondent-tenant had not made it clear that on which date he offered rents for the months of August, september and October 1993. As per the terms and conditions, the rent of each months shall be paid on or before 5th of every succeeding month and if the tenant failed to pay before that date, 15 days grace time may be given as per statute. It is further submitted that the rent for the month of August 1993, is payable on or before 5th of September, 1993 and if 15 days grace time is added, the same shall be payable on or before 20th of september 1993, but he has not given on which date he tendered the rent of August 1993. It is further contended that the respondent had sent the rents for three months by way of Money Order on 4-11-1993 and thereafter got issued a legal notice on 22-11 -1993 requiring the petitioner to specify his bank account to enable him to deposit rents in the bank account. It is the case of the petitioner that subsequent to his filing the present eviction petition, the respondent filed R. C. C. No. 58 of 1993 seeking permission to deposit the rents in the court. It is further submitted that if the rent tendered on 4-11-1993 is accepted, it is for the month of October 1993 and therefore, the tenant has committed default for the month of August and September 1993. On that ground he is liable to be evicted. Therefore, the trial Court as well as the appellate Court have committed error in holding that he has not committed any wilful default. On that ground he is liable to be evicted. Therefore, the trial Court as well as the appellate Court have committed error in holding that he has not committed any wilful default. It is further submitted that neither in the counter nor in the legal notice the respondent has specified the date of tendering the rents for the month of August and September 1993. ( 13 ) ON the other hand, the learned counsel forthe respondent submitted that he is regular in payment of rents and the petitioner is irregular in issuing the receipts for the rents paid. In this regard, the learned counsel for the respondent relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in S. Sundaram Pilial v. V. R. Pattabiramar wherein it is held that: "a consensus of the meaning of the words wilful default appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Tamil Nadu Act or other State acts which are in pari materia. " ( 14 ) PER contra, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in the above judgment the Supreme Court has confirmed the order of eviction on the ground of wilful default. ( 15 ) THE learned counsel forthe respondent also relied on the judgment of this Court in bhagi Bai v. Swastik Roller Flour Mills, Hyd. wherein it is held that: "tenant promptly tendering the rent but the rent being refused by the landlord - no question of default or wilful default arises. " ( 16 ) IN the case on hand, no where it is mentioned that the tenant has promptly tendered the rents, on the other hand for the months of August, September and October 1993 he offered rents on 4-11 -1993, therefore the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court has no application to the facts of this case. ( 17 ) MOREOVER, if the landlord had refused to receive the rents stated to have been tendered promptly by the respondent-tenant, no steps under Section 8 (5) of the Act were taken by the respondent. Section 8 (5) of the act mandates that if the landlord refuses to receive the rent remitted by way of Money order, the tenant may deposit the rent before such authority and in such manner prescribed by the statute. Section 8 (5) of the Act reads thus: " (5) If the landlord refuses to receive the rent remitted by money order under sub-section (4), the tenant may deposit the rent before such authority and in such manner as may be prescribed and continue to deposit any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the building, before the same authority and in the same manner, and the amount deposited may, subject to such conditions as may be prescribed, be withdrawn by the person held by the controller, to be entitled to the amount on application made by such person to the Controller in that behalf. ( 18 ) THEREFORE, the respondent did not take any steps under Section 8 (5) of the Act, when there is refusal to receive rents by the petitioner. As seen from the facts and circumstances of the case, the respondent did not tender the rent for the month of august and September 1993. He sent Money order on 4-11 -1993 and thereafter got issued legal notice and filed R. C. No. 58 of 1993. But, by that time, the petitioner had filed the present eviction petition. Even if, the rents tendered on 4-11-1993 is accepted, it is for the month of October 1993. As per the terms and conditions of the lease, the tenant has to pay the rents on or before 5th of every succeeding month. However, neither in the counter nor in the legal notice it is made clear that on what date rents for the months of august and September 1993 were tendered. Therefore, it cannot be held that the respondent-tenant promptly tendered the rents, but it is the petitioner, who refused to receive the same. However, neither in the counter nor in the legal notice it is made clear that on what date rents for the months of august and September 1993 were tendered. Therefore, it cannot be held that the respondent-tenant promptly tendered the rents, but it is the petitioner, who refused to receive the same. Further, it is to be seen that no steps as contemplated under section 8 (5) of the Act, were initiated by the respondent-tenant, when the petitioner refused to receive the Money Order stated to have been sent by the respondent-tenant. ( 19 ) THEREFORE, in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, I am unable to accept the contention of the respondent- tenant. Accordingly, it is held that the respondent-tenant has committed wilful default in paying the rents. The point is answered in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent-tenant. Bona fide requirement: ( 20 ) THE learned counsel forthe respondent relied on a judgment of the Supreme Court in m. Padmanabha Setty v. K. P. Papaiah Setty wherein their Lordships dealing with Mysore house Rent and Accommodation Control act, at paras 8 and 9 held as follows: "a tenant who can be evicted under the conditions prescribed in S. 8 (2) of the act cannot be said, in our view, to be entitled to the possession of the premises of which he is a tenant. No doubt he cannot be evicted till one or more of the conditions prescribed by the section are fulfilled, but it is difficult to equate his right to stay in the premises till he is evicted to an entitlement of the possession of the premises. Section 8 (3) (a (ii) deals with two types of cases; first where the landlord is in occupation of a non-residential building which is owned by him, and secondly, a non-residential building of which he is in occupation not as a landlord but otherwise. The object of the Act is to prevent unreasonable evictions of tenants. Can it be said that the legisalture is considering it to be unreasonable for a landlord to shift to his own premises while he is in occupation of tenanted premises over which he has not an absolute right of possession but only a right to remain in possession till one of the conditions in s. 8 (2) is satisfied, and over one of which he has no control? For instance, the landlord may require the premises for repairs or reconstruction or the neighbours may complain that the tenant is guilty of nuisance or annoyance, or the landlord may think that the tenant has committed some acts of waste as are likely to impair materially the value or utility of the house. If any of these conditions is proved, he is liable to be evicted. In our view, in the context the words, "entitled to possession" have a more positive content and are more akin to the right of possession which an owner has in respect of the building owned and occupied by him. " ( 21 ) RELIANCE was also placed on gangaram v. N. Shankar Redd wherein their Lordships at para 7 held as follows: "a landlord cannot invoke S. 10 (3) (c) of the Act to seek the eviction of a tenant who is not occupying a portion of the building occupied by the landlord himself but is occupying another adjoining building belonging to the landlord. What sec. 10 (3 (c) envisages is the oneness of the building and not the oneness of ownership of two different buildings, one occupied by the landlord and the other by the tenant. The significant words used in S. 10 (3) (c) are "the landlord who is occupying only a part of building" and "any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building". Surely no one can say that two adjoining buildings bearing different door numbers, one occupied by the landlord and the other by the tenant would make them one and the same building if they are owned by one person and separate buildings if they are owned by two different persons. A practical test which can be applied to find out if two adjoining buildings form part of the same building or two different buildings would be to see whether one of the two buildings can be sold by the landlord and the purchaser inducted into possession of the premises sold without the landlord s possession and enjoyment of the premises in his occupation being affected. In such a case the fact that the two buildings are separated only by a single wall with no intervening space between them would not alter the situation in any manner because the identity of two separate buildings is not to be judged on the basis of the buildings being separated by a single wall or by two separate walls with intervening space in between them. " ( 22 ) THEREFORE, on the basis of the above findings, the leanred counsel for the respoffdent-tenant submitted that since the landlord admitted that he purchased shops adjacent to the petition schedule premises and himself along with his wife are running business and therefore, he cannot seek eviction of the tenant for bona fide requirement to use it as an additional accommodation. It is further contended that he has not mentioned in the petition that the existing building in which he is running business is not purchased by him or it was purchased by his wife, but it was brought on record that both of them have purchased the building, therefore there is suppression of fact. It is further submitted that the building in which the petitioner is running his business is adjacent to the schedule premises and therefore, as per the findings of the Supreme Court in Gangaram s case (7 supra), he cannot seek eviction. ( 23 ) ON the other hand, the learned counsel forthe petitioner submitted thatthe contention cf the counsel for the respondent is not correct as the petitioner is running his business in the premises adjacent to the suit schedule premises and these shops are in a row and in one building, therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent- tenant cannot be accepted that tne premises in which the petitioner and his wife is running business is an adjacent shop situated in existing building. On the other hand, he submitted that Gangaram s case (7 supra) supports his case. It is the case of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the judgment in Smt. Vidyavathi Baiv. Shankarlal (2 supra), relying on which the appellate court held thatthe requirement of the landlord is not bona fide, was held to be not good law by the Apex Court in K. C. Kanniyappan v. Y. Venkataramana Rao. It is the case of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the judgment in Smt. Vidyavathi Baiv. Shankarlal (2 supra), relying on which the appellate court held thatthe requirement of the landlord is not bona fide, was held to be not good law by the Apex Court in K. C. Kanniyappan v. Y. Venkataramana Rao. He placed reliance on the said judgment, wherein it is held as follows: "section 10 (3) (c) of the Act is not a bar and on the contrary is an enabling provision to the landlord seeking a direction from the Court to evict the tenant from a portion of the building which has been rented out for non- residential purpose, so as to expand the business of the landlord, which he is already carrying on in a portion of that building. What is in essence that is provided for in Sec. 10 (3) (a) (iii) is that in order to claim eviction of a tenant from any non-residential building either for the purpose of business which he is carrying on or for a business which the landlord bona fide proposes to commence, he should not have been in occupation of any non-residential building. Therefore, the non-obstante clause which is introduced in sec. 10 (3) (c) viz. , "notwithstanding anything in clause (a)", which is explicit and conveys the scheme and object in unequivocal terms that the principle laid down in Sec. 10 (3) (a) (iii) cannot be extended to the principle postulated under Sec. 10 (3) (c) of the Act. The legislature intended deliberately to make a departure and carved out an exception enabling such of the landlords who are in occupation of a part of a building for non-residential purpose, they can as well seek to have the tenant evicted for the purpose of business which the landlord is carrying on: and then again not for the purpose of the business which he proposes to commence. " ( 24 ) RELIANCE was also placed on a judgment of the Supreme Court in g. Kaushalya Devi v. Ghanshyamdas9 wherein their Lordships of Apex Court dealing with the provisions of Section 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the A. P. Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) control Act, 1960 held as follows: "section 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act provides when the landlord requires the building whether residential or non-residential for his own occupation he may apply for eviction of tenant in case it is any other non-residential building, if the landlord is not occupying a non-residential building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own or to the possession of which he is entitled whether under this Act or otherwise. The expression "to the possession of which he is entitled" would not mean possession otherwise than as an owner or in that capacity or having a superior right or under any of the grounds under the Act. Provisions of S. 8 (3) (a) (ii) of the mysore Act are quite in parimateria with the provisions of S. 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the act. Therefore, merely because the landlord is already having his business in a leased premises of which he is in possession, it cannot be said that he cannot seek eviction of the tenant. It is not disputed that other conditions of s. 10 (3) (a) (iii) are satisfied in favour of the landlord. The Act did not prohibit eviction of the tenant by the landlord if the members of the family of the landlord possessed other non-residential premises. Even though the landlord and his brothers were conducting business on partnership in leased premises yet it was no ground to contend that the requirements of land is not bona fide. " ( 25 ) IT is further contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the landlord is entitled to choose his own premises according to his suitability, size of the shop for running the business and that the tenant cannot dictate. In this regard, reliance is further placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Boorgu Jagadeshwariah and Sons v. Pushpa Trading Co. In this regard, reliance is further placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Boorgu Jagadeshwariah and Sons v. Pushpa Trading Co. wherein their Lordships of Apex Court held as follows: "aspects of quality, size and suitability of the building for the business - non- consideration of, would frustrate the purposes of the Act-Mere occupation of another building not enough-Lanlord s contention that the non-residential premises he owned did not serve the purpose of his need of setting up a textile and cloth business and that the need could only be met in seeking eviction of the tenant from the premises sought, therefore, needs examination. " ( 26 ) THE contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the suit schedule premises and shops in which he is conducting business were non-residential premises, therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that the petitioner is running his business with his wife in the shop is not acceptable. That apart, as seen from the judgment of the Supreme Court and considering the phrase entitlement of possession of the non-residential building by the landlord, and also in view of the fact that he is running his business in a tenanted premises, and also considering the provisions of the Act and the intent of the Legislature and having regard to the fact that the Supreme court time and again has held that landlord is entitled to get eviction of the tenant to improve his business, according to the size and suitability of the accommodation. Therefore, i am unable to appreciate the reasons given by the appellate authority in reversing the finding of the Rent Controller with regard to the default and bona fide requirement and dismissing the application filed by the petitioner. ( 27 ) HAVING regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the law laid down by the Apex Court, I am of the considered opinion that the tenant has committed wilful default in payment of rents for the months of August and September 1993 and the landlord has established his bona fide requirement to establish his business in the schedule premises. Therefore, the tenant is directed to vacate the demised premises within three months from the date of receipt of copy of this order and he shall also file an undertaking before the Rent controller-cum-Principal Junior Civil Judge, guntur, within one week after receipt of a copy of this order, specifying that he shall not seek any further extension of time to vacate the demised premises in question. ( 28 ) IN the result, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed. No costs.