Research › Search › Judgment

Rajasthan High Court · body

2005 DIGILAW 2888 (RAJ)

Pal Singh v. Safi Mohd.

2005-11-08

PRAKASH TATIA

body2005
Judgment Prakash Tatia, J.-Heard learned Counsel for the appellate as well as learned Counsel for the respondent. 2. The plaintiffs are aggrieved against the Judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court dated 16.04.2004 by which the first appellate Court reversed the Judgment and decree decreeing the suit of the plaintiffs by Judgment and decree dated 112.1997. 3. Brief facts of the case are that plaintiff filed the suit for specific performance of contract dated 15.01.1986 by filing suit on 14.05.1993. According to plaintiff , the defendant agreed to sell the 3 Bigha agricultural land to the plaintiffs for consideration of RS. 10,000/-per Bigha. According to plaintiffs, the plaintiffs paid Rs. 27,400/-at the time of agreement. An agreement was executed on 15.01.1986. The plaintiff submitted that as per terms and conditions of the agreement, the defendant was under obligation to obtain the NOC for sale of the property from the Government Department. It was provided in the agreement that after obtaining the permission, the vender shall give one month notice to the plaintiffs-vendees, upon which the plaintiff will pay the balance amount and will get the sale-deed registered in their favour. It is also submitted that the possession of the land was delivered to the plaintiffs at the time of execution of the sale deed. In the plaint, it is stated that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, but the defendant did not obtain the sale permission from the Revenue department. However, provision for seeking prior permission for sale of the agricultural land was withdrawn by the amendment of the Act. The plaintiffs thereafter, requested defendant to take the money and execute the sale-deed, but two days before filing of the suit, the defendant refused to execute the sale-deed. Therefore, plaintiff filed the suit for specific performance of the contract. 4. The defendant submitted written statement and stated that he never entered into any contract for sale of the land in question nor he received Rs. 27,400/-as a sale consideration. However, the defendant stated that for a consideration of Rs. 20,000/-the defendant mortgaged the land in question with the plaintiffs. It is also stated that the defendant took loan of Rs. 4,000/-from the plaintiffs and also purchased a tractor from the plaintiffs for a consideration of Rs. 60,000/-. There were dues in defendant of the plaintiffs of Rs. 20,000/-. However, the defendant stated that for a consideration of Rs. 20,000/-the defendant mortgaged the land in question with the plaintiffs. It is also stated that the defendant took loan of Rs. 4,000/-from the plaintiffs and also purchased a tractor from the plaintiffs for a consideration of Rs. 60,000/-. There were dues in defendant of the plaintiffs of Rs. 20,000/-. For this purpose, a deed was executed, but the plaintiffs instead of getting any proper deed of mortgage of the land in question, obtained thumb impression of the defendant on the stamp paper and now that stamp paper sought to be being used by the plaintiff . The trial Court after rejecting the plea of bar of limitation raised by the defendant, decreed the suit of the plaintiff for specific performance of contract. The appellate Court after considering the evidence and the facts of the case held that the suit of the plaintiff is barred by limitation in view of the fact that alleged agreement is dated 15.01.1986 and the suit has been filed on 14.05.1993 after 7 years and 4 months. The plaintiffs pleaded that suit is within the period of limitation from the date of refusal by the defendant, but in evidence nothing has been said when the defendant denied to comply with the terms and conditions of the agreement. The first appellate Court also found the agreement suspicious. 5. According to learned Counsel for the appellant, the first appellate Court committed serious error of law and fact. It is submitted that no time period was fixed in the agreement and, therefore, limitation starts only from the date of refusal by the defendant. It is also submitted that in the year 1991 only the requirement of obtaining the prior permission before sale of the agricultural land was withdrawn by the Government by amendment in the Act. Thereafter, plaintiffs tried to persuade the defendant to execute the sale deed, but they did not execute the sale-deed. Therefore, in view of the specific condition in the agreement that the defendant shall obtain the sale permission and will serve a notice, therefore, unless that obligation is discharged by the defendant, the plaintiffs could not have sought the specific performance of the contract. It is also submitted that the execution of the agreement has been proved rather is not in dispute. It is also submitted that the execution of the agreement has been proved rather is not in dispute. In view of the above, the Courts below should have decreed the suit of the plaintiffs. 6. I considered the submissions of learned Counsel for the appellant and perused the reasons given by the first appellate Court as well as the reasons given by the trial Court. It is clear that the alleged agreement was executed on 15.01.1986. So far as the defence of the defendant is concerned, his case is that there was money transaction relating to the loan and sale of the property. This fact has been admitted by PW. 1 Ajayb Singh. In the background of these facts, if we look into the conduct of the plaintiffs, it is clear that agreement was executed on 15.01.1986 and the suit was filed on 14.05.1993. There is hardly any explanation for filing the suit at such belated time. So far as the plea that there was a condition in the agreement for obtaining the permission by the defendant and serving the notice upon the plaintiffs is concerned, that condition also could have been enforced by the plaintiff within reasonable period by filing the suit and the plaintiffs cannot take shelter of this condition for their inaction for such a long period. The plea that in the year 1991, the condition of prior approval for sale of the land was removed, is absolutely irrelevant because that fortuitous circumstance could not have been conceived by the plaintiff that plaintiff will get the title of the property after law will be amended. There was no bar against the plaintiffs for filing the suit for specific performance of the contract even during the period when the condition for obtaining the prior approval of the Government Department for sale of the land was there. 7. In view of the above, the first appellate Court was right in holding that the plaintiffs failed to prove about their readiness and willingness to perform their part of contract and also right in holding that the suit is barred by time. I do not find any substantial questions of law are involved in this appeal. 8. Hence, the appeal of the appellant is dismissed.