VIKRAM NATH, J. ( 1 ) THIS writ petition has been filed by the tenant for quashing the judgment and order dated 24. 1. 1996 and 28. 1. 1995 (Annexures-5 and 4 to the writ petition) passed by the Revisional Court in Revision Nos. 6 of 1993 and 14 of 1989. ( 2 ) IN respect of the premises in dispute, the respondents No. 3 and 4 filed a suit for recovery of arrears of rent and ejectemnt of the petitioner, which was registered as JSCC suit No. 1 of 1989. When despite service of notice the defendant-petitioner did not appear in the suit, the Trial Court proceeded ex parte and vide judgment dated 4. 5. 1989 decreed the suit for the reliefs claimed. Thereafter, an application under Order IX, Rule 13, C. P. C. for setting aside the ex parte decree was filed by the petitioner with the allegations that he had no knowledge of the proceedings. No notices or summons were served upon him and it was only on 30/6/1989 that he acquired knowledge of the ex parte decree. Thereupon, he applied for inspection of the record and filed an application for recalling the order on 3/7/1989 alongwith affidavit. The petitioner also filed an application for furnishing security/ deposit of the decreetal amount as contemplated under the proviso to Section 17 of the provincial Small Causes Courts Act, 1887, (hereinafter referred to as the 1887 Act ). Respondents No. 3 and 4 filed objections to recall application alleging that the petitioner had knowledge of the proceedings he deliberately did not appear, there is non-compliance of the proviso to Section 17 of the 1887 Act, therefore, the application for setting aside the ex parte decree was liable to be rejected. ( 3 ) IT would be relevant to mention here that the defendant-petitioner also filed a revision on merit under Section 25 of the 1887 act against the ex parte decree dated 4. 5. 1989, which was registered as JSCC Revision No. 14 of 1989. ( 4 ) THE Trial Court after considering the application under the proviso to Section 17 of the 1887 Act, allowed the same vide order dated 12/9/1989 and granted 10 days time for funishing the security. Pursuant to the said order, the petitioner submitted the tender on 22/9/1989 and deposited Rs. 4,000. 00. The trial Court vide order dated 8. 1. Pursuant to the said order, the petitioner submitted the tender on 22/9/1989 and deposited Rs. 4,000. 00. The trial Court vide order dated 8. 1. 1993, held the deposit made by the petitioner to be sufficient compliance of the proviso under Section 17 of the 1987 Act and further holding that the defendant had no knowledge prior to 30. 6. 1989 and that there was no sufficient service, dismissed the objection of the landlord and allowed the application (paper No. 4-C) for setting aside the ex parte decree and restored the suit to its original number. Against the order dated 8. 1. 1993, the landlord filed revision No. 6 of 1993 under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act. ( 5 ) THE Revisional Court firstly, by its judgment dated 28. 1. 1995 dismissed the Revision no. 14 of 1989 filed by the tenant-petitioner on the ground of limitation, being barred by time, further, the Revisional Court vide judgment dated 24. 1. 1996 allowed the Revision no. 6 of 1993 filed by the landlord-respondents No. 3 and 4 holding that sufficient compliance of proviso to Section 17 of the 1887 act had not been made and accordingly rejected the application (paper No. 4-C) of the petitioner for setting aside the ex parte decree. The effect was that the ex parte decree dated 4. 5. 1989 become operative under law. ( 6 ) AGGRIEVED by the aforesaid two orders passed in the two revisions the tenant-petitioner has filed the present writ petition. ( 7 ) I have heard Sri A. K. Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Swapnil kumar, learned Counsel for the respondents no. 3 and 4. ( 8 ) THAT with regard to the Revision No. 14 of 1989 decided vide judgment dated 28. 1. 1995 it has been contended by the parties that in view of the fact that the Trial Court has allowed the restoration application and restored the suit to its original number, the said revision had become infructuous and ought to have been dismissed as infructutous. It appears that neither of the parties at the time of the hearing of the said revision pointed out that the ex parte decree had already been set aside by the Trial Court on 8. 1. 1993 and the revision ought to have been dismissed as not pressed or as infructuous. It appears that neither of the parties at the time of the hearing of the said revision pointed out that the ex parte decree had already been set aside by the Trial Court on 8. 1. 1993 and the revision ought to have been dismissed as not pressed or as infructuous. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has tried to assail the judgment dated 28. 1. 1995 also on the ground that the revisional Court having come to the conclusion that the delay was not liable to be condoned ought to have dismissed the revision as time barred only and there was no justification in further observing on merits and dismissing the revision on merits also. Be that as it may, the learned Counsel for the petitioner is not pressing the writ petition as against the judgment dated 28. 1. 1995 inasmuch as the said revision was liable to be dismissed as infructutous. ( 9 ) COMING to the judgment dated 24. 1. 1996 passed in Revision No. 6 of 1993, filed by the landlord, the Counsel for the petitioner has contended, firstly, that the revision aganist the order restoring the suit after setting aside the ex parte decree was not maintainable. Secondly, that sufficient compliance was made with regard to the proviso to Section 17 of the 1887 Act and the finding of the revisional Court on this question was contrary to law and facts. ( 10 ) LEARNED Counsel for the respondent has strongly contended that sufficient compliance with regard to the proviso to Section 17 of 1887 Act had not been made and that the tenant had failed to deposit the entire decreetal amount. The Revisional Court has rightly held that there is non-compliance of the proviso of section 17 of the 1887 Act. ( 11 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner has urged that no revision is maintainable against the order setting aside ex parte decree, as it does not amount to case decided. In support of this proposition he has relied upon the following two decisions:1. State of U. P. v. III Additional district Judge, Azamgarh and others. 2. Ambika Chaudhary and others v. The District Judge, Ballia and others. ( 12 ) BOTH these judgments deal with Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In support of this proposition he has relied upon the following two decisions:1. State of U. P. v. III Additional district Judge, Azamgarh and others. 2. Ambika Chaudhary and others v. The District Judge, Ballia and others. ( 12 ) BOTH these judgments deal with Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the present case, the proceedings are under the Provincial Small Causes Courts 1887 Act and the revision has been filed under Section 25 of the 1887 Act. The powers conferred under Section 25 of 1887 Act are wider that the powers of Revisional Court under Section 115, C. P. C. Even otherwise the words used in section 25 of 1887 Act applicable in U. P. are "decree or order made in any case decided". In the present case by the order dated 8. 1. 1993 the Judge, Small Causes had allowed the application "4-C" by setting aside the ex parte decree. The consideration of this application is in the form of misc. proceedings before the judge, Small Causes. Decision of such an application on either ways would amount to a case decided. ( 13 ) THE Section 17 of 1887 Act also provides that there has to be necessarily a compliance of certain conditions. The application for restoration would be not maintainable in the absence of any compliance of the proviso to section 17 of the 1887 Act. The order of the trial Court setting aside the ex parte decree would be without fulfilment of mandatory conditions and, therefore, would result into an order without jurisdiction. ( 14 ) THE fulfilment of the condition laid down under proviso to Section 17 of the 1887 act is mandatory and has been so held in various judgments of this Court and the Apex court. The latest one being Kedarnath v. Mohan Lal Kesarwari and others. Therefore, the revision would be maintainable and as such this question goes against the petitioner and cannot be sustained. The same view has been taken in the case of Ram Lal v. Ganesh Lal wherein it has been held that revision would be maintainable under Section 25 of the 1887 act against an order of Small Causes Court setting aside an ex parte decree. The same view has been taken in the case of Ram Lal v. Ganesh Lal wherein it has been held that revision would be maintainable under Section 25 of the 1887 act against an order of Small Causes Court setting aside an ex parte decree. ( 15 ) THE next question urged by the petitioner is that there is sufficient compliance of the proviso to Section 17 of 1887 Act as the petitioner has admittedly deposited Rs. 4,000 on 22. 9. 1989. The decree is admitted to be of Rs. 3,400/- along with damages for pendente lite and future use at the rate of Rs. 80/- per month. There is no decree either for the costs of the suit or awarding any interest. The respondent has given statement in paragraph 4 of the supplementary counter-affidavit that the total amount due was Rs. 5,574/ -. The respondent has included Rs. 633/- as costs and further Rs. 960/- as interest on the rent claimed and Rs. 100/- as interest on damages. This cannot be permitted as proviso to section 17 of the 1887 Act only provides the decretal amount to be deposited. If these figures are exclude the decretal amount as on 30/6/1989 would be Rs. 3,880. 00 which includes Rs. 3,400. 00 as arrears of rent, and rs. 480/- as damages for 6 months from January 1989 till June 1989 i. e. , from the date of the pendency of the suit till the filing of the application in July 1989. In the supplementary rejoinder affidavit the petitioner has stated that only amount due would be Rs. 3,400. 00 as appears of rent and Rs. 480/- as damages for use of occupation from January to June 1989. The amount deposited appears to be the correct amount. It was sufficient amount as per the decree. ( 16 ) IT has been contended by the respondent that petitioner made the deposit on 22. 9. 1989 and therefore, the application for setting aside the ex parte decree having been filed on 3,7. 1989, the same could not be entertained. The compliance for deposit ought to have been made prior to filing of the application under Order IX, Rule 13, C. P. C. Even the Revisional Court has proceeded oh the same lines. 9. 1989 and therefore, the application for setting aside the ex parte decree having been filed on 3,7. 1989, the same could not be entertained. The compliance for deposit ought to have been made prior to filing of the application under Order IX, Rule 13, C. P. C. Even the Revisional Court has proceeded oh the same lines. ( 17 ) ON the other hand it is contended by learned Counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner had filed the application for compliance under Section 17 of 1887 Act, on 3. 7. 1989 along with application under Order ix, Rule 13, C. P. C. for depositing the amount or furnishing security as the Court may direct. This fact is stated in paragraph 4 of the petition and the factum of filing of the application is not disputed in the counter-affidavit. What has been said in the counter-affidavit is that deposit had not been made. The Court passed orders on 12. 9. 1989 on the said application directing the petitioner to make the deposit within 10 days. This direction was complied with and on 22. 9. 1989 the petitioner made the deposit of Rs. 4,000/ -. ( 18 ) THE requirement under law is that the applicant seeking order for setting aside ex parte decree on a previous application made should have deposited or furnished security as the Court may direct. In the present case the application for compliance was filed along with the application for setting aside the ex parte decree. The Court vide order dated 12. 9. 1989 directed for making deposit within 10 days, which was complied with, therefore, the requirement was fulfilled. It was only thereafter that ex parte order was recalled on 8. 1. 1993. ( 19 ) IN the case of Kedar Nath (supra), the supreme Court has already explained how the provisions for compliance of the proviso to section 17 of the 1887 Act are to be made. It is clearly held by the Supreme Court that the requirement is of filing an application for compliance before filing the application for setting aside the ex parte decree or for review. It is clearly held by the Supreme Court that the requirement is of filing an application for compliance before filing the application for setting aside the ex parte decree or for review. The relevant extract from the said judgment is quoted below:"the proviso as to deposit can be dispensed with by the Court in its discretion subject to a previous application by the applicant seeking direction of the court for leave to furnish security and the nature thereof. The proviso does not provide for the extent of time by which such application for dispensation may be filed. We think that it may be filed at any time up to the time of presentation of application for setting aside ex parte decree or for review and the Court may treat it as a previous application. The obligation of the applicant is to move a previous application for dispensation. It is then for the Court to make a prompt order. The delay on the part of the Court in passing an appropriate order would not be held against the applicant because none can be made to suffer for the fault of the Court. " ( 20 ) UNDER these circumstances, the application of the petitioner for setting aside the ex parte decree was maintainable and the petititoner had complied with the condition provided under the proviso to Section 17 of the 1887 Act. The application for setting aside the ex parte decree has been rightly allowed by the Trial Court. The Revisional Court erred in holding that compliance had been made as required under the proviso to Section 17 of the 1887 Act. The Revisional Court also erred in rejecting the application for setting aside the ex parte decree. The impugned order cannot be sustained. ( 21 ) THE petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order/dated 24/1/1996 is set aside. The order of the Judge, Small Causes court dated 8/1/1993 is affirmed. The suit may be decided on merits expedtiously within a period of 6 months from the date of production of certified copy of this judgment. Petition allowed. .