P. S. NARAYANA, J. ( 1 ) THIS second appeal was admitted on 29. 3. 1997 to consider the following substantial question of law, which is referred to as hereunder:"are not the Courts below in error in dismissing the plaintiffs suit, when it is an admitted fact that in pursuance of the 231 2005 (3) ALD June 1st allotment letter issued by the State government, the plaintiff had deposited the earnest money". ( 2 ) HEARD Sri S. Surya Prakasa Rao, learned Counsel representing the appellant- plaintiff and also the learned Standing counsel representing Machilipatnam municipality. ( 3 ) THE second appeal is preferred by the unsuccessful plaintiff in both the Courts below in getting the relief of Specific performance. The appellant-plaintiff filed the suit in OS No. 185 of 1986 on the file of the Principal District Munsif, Machilipatnam for the relief of Specific Performance of agreement of hire purchase system of the schedule house quarters by executing an agreement as per the terms of G. O. (P. S.) No. 2017 LA, Wealth and Local administration Department, dated 3. 9. 1958, by the 1st defendant-1 st respondent, machilipatnam Municipality, for allotment of house quarters as per G. O. Ms. No. 4, housing Municipal Administration and urban Development, dated 17. 1. 1977 and to deliver vacant possession of the schedule house quarters and also prayed for the execution of agreement and delivery of vacant possession after removing the 2nd defendant-2nd respondent herein from the quarters or in the alternative for granting a decree for a sum of Rs. 11,000/- against the respondents-defendants along with subsequent interest @ 12% p. a. In the Court of first instance, P. W. I and D. W. I were examined and Exs. A1 to A15 and Exs. Bl to B40 were marked. On appreciation of the evidence available on record, the Court of first instance dismissed the suit without costs, giving opportunity to the plaintiff to take back 20% of the deposit from the 1st defendant (1st respondent ). A1 to A15 and Exs. Bl to B40 were marked. On appreciation of the evidence available on record, the Court of first instance dismissed the suit without costs, giving opportunity to the plaintiff to take back 20% of the deposit from the 1st defendant (1st respondent ). Aggrieved by the same, the unsuccessful plaintiff carried the matter by way of appeal in A. S. No. 174 of 1989 on the file of the learned 1st additional District and Sessions Judge, krishna, Machilipatnam and the Court below partly allowed the appeal directing the 1st respondent to repay the amount deposited by the plaintiff along with interest @ 12% p. a. from the date of deposit till the date of payment. With the said modification, the judgment and decree of the Court of first instance had been confirmed. Aggrieved by the same, the present second appeal had been preferred and the substantial question of law referred to supra had been framed by this Court. ( 4 ) LEARNED Counsel on record made several submissions inclusive of certain submissions relating to the concluded contract and the right to enforce the agreement. The parties are referred to hereinafter as arrayed in the Original Suit for the purpose of convenience. The plaintiff pleaded in the plaint as hereunder: the plaintiff is working as Health Inspector in Medical and Health Department, machilipatnam. The defendant municipality constructed houses at Noble Road Margin, venugopalapuram, Machilipatnam for allotment be deserving candidates as per the G. O. Ms. No. 2017 L. A. dated 3. 9. 1986 framing the rules to regulate the allotment of houses on hire purchase system by the local bodies in Andhra Pradesh. The defendant municipality issued notification calling for the applications who are desirous of allotment of houses as per G. O. Ms. , No. 2017 L. A. , and who are eligible to apply for allotment of the houses and publication was made by the municipality in Andhra Patrika daily dated 10. 8. 1975. The plaintiff is son of an Ex-military person and he is working as Healdi Inspector and applied for Low Income Group house after complying with the procedure as per the rules framed under the above said government order. The defendant municipality issued proceedings as per r. O. C. Noa. 1901/75 dated 1. 2. 8. 1975. The plaintiff is son of an Ex-military person and he is working as Healdi Inspector and applied for Low Income Group house after complying with the procedure as per the rules framed under the above said government order. The defendant municipality issued proceedings as per r. O. C. Noa. 1901/75 dated 1. 2. 1977 to the plaintiff allotting quarters bearing d. No. 23/191 at Noble Road Margin, venugopalapuram, Machilipatnam, and it was also directed that he should remit rs. 1,957. 44 p. s. , towards 20% of the price of the building and pay monthly or yearly installments, within one month after receipt of the notice. The plaintiff received notice on 6. 2. 1977 and he has duly deposited an amount of Rs. 1,957. 44 p. s. , on 23. 2. 1977 through Demand Draft No. 522448 on andhra Bank Limited, awaiting the possession of the quarters as per the allotment orders. The plaintiff submits that the defendants allotted the said quarters bearing D. No. 23/191 which is more particularly described in the schedule appended herewith and to 9 other applicants as per GOMs. No. 4, Housing dated 17. 1. 1977, under Rule 6 of G. O. Ms. No. 2017 LA. dated 3. 9. 1958, the allotment of the house made by the Government shall be final and irrevocable. The plaintiff submits that some of the occupants of the quarters filed some representations to the government and on account of representation the Government stayed further proceeding by the Municipality. Therefore the defendant was representing that they are received orders from the government and the possession of the quarter will be given after receipt of the orders. The plaintiff sent several representations to the Municipality and as well as to the Government and also sent a notice through advocate on 23. 1. 1979, and subsequently, requesting to deliver possession of the quarter and he was ready and willing to pay the installments as per the terms and conditions agreed upon. The plaintiff submits that to his surprise a notice under R. C. No. 9018/75-g-l dated 16. 3. 1981 which was received on 8. 4. 1981 staling that in view of the policy decision of the Government to allot houses to the occupants, the defendants proposed to cancel the allotment of the house as per g. O. Ms. No. 4 Housing dated 17. 1. 3. 1981 which was received on 8. 4. 1981 staling that in view of the policy decision of the Government to allot houses to the occupants, the defendants proposed to cancel the allotment of the house as per g. O. Ms. No. 4 Housing dated 17. 1. 1977 and calling for the explanation to the said notice as a show-cause notice for cancellation of the allotment within seven days thereupon. The plaintiff submitted his explanation to the said show-cause notice on 11. 4. 1981 itself and also filed the Writ petition No. 2431/81 questioning the orders of the Government and also the defendant municipality for giving show cause notice to cancel the allotment of the house to the plaintiff and for other reliefs. The said writ petition was dismissed on 14. 4. 1981. Thereupon the plaintiff filed Writ Appeal no. 965 of 1983 against the orders of the writ petition and the writ appeal was disposed off on 16. 4. 1986 with a direction that the plaintiff can file a suit for specific performance of the allotment orders etc. , in a Civil Court before 25. 4. 1986. The plaintiff submits that there is a concluded contract between the plaintiff and D1 for allotment of the quarters of hire purchase system. So far as the plaintiff is concerned, he has fulfilled all his obligations under the agreement and he is always ready to fulfill the necessary obligations of payment of installments as per G. O (P. S.) No. 2017 LA, dated 3. 9. 1958. But the 1st defendant has not fulfilled the obligations under the rules framed under G. O. , and defendant municipality is always at default And the plaintiff is entitled to claim specific performance of the hire purchase agreement for the allotment of the quarters. The plaintiff submits that the 2nd defendant is an occupant in the schedule house quarters paying rents to the municipality. He never made any representation to the Government or municipality for the allotment of the said quarters to him and he is not the applicant complying with the instructions given by the defendant municipality published in Andhra Patrika Daily. The plaintiff submits that the 2nd defendant is an occupant in the schedule house quarters paying rents to the municipality. He never made any representation to the Government or municipality for the allotment of the said quarters to him and he is not the applicant complying with the instructions given by the defendant municipality published in Andhra Patrika Daily. It is unfortunate that the 1st defendant treating this case for allotment of the premises, on par, with the other applicants who made the representations to the Government The plaintiff submits that the alleged instructions issued by the Government changing its policy for allotment of the houses to the occupants is illegal, void and contrary to the rules framed under the G. O. (P. S.) no. 2017 LA. Moreover, the said memo of instructions cannot deprive an innocent purchaser the plaintiff who has already fulfilled his obligations under the hire purchase agreement. The plaintiff submits that he is ready and willing to obtain a written agreement from the 1st defendant as per the rules framed under G. O. Ms. No. 2017 LA. He also submits that he is prepared to pay the balance of consideration and obtain sale deed at his expenses and the 1st defendant has to give benefit or deduct the rents received from the 2nd defendant by way of rents. The plaintiff having paid the 20% of the sale price was not given possession of the house and therefore, he is putting up in a rent premises. He is loosing interest on the investment and he is paying rents for his accommodation in rented premises. The plaintiff submits that no final orders have passed for cancellation of the allotment. G. O. (P. S.) 2017 LA. was not amended by any Government order. The plaintiff diligently and bonafidely pursuing his remedies before Andhra Pradesh High court with the impression that the High court will grant the relief. The A. P. High court gave directions to file the suit in the civil Court for specific performance of the agreement. The 1st defendant never informed about the cancellation of the allotment of the schedule quarters. The plaintiff diligently and bonafidely pursuing his remedies before Andhra Pradesh High court with the impression that the High court will grant the relief. The A. P. High court gave directions to file the suit in the civil Court for specific performance of the agreement. The 1st defendant never informed about the cancellation of the allotment of the schedule quarters. And under the circumstances the plaintiff filled the suit within the prescribed period of time and there is no delay caused in filing the suit and the plaintiff submits that the 2nd defendant is in physical possession of the schedule quarter and he is proper and necessary party to the suit. The plaintiff submits that the 3rd defendant being government who passed G. O. Ms. No. 2017 LA. , dated 17. 1. 1977 is a proper party to the suit but no relief is claimed against the 3rd defendant. For the above reasons the plaintiff prays to pass a decree against the defendants as prayed above. ( 5 ) THE said allegations were denied and the 1st defendant filed written statement, which is as follows: the suit is not maintainable for want of notice under Section 369 of the A. P. Municipalities ACL It was further pleaded that the dispute arises out of the action of the Municipal Council in pursuance of the directions of the Government from time to time. Hence the dispute attracted the provisions of Section 369 of the A. P. Municipalities Act. The plaintiff questioned the power of the authorities of the government and also the validity of government orders. The relief sought for is consequential to be the cancellation or declaration of the Government orders illegal, null and void as alleged in the plaint. Therefore, the Government should be a party to the suit and the suit is bad for non-joinder of parties since the Government is not party against whom the Court cannot pass a decree, the suit is not maintainable. D1 submits that the Municipal Council resolved to cancel the allotment of suit premises in favour of the plaintiff by resolution No. 572 dated 18. 12. 1979, which operates as public notice and therefore section 14 of the Limitation Act is not attracted. D1 submits that the Municipal Council resolved to cancel the allotment of suit premises in favour of the plaintiff by resolution No. 572 dated 18. 12. 1979, which operates as public notice and therefore section 14 of the Limitation Act is not attracted. This suit is not the form to question the Government orders passed by the Government And the notice got issued by the plaintiff through his advocate is not the suit notice as contemplated under section 369 of the A. P. Municipalities Act it is not a fact that there is a concluded contract between the plaintiff that the 1st defendant, as the plaintiff failed to execute an agreement as directed in this office r. C. NO. A1 9018/75 dated 1. 2. 1977 and also failed to execute any agreement and to pay the monthly installment or yearly installment. The plaintiff was also informed in this office endorsement r. C. NO. A1. 9018/75 dated 21. 7. 1977 that the amount paid by him through demand draft was kept in deposit and it was not treated as 20% of the cost price of L. I. C. H. house in view of order of the Government dated 15. 2. 1977. He was further informed that the rules do not permit for payment of interest on the said deposit The said endorsement was acknowledged by the plaintiff on 26. 9. 1977. And the plaintiff is not entitled to claim any damages or specific performance under hire purchase system, as there is no concluded contract The 2nd defendant has completed two years of occupancy by 25. 9. 1977. As per policy decision of the Government he is qualified and entitled for the allotment of the same on or after 25. 9. 1977. The Government have considered his application and the allotment made to the plaintiff in g. O. Ms. No. 4 Housing dated 17. 1. 1977 was canceeed in Government Memo No. 825/ d3/77-27, Housing dated 3. 1. 1981. The entire contention of the plaintiff is based on incorrect stand taken by him that the rule 6 of the Rules issued in G. O. Ps. No. 2017 LA. , dated 3. 9. 1958 pre-concludes the Government itself from reviewing its original orders. This is not correct. The contents of Rule 6 kys down the relationship between Local Body and Government. No. 2017 LA. , dated 3. 9. 1958 pre-concludes the Government itself from reviewing its original orders. This is not correct. The contents of Rule 6 kys down the relationship between Local Body and Government. The local body being the statutory body to implement the decisions of the Government which has got the ownership power, control and authority over this defendant and also the plaintiff, it is the Government, who have got ultimate authority which has to allot the houses (as approved by the government) and this defendant is to collect money, enter into the agreement and deliver the possession of the house. The government is always at liberty to revise its administrative decision and also the decision taken by the Municipality, if necessary and as per Rules 22 and 23 of the said Government orders. In this case the Government themselves have rescinded their orders issued in G. O. Ms. No. 4, housing dated 17. 1. 1977. Always the government are at liberty to revise the orders which are not consistent with the policy decision of the Government taken prior to the said orders and there is no cause of action as against this defendant and the cause of action in Paragraph 12 of the plaint do not give any cause of action for the suit. Therefore prays to dismiss the suit with costs. ( 6 ) THE brief facts of the additional written statement filed on 31. 10. 1988 by the 1st defendant, after amending the plaint are as follows:the plaintiff wantonly suppressed the memo of the Government in their Memo no. 825/d3/x77-27 Hg. Dated 3. 1. 1981. The said G. O. , is in accordance with the rules framed under G. O. Ms. No. 2017 dated 3. 9. 1958. The plaintiff did not comply with the rules of the said G. O. the action taken by the Government is in accordance with the Rules 22 and 23 of the G. O. No. 2017 dated 3. 9. 1958. Hence, the plaintiff cannot have relief as against defendant, which is under control and authority of the 3rd defendant. The memo dated 3. 1. 1981 is not cancelled in Writ petition No. 2431/81 or Writ Appeal no. 965/83. 9. 1958. Hence, the plaintiff cannot have relief as against defendant, which is under control and authority of the 3rd defendant. The memo dated 3. 1. 1981 is not cancelled in Writ petition No. 2431/81 or Writ Appeal no. 965/83. What all the relief i. e. , obtained in this writ petition proceedings is that the plaintiff is given option to go to civil Court for specific performance of the order of the Government in G. O. Ms. No. 4/17-1/77 subject to the condition that it would be open to the Civil Court to adjudicate all questions including the question of limitation and other questions relevant under the specific relief Act. As such, the Memo No. 825/d3/77-27 dated 3. 1. 1981 stands unquestioned and is binding on the plaintiff. In order to avoid the adjudication on the question of vires of the Government in passing the said memo in the Civil Court, the plaintiff cunningly and evasively averred the allegations in amended Para 11 (a ). The plaintiff has no right of specific performance of the g. O. No. 4 dated 17. 1. 1977 which was cancelled by Government Memo dated 3. 1. 1981 referred to above. The suit is not maintainable for want of Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure notice. The suit is barred by limitation in any view of the matter consequent on the addition of the Government as party of the suit. Therefore, prays to dismiss the suit with costs. ( 7 ) THE 2nd defendant filed a written statement pleading as hereunder: the plaintiff has no privileged right in demanding specific performance of contract. In fact, there is no agreement in between the plaintiff and the 1st defendant. Even if such agreement is presumed (without conceding there is an agreement) the suit is barred by limitation. It is the finding of the Hon ble High Court in the judgment dated 16. 7. 1983 in Writ Petition No. 2431/ 81 which is not been set aside in Writ appeal No. 965/83 which was disposed off by judgment dated 16. 4. 1986, hence the suit is not in time. The plaintiff has cunningly and intentionally suppressed the said fact and judgment of the High Court. The allotment is always subject to the final decision of the Government and as such there is no concluded contract as alleged by the plaintiff. 4. 1986, hence the suit is not in time. The plaintiff has cunningly and intentionally suppressed the said fact and judgment of the High Court. The allotment is always subject to the final decision of the Government and as such there is no concluded contract as alleged by the plaintiff. The plaintiff did not at all comply with the formalities required by the various Government orders. The final authority is confirming the allotment lies with the Government The Government has rightly taken the decision and has rightly cancelled the allotment by its Memo no. 825/d3/77-27 H. G. dated 3. 1. 1981. The said memo was not questioned by plaintiff either in this writ petition or in his writ appeal. On the other hand the said writ proceedings are contemplated to have quashing the show-cause notice dated 16. 1. 1981 issued in pursuance of the government Memo dated 3. 1. 1981. It does not confer any right in favour of the plaintiff to have specific performance of the alleged agreement of hire purchase. It is also submitted that the Municipal council passed a resolution canceling the allotment of the tenement in pursuance of the orders and instructions. It is an act of municipal body situated under the A. P. Municipalities Act. As such, it cannot be questioned in this suit. If at all the said action has to be questioned, only after issuing a suit notice under Section 369 of the A. P. Municipalities Act, 6/65. There is no such prior suit notice, hence the suit is not maintainable for want of suit notice under the above said provision of Law and in the absence of such notice the suit is liable to be dismissed in limini. This defendant submits that the plaintiff is not entided to profits or damages to the extent of the rents realized by the 1st defendant, as there is no transfer or ownership in the premises. The ownership always lies with the 1st defendant municipality and the prerogative of the Government continues and the Municipal Authority is subject to the control and supervision of the government having a suzerain powers in these matters. Hence too, the suit is not maintainable for recovery of rents or profits and is to be dismissed. This defendant submits that the plaintiff wants to take aid of Section 14 of the Limitation Act of 1963 in the plaint Para 10. Hence too, the suit is not maintainable for recovery of rents or profits and is to be dismissed. This defendant submits that the plaintiff wants to take aid of Section 14 of the Limitation Act of 1963 in the plaint Para 10. The plaintiffs action is diligently and bonafidely pursuing his remedies before the High Court with the impression that the High Court will grant relief are not in furtherance of the relief now sought for. The directions of the A. P. High Court in writ proceedings are misconstrued by the plaintiff. The a. P. High Court directed to file the suit before 25. 4. 1986 and also directed that it is open to Civil Court to all the questions including the question of limitation and other questions relevant under the Specific relief Act. Hence, this Court has to decide all questions including the bar of limitation. It is also submitted the Municipal council resolved canceling of allotment of suit premises in favour of the plaintiff by resolution No. 572 dated 18. 12. 1979 which operates as public notice and therefore to section 14 of the Limitation Act is not entitlded. There is absolutely no cause of action as against these defendants and the alleged cause of action are not tenable. This defendant submits that the suit is frivolous and bona fide and intended to cause hardship and loss to this defendant therefore this defendant is entided to exemplary costs and compensatory costs of Rs. 3,000/- under Section 35 (A) of the code of Civil Procedure besides the suit costs and therefore prays to dismiss the suit with compensatory costs of Rs. 3,000/- under Section 35 of CPC besides the costs of the suit. ( 8 ) THE brief facts of the Additional written statement filed by the 2nd defendant are as hereunder: the plaintiff wantonly suppressed the memo of the Government in their Memo No. 825/d3/77-27 HG. , dated 3. 1. 1981. This memo is not cancelled in Writ Petition no. 2431/81 or Writ Appeal No. 965/83. What all the relief that is obtained in this writ proceedings is that the plaintiff is given option to go to Civil Court for specific performance of the order or Government in G. O. Ms. No. 4 by 17. 1. , dated 3. 1. 1981. This memo is not cancelled in Writ Petition no. 2431/81 or Writ Appeal No. 965/83. What all the relief that is obtained in this writ proceedings is that the plaintiff is given option to go to Civil Court for specific performance of the order or Government in G. O. Ms. No. 4 by 17. 1. 1977 subject to the condition that it would be open to the civil Court to adjudicate all questions including the question of limitation and the other questions relief under the specific relief Act. As such, the Memo No. 825/ d3/77-27 dated 3. 1. 1981 stands unquestioned and is binding on the plaintiff. In order to avoid the adjudication on the question of vires of the Government in passing the said memo in the Civil Court, the plaintiff cunningly and evasively averred the allegations in amended Para 11 (a ). The plaintiff has no right to specific performance of the G. O. No. 4, dated 17. 1. 1977, which was cancelled by the government Memo of 3. 1. 1981 referred to above. The suit is not maintainable for want of Section 80 of CPC. The suit is barred by limitation, in any view of the matter consequent on the addition of the government as party to the suit. Therefore prays to dismiss the suit with costs. ( 9 ) THE written statement filed by the 3rd defendant is as hereunder: the Government with an intention to regulate the allotment of hire purchase system of the houses contracted by the local bodies under the Low Income Group housing Scheme sponsored by the government of India, the Government issued rules in G. O. Ms. No. 2017-LA dated 3. 9. 1958. Under these rules the government (Rule 23) may issue necessary rules from time to time to give effect to the provisions of the rules. In all the matters concerned the rules, the decision of the Government is final. The final authority for giving allotment is given in these to the Government and also the government is empowered to issue any modifications, clarifications in regarding the rules for the allotment of the houses constructed by the local bodies. The government issued G. O. Ms No. 4 Housing municipal Administrative and Urban development Department dated 17. 1. 1977 allotting the houses to the plaintiff along with nine others. The government issued G. O. Ms No. 4 Housing municipal Administrative and Urban development Department dated 17. 1. 1977 allotting the houses to the plaintiff along with nine others. Later on the Government have taken a policy decision to the effect that where houses have been initially allotted on rental basis by the municipalities and the rental allottees have been in the houses for not less than two years they may be given first option to purchase the houses on hire purchase system. Keeping in view the above policy decision, the director of Municipal Administration proposed to cancel the orders already issued in G. O. Ms. No. 4 dated 17. 1. 1977. The housing Municipal Administration and urban Development Department issued a memo No. 825/d3/77-27 dated 3. 1. 1981. In this circular the Government has proposed to cancel the allotment made be the 6% along with the plaintiff allotment thereby, the Special Officer and the commissioner, Municipal Commissioner, machilipatnam Municipality is directed to verify the list of non-occupants of the l. I. G. , Housing and issue a show-cause notice to concerned individuals after giving an opportunity to the effected parties before cancellation of the allotments filed the rent petition before the Court of A. P. High court, this writ petitions were dismissed. The Writ Appeal No. 988/83 against the orders of the writ petition of the plaint, writ Petition No. 2431/81 was also dismissed. It is not true that the plaintiff was allotted their Quarter No. 23/191 as stated supra, the allotment made was cancelled by the Government. The judgment of the High Court was misinterpreted and wrongfully the plaintiff filed the suit in order to gain himself. It is not true that there is a concluded contract between the plaintiff and the 1st defendant is for the allotment of the quarter on hire purchase system. The decision of the government is final. The 1st defendant is not entitled to do anything in view of the orders of the Government. Hence, the plaintiff is not entitled to claim specific performance of hire purchase agreement for the allotment of the quarters. This defendant submits that there is no agreement between the plaintiff and the 1st defendant in view of the said government orders. The final decision vests within damages for extent of the rents realized by the 1st defendant and he is not entided for Rs. 5,942. 562ps. This defendant submits that there is no agreement between the plaintiff and the 1st defendant in view of the said government orders. The final decision vests within damages for extent of the rents realized by the 1st defendant and he is not entided for Rs. 5,942. 562ps. on damages for break of contract relating to hire purchase agreement and he is not entitled to claim Rs. 8,000/- towards the legal expenses. The suit itself is time barred. There is no cause of action arose as stated in Para 12 of the plaint. The cause of action mentioned is misconceived to file the suit wrongfully. The suit against this defendant is not maintainable without giving section 80 CPC notice and therefore prays the suit may be dismissed in limini with compensatory costs against this defendant. ( 10 ) ON the strength of these pleadings, the following issues and additional issues were settled:1. Whether there is concluded contract between plaintiff and first defendant municipality? 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the specific Performance of the agreement of hire purchase in respect of plaint schedule property? 3. Whether the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of contract? 4. Whether the Government of A. P. is a necessary party to this suit? If so, whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties? 5. Whether the suit is maintainable for want of notice under Section 369 of a. P. Municipalities Act? 6. Whether the suit claim is barred by limitation? 7. Whether the defendants are entitled to get compensatory costs from plaintiff? 8. To what relief? additional Issues dated 25. 11. 1986: 1. Whether the suit is barred for want of suit notice under Section 80 CPC? 2. Whether the suit is barred by time as against the Government (3rd defendant) as the Government is added as party to the suit after 25. 4. 1986? If so, whether the relief claimed as against the 1st defendant municipality is to be dismissed? 3. Whether the suit is maintainable while the Government Memo No. 825/d3/ 77-27 Hg dated 3. 1. 1981 is still in force without being quashed or cancelled either by the Government or a competent Court of law? ( 11 ) THE Court of the first instance, no doubt, dismissed the suit giving opportunity to the plaintiff to take back 20% of the deposit made with the 1st defendant. 1. 1981 is still in force without being quashed or cancelled either by the Government or a competent Court of law? ( 11 ) THE Court of the first instance, no doubt, dismissed the suit giving opportunity to the plaintiff to take back 20% of the deposit made with the 1st defendant. In the appeal preferred as against the said judgment and decree, A. S. No. 174 of 1989 on the file of the learned I Additional District and Sessions Judge, Krishna, Machilipatnam, the following point was framed for consideration: whether the lower Court committed any material irregularity, which warrants the interference of this Court? ( 12 ) THE Appellate Court had gone into all the aspects and recorded finding, commencing from Paragraph Nos. 8 to 28 of its judgment and ultimately, allowed the appeal in part, directing the 1st respondent to repay the amount deposited by the appellant/plaintiff along with interest at 12% p. a. from the date of deposit till the date of payment. Submissions at length were made relating to the concluded contract and the enforceability thereof. Incidentally, it was also pointed out that though all the facets have been discussed by the Appellate court, a cryptic point for consideration had been framed which is not in accordance with Order 41 Rule 31 of CPC. It is no doubt true that the point for consideration framed by the Appellate Court is definitely not happily worded, but however, on a careful scrutiny of the judgment, the Court is satisfied that each point had been discussed though no points for consideration had been framed in detail, and hence, there is a substantial compliance of the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 of CPC. In this regard, the following decisions may be glanced at Naseem Begum v. Kaleem 2004 (2) ALD 292 = 2004 (1) ALT 34 , sughra Bee v. Kareez Fatima Qureshi, 2003 (3) ALD 821 = 2004 (3) ALT 704 , ram Reddy v. Narasimha Reddy, 2004 (1) alt 629 , Narayana Rao v. Shantabai , 2004 (2) ALD 585 = 2004 (3) ALT 104 , ch. Rukma Reddy (died) by Lrs. 2 to 5 and others v. K. Dharma Reddy and others, 2004 (3) ALD 772 = 2004 (4) ALT 241 . ( 13 ) THIS is a suit for specific performance and the Appellate Court modified the relief granting the alternative relief. Rukma Reddy (died) by Lrs. 2 to 5 and others v. K. Dharma Reddy and others, 2004 (3) ALD 772 = 2004 (4) ALT 241 . ( 13 ) THIS is a suit for specific performance and the Appellate Court modified the relief granting the alternative relief. The plaintiff/appellant being not satisfied with the said relief had preferred the present second appeal. Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 reads as hereunder:discretion as to decreeing specific performance: (1) The jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary, and the Court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so, but the discretion of the Court is not arbitrary but sound and reasonable, guided by judicial principles and capable of correction by a court of appeal (2) The following are cases in which the court may properly exercise, discretion not to decree specific performance- (a) Where the terms of the contract or the conduct of the parties at the time of entering into the contract or the other circumstances under which the contract was entered into are such that the contract, though not voidable, gives the plaintiff an unfair advantage over the defendant; or (b) Where the performance of the contract would involve. some hardship on the defendant which he did not foresee, whereas its non-performance would involve no such hardship on the - plaintiff; or (c) Where the defendant entered into the contract under circumstances which though not rendering the contract voidable, makes it inequitable to enforce specific performance. Explanation 1 :mere inadequacy of consideration, or the mere fact that the contract is onerous to the defendant or improvident in its nature, shall not be deemed to constitute on unfair advantage within the meaning of clause (a) or hardship within the meaning of clause (b) explanation 2 :the question whether the performance of a contract would involve hardship on the defendant within the meaning of clause (b) shall, except in cases where the hardship has resulted from any act of the plaintiff subsequent to the contract, be determined with reference to the circumstances existing at the time of the contract. (3) The Court may properly exercise discretion to decree specific performance in any case where the plaintiff has done substantial acts or suffered losses in consequence of a contract capable of specific performance. (3) The Court may properly exercise discretion to decree specific performance in any case where the plaintiff has done substantial acts or suffered losses in consequence of a contract capable of specific performance. (4) The Court shall not refuse to any part specific performance of a contract merely on the ground that the contract is not enforceable at the instance of the other party. ( 14 ) IN Mayavati v. Kaushalya Devi, 1990 (3) SCC 1 , it was held that the relief of specific performance is discretionary. In rosaiah v. Balarami Reddy, AIR 1989 ap 179 , it was held that it is not obligatory to decree a suit for specific performance. It is always one of discretion, such discretion to be exercised carefully with circumspection on sound and reasonable grounds guided by judicial principles. In sardar Singh v. Krishna Devi, 1994 (2) slj 237 = 1994 (2) CLJ 334 (SC), the same view was expressed. The decisions in mohammed Mirza v. Subhan Saheb, 1993 (3) ALT 634 (DB) and Syed Sultan Pal v. Syed Bikhu Saheb, AIR 1986 AP 342 , may also be referred to in this regard. Thus, discretion no doubt, can be exercised even at the stage of second appeal. This has been the view expressed in Dayal Singh v. Mahabir Singh, 122 IC 740, Habibun rahman v. Ali Azhar, 44 CLJ 162. In bakram Kishore v. Benudhar, AIR 1976 orissa 4, it was held that where transfer of shares is subject to Government approval, court may refuse specific performance if approval already had been given, relief can be granted, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case. In Ramadass v. Ram Lubhaya, AIR 1998 Pandh 233 = 1998 (2) Punjab LR 326, it was held to decline specific performance and grant alternative relief is a jurisdiction of equity and good conscience and must be exercised in consonance with settled principles of law. ( 15 ) IN the light of the aforesaid decisions, it is clear that the relief of specific performance is a discretionary relief. It is also pertinent to note that the appellant- plaintiff also prayed for the alternative relief. The Appellate Court had modified the judgment and decree of the Court of first instance and exercised the discretion on sound lines by making such modification. It is also pertinent to note that the appellant- plaintiff also prayed for the alternative relief. The Appellate Court had modified the judgment and decree of the Court of first instance and exercised the discretion on sound lines by making such modification. When the Appellate Court had exercised the discretion of granting the alternative relief and declined to grant the relief of specific performance, such discretion exercised by the Appellate Court need not be disturbed, unless, it is shown that such discretion was not exercised by the Appellate Court in accordance with the settled principles of law. The Counsel was unable to point out anything in this direction. In view of the same, the findings recorded by the Appellate court are hereby confirmed. ( 16 ) THE appeal shall stand dismissed being devoid of merits. No order as to costs.