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2005 DIGILAW 294 (KER)

S. A. Sulochana v. Kalyani

2005-05-16

PIUS C.KURIAKOSE

body2005
Judgment :- The order of the Subordinate Judge’s Court, Ernakulam allowing I.A. 1305 of 1995 in I.A.688 of 1994 in O.s.No.41 of 1986 is under challenge in this Civil Revision petition. What the Sub Court did under the impugned order was to set aside an order of eviction passed on the ground of arrears of rent invoking the powers under Section 11(2) (c) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. 2. I have heard the arguments of Sri. Chacko George, learned Senior counsel appearing for the revision petitioner-landlady and Sri. M.P. Ramnath, learned counsel for the respondents-tenants. Having regard to the elaborate arguments addressed before me by counsel on both sides, I feel it necessary to give a resume of the facts. 3. The suit property consists of a residential building together with 45 cents of land. According to the revision petitioner-plaintiff, the suit property (hereinafter referred to as the schedule building) was let out to Padmanabhan, the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents in 1971. Padmanabhan did series of acts in defiance of the plaintiff’s title over the property. He could obtain a document of conveyance from certain relatives of the plaintiff’s predecessor as though they were having fractional interests over the property. Under the conveyance, one-third rights over the property was purportedly conveyed to Padmanbhan. He was able to have transfer of the registry in respect of 15 cents from out of the property in his favour in revenue records on the basis of the conveyance. This was got done surreptitiously. Once he was able to do that, he stopped paying rent and thus rent fell into arrears since November, 1981. Padmanabhan began contending that he himself is the owner of the schedule building. He published a notification in the Mathrubhoomi Daily on 11.4.1982 setting up rival title over the schedule building and the entire 45 cents in himself and warning all people from dealing with anybody else in respect of the property. He started obstructing the plaintiff from collecting usufructs from the property on the strength of his claimed title. Under the above circumstances, the plaintiff issued Ext.A12 termination notice on 21.4.1982. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed R.C.P. No.69 of 1982 on the ground of arrears of rent since November, 1981 and also on the ground of bona fide own occupation of the building by her daughter. Sri. Under the above circumstances, the plaintiff issued Ext.A12 termination notice on 21.4.1982. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed R.C.P. No.69 of 1982 on the ground of arrears of rent since November, 1981 and also on the ground of bona fide own occupation of the building by her daughter. Sri. Padmanabhan set up rival title in defence of the R.C.P. He denied the plaintiff’s title. The Rent Control Court found that Padmanabhan’s denial of the landlady’s title was bona fide and dismissed the R.C.P. referring the plaintiff to the civil court. 4. Even before a suit could be filed against Padmanabhan before the civil court, he passed away. Therefore, the suit was filed against the eight respondents herein who are the legal representatives of Padmanabhan. The following were the reliefs sought for in the suit:- 1. Recovery of possession of the building on the strength of title. 2. Recovery of rent at Rs.120/- per mensem for three years from 1.2.1983 to 31.1.1986. (Significantly, by the time of filing the suit, rent for 15 months covering the period from November, 1981 till January, 1983 had become time-barred). 3. Damages for use and occupation of the house from the date of suit till date of recovery at the rate of Rs.120/- per mensem. 4. Permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the plaintiff’s possession of the property. On 13.11.1986 the suit was decreed in favour of the plaintiff. The respondents preferred A.S.NO.61 of 1989 before the District Court. That appeal was dismissed by the District Court, that court clarifying the decree of eviction passed by the trial court to be an order under Section 11(2) (b) of the Rent Control Act. 5. A Second Appeal was preferred to this Court by the respondents as S.A.No.345 of 1990. Along with the Second Appeal, C.M.P.NO.695 of 1990 was moved for stay of execution. This Court on 1.6.1990 passed an order of conditional stay directing deposit of Rs.12,000/- within six weeks. Finally, on 6.1.1994 the Second Appeal was dismissed with costs. However, the appellants were given the right to have the eviction order passed against hem vacated under Section 11(2) (c). 6. According to the revision petitioner, deposit was to have been made by them within one month of 6.1.1994. They filed I.A.688 of 1994 on 2.2.1994 which was within the period of one month. But no amount were deposited along with I.A.688 of 1994. 6. According to the revision petitioner, deposit was to have been made by them within one month of 6.1.1994. They filed I.A.688 of 1994 on 2.2.1994 which was within the period of one month. But no amount were deposited along with I.A.688 of 1994. Respondents took the stand that the sum of Rs.12,000/- which they had deposited in compliance with the condition imposed by this Court while granting stay in the Second Appeal was sufficient to cover the amounts which they were liable to deposit. Plaintiff filed counter-affidavit to I.A.688 of 1994 on 11.6.1994. The contention raised by the plaintiff was that Section 11(2)(c) has no application to eviction decrees passed by regular civil courts. The further contention was that deposits which are made pursuant to the conditional order of stay cannot be adjusted against the deposit contemplated under Section 11 (2) (c) since the condition imposed by the High Court was basically towards security under order 41 Rule 5(3) C.P.C. for realization of the monetary part of the decree. It was during the pendency of the above I.A. that a Division Bench of this Court delivered the judgment in Chellamma Varaghese v. Cicey (1994 (2) KLT 106) ruling that arrears of rent contemplated under Sec.11(2) (c) is not confined to arrears accrued upto the notice of demand, but it will include rent accrued for the period upto the date of deposit, whether time-barred or not. The court on 31.1.1995 decided in I.A.688 of 1994 that Section 11(2) (c) is applicable to civil court decrees also. The court accordingly granted extension of time by one month, for the purpose of making additional deposits for covering the rent upto the date of petition, in the light of Chellamma Varghese (supra). 7. Challenging the order dated 31.1.1995 in I.A. 688 of 1994, the revision petitioner filed C.R.P.No.1089 of 1995. While the above revision petition was pending, respondents filed two applications for extension of time and made two deposits of amounts towards arrears of rent. One application was I.A. 1305 of 1995 and the sum deposited along with that I.A. was Rs.15,000/-. The other application was I.A.2019 of 1995 and the sum deposited on 29.3.1995 was Rs.6500/-. On 10.4.1995 the plaintiff filed counter opposing extension of time as per I.A.Nos.1305 and 2019 of 1995. 8. One application was I.A. 1305 of 1995 and the sum deposited along with that I.A. was Rs.15,000/-. The other application was I.A.2019 of 1995 and the sum deposited on 29.3.1995 was Rs.6500/-. On 10.4.1995 the plaintiff filed counter opposing extension of time as per I.A.Nos.1305 and 2019 of 1995. 8. During the pendency of C.R.P.No.1089 of 1995, the judgment of the Division Bench in Chellamma Varghese v. Cicey (supra) was overruled by the Supreme Court in Chinnamma v. Gopalan (1995 (2) KLT 755). It was ruled by the Supreme Court in the above case that the amounts which the tenant is liable to deposit for the purpose of Section 11(2) (C) will only be the rent due at the time of notice and that the landlord’s remedy regarding the rent which subsequently falls due will be to invoke the provisions of Section 12 of the Rent Control Act. 9. C.R.P. 1089 of 1996 was disposed of by the High Court only after Chinnamma’s case was decided by the Supreme Court. In the order dated 5.8.1997 in C.R.P.1089 of 1995 this Court held that the benefit of Section 11(2) (c) was available to the tenants against whom the civil court had passed eviction decree on the ground of arrears of rent. This Court also held following the Supreme Court decision that the amount to be deposited for the purpose of Section 11(2) (c) can only be the amount due on the date of the notice. However, this court noticed that there has been no application of mind by the trial court in the matter of extension of time and accordingly set aside the order of the trial court an demanded the I.A. for fresh consideration to the trial court. The remand order is confined to the following points:- 1. Whether the deposit made during the pendency of I.A.688 of 1994 is sufficient to vacate the order passed under Section 11(2) (a) and (b). 2. Whether extension of time can be granted to respondents to make up the deficiency in deposit required by Section 11(2) (c), indicating thereby that extension need be granted only if the court is of the opinion that there are sufficient reasons for the same. 10. 2. Whether extension of time can be granted to respondents to make up the deficiency in deposit required by Section 11(2) (c), indicating thereby that extension need be granted only if the court is of the opinion that there are sufficient reasons for the same. 10. On 18.10.1997, according to the revision petitioner, she filed calculation statement through her counsel which was in accordance with the Supreme Court, Judgment in Chinnamma’s case regarding the quantum of deposit required under Section 11(2) (c). Revision petitioner filed counter-affidavit in I.A.1305 and 2019 of 1995 which were being considered along with I.A.No.688 of 1994. The grievance of the revision petitioner is that the court which was obliged on the terms of the remand order to pass fresh orders on I.A.688 of 1994 has passed an order captioned under I.A. 1305 of 1995 setting aside the decree for eviction. According to Sri. Chacko George, learned Senior Counsel the contentions raised by the revision petitioner were not touched by the court below. The court below proceeded on the wrong assumption that the plaintiff was continuing to rely on the overruled decision in Chellamma Varghese (supra). The court below has not considered the question as to whether extension of time was allowable so as to treat the deposit of Rs.15,000/- made pursuant to the prior order of extension of time passed in I.A.688 of 1994 (which had already been set aside in C.R.P.No.1089 of 1995) was liable to be treated as a valid deposit for the purpose of Section 11(2) (c). Learned Senior counsel submitted that the sum of Rs.12,000/- deposited in compliance with the condition imposed by this Court while granting stay in the Second Appeal was essentially by way of security for the monetary part of the decree which was impugned in the Second Appeal. No portion of that deposit was liable to be adjusted against the deposits under Section 11(2) (c). The monetary part of the civil court’s decree impugned in the S.A., according to learned Senior counsel, will be as follows:- Arrears of rent from 1.2.1983 till 31.1.1986 Rs.4320/- Interest on do. at 6% per annum Upto 1.6.1990 Rs.1900/- Rs.6220/- Costs decreed Trial court Rs.3520/- Lower appellate court Rs.1882/- High Court Rs.2542/- Rs. 7944/- Total Rs.14164/- Deficiency to be recovered Rs. 2164/- According to Mr. at 6% per annum Upto 1.6.1990 Rs.1900/- Rs.6220/- Costs decreed Trial court Rs.3520/- Lower appellate court Rs.1882/- High Court Rs.2542/- Rs. 7944/- Total Rs.14164/- Deficiency to be recovered Rs. 2164/- According to Mr. Chacko George, the decree of the civil court also takes in damages for use and occupation at Rs.120/- per mensem from 1.2.1986 also. The Senior Counsel submitted that the following are the amounts which are liable to be deposited under Section 1(2) (c):- Arrears of Rent for six months From 11/1981 till 4/1982 at Rs.120/- per mensem - Rs. 720/- Interest thereon at 6% Per annum from 11/81 to 4/82 Upto 2.2.94, date of I.A. 688 of 1994 - Rs. 518/- ------------ Total - Rs.1238/- To the above figure, the eligible costs of Rs.7944/- should also be added which will bring the aggregate total to Rs.9182/-. But the Senior Counsel fairly concedes that the cost factor is a common element in the monetary part of the decree challenged in the S.A. as well as in the amount to be deposited under Section 11(2) (c). Counsel further added that the deposit made in compliance with the condition in the S.A. was deficient by Rs.2164/-. Thus according to him, at least the following amount was to be deposited under Sec.11(2) (c):- Rent in arrears and interest - Rs.1238/- Deficiency in costs - Rs.2164/- ----------- Total - Rs.3402/- ========= According to Mr. Chacko George, since there was deficiency, the order of eviction could not have been set aside without extending the time for making deposit. Counsel submitted that in I.A.688 of 1994 there was no prayer for extension of time. In I.A.1305 and 2019 of 1995, though the prayer was for extension of time, no grounds for extending time had been made out. On the contrary, time was sought for in those two I.As. on the supposed requirement of larger deposits in view of the Division bench decision in Chellamma Varghese (1994 (2) KLT 106) which was overruled in Chinnamma v Gopalan (1995 (2) KLT 755). Now that we are confined to the pre-1994 position, the question is whether any grounds are made out for extending the time for depositing the amounts which were deficient in spite of the initial deposit of Rs.12,000/- i.e., Rs.3402/-. Now that we are confined to the pre-1994 position, the question is whether any grounds are made out for extending the time for depositing the amounts which were deficient in spite of the initial deposit of Rs.12,000/- i.e., Rs.3402/-. High lighting the series of mischiefs committed by Padmanabhan in defiance of the landlady’s title, learned Senior Counsel submitted that exercise of discretion in favour of the respondents will not be justified. Rent was not paid for some 25 years since 1981, barring the one deposit pursuant to this Court’s direction and the two deposits made along with I.A. 1305 and 2019 of 1995. The rent for the period from 5/82 till 1/83 has become time-barred and irretrievably lost even before the suit was instituted and rent for a minimum period of 18 to 19 years from 2/86 will also be lost since by allowing the Sec.11(2) (c) petition, even the decree for damages for use and occupation will also be vacated. The landlady who is an old and sick widow is now past 70 years and she has no capacity to fight further litigations. Counsel referred to various decisions in support of his arguments. 11. Mr. M.P. Ramnath, learned counsel for the respondents reminded me about the limitations of this Court’s revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. According to Mr. Ramnath, there are no jurisdictional infirmities about the impugned order so as to warrant interference in revision. Learned Senior Advocate was only overcomplicating an otherwise simple issue since nobody can find fault with the impugned order in the light of the express overruling of the decision in 1994(2) KLT 106 by the Supreme Court in 1995 (2) KLT 755, submitted counsel. Mr. Ramnath further submitted that the order of eviction envisaged by Section 11(2) (b) is not an absolute order but is only a provisional order which is liable to be vacated by depositing the arrears of rent. Counsel also invited my attention to the Full Bench decision of this Court in Karthyayani v. S.N.D.P. Sakha Yogam (2004) (2) KLT 524) wherein it is ruled that rent control court has got the power to grant extension even more than once in appropriate cases. Refuting the submissions regarding arrears of rent made by Sri. Counsel also invited my attention to the Full Bench decision of this Court in Karthyayani v. S.N.D.P. Sakha Yogam (2004) (2) KLT 524) wherein it is ruled that rent control court has got the power to grant extension even more than once in appropriate cases. Refuting the submissions regarding arrears of rent made by Sri. Chacko George, counsel submitted that even if those submissions were correct, the landlady can always approach the rent control court again for eviction on the ground of arrears of rent and to avoid such eviction, the tenants will have to deposit even the time-barred rent arrears. Counsel concluded by submitting that it was not fair to attribute all the delay caused so far in the mater of this litigation to the tenants alone. 12. I have considered the rival submissions made at the Bar. I have gone through the available lower court records. I have read all the decisions cited at the Bar. The arrears of rent demanded as per Ext.A12 notice is rent for six months from 11/81 till 4/82 amounting to Rs.720/-. Statutory interest thereon is Rs.518/-. The total comes to Rs.1238/-. If the tenants had paid the above amount along with postal charges for Ext.A12, they could have avoided the order of eviction under Section 11(2) (b). Going by the principles laid down in 1995 (2) KLT 755 (SC) and many other precedents relating to Section 11(2) (c), in order to get an eviction order under Section 11(2) (b) set aside, the tenants will have to deposit apart from the above amount, the costs also. The judgment in Second Appeal was on 6.1.1994. Normally the deposit should have been made by 6.2.1994. The stand of the respondents was that since during the pendency of the Second Appeal, respondents did deposit a sum of Rs.12,000/- they were not liable to make any further deposits and therefore there is no question of seeking extension of time. When the impugned order is examined, it will be seen that the court below has virtually upheld that stand. But the order of this Court in C.R.P.1089 of 1995 was rendered after the pronouncement in Chinnamma v. Gopalan (1995 (2) KLT 755) (SC) and taking that pronouncement into account. When the impugned order is examined, it will be seen that the court below has virtually upheld that stand. But the order of this Court in C.R.P.1089 of 1995 was rendered after the pronouncement in Chinnamma v. Gopalan (1995 (2) KLT 755) (SC) and taking that pronouncement into account. The argument of the revision petitioner in the above revision was that the sum of Rs.12,000/- deposited during the pendency of the S.A. will not be sufficient to cover the amounts liable to be deposited under Sec.11(2) (C). This Court did not decide that question in the above revision. This Court deferred the question whether there was deficiency in spite of the deposit of Rs.12,000/- and the further question whether even if there was deficiency there was justification for granting the time extension which was sought for in I.A.1305 of 1995. Going by the calculation statement dated 18.10.97 which was admittedly submitted on behalf of the landlady before the trial court, the deposit of Rs.12,000/- made during the pendency of the Second Appeal is not sufficient to cover the tenants’ liability under Section 11(2) (c). The trial court thought that the calculation statement ignored the supreme Court decision in 1995 (2) KLT 755 (SC) and was prepared on the basis of the overruled decision in Chellamma Varghese (supra) under which the tenants are liable to deposit the entire arrears due till the date of deposit. Noticing that such a stand is per se unsustainable, the trial court would easily and quickly overrule the calculation statement submitted by the landlady. I feel that Sri. Chacko George is right in his submission that the learned Sub Judge did neither appreciate the landlady’s stand correctly nor did the learned Judge appreciate the scope of the order of remand passed by this Court in C.R.P. 1089 of 1995 properly. The landlady had clear reasons as to why the amount of Rs.12,000/- deposited by the tenants during the pendency of the Second Appeal was not sufficient to discharge their liability under Section 11(2) (c). The trial court has not examined whether that stand was correct. I feel it necessary that the correctness of that stand be examined at least now. 13. The deposit of Rs.12,000/- was not made by the tenants voluntarily in discharge of their liability under Section 11(2) (b). The trial court has not examined whether that stand was correct. I feel it necessary that the correctness of that stand be examined at least now. 13. The deposit of Rs.12,000/- was not made by the tenants voluntarily in discharge of their liability under Section 11(2) (b). On the contrary, the deposit was made by them in compliance with the condition imposed by this Court while granting stay of execution proceedings which was sought for through a separate petition filed in the Second Appeal. The order was passed on the stay petition at the time when the Second Appeal was admitted. The decree impugned in the Second Appeal was a decree authorizing the respondent-decreeholder to recover amounts apart from the same being a decree for eviction. The monetary part of the decree impugned in the Second Appeal was Rs.4320/-, being three years’ rent for the period from 1.2.1983 to 31.1.1986 and interest thereon upto 1.6.1990 at the rate of 6% per annum amounting to Rs.1900/-; amounts on account of damages for use and occupation from the date of suit. i.e., 31.1.1986 till 1.6.1990, Rs.6240/-; costs allowed as per the trial court’s decree Rs.3520/- and costs allowed as per the decree of the lower appellate court Rs.1882/-, thus totaling to Rs.17862/-. The order of stay was passed by this Court invoking the powers under Rule 5 of Order 41 C.P.C. obviously, while imposing the condition that a sum of Rs.12,000/- should be deposited for the grant of stay, this Court was directing the respondents-tenants to furnish security for the decrees which were impugned in the S.A. In other words, the imposition of condition was made by this Court under sub-rule (3) of Rule 5 of Order 41. The amounts deposited in compliance with the condition imposed under sub-rule (3) of Rule 5 of Order 41 ought to be adjusted first against the liabilities under the decrees which were being challenged in the S.A. As I have indicated above, the total amount payable by the respondents under the decree challenged in the Second Appeal was Rs.17862/-, as on the date of passage of the stay order, i.e, institution of the appeal. This means that after adjusting the sum of Rs.12,000/- which was deposited in compliance with the condition, there was no balance to be adjusted against the respondents’ liability under Section 11(2)(b). 14. This means that after adjusting the sum of Rs.12,000/- which was deposited in compliance with the condition, there was no balance to be adjusted against the respondents’ liability under Section 11(2)(b). 14. There is yet another point which is to be noticed. The most important ingredient of the respondents’ liability under Section 11(2) (c) is the arrears of rent demanded under Ext.A12 notice, i.e. rent for six months from November, 1981 till April, 1982. That ingredient was not part of the decree challenged in the Second Appeal at all. According to Sri. Chacko George, the prospective liability in the S.A. for which the sum of Rs.12,000/- was directed to be paid by the High Court should take in the sum of Rs.2542/- which was later allowed by this Court as costs to the revision petitioner. When sub-rule (3) of Rule 5 of Order 41 is carefully examined, it will be seen that the above argument also has force. At any rate, since the amount of Rs.12,000/- deposited in the Second Appeal was not sufficient even to cover the decree which was challenged in the Second Appeal, no portion of that amount is liable to be adjusted against the respondents’ liability under Section 11(2) (c). This means that it is only on 25.2.1995 when I.A.1305 of 1995 was filed and Rs.15000/- was remitted that the amounts necessary for adjusting the respondents’ liability under Section 11(2) (c) comes to the court. This means that the deposit is made only 18 days after the due date of 6.2.1995. Thus, the question whether extension of time should have been granted as prayed for by the respondent in I.A.1305 of 1995 was a real issued in the case and not a non-issue as the trial court thought. Ordinarily, I should have been inclined to remand the case to the trial court to decide the question whether the respondents are entitled to have enlargement of time as per I.A.1305 of 1995. But in this case where the present litigation is 23 years old and the revision petitioner herself has reached the evening, if not the twilight period, of her life it will be more just if a final decision is taken in the matter at least now. 15. The power to enlarge time in the matter of making the requisite deposit under Section 11(2) (C) is a discretionary power conferred on the Rent Control Court. 15. The power to enlarge time in the matter of making the requisite deposit under Section 11(2) (C) is a discretionary power conferred on the Rent Control Court. The said power is to be exercised judiciously on sound legal principles. I notice that the Supreme Court has ruled that the Rent Control legislation is a welfare legislation, both for the tenant as well as for the landlord, in many cases including Balwant Singh v. Anand Kumar Sharma (2003) 3 SCC 433. I also notice the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in E. Palanisamy v. Palanisamy (2003) 1 SCC 123 wherein it has been held that in order to enable the tenants to enjoy the benefits conferred by statutory provisions on them, they will have to comply with the provisions strictly. I also notice the principles laid down by the Full Bench of this court in Karthyayani (2004 (3) KLT 524) wherein this Court has ruled that the power to enlarge time in the matter of making the deposits under Section 11(2) (c) can be exercised more than once, but the exercise must be in a judicious manner on the basis of the facts and circumstances obtaining in a given case. Whenever discretionary power is exercised, courts often take into account the general equities of the given case. In the instant case, the conduct of the respondents, particularly that of their predecessor-in-interest, towards the landlady will indicate that they do not deserve much equity or indulgence at the hands of a court which is concerned with equity. The tenants not only denied the landlady’s title, but after procuring a purported document of conveyance of title from some relatives of the landlady set up rival title against her title. On the strength of that rival title, the tenants’ predecessor-in-interest Padmanabhan Surreptitiously obtained transfer of ownership in respect of a portion of the leasehold property in his favour. Denying the landlady’s title, he published a notification in a leading newspaper. Even the nominal rent of Rs.120/- per mensem for this property consisting of a building and 45 cents of land within the limits of the Kochi City was defaulted for years. Thus, there certainly are several circumstances which should ordinarily dissuade a court from exercising discretion in favour of the tenants. Even then, I feel that there are two or three strong circumstances in their favour. Thus, there certainly are several circumstances which should ordinarily dissuade a court from exercising discretion in favour of the tenants. Even then, I feel that there are two or three strong circumstances in their favour. The first circumstance is that the power to enlarge time needs to be exercised only once in their favour. The second is that the period of extension sought for by them is as short as 19 days. The third one is that the delay in the matter of making deposits has obviously happened on account of the legal advice received by them. Even though I have decided otherwise in this case, I am of the opinion that the legal advice given to the respondents that the sum of Rs.12,000/- deposited in Second Appeal can be adjusted against their liability under Section 11(2) (C), though wrong, was an advice given bona fide. In other words, I am of the view that the extension of time sought for in I.A.1305 of 1995 is to be granted to the respondents. But at the same time, the respondents are liable to compensate the landlady at least to a certain extent for the loss and injury which is being occasioned to the landlady on account of such exercise of discretion in favour of the tenants. In ordinary cases under Section 11(2) (b) the consequence of the grant of an application under Section 11(2)(C) will only be that the order of eviction will stand set aside. But in the peculiar circumstances of this case, apart from the order of eviction, even the decree for damages for use and occupation at the rate of Rs.120/- per mensem from the date of suit will also be set aside. A very substantial portion of those amounts has already become barred by limitation. Therefore, the terms to be imposed on the respondents while allowing I.A.1305 of 1995 should be very stringent. 16. I enquired of counsel on both sides as to what will be the rent which the schedule property consisting of 45 cents of land and the residential building will fetch if the same is let out now. According to Senior Advocate Sri. Chacko George, the amount will be Rs.10,000/-. Sri Ramnath submitted that he is not in a position to answer the question. Taking into account all relevant inputs, I dispose of the Civil Revision Petition in the following terms. According to Senior Advocate Sri. Chacko George, the amount will be Rs.10,000/-. Sri Ramnath submitted that he is not in a position to answer the question. Taking into account all relevant inputs, I dispose of the Civil Revision Petition in the following terms. The impugned order with all the findings therein will stand set aside. Instead, I.A.1305 of 1995 and I.A. 688 of 1994 will stand allowed due to the reasons stated in the foregoing paragraphs, subject to the following conditions:- 1. The respondents shall pay a sum of Rs.14660/- to the revision petitioner-landlady, either directly or through her counsel in this Court within one month from today, on account of the respondents’ apparent liability under the decree in S.A.No.345 of 1990 to pay damages for use and occupation and once this payment is made, the same will be given credit against the respondents’ rent liability to the revision petitioner. 2. Over and above the above payment, the respondents shall make a further payment of Rs.15,000/- in the same manner within the aforesaid period towards the costs incurred and the loss suffered by the revision petitioner after the disposal of the Second Appeal. 3. If both the payments are not made within the time mentioned above, both the I.As. will stand dismissed and it will be open to the landlady to recover possession of the building by levying execution. It is needless to mention that notwithstanding this order, it will be open to the landlady to initiate fresh proceedings before the Rent Control Court on all available grounds seeking the eviction of the respondents.