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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2005 DIGILAW 294 (MP)

Pushpendra Singh Baghel v. State of M. P.

2005-02-24

R.V.RAVEENDRAN, SHANTANU KEMKAR

body2005
ORDER R.V. Raveendran, C.J. 1. Many a time, the Courts are required to take inconvenient decisions, contrary to public opinion and personal sympathies. This is one such case. In this PIL, the appointment of third respondent, as a Commercial Tax Officer, on compassionate grounds, is challenged as being wholly illegal, arbitrary and prejudicial to public interest. 2. Third respondent is the widow of one R. K. Jain. The said R. K. Jain was working as Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Tax, Bhopal. He had put in about 25 years of service. The department considered him to be an excellent officer. On 14-7-2004, he was arrested by the Police Officers of the Special Police Establishment attached to Lokayukt, Madhya Pradesh, allegedly while accepting a bribe of Rs. 2,000/- from one Vinod Chhajad, Tax Practitioner. It would appear that he was detained and tortured in the office of Superintendent of Police, Special Police Establishment, Lokayukt, Bhopal. While in such Police custody, he was rushed to Hamidia Hospital, Bhopal, where he died. Postmortem examination disclosed the cause of his death as Asphyxia. The postmortem report also revealed fracture of ribs and other injuries on his body. It would appear that the State directed the Crime Investigation Department to inquire into circumstances leading to the death of R. K: Jain. According to the State, the investigation prima-facie revealed the involvement of M. S. Nain, the then In-charge Superintendent of Police, Special Police Establishment, Bhopal, in the death of R.K. Jain. 3. His unnatural death on account of injuries sustained in custodial violence caused lot of anger and resentment amongst the public and also sparked an agitation at Bhopal demanding the arrest and prosecution of Shri M. S. Nain, Dy. Superintendent of Police and Shri B. P. Singh, Inspector, officers of the Special Police Establishment, Lokayukt who were allegedly responsible for the death of R. K. Jain. It is also stated that a demand was made by some elected representatives of people as also by the colleagues of R. K. Jain in the Commercial Tax Department that appropriate compensation and relief be provided to the widow of late R. K. Jain. One of the suggestions was that the third respondent (wife of deceased R. K. Jain) should be provided a suitable appointment. 4. Late R. K. Jain left him surviving his widow (third respondent), two daughters and a son. One of the suggestions was that the third respondent (wife of deceased R. K. Jain) should be provided a suitable appointment. 4. Late R. K. Jain left him surviving his widow (third respondent), two daughters and a son. Third respondent submitted an application on 23-7-2004 to the State Government (Principal Secretary, Commercial Tax Department) seeking compassionate appointment on a Class II post. Along with the said application, she filed copies of testimonials to show that she possessed the requisite educational qualification for such post. Having regard to unfortunate circumstances in which her husband died and resultant public agitation, the State Government wanted to consider her case as a special case with compassion and sympathy. Therefore, after consulting the M.P. Public Service Commission (as per letter dated 26-7-2004) and securing its consent (as per reply dated 28-7-2004), the State Government issued an order dated 23-8-2004 appointing third respondent as Commercial Tax Officer (a Class II Post) on compassionate grounds on probation for a period of two years by relaxing the relevant recruitment Rules. It is stated that in pursuance of it, third respondent joined duty and is presently working as Commercial Tax Officer at Bhopal. 5. The petitioner, a practicing lawyer at Jabalpur, has filed this petition on 8-11-2004 by way of Public Interest Litigation for quashing the compassionate appointment order dated 23-8-2004 appointing third respondent as Commercial Tax Officer. He has also sought a direction to Lokayukt to complete investigation in Crime No. 97/2004 against late R. K. Jain and place the relevant material before the Court. The petitioner contends that the State Government has no power to make appointment to a class II Gazetted post, on compassionate grounds. It is submitted that appointment to such post can only be by an open process of recruitment through the M.P. Public Service Commission. It is also contended that as late R. K. Jain possessed huge assets, the family was not facing penury and there was no need to give appointment to third respondent to a class II Post, ignoring thousands of pending applications for compassionate appointment and regularisation. 6. The State (respondents No. 1 and 2) have resisted the petition. It is also contended that as late R. K. Jain possessed huge assets, the family was not facing penury and there was no need to give appointment to third respondent to a class II Post, ignoring thousands of pending applications for compassionate appointment and regularisation. 6. The State (respondents No. 1 and 2) have resisted the petition. It is stated that Commissioner of Commercial Tax, Indore, had sent a note dated 20-7-2004 informing that 55 posts of Commercial Tax Officers were lying vacant; that recruitment to the post of Commercial Tax Officers was governed by the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Sales Tax Class I and II Service Recruitment Rules, 1966 (for short 'Rules'); that the Commissioner of Commercial Tax recommended the appointment of the third respondent, by relaxing the Rules; that in view of the recommendation by the Commissioner, Commercial Tax and the approval granted by the M.P. State Public Service Commission; considering the hardship pleaded by the third respondent, the State Cabinet at its meeting on 4-8-2004 took a decision to grant appointment to third respondent as Commercial Tax Officer, by relaxing the Rules, as a special case. It denies any irregularity in making the appointment as per order dated 23-8-2004. It is stated that the decision was taken, at the highest level that is by the Cabinet, by relaxing the rules particularly having regard to the fact that third respondent's husband, who was a Senior Class I Gazetted Officer of the State Government with an unblemished service record died in the custody of the special Police establishment attached to Lokayukt. It is contended that the State Government was enabled to make such appointment under Rule 7(4) of the Rules. The State submits that the petition has been filed to benefit the police Officers, who are facing investigation in connection with the death of R. K. Jain. 7. Third respondent has filed a separate return reiterating the contentions raised by the respondents No. 1 and 2. Additionally, it is contended that challenge to the appointment of third respondent as Commercial Tax Officer, would amount to filing a PIL in a service matter, which is impermissible. It is also contended that in regard to the custodial death of R. K. Jain, an offence under section 302/330 of the Indian Penal Code has been registered, in Crime No. 346/2004, against Mr. M. S. Nain, Mr. It is also contended that in regard to the custodial death of R. K. Jain, an offence under section 302/330 of the Indian Penal Code has been registered, in Crime No. 346/2004, against Mr. M. S. Nain, Mr. B. P. Singh, and certain other Police Officers; and that this petition is filed at the instance of the said M. S. Nain to harass third respondent and therefore it should be dismissed. Lastly, it is contended that hers is not the first case of compassionate appointment to a Class II post; that there have been as many as six appointments between 1998 and 2002 on compassionate grounds to Class II Posts; and that her appointment on compassionate grounds being a valid one, it is not open to challenge. 8. The fourth respondent (Lokayukt M.P.) has filed a return stating that Crime No. 97/2004 was registered against R. K. Jain for offences punishable under section 13(2) read with section 13(1)(e) of Prevention of Corruption Act, for having disproportionate assets; and after completion of investigation, charge sheet was filed in the Court of Special Judge, Bhopal. It is also stated that the internal inquiry disclosed that R. K. Jain was not harassed by any officer of SPE. 9. On the contentions raised, the following questions arise for consideration: (i) Whether the appointment of third respondent on compassionate ground is valid and sustainable? (ii) Whether the appointment is valid having regard to Rule 7(4) of the M.P. Sales Tax Class I and n Service Recruitment Rules, 1966? (iii) Whether the PIL is not maintainable as it relates to a service matter and is filed with ulterior motives? (iv) Whether several compassionate appointments to Class II posts having been made in the past, interference with petitioner's appointment alone, will amount to subjecting her to hostile discrimination. Point (i) : 10. It is not in dispute that the compassionate appointments by the State Government are governed by the guidelines contained in its Circular dated 23-7-2001 (Annexure P/4 to the petition). Clause-in thereof enables the State Government to offer appointment to a dependent member of the family of the deceased Government servant to a Class EI of Class IV post (that is Assistant Grade m, Shiksha Karmi, Ward Boy, Forest Guard, Patwari and Peon or equivalent posts). Clause-in thereof enables the State Government to offer appointment to a dependent member of the family of the deceased Government servant to a Class EI of Class IV post (that is Assistant Grade m, Shiksha Karmi, Ward Boy, Forest Guard, Patwari and Peon or equivalent posts). It does not enable the State Government to offer appointment to a Class H post to a member of any deceased Government servant, who dies in harness. The said guidelines do not also contain any provision enabling appointment to a Class n post, by relaxing the conditions of appointment on compassionate grounds. 11. The Supreme Court has considered the nature of compassionate appointments in a series of cases. 11.1. In Umesh Kumar Nagpal v. State of Haryana, 1994 (4) SCC 138 , the Supreme Court has considered the matter exhaustively and made it clear that under no circumstances, compassionate appointment can be offered to a Class II post. The Supreme Court held : The question relates to the considerations which should guide while giving appointment in public services on compassionate ground.... As a rule, appointments in the public services should be made strictly on the basis of open invitation of applications and merit. No other mode of appointment nor any other consideration is permissible. Neither the Governments nor the public authorities are at liberty to follow any other procedure or relax the qualifications laid down by the rules for the post. However, to this general rule, which is to be followed strictly in every case, there are some exceptions carved out in the interests of justice and to meet certain contingencies. One such exception is in favour of the dependents of an employee dying in harness and leaving his family in penury and without any means of livelihood. In such cases, out of pure humanitarian consideration taking into consideration the fact that unless some source of livelihood is provided, the family would not be able to make both ends meet, a provision is made in the rules to provide gainful employment to one of the dependents of the deceased who may be eligible for such employment. The whole object of granting compassionate employment is thus to enable the family to tide over the sudden crisis. The object is not to give a member of such-family a post much less a post for post held by the deceased. The whole object of granting compassionate employment is thus to enable the family to tide over the sudden crisis. The object is not to give a member of such-family a post much less a post for post held by the deceased. What is further, mere death of an employee in harness does not entitle his family to such source of livelihood. The Government or the public authority concerned has to examine the financial condition of the family of the deceased, and it is only if it is satisfied, that but for the provision of employment, the family will not be able to meet the crisis that a job is to be offered to be eligible member of the family. The posts in Class III and IV are the lowest posts in non-manual and manual categories and hence they alone can be offered on compassionate grounds, the object being to relieve the family, of the financial destitution and to help it get over the emergency. The provision of employment in such lowest posts by making an exception to the rule is justifiable and valid since it is not discriminatory. The favorable treatment given to such dependent of the deceased employee in such posts has a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved, viz., relief against destitution. No other posts are expected or required to be given by the public authorities for the purpose. It must be remembered in this connection that as against the destitute family of the deceased, there are millions of other families which are equally, if not more destitute.... Unmindful of this legal position, some governments and public authorities have been offering compassionate employment sometimes as a matter of course irrespective of the financial condition of the family of the deceased and sometimes even in posts above class III and IV. That is legally impermissible.... In the present case, the High Court has rightly pointed out that the State Government's instructions in question did not justify compassionate employment in class II posts. However, it appears from the judgment that the State Government had made at least one exception and provided compassionate employment in Class II post on specious ground that the person concerned that technical qualifications such as M.B.B.S., B.E., B. Tech. etc. Such exception, as pointed out above, is illegal, since it is contrary to the object of making exception to the general rule. etc. Such exception, as pointed out above, is illegal, since it is contrary to the object of making exception to the general rule. The only ground which can justify compassionate employment is the penurious condition of the deceased's family. Neither the qualifications of his dependant nor the post which he held is relevant. It is for this reason that we are unable to understand the following observations of the High Court in the impugned judgment: We are of the view that the extraordinary situations require extraordinary remedies and it is open to the Government in real hard cases to deviate from the letter and spirit of the instructions and to provide relief in cases where it is so warranted. To hold as a matter of law that the Government cannot deviate even minutely from the policy of providing appointment only against Class III and Class IV posts, would be to ignore the reality of life these days. It would be ridiculous to expect that a dependant of a deceased Class I Officer, should be offered appointment against a Class HI or IV post. While we leave it to the Government to exercise its discretion judiciously in making appointments to Class I or II posts on compassionate grounds, yet a word of caution needs to be struck. It is to be noted that such appointments should be ordered in the rarest of rare cases, and in very exceptional circumstances. As a matter of fact, we would recommend that the Government should frame a policy even for such appointments. It is obvious from the above observations that the High Court endorses the policy of the State Government to make compassionate appointment in posts equivalent to the posts held by the deceased employees and above classes III and IV. It is necessary to reiterate that these observations are contrary to law. If the dependant of the deceased employee finds it below his dignity to accept the post offer he is free not to do so. The post is not offered to cater to his status but to see the family through the economic calamity. (emphasis supplied) 11.2. It is necessary to reiterate that these observations are contrary to law. If the dependant of the deceased employee finds it below his dignity to accept the post offer he is free not to do so. The post is not offered to cater to his status but to see the family through the economic calamity. (emphasis supplied) 11.2. The above principles were reiterated by the Supreme Court in Haryana State Electricity Board v. Hakim Singh, 1997 (8) SCC 85 , Director of Education (Secondary) v. Pushpendra Kumar, 1998 (5) SCC 192 and Punjab National Bank v. Ashwini Kumar Taneja, 2005 (1) UPU (SC) 225 : 2004 (7) SCC 265 . In Hakim Singh (supra), the Supreme Court held: The rule of appointments to public service is that they should be on merits and through open invitation. It is the normal route through which one can get into a public employment. However, as every rule can have exceptions, there are a few exceptions to the said rule also which have been evolved to meet certain contingencies. As per one such exception relief is provided to the bereaved family of a deceased employee by accommodating one of his dependents in a vacancy. The object is to give succour to the family which has been suddenly plunged into penury due to the untimely death of its sole breadwinner. This Court has observed time and again that the object of providing such ameliorating relief should not be taken as opening an alternative mode of recruitment to public employment. (Emphasis supplied) In Puskpendra Kumar (supra), the Supreme Court observed : "The object underlying a provision for grant of compassionate employment is to enable the family of the deceased employee to tide over the sudden crisis resulting due to death of the bread-earner which has left the family in penury and without any means of livelihood. Out of pure humanitarian consideration and having regard to the fact that unless some source of livelihood is provided, the family would not be able to make both ends meet, a provision is made for giving gainful appointment to one of the dependants of the deceased who may be eligible for such appointment. Such a provision makes a departure from the general provisions providing for appointment on the post by following a particular procedure. Such a provision makes a departure from the general provisions providing for appointment on the post by following a particular procedure. Since such a provision enables appointment being made without following the said procedure, it is in the nature of an exception to the general provisions. An exception cannot subsume the main provision to which it is an exception and thereby nullify the main provision by taking away completely the right conferred by the main provision. Care has, therefore, to be taken that a provision for grant of compassionate employment, which is in the nature of an exception to the general provisions, does not unduly interfere with the right of other persons who are eligible for appointment to seek employment against the post which would have been available to them, but for the provision enabling appointment being made on compassionate grounds of the dependent of a deceased employee. (Emphasis supplied) 11.3. From the said decisions, the following principles emerge : (a) Compassionate appointment is an exception to the general rule relating to appointment to public service, which is by open invitation and a competitive process. (b) Compassionate appointment can be only in accordance with the Scheme governing such appointment and not dehorns the Scheme. (c) Compassionate appointment is given to enable the family to tide over sudden crisis on account of death of breadwinner. It cannot be converted into a boon by seeking or providing an appointment to a Class I or Class II post. (d) Compassionate appointments should be made only to Class III or IV posts and not for Class I or Class II posts. A provision for appointment to such lower posts in a justifiable exception u>the general rule that appointment to public service can only be on the basis of open invitation of applications and merit. A compassionate appointment when made to a higher post (class I or II posts) ceases to be a justifiable exception, and will be treated as it will be discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. 12. In this case the scheme does not provide for compassionate appointment to class II posts. A compassionate appointment when made to a higher post (class I or II posts) ceases to be a justifiable exception, and will be treated as it will be discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. 12. In this case the scheme does not provide for compassionate appointment to class II posts. The reasons assigned for offering a class II post to third respondent are the very reasons that were expressly considered and negatived by the Supreme Court in Umesh Kumar Nagpal Having regard to the terms of the Scheme for compassionate appointment, and the clear principles laid down by the Supreme Court, it is clear that the appointment of third respondent to a class II post cannot be sustained. Neither the circumstances leading to the death of third respondent's husband, nor the position held by the husband of the third respondent, nor the availability of vacancies in higher posts, are relevant considerations for offering compassionate appointment. Death in harness and the consequential financial destitution of the family of the deceased, are the only two relevant considerations. If the State Government feels remorse or responsible for the death due to injuries while in police custody, and wants to give relief to the family of the deceased, it may do so by awarding compensation and/or extending any other special relief (not opposed to law) including offer of an employment to a Class HI post which is permissible under the guidelines. 13. An attempt was made by respondents No. 1 to 3 to justify the appointment to a class II post on compassionate grounds, with reference to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Sushma Gosain v. Union of India, AIR 1989 SC 1976 and Kamala Gaind v. State of Punjab, 1990 (Supp) SCC 800. It is even contended that the said decisions should be followed in preference to the two Judge Bench decision in Umesh Kumar Nagpal, as the decision in Kamla Gaind is rendered by a Bench of Three Judges. 13.1. In Sushma Gosain, the Supreme Court merely observed that it is improper to keep applications for compassionate appointments pending on the ground that there were no suitable posts and if necessary supernumerary posts should be created to make compassionate appointments. 13.1. In Sushma Gosain, the Supreme Court merely observed that it is improper to keep applications for compassionate appointments pending on the ground that there were no suitable posts and if necessary supernumerary posts should be created to make compassionate appointments. The said observation is of no assistance to claim appointment to a class II post, particularly as the request for appointment in the case Sushma Gosain was for the post of a Lower Division Clerk. In fact in Umesh Kumar Nagpal and Pushpendra Kumar, the Supreme Court have distinguished the decision in Sushma Gosain with the following observations: We are also dismayed to find that the decision of this Court in Sushma Gosain v. Union of India has been misinterpreted to the point of distortion. The decision does not justify compassionate employment either as a matter of course or in employment in posts above classes III and IV. (emphasis supplied) 13.2 In Kamala Gaind the appellant's husband was working as an Additional District Judge in Punjab Judicial Service. He was gunned down by the terrorists in the year 1986 at the height of terrorism in Punjab. The Punjab Government had framed a special scheme for providing jobs to one member of the family, of each Government Servants killed by Terrorists. The appellant's son was offered a Class II State Service post while others similarly placed had been given Class I posts. The Appellant complained of discrimination. The Supreme Court in a short judgment merely held that even in case of compassion, there must be no discrimination and directed that a suitable Class I post should be provided to the Appellant's son. While in this case the scheme specifically restricted compassionate appointments to only Class III or Class IV posts, it is evident that the special Punjab Scheme specifically contemplated appointment to Class I and Class II posts. In fact on that very ground the decision in Kamala Gaind was distinguished in Auditor General of India v. G. Anantha Rajeswara Rao, AIR 1994 SC 1521 . The observations in Kamala Gaind should, therefore, be considered as depending upon the special facts of the case and cannot be read as laying down a general proposition that compassionate appointments can be made even to class I and II posts. The observations in Kamala Gaind should, therefore, be considered as depending upon the special facts of the case and cannot be read as laying down a general proposition that compassionate appointments can be made even to class I and II posts. The contention that the decision in Umesh Kumar Nagpal rendered by two Judges runs counter to the decision in Kamala Gaind rendered by three Judges is therefore untenable, particularly when the principles laid down in Umesh Kumar Nagpal have been consistently followed in more than a dozen reported decisions of the Supreme Court including the three Judge Bench decision in Pushpendra Kumar. 13.3. Hence the said two decisions cannot be pressed into service to support compassionate appointment to a Class I or Class II Post. Re: Point (ii) 14. The State Government has attempted to find authority for the appointment, in Rule 7(4) of the Rules which reads as follows : Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (1), if in the opinion of Government the exigencies of the service so require, the Government may, after consulting the Commission, adopt such methods of recruitment to the Service other than those specified in the said sub-rule as it may, by order issued in this behalf, prescribe. The State contends that sub-rule (4) of Rule 7 enable the Government to make an appointment otherwise then by a competitive examination after consulting the Commission and the appointment of third respondent would therefore be covered by this Rule. 15. Rule 7 of the Rules deals with method of recruitment. It provides that recruitment to the Madhya Pradesh Sales Tax Class I and II Service, shall be either by a competitive examination or by promotion of persons holding substantively the posts indicated in the feeder channel. The Rules do not enable or empower the State Government to make appointment by relaxing the Rules nor provide for employment by direct recruitment without undergoing any competitive examination selection process. It is no doubt true that Rule 7(4) enables the State Government to adopt methods other than competitive examination and promotion for recruitment to the service provided the following conditions are fulfilled : (a) The Government should form an opinion that the exigencies of the service requires adoption of such a method other than competitive examination and promotion from the specified feeder cadres. (b) The new method of recruitment to be so adopted, should be prescribed by issue of an order after consulting the Madhya Pradesh Public Service Commission. 16. The term 'exigencies of service' clearly refers to urgent and emergent demand. The 'exigencies' is with reference to the urgent need of the service. It does not refer to the needs or necessitates of the person who seeks employment. It refers to a situation where there is an urgent need or necessity to appoint officer(s) to class I or II posts, but such appointment by prescribed mode (direct recruitment through competitive examination and by promotion) is not feasible. For example, if there is an urgent need for Class-I officers, and competitive examination is likely to take time and suitable persons are not available in the feeder cadres, the State may resort to borrowing the services of suitable persons on deputation. It cannot be said that the appointment of third respondent on the ground that her husband has been killed in mysterious circumstances while in the custody of the Police, is an urgent or emergent demand of the service relating to Commercial Tax Department. Therefore, the first condition for invoking Rule 7(4) does not exist. 17. The State Government admittedly has not 'prescribed' by any order, any alternative method of recruitment under Rule 7(4) for filling the posts of Commercial Tax Officer. Sub-rule (4) of Rule 7 cannot be relied on to justify an appointment, unless the mode of such appointment, is prescribed by the State Government as an alternative mode of recruitment, in consultation with the Public Service Commission. Therefore, the second condition for invoking Rule 7(4) is also not satisfied. 18. Whatever be the circumstances that led to the appointment, whatever be the public agitation, whatever be the recommendation of the department, the State Government cannot give a go-by to the Rules and make an appointment and then try to take shelter under Rule 7(4). The public employment is not a largesse to be distributed merely on the ground of hardship. If that is so, we are sure that there are hundreds or thousands, who are equally qualified and who are in similar or much more disadvantageous circumstances. Making such appointment would be an antithesis of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution assuring equality of opportunity in employment. 19. If that is so, we are sure that there are hundreds or thousands, who are equally qualified and who are in similar or much more disadvantageous circumstances. Making such appointment would be an antithesis of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution assuring equality of opportunity in employment. 19. At all events, it is not permissible for the State Government to justify an appointment on compassionate grounds by trying to convert it into an appointment under Rule 7(4). The application of third respondent was for appointment on compassionate ground. The recommendation by the M.P. Public Service Commission was also for appointment on compassionate ground. The appointment order also states that it was on special compassionate ground. The State Government in its return, has admitted that the appointment of third respondent was on compassionate appointment 'in order to help respondent No. 3 and her family to overcome distress caused on account of sudden demise of late Shri R K. Jain. Therefore, the validity of the appointment of third respondent should be tested with reference to the principles/Rules/Guidelines relating to compassionate appointment and not Rule 7(4) which has nothing to do with compassionate appointments. Point 111: 20. The third respondent has contended that the petition has been filed at the instance of M.S. Nain, In-Charge Superintendent of Police, whose hand is suspected in the mysterious death of R. K. Jain. The respondents No. 1 to 3 submit that certain facts pleaded by the petitioner and the documents produced by the petitioner show that he had access to records of Lokayukt and that was possible only at the instance of the person involved in the death of R. K. Jain. Reliance is placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Dattaraj Nathuji Thaware v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2005 SCW 46 , where Supreme Court deprecated the habit of members of the Bar filing Public Interest Litigation to secure personal advantage or to take revenge or to lend name of someone with an axe to grind. The Supreme Court also observed that Courts have to act ruthlessly while dealing with imposters and busy bodies or meddlesome interlopers impersonating as public spirited crusaders of justice. 21. If the cause is frivolous, if the cause is false, if the cause is to seek publicity, then the petitioner has to be dealt with severely. The Supreme Court also observed that Courts have to act ruthlessly while dealing with imposters and busy bodies or meddlesome interlopers impersonating as public spirited crusaders of justice. 21. If the cause is frivolous, if the cause is false, if the cause is to seek publicity, then the petitioner has to be dealt with severely. There can also be no two views about the duty of the High Court to segregate frivolous and publicity seeking litigation and dismiss them with heavy costs. But where the cause espoused is not frivolous, the mere fact that the petitioner is unconnected with the incident or that he might have secured information or documents with some effort from source normally not openly available to public, may not be grounds for rejection of a PIL, particularly when the PIL, satisfies the following requirements laid down in Dattaraj Nathuji (supra): (a) the credentials of the writ petitioner : (b) the prima facie correctness or nature of information given by him; and (c) the information should not be vague and indefinite, but show gravity and seriousness. Firstly, there is nothing to show any connection between petitioner who is a practicing Advocate at Jabalpur and M.S. Nain whose hand is suspected in the death of R. K. Jain. The petitioner's credentials are good. Secondly, as the cause espoused is genuine, clear and is in public interest, the possibility that the petitioner in the PIL may have been instigated by someone else to file the petition, pales into insignificance. The ground of ulterior motive and want of bona fides is therefore liable to be rejected. 22. Third respondent next contended that no PIL can lie in regard to service matters relying on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Dr. Duryodhan Sahu v. Jitendra Kumar Mishra, AIR 1999 SC114 and Dattaraj Nathuji (supra). In Duryodhan Sahu, the Supreme Court observed that a PIL at the instance of strangers cannot be entertained by the Administrative Tribunals in service matters, as such strangers were not 'persons aggrieved' and the provisions of Administrative Tribunals Act enable only persons aggrieved to approach the Tribunal. But that principle may not apply to a writ petition brought in public interest before the High Court where there is a relaxation of the rule of locus standi. But that principle may not apply to a writ petition brought in public interest before the High Court where there is a relaxation of the rule of locus standi. It is no doubt true that in Dattaraj Nathuji (supra), Supreme Court observed that High Courts should throw out pseudo-PELs relating to service matters. This means that High Courts should not entertain petitions which would not have been entertained by Tribunals as PIL. But there is nothing in Dattaraj Nathuji to prevent a genuine public cause being espoused in a PIL. This petition does not relate to a 'service matter' in the sense the said term is understood. This petition relates to Government making an appointment on compassionate grounds in- violation of the service Rules, guidelines regarding compassionate appointments, and the principles laid down by the Supreme Court. This petition clearly shows that if the order is allowed to stand, it may lead to repetition and perpetuation of the illegality by similar appointments to Class I and II being made without open selection, thereby subverting the goal of Articles 14 and 16. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the observation in Dr. Duryodhan Sahu and Dattaraj Nathuji do not come in the way of entertaining this petition. Point IV: 23. Lastly, it is contended that the State Government has granted compassionate appointments in Class II posts in respect of six persons during the years 1998, 2000, 2001 and 2002; and therefore, to deny similar appointment to the third respondent on the ground that the Rules do not provide for it, would amount to discrimination. The six cases are : s. No. Name Post Date of Appointment 1. Anil Kumar Mishra Police Prosecutor Class II 21-3-2002 2. Avnish Bansal Dy. Superintendent of Police 31-10-1998 3. Parminder Singh Dy. Superintendent of Police 25-11-2000 4. Rekha Diwan Assistant Professor 2000 5. Alpana Komlesh Assistant Professor 24-7-2000 6. Parakram Singh Chandrawat Assistant Professor 3-9-2001 We will assume that such appointments were made and that those appointments were illegal or contrary to Rules. But then the question is whether that will entitled third respondent to continue in the post. 24. Superintendent of Police 25-11-2000 4. Rekha Diwan Assistant Professor 2000 5. Alpana Komlesh Assistant Professor 24-7-2000 6. Parakram Singh Chandrawat Assistant Professor 3-9-2001 We will assume that such appointments were made and that those appointments were illegal or contrary to Rules. But then the question is whether that will entitled third respondent to continue in the post. 24. In Chandigarh Administration v. Jagjit Singh, 1995 (1) SCC 745 the Supreme Court held: Generally speaking, the mere fact that the respondent-authority has passed a particular order in the case of another person similarly situated can never be the ground for issuing a writ in favour of the petitioner on the plea of discrimination. The order in favour of the other person might be legal and valid or it might not be. That has to be investigated first before it can be directed to be followed in the case of the petitioner. If the order in favour of the other person is found to be contrary to law or not warranted in the facts and circumstances of his case, it is obvious that such illegal or unwarranted order cannot be made the basis of issuing a writ compelling the respondent-authority to repeat the illegality or to pass another unwarranted order. The extraordinary and discretionary power of the High Court cannot be exercised for such a purpose. Merely because the respondent-authority has passed one illegal/unwarranted order, it does not entitle the High Court to compel the authority to repeat that illegality over again and again. The illegal/unwarranted action must be corrected, if it can be done according to law - indeed, wherever, it is possible, the Court should direct the appropriate authority to correct such wrong orders in accordance with law - but even if it cannot be corrected, it is difficult to see how it can be made a basis for its repetition. By refusing to direct the respondent-authority to repeat the illegality, the Court is not condoning the earlier illegal act/order nor can such illegal order constitute the basis for a legitimate complaint of discrimination. Giving effect to such pleas would be prejudicial to the interests of law and will do incalculable mischief to public interest. It will be a negation of law and the rule of law. Giving effect to such pleas would be prejudicial to the interests of law and will do incalculable mischief to public interest. It will be a negation of law and the rule of law. Of course, if in case the order in favour of the other person is found to be a lawful and justified one it can be followed and a similar relief can be given to the petitioner if it is found that the petitioner's case is similar to the other persons' case. But, then why examine another person's case in his absence rather than examining the case of the petitioner who is present before the Court and seeking the relief. Is it not more appropriate and convenient to examine the entitlement of the petitioner before the Court to the relief asked for in the facts and circumstances of his case than to enquire into the correctness of the order made or action taken in another person's case, which other person is not before the case nor is his case. In our considered opinion, such a course - barring exceptional situations-would neither be advisable nor desirable. In other words, the High Court cannot ignore the law and the well-accepted norms governing the writ jurisdiction and say that because in one case a particular order has been passed or a particular action has been taken, the same must be repeated irrespective of the fact whether such an order or action is contrary to law or otherwise. Each case must be decided on its own merits, factual and legal, in accordance with relevant legal principles. The orders and actions of the authorities cannot be equated to the judgments of the Supreme Court and High Courts nor can they be elevated to the level of the precedents, as understood in the judicial world. In Gursharan Singh v. New Delhi Municipal Committee, AIR 1996 SC 1175 , the Supreme Court held : There appears to be some confusion in respect of the scope of Article 14 of the Constitution which guarantees equality before law to all citizens. This guarantee of equality before law is a positive concept and it cannot be enforced by a citizen or Court in a negative manner. This guarantee of equality before law is a positive concept and it cannot be enforced by a citizen or Court in a negative manner. To put it in other words, if an illegality or irregularity has been committed in favour of any individual or a group of individuals, the others cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court or of this Court, that the same irregularity or illegality be committed by the State, so far such petitioners are concerned, on the reasoning that they have been denied the benefits which have been extended to others although in an irregular or illegal manner. Such petitioners can question the validity of orders which are said to have been passed in favour of persons who were not entitled to the same, but they cannot claim orders which are sanctioned by law in their favour on principles of equality before law. Neither Article 14 of the Constitution conceives within the equality clause this concept nor Article 226 empowers the High Court to enforce such claim of equality before law. If such claims are enforced, it shall amount to directing to continue and perpetuate an illegal procedure or an illegal order for extending similar benefits to others. Before a claim based on equality clause is upheld, it must be established by the petitioner that his claim being just and legal, has been denied to him, while it has been extended to others and in this process there has been a discrimination. 25. In view of the above, the third respondent will be able to defend her appointment only if it is just and legal and not on the ground that someone else has also been extended the benefit of an illegality. The contention of petitioner, if accepted, would lead to repetition and perpetuation of illegality which is impermissible. Conclusion : 26. Our decision is not that third respondent should be denied any remedy. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that in case of custodial death, the family should be given compensation. It is surprising that the State Government has not chosen to extend such compensation to third respondent, even though it has categorically admitted that the death of third respondent's husband was in unexplained circumstances while in the custody of the Special Police Establishment. It is surprising that the State Government has not chosen to extend such compensation to third respondent, even though it has categorically admitted that the death of third respondent's husband was in unexplained circumstances while in the custody of the Special Police Establishment. It would be appropriate if the State Government shows sympathy and compassion to third respondent and her family by giving compensation as is the norm in such cases and also provide an appointment in a Class HI post. As stated at the outset, it is with great reluctance that we are interfering in the matter. But, such interference is absolutely necessary. If the appointment violative of principles relating to compassionate appointments is left undisturbed, it will spawn similar illegal appointments. 27. For the aforesaid reasons, we allow this petition as follows : (i) The order dated 23-8-2004 appointing the third respondent as Commercial Tax Officer (Class II) is quashed. (ii) We, however, recommend to the State Government that appropriate compensation as extended in cases of other custodial death should be offered to the third respondent. (iii) Quashing of the order of appointment will not come in the way of State Government extending to the family of late R. K. Jain, such concession and facilities as are permissible under law, including offer of appointment to a class HI post to one member of the family. (iv) Parties to bear their respective costs. The security deposit by petitioner be refunded to him.