Research › Search › Judgment

Allahabad High Court · body

2005 DIGILAW 298 (ALL)

BIMAL KISHORE PALIWAL v. IV ADDL DISTT AND SESSIONS JUDGE MUZAFFAR NAGAR

2005-02-18

VIKRAM NATH

body2005
VIKRAM NATH, J. This writ petition has been filed by the landlord for quashing the judgment and order dated 30-3-1989 passed by IVth Additional District Judge, Muzaffarnagar in S. C. C. Revision No. 50 of 1987 and S. C. C. Revision No. 52 of 1987 whereby both the revisions were allowed and the judgment and decree of the J. S. C. C. Muzaffarnagar decreeing the suit of the plaintiff-petitioner vide judgment dated 11-9-1987 was set aside and the suit was dismissed. 2. The dispute relates to premises No. 68 and 73 situate in Mandir Moran Mohalla Sarvat Darwaja Sharki, Muzaffarnagar of which the petitioner is the landlord and respondent No. 2, is the tenant. It is alleged that he had illegally inducted respondent No. 3 as the sub-tenant in 1983 without the consent of the landlord. The petitioner filed suit for ejectment of the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 from the premises No. 68 and 73 mentioned above, on the allegations that Vishnu Chand father of respondent No. 2 Om Prakash was the tenant of both the premises. After his death Om Prakash respondent No. 2 inducted Jagdish Prasad respondent No. 3 as the sub-tenant in premises No. 73 and started charging Rs. 40 from Jagdish Prasad as monthly rent. Om Prakash continued to pay only Rs. 30 as monthly rent for both the premises to the petitioner. On this allegation, the petitioner filed suit for eviction, which was registered as J. S. C. C. Suit No. 70 of 1983. 3. The suit was contested by both the defendants, namely, Om Prakash and Jagdish Prasad separately. It was alleged by both of them that the suit had been filed in collusion with the other defendant. However, it was alleged by both the defendants that Jagdish Prasad was living in premises No. 73 as a tenant of the landlord and that there was no sub-tenancy. 4. Evidence was led by the parties and witnesses were also examined by all the parties. The Trial Court vide judgment dated 11-9-1987 decreed the suit of the plaintiff-petitioner holding that both the premises No. 68 and 73 had been let out to Vishnu Chand father of Om Prakash (respondent No. 2 ). There was no contract of tenancy between the landlord and Jagdish Prasad the subtenant. The Trial Court vide judgment dated 11-9-1987 decreed the suit of the plaintiff-petitioner holding that both the premises No. 68 and 73 had been let out to Vishnu Chand father of Om Prakash (respondent No. 2 ). There was no contract of tenancy between the landlord and Jagdish Prasad the subtenant. It was held that Jagdish Prasad was not living in the premises No. 73 with the consent of the landlord and was therefore, not entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act No. 13 of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). 5. Aggrieved by judgment of the Trial Court two revisions were filed under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Court Act, 1887 (hereinafter referred to as the 1887 Act) S. C. C. Revision No. 50 of 1987 was filed by Om Prakash and S. C. C. Revision No. 52 of 1987 was filed by Jagdish Prasad. The Revisional Court vide impugned judgment dated 30-3-1989 allowed both the revisions and dismissed the suit holding that Jagdish Prasad was entitled to benefit of Section 14 of the Act as he had been living in the premises No. 73 with the consent of the landlord. Aggrieved by the said judgment the present writ petition has been filed. 6. I have heard Sri Bhupeshwar Dayal, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Sri Arjun Singhal learned Counsel for the respondents. 7. Shri B. Dayal learned Counsel for the petitioner has raised the following questions in the present petition: - Firstly, that a finding with regard to relationship of landlord and tenant being a pure finding of fact, and the Trial Court having recorded a finding that there was no contract of tenancy between the plaintiff and Jagdish Prasad and after appreciation of evidence, the Revisional Court while exercising the power under Section 25 of 1887 Act exceeded its jurisdiction in reversing the said finding. Secondly, it was urged that both the premises let out to Vishnu Chand was also affirmed by the Revisional Court and therefore, till such time Jagdish Prasad established any relationship with the landlord, he could not be entitled to benefit of Section 14 of the Act in view of clear denial of consent by the landlord. Secondly, it was urged that both the premises let out to Vishnu Chand was also affirmed by the Revisional Court and therefore, till such time Jagdish Prasad established any relationship with the landlord, he could not be entitled to benefit of Section 14 of the Act in view of clear denial of consent by the landlord. The third question urged is that in view of the admitted fact that rent receipt were still being issued to the main tenant Om Prakash and were never issued by the landlord in favour of Jagdish Prasad, he could not be held to be tenant of the landlord. 8. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the respondent has tried to defend the judgment of the Revision Court on the ground that this Court under Article 226 of Constitution cannot look into the finding of fact recorded by the Revisional Court and therefore, the petition being concluded by finding of fact (even though recorded by the Revisional Court,) the petition deserves to be dismissed. Learned Counsel for the respondent has drawn my attention to various documents filed alongwith counter affidavit to show that the possession and occupation of Jagdish Prasad was established at least from 1962 and therefore, the landlord having closed his eyes to use and occupation of the Jagdish Prasad even though he had sufficient knowledge, shall be deemed that there was implied consent of the landlord. 9. The scope and ambit of power under Section 25 of 1887 Act vested in the Revisional Court has been well settled by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Luxmi Kishore & Anr. v. Har Prasad Shukla, 1981 ARC 545. The relevant extracts of the Division Bench judgment is quoted below: 19. "if it finds that there is no evidence to sustain a finding on a particular issue of fact, it can ignore that finding. Same will be the case where the finding is based only on inadmissible evidence. In such case, the Court will be justified in deciding the question of fact itself, because the evidence is all one way. No assessment is needed. The Court can also decide the revision if only a question of law or some preliminary point of law, viz. validity of notice, is sufficient for its decision. " 20. In such case, the Court will be justified in deciding the question of fact itself, because the evidence is all one way. No assessment is needed. The Court can also decide the revision if only a question of law or some preliminary point of law, viz. validity of notice, is sufficient for its decision. " 20. But, if it finds that a particular finding of fact is vitiated by an error of law, it has power to pass such order as the justice of the case requires; but it has no jurisdiction to reassess or reappraise the evidence in order to determine as issue of fact for itself. If it cannot dispose of the case adequately without a finding on a particular issue of fact, it should sent the case back after laying down proper guidelines. It cannot enter into the evidence, assess it and determine an issue of fact. " 10. Having examined the judgment of the Revisional Court I am of the view that the Revisional Court exceeded its jurisdiction in reappreciating the evidence, which were considered by the Trial Court. The finding of fact recorded by the Trial Court could not be upset and substituted. The Revisional Court at best if convinced that the Trial Court had wrongly and incorrectly appreciated the evidence ought to have remanded the matter to the Trial Court rather than substituting its own finding. 11. The Revisional Court in para 10 has recorded the specific finding that Vishnu Chand father of defendant No. 1 Om Prakash was the tenant of both the property of premises No. 68 and 73 from 1945. It therefore, held that the notice given by the landlord under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act in respect of both the premises was a valid notice. It also recorded the finding that the property in suit was identifiable and had been correctly described. The Revisional Court also did not agree with the contention of the, respondent Jagdish Prasad that he was a tenant since 1945. 12. Revisional Court has tried to justify the exercise of its power under Section 25 of 1887 Act on the ground that it was not interfering with the findings of Trial Court on the question of sub-tenancy but was trying to hold that the occupation of Jagdish Prasad stood regularised under Section 14 of 1972 Act. 12. Revisional Court has tried to justify the exercise of its power under Section 25 of 1887 Act on the ground that it was not interfering with the findings of Trial Court on the question of sub-tenancy but was trying to hold that the occupation of Jagdish Prasad stood regularised under Section 14 of 1972 Act. The Revisional Court held that there was consent of the plaintiff- landlord and therefore, the possession of Jagdish Prasad stood regularised. This finding has been recorded by the Revisional Court on the ground that no case was pending for the eviction of the two defendants prior to 5-7-1976, the relevant date for consideration of possession for regularisation. The Revisional Court has also taken note of the fact that the petitioner- landlord had knowledge of the occupation of Jagdish Prasad from before 1976 and having not taken any action his consent was implied and ho was estopped from alleging sub-tenancy. The possession of Jagdish Prasad was therefore liable to be regularised. 13. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Girja Shankar Tiwari & Anr. v. Hridaya Ranjan Chakrawaarti & Anr. , 1988 (24) ALR 732 (SC ). In the said case, the Supreme Court while considering the question of deemed vacancy held that premises would be deemed to be vacant even though it may be in occupation of an employee of a Medical Store without consent of the landlord and rent being paid in the name of the Medical Store. The Supreme Court further held that mere knowledge of the landlord would not entitle the employee to benefit of regularisation under Section 14 of Act. In the said case, after closure of the Medical Store, prior to 1976 the employee of the Medical Store continued in possession and paid rent in the name of Medical Store, it was held that the employee would not be entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the Act. The Supreme Court held that as no rent was paid by the employee in his own name he cannot be treated as the tenant and it is only the Medical Store or its proprietor who could be held to be tenant in whose name the rent was being paid. 14. The Supreme Court held that as no rent was paid by the employee in his own name he cannot be treated as the tenant and it is only the Medical Store or its proprietor who could be held to be tenant in whose name the rent was being paid. 14. Learned Counsel for the respondent has relied upon the following two decisions, namely, in the case of Rajendra Kumar & Anr. v. District Judge Bulandshahr & Ors. , 1984 (10) ALR 123 and in the case of Rajendra Nath Sinha & Ors. v. IIIrd Additional District Judge, Allahabad, 1981 A. R. C. 271. Both the cases cannot be of any advantage to the respondent as there was consent of the landlord in both the cases, which is absent in the present case. Therefore, both the cases are distinguishable on fact. Moreover the case of Girja Shankar Tiwari (supra) of the Apex Court relied upon by the petitioner applies to the present case. 15. In the present case the rent has been admittedly paid in the name of Om Prakash the main tenant. The landlord has denied any consent to the occupation of Jagdish Prasad. Jagdish Prasad has never paid any rent in his own name. Even if it may be taken that the landlord had knowledge of occupation by Jagdish Prasad, still Jagdish Prasad cannot be held to be entitled to benefit of Section 14 of 1972 Act, in the absence of any specific consent of the landlord. Therefore, to take advantage of Section 14 of the Act it has to be necessarily established firstly that the occupation is from before 5-7-1976 and secondly there was specific consent of the landlord. Mere knowledge of the landlord is not sufficient. 16. In the circumstances, the Revisional Court has erred holding that Jagdish Prasad was entitled to regularisation at benefit under Section 14 of Act. 17. The writ petition, therefore, succeeds and is allowed. The impugned judgment of the Revisional Court dated 30-3-1989 set aside and that of the Trial Court dated 11-9-1987 confirmed. Petition allowed. .