MADAN B. LOKUR, J. ( 1 ) I have had the benefit of going through the draft judgement prepared by my learned brother and am in respectful agreement with him on all issues, except one. ( 2 ) THE divergence of views is in respect of the question whether the inquiry conducted under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1984 (the Act) in respect of villages Chattarpur, Khanpur, Satbari, Tughlakabad, Deoli and Khirkee was in accordance with the principles of natural justice. A Division Bench of this Court in balak Ram vs. Union of India, 37 (1989) DLT 150 (hereinafter referred to as Balak ram-III) held that the inquiry conducted under Section 5-A of the Act in respect of these villages (and also village Tigri) was vitiated. I am of opinion that this view still holds the field. Since there is no case before us in respect of village Tigri, I am not making any comment about the inquiry held in respect of this village. ( 3 ) WITH respect to villages Shayoorpur, Khirkee, Maidan Garhi and Rajpur khurd, I agree with my learned brother, though for different reasons, that the inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act was valid. ( 4 ) AS regards the cases pertaining to village Neb Sarai, I agree with my learned brother that these cases have to be dismissed because the Petitioners in these cases did not file any objections under Section 5-A of the Act. Similarly, I agree that all cases, in respect of other villages also, where objections were not filed under section 5-A of the Act should all be dismissed. ( 5 ) THE primary reason for my respectful disagreement is the way I read and understand three important judgements extensively referred to by learned counsels for the parties, namely, Abhey Ram vs. Union of India, (1997) 5 SCC 421 , Delhi administration vs. Gurdip Singh Uban and Ors. , (1999) 7 SCC 44 (hereinafter referred to as Uban-I) and Delhi Administration vs. Gurdip Singh Uban and Ors. , (2000) 7 SCC 296 (hereinafter referred to as Uban-II ). I am of the view that the validity or otherwise of the inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act in respect of the above six (or even seven) villages was not all in issue in either of these cases and so was not dealt with by the supreme Court. , (2000) 7 SCC 296 (hereinafter referred to as Uban-II ). I am of the view that the validity or otherwise of the inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act in respect of the above six (or even seven) villages was not all in issue in either of these cases and so was not dealt with by the supreme Court. In fact, neither Abhey Ram nor Gurdip Singh Uban had filed objections under Section 5-A of the Act and so the question of examining the validity of the inquiry in respect of their objections could not even arise for consideration before the Supreme Court. ( 6 ) MOREOVER, another Division Bench of this Court in Hari Ram Kakkar vs. Union of India and ors, 2002 (61) DRJ 86 (DB) once again came to the same conclusion as in Balak Ram-III and held that the inquiry under Section 5-A of the act in respect of village Satbari (one of the above seven villages) was vitiated. I find no reason to take a view different from that expressed by two different Division benches of this Court in Balak Ram-III and Hari Ram Kakkar. ( 7 ) ON 5th November, 1980 and 25th November, 1980, the Respondents issued two Notifications under Section 4 of the Act seeking to acquire almost 50,000 bighas of land in 13 villages in Delhi. The Notification dated 5th November, 1980 pertained to villages Tughlakabad, Tigri, Deoli, Khanpur, Saidul Ajaib, Neb Sarai, hauz Rani and Khirkee. The Notification dated 25th November, 1980 pertained to villages Chhatarpur, Satbari, Maidan Garhi, Shayoorpur and Rajpur Khurd. ( 8 ) DECLARATIONS under Section 6 of the Act were made in respect of these lands on 27th May, 1985, 6th June, 1985, 7th June, 1985 and 26th June, 1985. Of course, the declarations were made after inviting objections under Section 5-A of the act. ( 9 ) A large number of writ petitions were filed in this Court challenging the validity of the Notifications issued under Section 4 of the Act. These writ petitions were dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court in Munni Lal vs. Union of India, ilr (1984) I Delhi 469. The decision rendered by the Division Bench in Munni Lal was not challenged by anybody and it is common ground that this decision has become final. These writ petitions were dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court in Munni Lal vs. Union of India, ilr (1984) I Delhi 469. The decision rendered by the Division Bench in Munni Lal was not challenged by anybody and it is common ground that this decision has become final. Therefore, I am proceeding on the basis that the Notifications dated 5th november, 1980 and 25th November, 1980, both issued under Section 4 of the Act are valid in law and final. ( 10 ) AFTER the Notifications under Section 6 of the Act were issued, a large number of writ petitions were filed in which the principal contention urged was that the Notifications under Section 6 of the Act were bad in law because they were issued beyond a period of three years specified under the Act. ( 11 ) A Full Bench of this Court in Balak Ram Gupta vs. Union of India, AIR 1987 Del 239 (hereinafter referred to as Balak Ram-I) dealt with the contentions urged in those writ petitions and negatived the challenge. It was held by the Full bench that the Notifications issued under Section 6 of the Act were not made beyond time and to this extent they were not bad in law. The decision of the Full Bench was not challenged by anybody and has attained finality. However, there is a discussion about the decision of the Full Bench in Abhey Ram in which the Supreme Court upheld the view taken in Balak Ram-I. This issue, therefore, is also no longer res integra and in any case was not agitated by any of the learned counsels appearing for the parties. ( 12 ) IT may be mentioned, en passant, that the correctness of Balak Ram-I was sought to be challenged recently, based on a Constitution Bench decision in padma Sunder Rao vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2002) 3 SCC 533 . But a Division bench of this Court hearing the challenge negatived it in Sunil Nagpal vs. Union of india [wp (C) No. 838/1986 decided on 17th December, 2004]. It may also be mentioned that neither Sunil Nagpal nor any of the other petitioners whose cases were heard by the Division Bench had filed objections under Section 5-A of the Act. But a Division bench of this Court hearing the challenge negatived it in Sunil Nagpal vs. Union of india [wp (C) No. 838/1986 decided on 17th December, 2004]. It may also be mentioned that neither Sunil Nagpal nor any of the other petitioners whose cases were heard by the Division Bench had filed objections under Section 5-A of the Act. ( 13 ) AFTER the decision of the Full Bench, the merits of the issues raised in writ petitions challenging the issuance of Notifications under Section 6 of the Act were heard by a Division Bench which disposed of a batch of 73 writ petitions. ( 14 ) UPON hearing arguments, the Division Bench passed a short order on 14th August, 1988. This is reported as B. R. Gupta vs. Union of India, 38 (1989) DLT 243 (DB) (hereinafter referred to as Balak Ram-II) and reads as follows:- the orders of Land Acquisition Collectors under Section 5-A and the notifications issued by the Lt. Governor under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act together with further land acquisition proceedings in all the above writ petitions are quashed and set aside with costs. There shall be two set of counsel s fees only at rs. 1500/- each as the group of petitions were heard mainly in the two writ petitions. The respondents have also not filed the counter affidavits in all the petitions as it was agreed to complete two sets of petitions with counter affidavits. The rule is made absolute. Reasons to follow. ( 15 ) THE Division Bench thereafter gave reasons in support of its short order passed on 14th August, 1988. The reasons are contained in Balak Ram-III. ( 16 ) THE conclusions arrived at and directions given in Balak Ram-III in so far as they are material to these cases are:- (A) the inquiry conducted by the Land Acquisition Collector (the Collector) under Section 5-A of the Act, in respect of seven villages, is vitiated due to non- compliance with the principles of natural justice, inter alia, because the Collector who heard the objections was not the Collector who gave the report. These villages are chhatarpur, Khanpur, Satbari, Tigri, Tughlakabad, Deoli and Khirkee. (B) the Lt. Governor issued declarations under Section 6 of the Act in respect of eleven villages without proper application of mind and his satisfaction in this regard was not real but mechanical. These villages are chhatarpur, Khanpur, Satbari, Tigri, Tughlakabad, Deoli and Khirkee. (B) the Lt. Governor issued declarations under Section 6 of the Act in respect of eleven villages without proper application of mind and his satisfaction in this regard was not real but mechanical. He failed to disclose any reason for rejecting all objections filed under Section 5-A of the Act. (C) the entire acquisition in respect of eleven villages was quashed. This was even with regard to those persons who had not filed objections and had also not filed any writ petition. Since no objections were filed relating to village Hauz Rani, the acquisition of land in that village was not disturbed. Village Saidul Ajaib was not the subject matter of discussion. ( 17 ) IT is significant to note that no one challenged the short order passed by the Division Bench nor did any one challenge the reasons given and conclusions arrived at and consequent directions of the Division Bench. In other words, Balak ram-II and Balak Ram-III attained finality and the acquisition of land in eleven villages was held to be contrary to law. ( 18 ) SOME other writ petitions were then sporadically taken up for disposal by this Court in accordance with the decision rendered in Balak Ram-II and Balak Ram- iii. These writ petitions were allowed in view of the above and the decisions rendered therein were also not challenged by anybody. ( 19 ) HOWEVER, in one set of cases, being Balbir Singh vs. Union of India and ors. , 39 (1989) DLT 233 the Respondents, through the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) approached the Supreme Court challenging the decision rendered by this court. By a judgement and order dated 20th September, 1991 (although it is reported much later) the Supreme Court upheld Balak Ram-III. The decision of the Supreme court is reported as Delhi Development Authority vs. Sudan Singh and Ors. , (1997) 5 scc 430 . This decision related to village Saidul Ajaib also. ( 20 ) FOLLOWING the decision in Sudan Singh, several writ petitions were intermittently taken up and allowed by various Benches of this Court. The decision of the Supreme court is reported as Delhi Development Authority vs. Sudan Singh and Ors. , (1997) 5 scc 430 . This decision related to village Saidul Ajaib also. ( 20 ) FOLLOWING the decision in Sudan Singh, several writ petitions were intermittently taken up and allowed by various Benches of this Court. In fact, after the decision in Sudan Singh, it appears that all parties assumed that the acquisition proceedings in respect of 12 villages (other than Hauz Rani) were quashed and that nothing further was required to be done except to dispose of the pending writ petitions. ( 21 ) ONE Abhey Ram had also filed a writ petition in this Court challenging the acquisition of his land pursuant to the Notifications mentioned above. However, since the only point urged by him was covered by Balak Ram-I, his writ petition was dismissed by this Court. ( 22 ) FEELING aggrieved, Abhey Ram approached the Supreme Court and the decision rendered in his case is reported as Abhey Ram vs. Union of India, (1997) 5 scc 421 (supra ). While disposing of Abhey Ram, the Supreme Court upheld Balak ram-I, overruled Sudan Singh and expressed some doubt with regard to the earlier direction given in Balak Ram-III. This is what the Supreme Court had to say in respect of Balak Ram-III in paragraph 9 of the Report:- we are not concerned with the correctness of the earlier direction with regard to section 5-A enquiry and consideration of objections as it was not challenged by the respondent Union. We express no opinion on its correctness, though it is open to doubt. ( 23 ) A reading of Abhey Ram suggests to me that the above extract has reference to the second conclusion/direction given in Balak Ram-III. This is because the first conclusion arrived at in Balak Ram-III was not at all in issue in Abhey Ram (who had not filed objections under Section 5-A of the Act) while the third conclusion was set aside in Abhey Ram which clarified that the effect of Balak Ram-III would be limited only to those 73 writ petitions that were the subject matter of Balak Ram-II. I am of the view that the above extract from Abhey Ram has to be read and understood in this context. I am of the view that the above extract from Abhey Ram has to be read and understood in this context. ( 24 ) CONSEQUENTLY, in so far as the present controversy is concerned, it was held in Abhey Ram that:- (A) balak Ram-II only quashed the declarations under Section 6 of the Act in respect of the writ petitioners before the Division Bench. The benefit of quashing those declarations did not inure to the benefit of other persons such as Abhey Ram who were not petitioners in Balak Ram-II. To this extent, Balak Ram-III was wrongly decided. (B) since Abhey Ram did not file any objections under Section 5-A of the act, there was no need to consider his objections. Consequently, the declarations under Section 6 of the Act were valid in so far as Abhey Ram and all those who had not filed objections under Section 5-A of the Act were concerned. ( 25 ) SOME time in 1996, the case of one Gurdip Singh Uban came up for hearing before this Court. By an order dated 17th December, 1996, the writ petition filed by Gurdip Singh Uban was allowed on the ground that Balak Ram-III had quashed the declarations issued under Section 6 of the Act and so Gurdip Singh Uban was entitled to the benefit of that judgment even though he had not filed any objections under Section 5-A of the Act. ( 26 ) THE Delhi Administration approached the Supreme Court against the decision of this Court in Gurdip Singh Uban. The Supreme Court agreed in principle with the view rendered in Abhey Ram to the effect that those who have not filed objections under Section 5-A of the Act cannot be allowed to contend that the Section 5-A inquiry was bad in law or that the declarations issued under Section 6 of the Act ought to be struck down. Therefore, it was held that in respect of persons who had not filed objections under Section 5-A of the Act, the declarations under Section 6 of the Act must be deemed to be in force in so far as they are concerned. (Paragraph 8 of the Report ). Since Gurdip Singh Uban had not filed objections under Section 5-A of the Act, the appeal filed by the Delhi Administration was allowed and his writ petition was dismissed. (Paragraph 8 of the Report ). Since Gurdip Singh Uban had not filed objections under Section 5-A of the Act, the appeal filed by the Delhi Administration was allowed and his writ petition was dismissed. The decision of the Supreme Court is reported as Delhi administration vs. Gurdip Singh Uban and Ors. , (1999) 7 SCC 44 (hereinafter referred to as Uban-I ). ( 27 ) SUBSEQUENTLY, an application for review was filed in Uban-I and this was decided by a detailed judgement being Delhi Administration vs. Gurdip Singh Uban and Ors. , (2000) 7 SCC 296 (hereinafter referred to as Uban-II ). ( 28 ) IN Uban-II, the Supreme Court formulated as many as eight points for consideration but I am really concerned with Point No. 3 (Points No. 2 and 3 were dealt with together) and Points No. 4 and 5 which were dealt with collectively. These points are as follows:- (2) Whether, in any event, the judgment of this Court dated 20-8-1999 allowing the appeals of the Delhi Administration and Delhi Development Authority was liable to be set aside on merits, treating this as the first review petition, and whether such a relief could be granted on the ground that the two-Judge Bench of this Court in these civil appeals which followed Abhey Ram (decided by three learned Judges) should have referred Abhey Ram to a larger Bench? (3) Whether the order of the Division Bench in Balak Ram Gupta case, where there are two orders, the order dated 14-10-1988 allowing the writ petitions in 73 civil writ petitions (reasons to follow) controlled the subsequent order passed in those cases on 18-11-1988 containing the reasons and whether in the latter order, the High Court could have quashed land acquisition proceedings in writ petitions which were not before them? (4) Whether under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, while dealing with an inquiry report under Section 5-A, the Government (here the Lt. Governor) is required to give elaborate reasons? (5) To what extent could a person who had not filed objection in Section 5-A inquiry challenge the Section 6 declaration? (4) Whether under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, while dealing with an inquiry report under Section 5-A, the Government (here the Lt. Governor) is required to give elaborate reasons? (5) To what extent could a person who had not filed objection in Section 5-A inquiry challenge the Section 6 declaration? ( 29 ) IN so far as Points No. 2 and 3 are concerned, the Supreme Court noted that in Uban-I, it had agreed with Abhey Ram that a land owner who did not file any objections under Section 5-A of the Act cannot be allowed to challenge a declaration under Section 6 of the Act, except where it is a colourable exercise of power or if the challenge that goes to the root of the acquisition such as where it is contended that there is no public purpose involved in the acquisition. The Supreme Court also made it clear that Balak Ram-II and Balak Ram-III must be confined only to those 73 writ petitions that were decided in Balak Ram-II because the objections filed were personal to each case and there was no argument that there was no public purpose in issuing the declarations or that there was a colourable exercise of power while issuing the declarations under Section 6 of the Act. Consequently, in respect of cases not before it, the High Court could not have (in Balak Ram-III) quashed the Section 5-A inquiry and Section 6 declarations, particularly when no question was raised that went to the root of the matter. (Paragraphs 41, 42 and 45 of the Report ). Summarizing its view in Paragraph 45 of the Report, the Supreme Court said as follows:- [the Appellant s] contention was however repelled in Abhey Ram holding that notwithstanding the broad language used in the latter reasoned order dated 18-11- 1988 [balak Ram-III], its area of operation was to be confined to what was stated by the same Division Bench earlier on 14-10-1988 [balak Ram-II] when a brief operative order was passed in the 73 cases allowing the writ petitions. We have already held that the writ absolute dated 14-10-1988 in each case was based on non- consideration of objections and not on the basis of there being no public purpose and that the decision in each case must, therefore, be confined to the land covered therein. We have already held that the writ absolute dated 14-10-1988 in each case was based on non- consideration of objections and not on the basis of there being no public purpose and that the decision in each case must, therefore, be confined to the land covered therein. The three-Judge Bench in Abhey Ram held that the reasoned order dated 18-11-1988 of the Division Bench could not travel beyond the earlier operative order dated 14-10- 1988 and could not have covered land other than the land involved in the said batch of writ petitions. ( 30 ) WHILE dealing with Points No. 4 and 5, the Supreme Court held that some of the observations made by the Division Bench, which have been extracted in paragraph 48 of the Report, do not lay down the law correctly. These observations related to the manner in which the Lt. Governor had exercised his power while issuing declarations under Section 6 of the Act. The Supreme Court reiterated the principle that it was not necessary for a declaration under Section 6 of the Act to contain reasons or refer to the objections for every parcel of land. It was held that it was sufficient if the authority, which conducts an inquiry under Section 5-A of the act, has considered the objections and if the appropriate Government accepts the report under Section 5-A of the Act, then the declaration that follows under Section 6 of the Act need not advert to the reasons or facts concerning each piece of land. To this extent, the contrary observations in Balak Ram-III could not be accepted and the doubt expressed in Abhey Ram was set at rest. ( 31 ) IN the above context, the Supreme Court held in paragraphs 50 and 51 of the Report that:- 50. No reasons or other facts need be mentioned in the Section 6 declaration on its face. If the satisfaction is challenged in the court, the Government can show the record upon which the Government acted and justify the satisfaction expressed in the section 6 declaration. 51. It is true that Section 6 uses the words particular land but in our view while referring to its satisfaction in regard to the need to acquire the entire land, the government need not refer to every piece of particular land. 51. It is true that Section 6 uses the words particular land but in our view while referring to its satisfaction in regard to the need to acquire the entire land, the government need not refer to every piece of particular land. It is sufficient if the authority which conducts the Section 5-A inquiry has considered the objections raised in relation to any particular land. Even where the said authority accepts the objections, that is not binding on the Government which can take a different view for good reasons. Where the Government agrees with the report under Section 5-A, the declaration under Section 6 need not advert to the reasons or facts concerning each piece of land. Hence, the wide observations made in Balak Ram Gupta case cannot be accepted. ( 32 ) THE Supreme Court thereafter clarified that objections under Section 5-A of the Act can be generic in the sense that the land sought to be acquired is not required for a public purpose. The objections can also be specific in the sense that particular land of a particular individual is not required for a public purpose. In so far as the issues raised in Balak Ram-III are concerned, apart from holding that the Lt. Governor had expressed his satisfaction in accordance with law, the Supreme Court noted that his satisfaction regarding public purpose was not in issue before the division Bench because there was no dispute that the purpose for which the land is required is a public purpose. (Paragraphs 42, 56 and 59 of the Report ). The Supreme court, therefore, reaffirmed its view that land owners who had not filed any objection under Section 5-A of the Act were not entitled to the benefit of Balak Ram-III. The supreme Court was not concerned in Uban-II with the cases of those who had filed objections under Section 5-A of the Act, except to the extent of clarifying that their objections did not relate to the public purpose for which land was sought to be acquired. ( 33 ) A reading of all these judgements would go to show the following:- (I) the Supreme Court categorized land owners into those who filed objections under Section 5-A of the Act and those who did not. ( 33 ) A reading of all these judgements would go to show the following:- (I) the Supreme Court categorized land owners into those who filed objections under Section 5-A of the Act and those who did not. In respect of those who did not file any objections, the Supreme Court held in Abhey Ram, Uban-I and uban-II that they were not entitled to any relief. (II) none of the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court, either in Abhey ram or in Uban-I and Uban-II dealt with, or were even concerned with, the rights of land owners who had filed objections under Section 5-A of the Act. (III) there was no generic challenge to the Notifications under Section 6 of the Act, namely, that the land was not required for a public purpose. To this extent, therefore, the Notifications under Section 6 of the Act were valid and there was a public purpose in acquiring the land. (IV) the writ petitioners who had filed objections under Section 5-A of the act and whose writ petitions were allowed by Balak Ram-II and Balak Ram-III are entitled to continue to say that the declarations under Section 6 of the Act, in so far as they are concerned, are not valid in view of the decisions of this Court which still hold the field and which decisions have not been considered, let alone upset by the supreme Court. ( 34 ) IN view of the above, the question that survives for consideration is what benefit, if any, are the present Petitioners entitled to under the Act? Clearly those petitioners who did not file any objections under Section 5-A of the Act are not entitled to any relief. But, what about those who did file objections? Obviously, each case will have to be considered individually, but the broad facts mentioned above suggest that at least some writ petitioners would be entitled to the benefit of a part of the reasoning given in Balak Ram-III. ( 35 ) IN Balak Ram-III, the Division Bench noted that in respect of seven villages, that is, Chhatarpur, Khanpur, Satbari, Tigri, Tughlakabad, Deoli and khirkee, objections under Section 5-A of the Act were heard by one Collector but the consequent report was given by another Collector. ( 35 ) IN Balak Ram-III, the Division Bench noted that in respect of seven villages, that is, Chhatarpur, Khanpur, Satbari, Tigri, Tughlakabad, Deoli and khirkee, objections under Section 5-A of the Act were heard by one Collector but the consequent report was given by another Collector. On these facts, it was conceded by the learned Government counsel that he could not support the Section 6 declarations in respect of these villages. Nevertheless, the Division Bench looked into the matter (ignoring the concession made by learned counsel) and independently examined the requirements under Sections 5-A and 6 of the Act as well as the facts disclosed from the original record. In paragraph 8 of Balak Ram-III, the Division Bench noted that in respect of these seven villages, the following stood out:- (i) no effective and real opportunity of being heard was given to the Petitioners/objectors and, therefore, the acquisition proceedings could not be sustained in law. (ii) implicit in the provisions of Section 5-A of the Act is the requirement that a person hearing the objections and the person making the report thereon, must be one and the same. This is because valuable property of a land owner/objector is sought to be taken by the Government, which cannot be permitted to exercise its power arbitrarily. (iii) on a perusal of the original files, it was clear that notes were not maintained by the Collector who heard the objectors. As such, the succeeding collector who actually made the report did not have the benefit of the hearing given by his predecessor. Admittedly, the Collector who made the report did not give any hearing to the objectors. ( 36 ) I am of the view that the conclusions arrived at by the Division Bench in balak Ram-III are valid even today, and in fact have not been doubted or disputed by anybody till today. ( 37 ) IT was submitted by learned counsel for the Respondents that the fact that objections under Section 5-A of the Act were heard by one Collector and the report given by another Collector would not vitiate the inquiry because, according to her, it was merely an administrative exercise of power by the Collector and so the principle that the one who decides must hear would not be applicable. On the other hand, it was submitted by learned counsel for the Petitioners that the proceedings before the collector are quasi-judicial, or judicial proceedings and, therefore, the Collector who heard the objections ought to have submitted his report or else his successor ought to have heard the objections afresh before giving his report. This argument is, of course, material in so far as seven villages are concerned, namely, Chhatarpur, Khanpur, deoli, Satbari, Khirkee, Tughlakabad and Tigri, out of which, I am not concerned with Tigri. ( 38 ) WHILE there was much debate on the question whether an inquiry held under Section 5-A of the Act is a quasi-judicial or an administrative inquiry, there was no discussion on the second aspect of this issue, namely, whether a report prepared by the Collector is an administrative report or not. Consequently, I think it would be appropriate to proceed on the basis that a report prepared by the Collector under Section 5-A of the Act is an administrative report. Such a report may be administratively accepted, rejected or modified by the appropriate Government, and so it cannot be said that it is a quasi-judicial or a judicial report even if the inquiry is required to be held in a quasi-judicial manner. ( 39 ) IN any case, this issue is not a live one because a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held in Jayantilal Amrit Lal Shodhan vs. F. N. Rana and Ors. , AIR 1964 SC 648 that a report prepared by a Collector under Section 5-A of the Act is an administrative report. The Constitution Bench also held in paragraph 19 and 20 of the report that the Collector does not make a judicial or a quasi-judicial inquiry. ( 40 ) FRANKLY, I would have thought that this should have been the end of the matter, but learned counsel for the Petitioners drew attention to Section 14 of the Act to contend that an inquiry under Section 5-A is nothing but a quasi-judicial inquiry that has to be conducted, by and large, on the principles laid down in the Code of Section 5-A civil Procedure (CPC ). It was submitted that it is for this reason that power has been vested in the Collector to summon and enforce the attendance of witnesses and to compel the production of documents in the manner provided for in the CPC. It was submitted that it is for this reason that power has been vested in the Collector to summon and enforce the attendance of witnesses and to compel the production of documents in the manner provided for in the CPC. It was submitted that the Constitution Bench had overlooked Section 14 of the Act which clearly postulates that an inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act is not an administrative, but a quasi-judicial inquiry. ( 41 ) THE question whether a Collector holds a quasi-judicial inquiry or an administrative inquiry is really academic today because of the development in the law over the last 40 years (particularly since Maneka Gandhi vs. UOI, AIR 1978 SC 597 ), which is to the effect that even if such an inquiry is an administrative inquiry, it does not preclude the principles of natural justice and fair play, given the nature and consequence of the inquiry. ( 42 ) NEVERTHELESS, learned counsel for the Petitioners wanted to emphasize that the decision of the Constitution Bench requires to be reconsidered by the supreme Court. To reinforce his submission, learned counsel relied upon Gasket radiators Pvt. Ltd. vs. Employees State Insurance Corporation and Anr. , (1985) 2 SCC 68 to contend that a judgment of the Court on a particular aspect of a question is not to be read as a Holy Book covering all aspects of every question whether such questions and facets of such questions arise for consideration or not in that case. Reliance was also placed on Assam Sillimanite Ltd. and Anr. vs. Union of India and ors. , ILR (1977) I Delhi 272 to contend that it is well known that when authority is wanting, Courts decide a case for a point of principle. It was submitted that it has been held in State of Bihar vs. Kalika Kuer and Ors. , (2003) 5 SCC 448 that where a judgment is rendered by a Court, including the Supreme Court, in ignorance of the terms of a statute, the judgement can be said to have been rendered per incuriam or even per ignoratium and as such would not be binding. , (2003) 5 SCC 448 that where a judgment is rendered by a Court, including the Supreme Court, in ignorance of the terms of a statute, the judgement can be said to have been rendered per incuriam or even per ignoratium and as such would not be binding. Fagu Shaw vs. State of West bengal, (1974) 4 SCC 152 was relied upon (paragraph 38 of the Report) to suggest that where there is no discussion on any point and no reasons are given in support of that point, it would merely amount to an expression of the ipse dixit of the Court which cannot bind anybody. Quinn vs. Leathem, (1900-1903) All ER Reprint 1 was cited to contend that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but are governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. It has also been held in that decision (page 7 of the Report) that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides and cannot be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. ( 43 ) REFERENCE was also made to Gullapalli Nageshwar Rao vs. APSRTC, air 1959 SC 308 wherein it has been held (paragraphs 21 to 24 of the Report) that the State Government order under Section 68-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 as amended in 1956 is a judicial act and the State Government acts judicially while framing a scheme under Section 68-C of the said Act. It was, therefore, held that if the Secretary in the Department hears objections under Section 68-D of the said act and the Minister adjudicates upon them, then there is a violation of the principles of natural justice and the hearing granted to an objector is only an empty formality. ( 44 ) LEARNED counsel for the Respondents cited Ossein and Gelatine manufacturers Association of India vs. Modi Alkalies and Chemicals Ltd. and Anr. , (1989) 4 SCC 264 , but since that does not relate to the Land Acquisition Act, I do not think it necessary to discuss the conclusion arrived at by the Supreme Court in that case. But, in Sam Hiring Co. , (1989) 4 SCC 264 , but since that does not relate to the Land Acquisition Act, I do not think it necessary to discuss the conclusion arrived at by the Supreme Court in that case. But, in Sam Hiring Co. vs. A. R. Bhujbal and Ors. , (1996) 8 SCC 18 it has been held that the Collector is not a judicial or a quasi-judicial authority; he exercises his power under Section 5-A of the Act as an administrative authority. However, in shyam Nandan Prasad and Ors. vs. State of Bihar and Ors. , (1993) 4 SCC 255 there is an observation in paragraph 17 of the Report that the Collector is required to hold a quasi-judicial inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. Reference may also be made to State of Mysore and Others vs. V. K. Kangan and Others, (1976) 2 SCC 895 where it has been held in paragraph 8 of the Report that the proceedings of the collector under Section 5-A of the Act are quasi-judicial. ( 45 ) I do not think it is really necessary for this case to decide whether an inquiry conducted under Section 5-A of the Act is a quasi-judicial inquiry or an administrative inquiry or even whether a report submitted by the Collector to the appropriate Government under Section 5-A is a quasi-judicial report or an administrative report. In any event, the Constitution Bench in Jayantilal has already settled these issues. ( 46 ) HOWEVER, regardless of anything, it cannot be said that an inquiry under section 5-A of the Act should not be given its due importance. ( 47 ) IN Union of India and Others vs. Mukesh Hans, (2004) 8 SCC 14 , it has been held in paragraph 35 of the Report that the right conferred by Section 5-A of the act is a substantive right and is not an empty formality. In the same decision, the supreme Court has quoted with approval the observations rendered in Munshi Singh vs. Union of India, (1973) 2 SCC 337 wherein it has been said that:- section 5-A embodies a very just and wholesome principle that a person whose property is being or is intended to be acquired should have a proper and reasonable opportunity of persuading the authorities concerned that acquisition of the property belonging to that person should not be made. ( 48 ) THEREAFTER, in paragraph 36 of the Report, it has been reiterated that the right of representation and hearing contemplated under Section 5-A of the Act is a very valuable right of a person whose property is sought to be acquired and that he should have an appropriate and reasonable opportunity of persuading the authorities concerned that the acquisition of his property should not be made. ( 49 ) IN Shyam Nandan Prasad, the Supreme Court reiterated that affording an opportunity of being heard to an objector under Section 5-A of the Act is a must and that the provision embodies a just and wholesome principle as mentioned above. In nandeshwar Prasad and Ors. vs. U. P. Government and Ors. , AIR 1964 SC 1217 , it has been held by the Supreme Court that the right of hearing under Section 5-A of the Act is a substantial right. ( 50 ) IN Farid Ahmed vs. Municipal Corporation, AIR 1976 SC 1095 it has been noted in paragraph 18 of the Report that the heart of Section 5-A of the Act is the hearing of objections and that sub-section (2) of Section 5-A of the Act mandatorily provides for a personal hearing. It is quite another matter that the right of personal hearing may be abandoned, but it is quite clear that a personal hearing must be offered by the Collector (and does not rest on a person s demand for it) and if the offer is accepted by the objector then a personal hearing must be given in accordance with law. .