J. K. BISWAS, J. ( 1 ) THE writ petitioner is aggrieved by the decisions of the disciplinary authority dated February 28th, 2003 and of the appellate authority dated december 28th, 2003, which were given in the disciplinary proceeding initiated against him by the charge-sheet dated August 19th, 1995. The penalty of dismissal from service imposed by the disciplinary authority was affirmed by the appellate authority. ( 2 ) HE was working as a shramik in West Bengal State Electricity board. In the charge-sheet it was alleged that he along with a Asit Baran ghosh (a senior assistant working in the board) were caught by the officers of the corporate vigilance cell of the board while receiving bribe from a consumer at his residence on July 21st, 1995. ( 3 ) HE moved a writ petition for stay of the disciplinary proceeding on the ground that the criminal laws were set into motion by FIR dated July 21st, 1995. By an order dated May 27th, 1996 the disciplinary proceeding was stayed. Since the police failed to file any charge-sheet, he was discharged by the Criminal Court. By order dated December 14th, 2000 stay granted in his 1996 writ petition was vacated. ( 4 ) THEN an enquiry was conducted by the duly appointed enquiry officer. In the enquiry while the board examined nine witnesses to bring home the charges, no defence evidence was adduced by the petitioner. In addition to oral evidence of the witnesses, the board adduced documentary evidence, including a confessional statement of the petitioner dated July 21st, 1995. ( 5 ) THE enquiry officer submitted his report recording the findings of guilt. After giving opportunity of showing cause against the findings of the enquiry officer, and also against the proposed penalty, the disciplinary authority gave his decision. The appeal preferred was rejected. ( 6 ) ADVOCATE for the petitioner argues that, on the facts, the decisions are liable to be set aside, because there was no evidence to prove the allegation that the petitioner took bribe. The appeal preferred was rejected. ( 6 ) ADVOCATE for the petitioner argues that, on the facts, the decisions are liable to be set aside, because there was no evidence to prove the allegation that the petitioner took bribe. He has read to me depositions of the witnesses, and has commented that except the fact of mere presence of the petitioner at the residence of the consumer, at which a trap was laid by the vigilance cell of the board, nothing was proved ; and the presence factor alone was not sufficient to reach a conclusion that the petitioner accepted bribe for tampering with the meter or was present at the place for tampering with the meter. He argues that evidence of the witnesses would show that the enquiry officer recorded findings of guilt on the basis of suspicion. According to him, having regard to the nature of the evidence, the petitioner was entitled to get the benefit of doubts. He says that, in any case, the penalty of dismissal from service with the specified consequences is shockingly disproportionate to the gravity of the charge. ( 7 ) HE contends that the charge-sheet, a vague one, was issued with a closed mind, and for this he cites to me the decision in Surendra Chandra das v. State of West Bengal and Ors. , 86 Calwn 232. He refers me to the decision in Sawai Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1986 SC 995 , and proposes that simply because the petitioner did not raise any objection regarding vagueness of the allegation in the charge-sheet, the respondents did not stand exonerated from establishing the allegations. He refers me to Smt. Meena Balwant Hemke v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 3377 , and says that the allegation of taking bribe required proof. He relies on the decision in Union of India v. H. C. Goel, AIR 1964 SC 364 , for reminding me of the principle that suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof. He points out the fact that neither the disciplinary authority nor the appellate authority gave the petitioner any opportunity of personal hearing before giving their decisions. He describes the decisions as nullity in law, and cites to me the decision in State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss.) Binapani Dei and Ors. , AIR 1967 sc 1269 . He points out the fact that neither the disciplinary authority nor the appellate authority gave the petitioner any opportunity of personal hearing before giving their decisions. He describes the decisions as nullity in law, and cites to me the decision in State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss.) Binapani Dei and Ors. , AIR 1967 sc 1269 . He argues that the principles discussed in Express Newspapers pvt. Ltd. and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. , AIR 1986 SC 872 regarding fraud on power are squarely applicable to this case. ( 8 ) IN response Advocate for the respondents submits that vagueness of the allegations in the charge-sheet is a stale issue, since the petitioner consciously participated in the proceeding, presumably after understanding the purport of the allegations. He points out that not only the confessional statement of the petitioner remained unchallenged, the petitioner even chose not to cross-examine most of the important witnesses who were examined as members of the trapping team. Regarding admission of guilt he cites to 288 Jiban Chakrabotty v. West Bengal State Electricity Board [2005 (1) CLJ (Cal) me Delhi Transport Corporation v. Shyam Lal, 2004 (8) SCC 88. He submits that on the facts of the case it cannot be said that the penalty imposed is disproportionate to the gravity of the proven misconduct. He says that on the facts a deterrent punishment was warranted, and he reads to me the decisions in Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction and Anr, 1996 (1) scc 272 and Tara Chand Vyas v. Chairman and Disciplinary Authority and Ors. , 1997 (4) SCC 565 . ( 9 ) BEFORE I proceed to deal with the contentions of the Advocates, i want to place it on record that I have decided not to dwell on the authorities cited to me, not because I am unappreciative of the principles discussed in them, which command great respect, but because, in my-judgment, on the facts of this case there is no scope to take any assistance from them. ( 10 ) TO my mind, the plea regarding vagueness of the allegations made in the charge-sheet does not merit any consideration. The charge-sheet was issued as back as August 19th, 1995. If the allegations were vague, then the course open to the petitioner was to ask the disciplinary authority to remove the vagueness. ( 10 ) TO my mind, the plea regarding vagueness of the allegations made in the charge-sheet does not merit any consideration. The charge-sheet was issued as back as August 19th, 1995. If the allegations were vague, then the course open to the petitioner was to ask the disciplinary authority to remove the vagueness. In any case, the issue would have been fit for examination, had it been brought to the Court of taw at the earliest available opportunity. In my view, after conclusion of the proceeding upto the appellate authority stage, the petitioner is not entitled to question the charge-sheet on the ground that allegations made in it suffer from vagueness. ( 11 ) THERE can be no dispute that allegations made in the charge-sheet are to be proved by adducing evidence, unless they are admitted. Although advocate forthe petitioner has criticized the findings of the enquiry officer by saying that on the evidence there was no scope to reach such a conclusion as was recorded by the enqiury officer, I do not feel impressed to say that the findings of the enquiry officer are perverse. ( 12 ) THE complainant consumer was one of the witnesses, and his evidence has remained totally unchallenged. As members of the trapping team the officer on special duty of vigilance cell, the executive magistrate, and the station superintendent of the board were examined; and their evidence also remained totally unchallenged. The seizure list was exhibited ; admittedly the petitioner's tool kit was one of the items mentioned in the seizure list. Photograph showing the petitioner holding the screwdriver in his hand was also exhibited. His confessional statement was also marked an exhibit before the enquiry officer. On these facts, I do not see how it can be said that findings of the enquiry officer, on which the disciplinary authority acted, are perverse. ( 13 ) THE petitionertried to explain his presence by saying that though he was not supposed to do any allotted job at the premises, he accompanied asit in compliance with oral ordergiven by Asit forthe purpose, as his superior. The enquiry officer, and the disciplinary and the appellate authorities, did not find any reason to accept such explanation. I find no reason to say that the authorities were wrong. The enquiry officer, and the disciplinary and the appellate authorities, did not find any reason to accept such explanation. I find no reason to say that the authorities were wrong. ( 14 ) IN my judgment, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the conclusions reached by the authorities cannot be regarded as perverse ; for once the act of offence was admitted by the petitioner, little was left for the enquiry officer and the other authorities to disbelieve the evidence of the witnesses examined in support of the charges. ( 15 ) I do not think this is a case where it can be said that suspicion has taken the place of proof. Simply because none of the witnesses said that they say the petitioner accepting the bribe, it cannot be said that he was not a beneficiary of the amount that was received by Asit from the consumer for tampering with the meter for financial loss to the board and wrongful financial gain to the consumer. ( 16 ) I am unable to understand how the principle regarding fraud on power would fit in, in this case. I feel the same regarding the benefit of doubt proposition. Conclusions are to be reached and findings are to be recorded, in a disciplinary proceeding, on the basis of preponderance of probabilities the benefit of doubt proposition is totally alien to the filed of service jurisprudence. ( 17 ) I confess that at first I felt impressed by the submission regarding denial of opportunity of personal hearing at the appellate authority stage. It must be mentioned here that the relevant rules do not provide for giving opportunity of personal hearing either at the disciplinary authority stage or at the appellate authority stage. The disciplinary authority gave opportunities to show cause against finding of the enquiry officer and against proposed punishment. ( 18 ) TO my mind, the procedure followed by the disciplinary authority conforms to the existing legal position. There was no scope forthe disciplinary authority to give an opportunity of personal hearing. The appellate authority was however required to give an opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioner. But, on the facts, I am convinced that though opportunity of personal hearing was not given to the appellate authority, there is no good reason to interfere with their decision. There was no scope forthe disciplinary authority to give an opportunity of personal hearing. The appellate authority was however required to give an opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioner. But, on the facts, I am convinced that though opportunity of personal hearing was not given to the appellate authority, there is no good reason to interfere with their decision. On the evidence on record, and particularly in view of the unchallenged confessional statement of the petitioner, in my view, the absence of personal hearing did not cause any real prejudice to the petitioner. ( 19 ) I do not see any merit in the contention that the penalty is disproportionate to the gravity of proven misconduct. May be the petitioner's past record did not reflect any aggravating circumstances, but that by itself is not a good ground to say that for such a charge as was levelled against the petitioner the penalty of dismissal from service would be disproportionate to the gravity of proven misconduct. In my view, on the facts of the case a deterrent punishment was warranted, and the disciplinary authority rightly imposed the penalty of dismissal from service. ( 20 ) FOR these reasons I do not find any merit in the writ petition ; and accordingly I hereby dismiss it. 290 Om Prakash Agarwal v. State of West Bengal [2005 (1) CLJ (Cal) ( 21 ) IN the facts and circumstances of the case, I am not inclined to make any order for costs in favour of the respondents. Hence there will be no order for costs in the writ petition. Urgent certified xerox copy of this judgment and order shall be supplied to the parties, if applied for.