JUDGMENT 1. - Petitioners have challenged the order dated 1.9.1999 passed by the learned Special Judge, Communal Riots, Jaipur wherein he has framed the charges against the accused petitioners for offences under Section 27-D, 27-A and 28-A of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. 2. Mr. Ravi Yadav the learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the only evidence against the petitioners is the statement of co-accused Mangi Lal who has stated before the Drug Inspector that he had brought the drugs in question from Mohan Behari proprietor of M/s. Amar Medical Agencies, Film Colony, Jaipur. But Mangilal could not produce any cash memo to substantiate his claim that he had brought the medicines from M/s. Amar Medical Agencies, Jaipur. 3. Further more, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the trial Court has committed an error in treating this statement as a confession made by the co-accused. Learned trial Court has also committed an error in using this statement as a statement made under Section 30 of the Evidence Act. According to him the Drug Inspector has even raided the shop of M/s. Amar Medical Agencies, Jaipur but nothing incriminating had been discovered in the shop. Since, there is no other evidence but the statement of the co-accused, prima-facie no case is made out against the petitioner to warrant the framing of charges. 4. Learned PR has contended that it is a matter of trial whether the statement given by the co-accused tantamount to confession or not. However, he has frankly conceded that the statement of co-accused cannot be read out as evidence against the petitioner. It is a settled principle of law that the statement of co-accused cannot be read against the accused petitioner for the purpose of framing of charges. 5. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 6. Although, while framing the charges, the trial Court cannot enter into a detailed discussions of evidence, but the trial Court is duty bound to consider if there is any evidence to connect the accused petitioner with the alleged offence. In the present case, the only evidence against the petitioner is the statement made by the co-accused Mangilal, there is no other evidence available on record to connect him with the alleged crime. In the present case, the only evidence against the petitioner is the statement made by the co-accused Mangilal, there is no other evidence available on record to connect him with the alleged crime. It is, indeed a, settled proposition of law that the statement of co-accused cannot be read against the petitioner. Without examining the feeble evidence available on record against the accused petitioner, the trial Court had proceeded to frame the charges. In the case of Dilawar Balu Kurane v. State of Maharashtra (2002) 2 SCC 135 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has clearly stated that the trial Court should not act merely as a Post Office or mouthpiece of the prosecution. The trial Judge is expected to apply his mind judiciously while framing the charges. In the case of Kishan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 1995 Cr.L.J. 3947 wherein except the statement of co-accused there was no evidence against the accused petitioner, this High Court clearly held that in such cases, charges could not be framed against the accused petitioner. Likewise, in the present case, except the statement of Mangilal, there is no evidence to connect the accused petitioner with the alleged offences. The trial court has passed an order which is clearly against the settled principle of criminal jurisprudence. The learned Judge has also mis-applied Section 30 of the Evidence Act. Therefore, it tantamounts to non-application of mind and law. Hence, the impugned order dated 1.9.1999 is clearly perverse. 7. We, therefore, allow this petition and quash and set-aside the impugned order dated 1.9.1999.Revision allowed. *******