ANJANI KUMAR, J. ( 1 ) THIS writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India filed by the petitioner-tenant has been heard on merits with the consent of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties at the admission stage itself. ( 2 ) BY means of present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitionertenant challenges the order dated 24th November, 2000, passed by the prescribed authority and the order dated 20th July, 2004, passed by the appellate authority under the provisions of the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972, copies whereof are annexed as Annexures-3 and 4, respectively, to the writ petition. ( 3 ) THE facts leading to the filing of present writ petition are that admittedly the petitioner is the tenant of the accommodation in question and the respondent No. 3 is the landlord. The respondent-landlord filed an application before the prescribed authority under Section 21 (1) (a)of the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972, (In short the Act), for release of the accommodation in question in favour of the landlord on the ground that the accommodation in question is required for the personal requirement of the landlord and its family, particularly his son to whom the landlord wants to set up in his life. It is further asserted in the release application that the accommodation in question is a shop, which is under the tenancy of the tenant-petitioner. The petitionertenant denied the allegations made in the release application and stated that it is incorrect to say that the landlord either himself or his son would carry on any business from the shop in question after release of the shop in question. In fact the landlord, his father and brothers are member of joint hindu family and they are engaged in the business of ornaments (Sarrafa) and money lending and this business is being carried on in the family of the landlord at Kabrai, district Banda for fairly long time past. The income of the landlord and its family is quite sufficient and they are living comfortably. The landlord is purchasing properties and the allegation that from the shop in question the landlord will start new business of clothes, is wholly incorrect. It is only a camouflage to evict the tenant-petitioner. The income of the landlord and its family is quite sufficient and they are living comfortably. The landlord is purchasing properties and the allegation that from the shop in question the landlord will start new business of clothes, is wholly incorrect. It is only a camouflage to evict the tenant-petitioner. It is also asserted by the tenant that the accommodation in question is a residential accommodation and is not suitable for any business in which the tenant is living with his family and also in part of the accommodation the tenant is carrying on the business of selling lathi, danda etc. , the accommodation in question was used and let out mainly for the residential purposes. ( 4 ) AFTER the exchange of the pleadings and the evidence adduced by the parties, the prescribed authority found that the need of the landlord is bona fide and on comparison of the hardship, the prescribed authority found that the tilt of the comparative hardship is also in favour of the landlord. Thus, the prescribed authority vide its order dated 24th November, 2000 allowed the release application filed by the landlord and directed the release of the accommodation in question in favour of the landlord. ( 5 ) AGGRIEVED thereby, the petitioner-tenant preferred an appeal before the appellate authority under the provisions of the Act. Before the appellate authority, the same arguments were advanced on behalf of tenant, which were advanced before the prescribed authority with regard to the bona fide need as well as comparative hardship. The appellate authority after hearing the appellant petitioner have found that the findings arrived at by the prescribed authority on question of bona fide need do not warrant any interference by the appellate court and thus affirmed the finding regarding bona fide need. On the question of comparative hardship also, the appellate authority affirmed the finding arrived at by the prescribed authority. Thus, the appellate authority vide its order dated 20th July, 2004 dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioner-tenant. Thus, this writ petition. ( 6 ) LEARNED counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner-tenant submitted before this Court that the view taken by the prescribed authority and affirmed by the appellate authority on the question of bona fide need as well as on the question of comparative hardship suffer from the manifest error of law and in fact is perverse finding. ( 6 ) LEARNED counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner-tenant submitted before this Court that the view taken by the prescribed authority and affirmed by the appellate authority on the question of bona fide need as well as on the question of comparative hardship suffer from the manifest error of law and in fact is perverse finding. Before the appellate authority this has also been asserted by the appellant-tenant that during the pendency of the litigation, one accommodation owned by the family of the landlord fell vacant and had the landlord required the accommodation in question bona fide, he would have set up his son in the business, but since the same has not been done, therefore the findings arrived at by the prescribed authority and affirmed by the appellate authority regarding bona fide need deserve to be set aside. On the question of the use of the accommodation in question, the appellate authority has relied upon a decision of this Court in Kailash Nath Bajpai v. Chandrashekhar and others, 1995 Alld Vidhi patrika 368, wherein this Court has held that if the tenant is utilising the accommodation in question for residential purpose without obtaining permission from the landlord, the same cannot be said to be residential and the application under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act is maintainable for the release of the accommodation for non-residential purposes, i. e. , the purpose for which the accommodation was let out. Learned counsel for the petitioner- tenant tries to demonstrate from the record that the findings arrived at by the prescribed authority and affirmed by the appellate authority deserve to be set aside on the ground that they suffer from the manifest error of law, but after going through the respective evidence cited by learned counsel for the tenant-petitioner, i do not find that the findings arrived at by the prescribed authority and affirmed by the appellate authority are either perverse, or suffer from the manifest error of law. In this view of the matter, this question being finding of fact, this Court cannot sit in appeal or re- appraise the evidence as has been suggested by learned counsel for the tenant-petitioner in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Ranjeet Singh v. Ravi Prakash, 2004 (2) AWC 1721 (SC), where the Apex court has relied upon in the case in Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and others, AIR2003 SC 3044 , 2003 (5)ALD36 (SC), 2003 (5)ALT19 (SC), 2003 (4)CTC48 , (2004)1 GLR320 , [2003 (4)JCR174 (SC)], 2003 (3)KLT490 (SC), (2003)3 MLJ60 (SC), RLW2003 (4)SC 523 , 2003 (6)SCALE133 , (2003)6 SCC675. Paragraph 38 (8) of the decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai (supra) is reproduced below : "38. Such like matters frequently arise before the High Courts. We sum up our conclusion in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder: (8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a court of appeal and indulge in re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character. " ( 7 ) LEARNED counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner-tenant could not demonstrate that the findings arrived at by the prescribed authority and affirmed by the appellate authority are either perverse, or suffer from the manifest error of law, which may warrant any interference by this court in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. ( 8 ) IN this view of the matter, I do not find this to be a fit case for interference by this Court in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. This writ petition therefore has no force and is accordingly dismissed. However, the parties shall bear their own costs. . .