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2005 DIGILAW 3037 (RAJ)

Karunesh Bansal v. Board of Revenue

2005-11-18

KRISHAN KUMAR ACHARYA, S.N.JHA

body2005
Judgment 1. This appeal is directed against the order of the learned Single Judge dated 112.2003 dismissing the writ petition of the appellant. The appellant had filed writ petition for quashing the orders by which while allotting a plot of land to him for industrial purposes he was asked to pay the price at the market rate prevailing at the time of allotment. 2. The short facts of the case are that the appellant made application for allotment of land for setting up a Crusher machine on or about 03.09.1991. The application was rejected by the District Collector, Chittorgarh on 23.09.1992 on the ground that the land was disputed. The appellant moved the Revenue Appellate Authority who by order dated 30.10.1995 set aside the order of the Collector and directed him to re-hear the matter and pass a fresh order. On 30.12.1996 the District Collector, passed order allotting a plot of land measuring 0.86% hectare on lease basis for a period of 99 years on deposit of Rs. 7,43,986/-and 10% of the price as the lease amount every year, amongst other conditions. Feeling aggrieved by the price the appellant moved the Revenue Appellate Authority contending that he was entitled to allotment at the rate prevailing at the time of application. On 07.07.1997 the appeal was rejected by the Revenue Appellate Authority who held that the land cannot be allotted at the rate prevailing in 1991-1992. The appellant preferred another appeal to the Board of Revenue. By order dated 24.04.2003 the Board also rejected the appeal. The appellant filed a petition for review which too was rejected on 03.09.2003. He then filed writ petition, giving rise to this appeal, which was dismissed on 112.2003. 3. Shri Girish Joshi appearing for the appellant firstly submitted that the application for allotment having been wrongly rejected in 1992, on allotment after remand by the Revenue Appellate Authority, the appellant could not be charged price at the rate prevailing at the time of allotment. He submitted that appellant cannot be asked to pay higher amount for no fault of his. The submission is in the teeth of the statutory provisions in terms of which allotment of land is to be made at the prevailing market rate. In our opinion the expression prevailing market rate cannot be understood to mean the rate prevailing at the time of application. The submission is in the teeth of the statutory provisions in terms of which allotment of land is to be made at the prevailing market rate. In our opinion the expression prevailing market rate cannot be understood to mean the rate prevailing at the time of application. May be that the order rejecting the application for allotment was set aside by the Revenue Appellate Authority and on remand prayer of the appellant was allowed but it does not mean that the land could be allotted at the rate prevailing at the time of application in 1991. 4. Counsel alternatively submitted that the appellant may be allowed to taken the land at the rate fixed in the impugned order i.e., Rs. 7,43,986/-plus 10% of the price as the lease money. Similar request was made before the Revenue authorities who took the view that the period envisaged for making deposit and execution of the lease-deed being two months having expired, the offer of allotment had lapsed and, therefore, the appellant cannot claim allotment subsequently. 5. We are in agreement with the view taken by the authorities. It is clear that the appellant cannot take advantage of his own mistake. The price of land must have substantially increased with the passage of time since 1996. Allowing the prayer would not only mean giving premium to recalcitrance on the part of the appellant but also acting contrary to the spirit of the statute. It is too late in the day for the appellant to seek allotment of land after nine years at the price mentioned in order of allotment dated 30.12.1996. We thus do not find any error in the order of the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition. 6. The appeal stands dismissed.