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2005 DIGILAW 304 (SC)

SHANTI v. State Of Haryana

2005-02-15

ARUN KUMAR, B.N.SRIKRISHNA

body2005
ORDER 1. This is yet another case of a young 22-year-old bride being burnt for the sake of dowry by her in-laws. Four persons were tried for the murder. They are the appellant Shanti, mother-in-law of the deceased, Vinod, husband of the deceased, Bhushan, younger brother of the husband of the deceased and Jai Narain, father-in-law of the deceased. The deceased, Dinesh Kumari was married to Vinod on 27-6-1989. The incident took place on 3-10-1993 when, according to the prosecution, Dinesh Kumari was taken to a storeroom meant for storing hay by Shanti, the appellant herein. Shanti is alleged to have poured kerosene oil on Dinesh Kumari. A matchstick was lit by Bhushan, the younger brother of the husband of Dinesh Kumari and thus she was set on fire. The husband of Dinesh Kumari, namely, Vinod and her d father-in-law Jai Narain are said to have been standing by the side and watching the incident quietly. This happened at night between 9 to 10 p.m. on 3-10-1993. The door of the storeroom was locked from outside. However, in view of the incessant cries of the woman, she was ultimately removed to the hospital at about 6 a.m. next morning. The trial court convicted the present appellants i.e. Shanti, mother-in-law of the deceased and Vinod, husband of e the deceased under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. They were acquitted of the charges under Section 304-B and Section 498-A IPC. Since the younger brother of the deceaseds husband was a minor at the relevant time, his trial was separated. We are informed that the trial is still going on. The trial court acquitted Jai Narain, father-in-law of the deceased. In the appeal filed by the appellants before the High Court, the f decision of the trial court was upheld and the appeal was dismissed. Hence, the present appeal by the said two convicts. 2. The present case entirely rests on the two dying declarations said to have been made by Dinesh Kumari. The first dying declaration was recorded on 4-10-1993 by Sandeep Singh, ASI who is PW 13 in the case. This was recorded in the presence of Dr. D.P. Singh, PW 5 at 12 noon on 4-10-1993 9 and is Ext. PJ. Dr. Singh declared her fit for making statement. The first dying declaration was recorded on 4-10-1993 by Sandeep Singh, ASI who is PW 13 in the case. This was recorded in the presence of Dr. D.P. Singh, PW 5 at 12 noon on 4-10-1993 9 and is Ext. PJ. Dr. Singh declared her fit for making statement. The second dying declaration was recorded by the Chief Judicial Magistrate Mr V.P. Bishnoi, PW 7, on 7-10-1993 at 10 a.m. and the same is Ext. PL-3. Dinesh Kumari ultimately died on 11-10-1993 at about 7.45 a.m. Dr. D.P. Singh who certified Dinesh Kumari as fit for making the statement on 7-10-1993 was examined as PW 5. 3. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants tried to challenge the first dying declaration on two grounds, mainly that there was no proper certification about the fitness of the maker of the declaration at the relevant time. It was stated that the doctor who gave the certificate was not the treating doctor of the lady nor was there any entry made in the bed headticket about the certificate issued. Both these points do not appeal to us. The dying declaration shows clarity of mind of the maker of the declaration. We have no reason to doubt the certificate issued by a qualified doctor about the fitness of the maker of the statement at the relevant time. Nothing has been urged to suggest that the doctor was in any way interested in the outcome of the case. It is not necessary that only a treating doctor must certify fitness for making statement. Secondly, it was argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that in the dying declaration it has been stated that the reason for the crime was demand for dowry which could not be met by the family of the deceased. The accused have been acquitted of the charge under Section 498-A. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, it cannot be said that the present was a case of harassment of the lady on account of dowry. We are unable to accept this contention of the learned counsel. The prosecution was not able to sustain the charge under Section 498-A IPC for which standard of proof required is high. Yet the allegation of Dinesh Kumari about she being harassed on account of demand for dowry cannot be ignored. We are unable to accept this contention of the learned counsel. The prosecution was not able to sustain the charge under Section 498-A IPC for which standard of proof required is high. Yet the allegation of Dinesh Kumari about she being harassed on account of demand for dowry cannot be ignored. Moreover, the dying declaration was made much before the verdict of acquittal in charge under Section 498-A. The two things have no connection. 4. About the second dying declaration it is argued that Dr. Sham who had certified as fit the maker of the dying declaration had not been examined and therefore, the dying declaration ought to be rejected. We cannot accept this submission. Regarding the second dying declaration there is evidence of the Chief Judicial Magistrate who has been examined as PW 7. Before recording the dying declaration he has noted that he had obtained the doctors opinion about condition of the patient. The doctor had declared her fit for making statement. We find no merit in this argument. 5. The law regarding dying declaration is well established. A dying declaration should inspire confidence and it should not appear to be tutored. We have gone through both the dying declarations relied upon by the prosecution in this case and we find them to be absolutely coherent, cogent and inspiring confidence. We are unable to find anything to discredit or disbelieve the dying declarations. A very important aspect is that though there was a big time gap between the two declarations, yet they are totally consistent with each other. The result is that we find no merit in this appeal. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. We are informed that the appellants are on bail granted by this Court. Their bail bonds are hereby cancelled and they are ordered to be taken into custody forthwith to serve out their sentences.