Jayanta Kumar Biswas ( 1 ) THE petitioners in this writ petition principally seek to challenge (a)several sections of the West Bengal Thika Tenancy (Acquisition and regulation) Act, 2001, and (b) Section 4 of the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal Act, 1997. ( 2 ) THE question that has arisen for consideration is whether the writ petition can be entertained by me in exercise of my powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Counsel for the petitioners argues that it can be entertained. ( 3 ) REGARDING the prayers connected with provisions of the West bengal Thika Tenancy (Acquisition and Regulation) Act, 2001, he submits that the writ petition can be entertained by me in view of the apex Court decision in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1997 SC 1125 . Counsel places para 93 of the report, which is : "before moving on to other aspects, we may summarise our conclusions of the jurisdictional powers of these Tribunals. The tribunals are competent to hear matters where the vires of statutory provisions are questioned. However, in discharging this duty, they cannot act as substitutes for the High Courts and the Supreme Court which have under our constitutional setup, been specifically entrusted with such an obligation. Their function in this respect is only supplementary an all such decisions of the Tribunals will be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the respective High Courts. The Tribunals will consequently also have the power to test the vires of subordinate legislations and rules. However, this power of the tribunals will be subject to one important exception. The Tribunals shall not entertain any question regarding the vires of their parent statutes following the settled principle that a Tribunal which is a creature of an Act cannot declare that very Act to be unconstitutional. In such cases alone, the concerned High Court may be approached directly. All other decisions of these Tribunals, rendered in cases that they are specifically empowered to adjudicate upon by virtue of their parent statutes, will also be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of their respective High Court. We may add that the Tribunals will, however, continue to act as the only Courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. We may add that the Tribunals will, however, continue to act as the only Courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. By this, we mean that it will not be open for litigants to directly approach the High courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except, as mentioned, where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the concerned Tribunal. " ( 4 ) COUNSEL submits that notification issued by the Government for including the West Bengal Thika Tenancy (Acquisition and Regulation) Act, 2001 in the list of the specified Acts mentipned in Section 2 (r) of the West bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal Act, 1997, would not take away the right of the petitibners to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court, as the court of the first instance, for challenging (a) the provisions of the 2001 Act (b) the steps taken by the authorities under them. ( 5 ) I regret that I am unable to agree with him. The West Bengal land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal Act, 1997 was made by the State government in exercise of powers conferred on it by Article 323b of the constitution of India. It was clearly provided in that Act that with respect to things connected with the specified Acts (they were mentioned in Section 2 (r) of that Act) only the tribunal established thereunder would have the power and authority to adjudicate, and as the Court of the first instance, the writ Court would not possess any power or authority to adjudicate any issue connected with them. The issue was decided by the apex Court in L. Chandra kumarcase (supra) and again in the case of State of West Bengal v. Ashish kumar Roy, AIR 2005 SC 254 . In my view, with respect to all the prayers in the writ petition, except prayer (f), the petitioners are not entitled to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court, as the Court of the first instance, and hence the writ petition as to those prayers is not maintainable. In my view, with respect to all the prayers in the writ petition, except prayer (f), the petitioners are not entitled to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court, as the Court of the first instance, and hence the writ petition as to those prayers is not maintainable. ( 6 ) AS to prayer (f) of the writ petition, I am of the view that the petitioners can invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, since by it they seek to challenge the validity of Section 4 of the West Bengal Land Reforms and tenancy Tribunal Act, 1997, under which the tribunal was established. The position of law is clear from the apex Court decision in L. Chandra Kumar case (supra) that for this purpose the petitioners can invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court, since the tribunal would not possess the power and authority to decide the vires of the provisions under which it was established. ( 7 ) I wanted to know from the Counsel why I should permit the petitioners to challenge vires of Section 4 of the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal Act, 1997, when the 1998 writ petition challenging vires of various provisions of the Act travelled up to the apex Court, which gave finality to the issues by giving the decision in State of West Bengal v. Ashish Kumar Roy, AIR 2005 SC 254 . It is to be noted that Section 4 of the 1997 Act only indicates the manner in which the State Government is to establish the tribunal. I am, therefore, of the view that the present challenge is not of great significance, particularly when challenge regarding vires of various provisions of the 1997 Act and its scheme has already been turned down by the apex Court. ( 8 ) HOWEVER, Counsel has argued that in view of the apex Court decisions in Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd. v. Janapada Sabha, AIR 1964 SC 1013 (he relies on para 24) and Kunwar Ram Nath v. The Municipal Board, pilibhit, AIR 1983 SC 930 (he relies on para 8), the petitioners are entitled to challenge the vires of Section 4 of the 1997 Act, since vires of this section was not challenged in the previous case in which the apex Court gave the decision, and since a fresh cause of action has arisen at the present moment. ( 9 ) I am unable to agree with him. I do not see what fresh cause of action has arisen. In my view, permitting the petitioners to challenge vires of Section 4 of the 1997 Act once again, would amount to nothing but encouraging abuse of the process of the Court, particularly when provisions of the Act were examined closely by their Lordships of the apex Court, and it was open to the parties there to challenge vires of all the provisions, and the petitioners were also free to join if they had something to say regarding vires of any provision of the Act. I cannot countenance the fresh move of the petitioners to challenge vires of Section 4 after the apex Court has given final shape to the position of law after so many years. ( 10 ) EVEN on merits, I am of the view that the petitioners have failed to make out even a prima facie case for entertaining the challenge thrown to vires of the section. Under this section provisions were made only for indicating the manner of establishing the tribunal. In my view, when the apex Court found nothing wrong in the other provisions of the Act, there is absolutely no reason to permit the petitioners to throw an insignificant challenge to an incidental provision of the Act which simply provides the mechanism. I am also of the view that the decisions cited to me are of no assistance at all. In them their Lordships of the apex Court did not hold that parties should be permitted to challenge provisions of a particular Act in installements. In my view, encouraging this kind of litigation would be against the public interest, and hence an abuse of the process of law. ( 11 ) FOR these reasons I summarily dismiss the writ petition. There shall be no order for costs in it. ( 12 ) ALL parties including the departments concerned shall act on a signed xerox copy of this dictated order and also on an urgent certified xerox copy thereof, both to be supplied on the usual undertaking.