Pinaki Chandra Ghose And Pravendu Narayan Sinha, JJ. ( 1 ) THE appeal is preferred from an order passed by the Hon'ble first Court dated 15th October, 2004 whereby Court after interpreting the section 8 and 13 of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act, 1940 directed the plaintiff/the respondent herein to pay the statutory penalty under sub-section (3) of section 13 of the said Act and further directed that the certificate of all payments of statutory penalty should be paid by the respondent within three months and thereafter the respondent/plaintiff may proceed with the suit, failing which the suit will stand dismissed. ( 2 ) THE only question arose before us that whether the Court can direct the said order when a money-lender without having a licence under Bengal Money-Lenders Act, 1940 lent and advanced money to a person. ( 3 ) WE have heard the learned Advocates for the parties at length. ( 4 ) THE argument put forwarded by Mr. Bachhawat appearing on behalf of the appellant that the Court has no power to grant such order in favour of the plaintiff who carries on money-lending business without having a licence under the said Act. He further drew our attention to section 8 of the Act and contended that after the notification in the Official Gazette by the State Government no money-lender shall have right to carry on business of money-lending unless he holds an effective licence. He further submitted that section 13 (1) of the said act is a bar to institute a suit by a money-lender without having a licence under section 8. He further contended that the acts on the part of the moneylender is void under section 23 of the Contract Act and if the act is void it is not curable and it is really a latent defect cannot be cured under any circumstances. He relied upon 1994 (1) CHN page 49 (Shib Kumar Todi vs. Amal Chand champalal) and he submitted that in the said decision the Court came to the conclusion that a money lender within the meaning of the said Act if carries on business must satisfy the following conditions: "a) If the money-lender has a place of such money-lending business then he need not advance a single loan to become a money-lender. b) If the lender lent for business purpose with interest then he would have to be shown as lending primarily for the motive of lending for profit, and not primarily for the motive of lending a helping hand to a friend or a relation or for some such other primary motive than pure business. " ( 5 ) HE also drew our attention to paragraph 38 of the said decision and submitted that the Court cannot pass a decree in favour of the plaintiff moneylender unless he holds an effective licence at the time of granting loan. He also contended relying upon paragraph 39 of the said decision that if the plaintiff can only proceed with the suit upon payment of such penalty in accordance with the sub-section (2) of section 13 and he submitted that the Court came to the conclusion that is as follows: "41. I am, therefore, faced with two unsavoury choices. I must either construe sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 13 as being of practically no value to the plaintiff, or I must alternatively construe the entire Act to be of no value of the regulating (3) would enable the plaintiff to proceed, but proceed fruitlessly. In the other line of constriction, the Government would be permitted to make rules and regulations, regarding money lending business, but only to be defeated, by any money lender who is prepared to pay a penalty of seventy five rupees, prior to obtaining a decree in any suit of his against a borrower. 42. To speak very plainly, I would rather make a nonsense of sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 13, than make a nonsense of the entire scheme of the Act. " ( 6 ) MR. Bachhawat submitted that the respondent had no authority even to file that suit since he is carrying on business without the licence. Incidentally, it has to be noted here that the respondent carries on business as non-banking financial institution having a licence granted by Reserve Bank of India after making application before the said authority of Reserve Bank of India after perusing such application on behalf of the respondent/plaintiff allowed them to carry on business and granted permission in accordance with the said provision which has specifically stated in section 45q of the said Act. Mr. Mr. Bachhawat further submitted that even after having a licence under Reserve Bank of India that cannot be a help to the plaintiff/respondent since the plaintiff carries on business as a money-lender and hit by the Bengal Money-Lenders Act, particularly section 8 of the said Act. ( 7 ) HE further relied upon a decision reported in AIR 1986 SC page 463 reported in (Andhra University, Appellant vs. Regional Provident Fund commissioner of Andhra Pradesh and Ors, Respondents) and (Osmania University, appellant vs. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner and Anr, Respondents)where the Hon'ble Division Bench dealing with a matter of Employees' Provident funds under the said Special Act has specifically observed as follows: "in construing the provisions of the Act, we have to bear in mind that it is a beneficent piece of social welfare legislation aimed at promoting and securing the well being of the employees and the Court will not adopt narrow interpretation which will have the effect of defeating the very object and purpose of the Act. Once it is found that there is an establishment which is a 'factory' engaged in an industry specified in Schedule 1 and employing 20 or more persons. The provisions of the Act will get attracted to the case and it makes no difference to this legal position that the establishment is run by a larger organisation which may be carrying on other additional activities falling outside the Act. " ( 8 ) MR. Bachhawat further strenuously urged before us that section 8 is a mandatory section, without having a licence under the said section it is a complete bar to file a suit in Court of such transaction and thereby it attracts the provision of section 13 (1) and that is the reason the legislature thought it would be fit to enact the said Act directing the Court not to pass a decree in favour of the money-lender who carries on business without a licence. ( 9 ) ON the contrary Mr. S. Tibrewal, senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent/plaintiff drew our attention to Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes and submitted that the Court must consider the provision and will read the same harmoniously so that it can fit in each other on a given facts. Mr. ( 9 ) ON the contrary Mr. S. Tibrewal, senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent/plaintiff drew our attention to Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes and submitted that the Court must consider the provision and will read the same harmoniously so that it can fit in each other on a given facts. Mr. Tibrewal further relied upon a decision reported in 2003 (7) SCC 350 (Ramesh chand Ardawatiya vs. Anil Panjwani) and submitted that if there was an intention of the legislators to oust the jurisdiction of the Civil Court it could have been mentioned specifically in the said legislation by the legislators creating a complete bar to a person, who carries on business as a money-lender, to file a suit under the Special Act. But since there is no such prohibition as has been specifically stated in the said legislation it cannot be inferred that the plaintiff/respondent herein had no right to file a suit before the Court. He further relied upon a decision reported in AIR 1976 SC page 714 (Lachmi Narain etc. Appellants vs. Union of India and Ors. Respondent) and submitted that primary key to the problem whether a statutory provision is a mandatory or directory, is the intention of the law maker as expressed in the law itself. If the legislative intent is expressed clearly and strongly in imperative words in that case the use of "must" instead of "shall" will be sufficient to hold that the provision to be mandatory and it will not be necessary to pursue any further enquiry in the matter. If the provision is couched in prohibitive or negative language it can rarely be directory, and he submitted relying on the said decision in the instant case there is no such prohibitory language has been used by the legislators ousting the rights of the Civil Court or to a money-lender who comes within the meaning of the said Bengal Money-Lenders Act, 1940 to file a suit in a Court without having a licence. According to him the said section 8 of the said Act is only to be taken into account as in directory nature and not as a prohibition or a bar on the part of a litigant who comes before the Court praying for a decree for a sum which has been lent and advanced by him to a party. According to him the said section 8 of the said Act is only to be taken into account as in directory nature and not as a prohibition or a bar on the part of a litigant who comes before the Court praying for a decree for a sum which has been lent and advanced by him to a party. He further relied upon the Division Bench decision which is reported in 2000 (2) CLJ page 185 (Swaika Vanaspati Products Ltd. vs. Canbank Financial Services Ltd.) it has been pointed out by Mr. Bachhawat appearing for the appellant that the said decision is obiter contended before us that the decision of the Division bench would show that the decision in Shib Kumar Todi vs. Amal Chand champalal (supra) has been specifically declared to be not a good law emphasized as has been held by the Hon'ble Division Bench in the said decision as it would be proper for us to quote from the said decision which reads as follows: ". . . . . . . with utmost respect we say. hold and declare that the rule ratio laid down by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Shib Kumar Todi vs. Amal Chand Champalal is not a good law and that it is required to be overruled. We accordingly, declare that the ratio in Shib Kumar Todi's case as being contrary to the provision of law as contained in section 3 of the Act and overrule the aforesaid judgment. " ( 10 ) HE submitted relying on the said passage from the said decision that the said decision of the learned Single Judge is no more a good law. Mr. Tibrewal further relied upon AIR 1953 SC page 274 (Poppatlal Shah, Partner of Messrs. Indo Malayan Trading Co. , Appellant vs. State of Madras, represented by the deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Sowcarpet, Madras, Respondent) and submitted that it is a settled rule of construction that to ascertain the legislative intent of the constituent parts of a statute are taken together and each word, phrase or sentence is to be considered in law of the general purpose and object of the Act itself. He further drew attention to the objects of the said Act and submitted that the object would show the intention of the legislators and indicate the scope and purpose of the legislation itself. He further drew attention to the objects of the said Act and submitted that the object would show the intention of the legislators and indicate the scope and purpose of the legislation itself. According to him the said Act has been indicated for the purpose of introducing a regulatory provisions and the same do not apply to commercial transactions or loan. The purpose of the Act and the object therefor is to make statutory provisions relating to money-lender and money-lending business more comprehensive and to protect the interest of borrowers and accordingly he submitted after taking a loan, a person cannot be allowed to take a point that the suit is hit by Bengal Money-Lenders Act since the money lender has not any licence to grant such loan. ( 11 ) HE further relied upon a decision reported in 2001 (8) SCC page 540 (Anwar Hasan Khan vs. Md. Shafi and Ors.) and submitted that for interpreting a particular provision of an Act the import and effect of the meaning of the words and phrases used in the statute have to be gathered from the text, the nature of the subject-matter and the parties and intention of the statute it is a cardinal principle of construction of a statute that effort should be made in construing its provisions by averring a conflict and adopting a harmonious construction. The statute or rules made thereunder should be read as a whole and one provision should be construed with reference to the other provision to make provision consisting with the object sought to be achieved. He further submitted that for the purpose of giving effect to the said statute it is required to be construed harmoniously and not otherwise. ( 12 ) WE have also considered a decision and we want to place on record which is anunreported decision delivered by His Lordship Ruma Pal, J. on 22nd september, 1997 in G. A. No. 1128 of 1997, G. A. No. 1597 of 1997 (Ashutosh enterprises Limited vs. Mewar Growth Limited) a similar situation arose as we have examined from the said decision and it appears to us that His Lordship dealt with the matter extensively and we approve the said view and we also express ourselves in the light of His Lordship's views, which are quoted here under. In view of the said sections including section 8 it is necessary for us at this stage to quote section 8 and section 13 hereunder: "8. Money-lending business not to be carried on except under licence.- After such date not less than six months after the commencement of this Act as the State Government shall, by notification in the Official gazette, appoint in this behalf, no money-lender shall carry on the business of money-lending unless he holds an effective licence. ( 13 ) STAY of suit when money-lender does not hold licence.- (1) No court shall pass a decree or order in favour of a money-lender in any suit instituted by a money-lender for the recovery of a loan advanced after the date notified under section 8, or in any suit instituted by a money-lender for the enforcement of an agreement entered into or security taken, or for the recovery of any security given, in respect of such loan, unless the Court is satisfied that, at the time or times when the loan or any part thereof was advanced, the money-lender held an effective licence. (2) If during the trial of a suit to which sub-section (1) applies, the Court finds that the money-lender did not hold such licence, the Court shall, before proceeding with the suit, require the money-lender to pay in the prescribed manner and within the period to be fixed by the Court such penalty as the court thinks fit, not exceeding three times the amount of the licence fee specified in section 10. (3) If the money-lender fails to pay the penalty within the period fixed under sub-section (2) or within such further time as the Court may allow, the court shall dismiss the suit: if the money-lender pays the penalty within such period, the Court shall proceed with the suit. (4) The provisions of this section shall apply to a claim for a set-off by or on behalf of a money-lender. (5) In this section, the expression 'money-lender' includes an assignee of a money-lender, if the Court is satisfied that the assignment was made for the purposes of avoiding the payment of licence fee and penalty which may be ordered to be paid under this section. (5) In this section, the expression 'money-lender' includes an assignee of a money-lender, if the Court is satisfied that the assignment was made for the purposes of avoiding the payment of licence fee and penalty which may be ordered to be paid under this section. " the section 13 (1) places an embargo to a Court of passing a decree or order in favour of a money-lender who did not have a valid licence when the loan was advanced. When the fact is brought to the Court's notice during the trial the Court shall not proceed with the suit but under the said provision the Court shall only direct the money-lender to pay the penalty within the specified period. The penalty has also been specifically stated would not exceed three times that of the licence fees payable. The licence fee is fixed at Rs. 25/- under section. 10 even this may be remitted by the State Government either generally or for any particular class of money-lenders by notification in the official Gazette. If the money-lender pays the amount as directed by the Court the Court will proceed with the suit. If he does not, then automatically the suit will be dismissed. Similarly if a claim is made against a money-lender the money-lender's defence to set-off will not be considered unless he holds valid licence or pays the penalty as may be fixed by the Court within the prescribed time. The Rules of Construction must be kept in mind when the court will decide the matter. The first Rule of Construction which is elementary is that the words used in the section must be given their plain grammatical meaning as has been held by His Lordship Gajendra Godkar, J. reported in AIR 1962 SC 1543 (Madan lal Fakirchand Dudhodiya vs. Shree Changdoo Sugar Mills Ltd.) Secondly as a corollary to this is the rule that if the enactment is clear and unambiguous the object of the spirit of law cannot be relied upon for negating the plain language of the statute which is specifically stated in AIR 1954 SC 749 (Rononjan singh vs. Baij Nath Singh) and AIR 1973 SC 913 (AC. Sharma vs. Delhi administration ). Sharma vs. Delhi administration ). Thirdly, the two sub-sections i. e. section 13 (1) and section 13 (2) must be read as parts of an integral whole and as being inter-dependent and attempt should be made in construing them to reconcile them if it is reasonably possible to do so, and to avoid repugnancy. If repugnancy cannot be possibly be avoided, then question may arise as to which of the two should prevail. But that question can arise only if repugnancy cannot be avoided [air 1962 SC page 1543 (supra)]. In other words if it is reasonably possible, such an interpretation should be given to the provision of the statute that they can be read harmoniously and no provision is destroyed and nullified. This is the rule of harmonious construction of a Statute. 13. It appears to us that to give effect to the sections and the intention of the legislature we do not have any hesitation to hold that there is no bar to file a suit before the Court without having a money-lending licence under the said act but there is a bar to proceed with the suit without having such licence and the Court has ample jurisdiction as has been given by the legislature to the court under section 13 (2) of the said Act to have the said licence and then to proceed with the suit. We have perused the order and/or the decision of the hon'ble First Court. We do not find there is any irregularity or any provisions which has been construed by His Lordship which cannot fit in the decision as placed before us and the Statute which is the intention of the legislators. Therefore, we do not find any reason in this appeal to interfere with the order so passed by His Lordship by allowing time to the respondent/plaintiff and to proceed with the suit. Incidentally the said order was passed on 15th October, 2004 and directed to have the licence within three months. It is also placed on record before us by Mr. Tibrewal appearing on behalf of the plaintiff/respondent that they did apply in accordance with the directions given by His Lordship within fifteen days from the date of His Lordship's order. Therefore, we cannot also keep our eyes shut in these facts that they have complied with the order by applying before the said authorities. Tibrewal appearing on behalf of the plaintiff/respondent that they did apply in accordance with the directions given by His Lordship within fifteen days from the date of His Lordship's order. Therefore, we cannot also keep our eyes shut in these facts that they have complied with the order by applying before the said authorities. It is the duty of the authorities to grant permission and/or the licence under the said Act and that too at the instance of the Court. If such licence is not being granted and if not complied with by the said authorities then it would be the sufferance of the said authorities only that they have not complied with the order in spite of the directions given by the Court. Since the appeal has been filed in this matter and the matter was pending before Hon'ble Division Bench till date we feel that time so granted by his Lordship is also to be extended by us and even then if no step can be taken by the respondent then and then only the question of dismissal would arise and not otherwise. ( 14 ) IN view of these facts stated hereinabove, we do not intend to interfere with the order so passed by the Hon'ble First Court excepting the time is extended by two months from date and further the authorities are directed that if the respondents/plaintiffs have taken steps in the matter applying before them to have such licence after making payment as directed by the Hon'ble first Court, they would take immediate steps in the matter so that a litigant cannot suffer in the hands of the Executives and they would take immediate steps to grant such licence upon payment of such fees. ( 15 ) THE appeal is thus disposed of on the above terms. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. No order as to costs. Appeal disposed of.