R. V. RAVEENDRAN, C. J. ( 1 ) WHEN the petitioner was working as junior Engineer Grade-II in Coach Repair work Shop, Bhopal, Central Railway, he was issued a charge sheet dated March 11, 2000, the charge was that on February 19, 2000 at about 11 A. M. he assaulted the Private Security supervisor (R. K. Chandel) who was on duty, thereby causing grievous injuries. An enquiry was held. On behalf of the Disciplinary authority five witnesses were examined, namely, Udayaveer Singh Badhoria, Pankaj shnvastava, Anupam Shrivastava, R. K. Jaiswal and Sulekh Yadav. The said witnesses were permitted to be cross-examined on behalf of the petitioner. The petitioner was also permitted to let in his evidence. He examined two witnesses, but did not choose to give evidence himself. Therefore, on January 20, 2001, the Inquiry Officer granted ten days time to the petitioner to file his defence brief explaining his stand. Accordingly, the petitioner filed his defence brief. After considering the evidence and the defence brief, the Inquiry Officer submitted a report holding the petitioner guilty of the charge. The disciplinary Authority furnished a copy of the report to the petitioner and gave him opportunity to show cause in the matter. Petitioner, accordingly, submitted his explanation dated February 17, 2001. After considering the same, the Disciplinary authority passed an order dated February 24, 2001, accepting the findings of the Inquiry officer, and imposing the punishment of' removal from service. ( 2 ) FEELING aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal before Appellate Authority (third respondent) and the Appellate Authority, dismissed the appeal by order dated June 6, 2001. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a revision before the Chief Work Shop Engineer, Mumbai on July 2, 2001. The Revisional Authority allowed the revision petition in part by order, dated November 15, 2001. The Revisional authority found that the charge against the petitioner that was proved was very grave in nature and extremely detrimental to conducive working atmosphere. He was also of the view that the penalty of removal was justified. However, purely on humanitarian grounds he reduced the penalty as follows:"however, purely on humanitarian grounds, I have taken a lenient view and decided to reinstate Shri Tiwari in Railway service with the reduced penalty of reduction in the same time scale of pay i. e. at Rs. 5000/- JE Grade II Rs. 5000-8000 (RSRP) for a period of five years with cumulative effect. 5000/- JE Grade II Rs. 5000-8000 (RSRP) for a period of five years with cumulative effect. Shri Viresh Tiwari shall be re-instated at KWV Workshop and atleast 1 for a period of 5 years he will not be considered for transfer to Bhopal even on own request transfer. The intervening period from the date of ' Removal' of Shri Viresh Tiwari to the date of his 're-joining' shall be treated as 'leave without Pay'. " ( 3 ) FEELING aggrieved, the petitioner approached the Central Administrative tribunal, Jabalpur Bench in O. A. No. 816/2002 for quashing the order dated november 15, 2001 passed by the Revisional authority to the extent it prejudiced him and also for quashing orders of the Disciplinary authority and Appellate Authority. He also sought a declaration that he had not committed any misconduct and that there was violation of principles of natural justice in conducting the enquiry. The Tribunal by order dated July 6, 2004 considered the matter exhaustively and rejected the petition. The said order of the tribunal is challenged in this petition. ( 4 ) THE first contention urged by the petitioner is that R. K. Jaiswal, the only witness who categorically stated in his evidence in the enquiry that the petitioner assaulted the security Supervisor, while giving evidence in the criminal case had stated that he had not witnessed any quarrel between petitioner and chandel; and therefore, the evidence of R. K. Jaiswal before, the domestic enquiry should be ignored; and if the said evidence is ignored, as chandel himself was not examined, the case will became one of 'no evidence' as no other witness had specifically stated that he had witnessed petitioner assaulting Mr. Chandel. ( 5 ) THE standard of proof required in a criminal Case is completely different from the standard of proof required in the departmental enquiries. The Inquiry Officer has decided the matter with reference to the evidence placed before him. That finding cannot be interfered with on the ground that the witness who had deposed against the petitioner in the departmental enquiry, had ( subsequently given a different version in the Criminal Case. The tribunals and Courts do not sit in appeal over the findings recorded in the domestic enquiry nor can they reappreciate the evidence. That finding cannot be interfered with on the ground that the witness who had deposed against the petitioner in the departmental enquiry, had ( subsequently given a different version in the Criminal Case. The tribunals and Courts do not sit in appeal over the findings recorded in the domestic enquiry nor can they reappreciate the evidence. It is also well settled that the findings in the enquiry can be interfered only where principles of natural justice have been violated and such violation had resulted in prejudice to the delinquent employee or where the case is one of 'no evidence'. Merely because a different view could be arrived at, on reappreciating the evidence, it is not possible to interfere with findings recorded in the domestic enquiry (Vide b. C. Chaturvedi v. Union India, AIR 1996 SC 484 : 1995 (6) SCC 749 : 1996-I-LLJ-1231, high Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patel AIR 2000 SC 22 : 2000 (1)SCC 416 and Union of India v. Narain Singh air 2002 SC 2102 : 2002 (5) SCC 11 . In this case the finding of guilt has been recorded in the domestic enquiry on the basis of evidence placed in such domestic enquiry. The said evidence was the effect that the petitioner assaulted the Security Supervisor Mr. Chandel. Therefore the first contention is rejected. ( 6 ) THE second contention of the petitioner is based on Railway Service (Discipline and appeal) Rules, 1968, which prescribes the procedure for imposing major penalties. It is pointed out that Rule 9 (21) of the said Rules provides that where the delinquent employee does not examine himself and closes his case, the Inquiring Authority shall generally question him on the circumstances appearing against him in the evidence for the purpose of enabling him to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him. Petitioner contends that in this case as he did not examine himself, the Inquiring Authority ought to have generally questioned him on the circumstances appearing against him so as to enable him to explain such circumstances and that was not done and that therefore there was violation of principles of natural justice and specific provisions of the rule prescribing the procedure for imposing major penalties and therefore, the entire enquiry should be treated as vitiated. ( 7 ) IN Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar, AIR 1994 SC 1074 : 1993 (4) SCC 727 : 1994-I-LLJ-162 and State Bank of Patiala v. S. K. Sharma, AIR 1996 SC 1669 : 1996 (3)SCC 364 : 1996-II-LLJ-296 while summarising the principles of natural justice in the context of disciplinary proceedings, the Supreme Court has held that violation of any and every procedural provision will not automatically vitiate the enquiry; and that except cases falling under 'no notice', 'no opportunity' and 'no hearing' categories, any complaint of violation of a procedural provision should be examined from the point of view of prejudice, that is, whether the violation has prejudiced the employee in defending himself properly and effectively; and if no prejudice is established to have resulted therefrom, no interference is warranted. ( 8 ) THE rule requiring the Inquiring authority to generally question the delinquent employee on the circumstances appearing against him in the evidence, is a procedural provision. Where it is alleged that such a procedural provision has not been complied with, it is necessary to examine whether such non compliance has resulted in prejudice to the person/s for whose benefit the provision is made. ( 9 ) SUCH a situation was considered in Sunil kumar Banerjee v. State of West Bengal, Air. 1980 SC 1170 : 1980 (3) SCC 304 . In that case also, the delinquent employee was not questioned by the Inquiring Officer on the circumstances appearing against him in the evidence, for the purpose of enabling him to explain the same, though the relevant Rules required it. The Supreme Court held that violation of such a rule did not vitiate the enquiry unless the delinquent employee established prejudice. The Supreme Court held that where the delinquent employee was fully alive to the allegations against him and had submitted his written defence in detail dealing with all allegations, he could not be said to be prejudiced by not complying with the rule requiring the Inquiry Officer to question the delinquent employee. The Supreme Court held that where the delinquent employee was fully alive to the allegations against him and had submitted his written defence in detail dealing with all allegations, he could not be said to be prejudiced by not complying with the rule requiring the Inquiry Officer to question the delinquent employee. ( 10 ) WE may also refer to the similar provision in Section 313 of the Code of criminal Procedure, 1973 which provides that in every inquiry or trial, for the purpose of enabling the accused personally to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him, the Court shall, after the witnesses for the prosecution have been examined and before he is called on for his defence, question him generally on the case. The scope of the said section has been considered by the Supreme court in several decisions and it is held that mere non-examination or defective examination is not ground for interference unless prejudice is established. The Supreme court has held that while the attention of the accused should be drawn to every inculpatory material so as to enable him to explain it, an omission to do so does not ipso facto vitiate the proceedings, unless prejudice occasioned by such defect is established by the accused vide k. C. athew v. State of Travancore Cochin, air 1956 SC 241 and Bibhuti Bhusan Das gupta v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1969 SC 381 and Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade v. State of maharashtra AIR 1973 SC 2622 : 1973 (2)SCC 793 . in the last case, the Supreme Court observed:"it is also open to the Appellate Court to call upon the counsel for the accused to show what explanation the accused has as regards the circumstances established against him but not put to him and if the accused is unable to offer the Appellate court any plausible or reasonable explanation of such circumstances, the court may assume that no acceptable answer exists and that even if the accused had been questioned at the proper time in the trial Court, he would not have been able to furnish any good ground to get out of the circumstances on which the trial Court had relied for its conviction. " ( 11 ) IN this case, an opportunity was in fact given to him to submit a written defence explaining the circumstances against him. " ( 11 ) IN this case, an opportunity was in fact given to him to submit a written defence explaining the circumstances against him. He accordingly submitted his written defence explaining the circumstances and allegations against him. There is thus substantial compliance with the requirement and the object of the rule has been fulfilled. Except stating that rule 9 (21) was not complied with, the petitioner has not been able to demonstrate how e was prejudiced by non-compliance with rule 9 (21 ). Therefore, we hold that non compliance with Rule 9 (21) does not vitiate either the enquiry or the order of punishment. ( 12 ) PETITIONER next contended that denial of salary for the period between the date of removal to the date of reinstatement, in addition to reduction in the time scale, amounted to double punishment. The Disciplinary authority had imposed the punishment of removal and that was confirmed by the appellate Authority. Even the Revisional authority found the punishment to be appropriate. But the Revisional Authority, on humanitarian grounds took a lenient view and substituted the punishment of removal with the lesser punishment of reduction in the time scale of pay to the minimum for the period of 5 years with cumulative effect, with a further direction that the intervening period from the date of removal to the date of rejoining will be treated as Leave Without Pay. The direction as to how the intervening period should be treated is not a punishment, but a consequence of imposition of a lesser punishment resulting in reinstatement. The assumption that reduction in penalty resulting in reinstatement would entail a liability on the part of the employer to pay the salary for the (period when the employee was not out of service (as a consequence of imposition of punishment of dismissal), is without basis. There is a basic difference between cases where reinstatement is a consequence of the order of dismissal/removal being set aside by the Appellate/revisional authority or Court or Tribunal, by holding the employee not guilty or by holding that the enquiry was invalid, and cases where reinstatement is as a result of imposition of a lesser punishment, in place of the punishment of dismissal, removal, or compulsory retirement. In the first category of cases, it is possible to contend that payment of full salary for the intervening period, should be automatic. In the first category of cases, it is possible to contend that payment of full salary for the intervening period, should be automatic. But where the reinstatement is as a consequence of imposition of a lesser punishment by the Appellate/revisional authority or Court or Tribunal, the question whether the terminated employee will be entitled to back wages or not, and if entitled to what extent, will be governed and regulated by the order of such authority. In this case the order of Revisional Authority reducing the penalty with a direction that the period from the date of removal to date of rejoining be treated as Leave Without Pay, is a package order, which does not call for interference. ( 13 ) THE petitioner next submitted that there was no justification for the Revisional authority to direct that he should be reinstated at Kurdwadi Work Shop away from Bhopal with a condition that for a period of five years, he will not be considered for transfer to Bhopal even at his own request. According to him, that amounted to another punishment. This contention is also untenable. The said condition was obviously imposed, having regard to the gravity of the misconduct involving assault of a Security Supervisor. Having regard to the nature of charge held to be proved, it was apparently thought that petitioner's presence in the same premises may lead to tension. We therefore, consider that the said condition is not unwarranted. ( 14 ) NO other contention is urged. Petition is therefore liable to be dismissed. The petitioner is indeed lucky to be back in service, even after the Revisional Authority found that the punishment of dismissal was justified. The attempt of the petitioner to look a gift horse in the mouth should be deprecated. ( 15 ) THIS petition is dismissed with costs of Rs. 1000/- payable by the petitioner to the respondents. .