ORDER Writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is directed against the proceedings for implementation of an eviction order dated 3-1-1989 in HRC No. 160 of 1984 passed by the Court of the Prl. Munsiff at Hubli. 2. The eviction order passed under the provisions of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 (for short, 1961 Act') was in terms of the provisions of Section 21(1)(c), (d) and (0) of 1961 Act. That order had been challenged by the tenant and came to be affirmed in Rent Revision Petition No. 28 of 1989 on the file of the District Judge at Dharwad in terms of the order dated 21-12-1996 and a further revision by the aggrieved tenant to this Court in H.R.R.P. No. 177 of 1997 also came to be dismissed in terms of the order dated 13-6-2001. However, during the Course of the proceedings before this Court in H.R.R.P. No. 177 of 1997. submission of the learned Counsel for the landlord was that the examination of the eviction order can be confined to eviction under Section 210)(c) of 1961 Act and the ultimate result was that the eviction order was confirmed only under the provisions of Section 21(1)(c) of the 1961 Act. It is this order which was sought to be enforced by the landlord by filing Execution Case No. 77 of 2004 before the Court of the Prl. Civil Judge (Junior Division) at Hubli. It is in this proceeding that further disputes have arisen and the said proceeding continues to provide further cause for the parties to remain in litigation. 3. An eviction proceeding initiated in the year 1984 refuses to see its culmination as the landlord complained before the executing Court that he had not been given possession of the entire premises in terms of the eviction order; that the tenant continued to squat on some portions and it is for realization of possession of this portion also that the landlord had filed LA. No. VI before the executing Court. 4. No. VI before the executing Court. 4. It is not in dispute between the parties that in terms of the delivery warrant that had been issued by the executing Court, the eviction petitioner has handed over possession of stalls 5 and 6 of CTS No. 4524 of CTS Ward Extension, Hubli, but the prime contention between the parties was that while the eviction petitioner contended that, that he was not handed over the entire extent; that some portion was still left out and therefore unless that portion was also handed over, the eviction order is not executed in its entirety, the tenant contended that the eviction order had been implemented in terms of the prayer as in the eviction petition and what was being sought for by filing I.A. No. VI was for recovery of possession over and above what was the subject-matter of the eviction petition and therefore the eviction petitioner cannot by way of implementation of eviction order seek for recovery of possession of such portion. 5. The executing Court after hearing the arguments on behalf of the eviction petitioner who had filed I.A. No. VI for delivery of such portion of the premises, which according to the petitioner had not been handed over and the learned Counsel for the tenant who had suffered the order of eviction in terms of its order dated 6-7-2004, felt that for the purpose of seeking possession of the portion mentioned in I.A. No. VI, it was necessary that the eviction petitioner should instead come up with an application under Order 21, Rule 97 of the CPC and therefore dismissed the application. The learned Judge in the executing Court was of the view that the determination of the disputed aspect warranted an enquiry in terms of the provisions of Order 21, Rule 101 of the CPC and that it was not possible to embark on the same in the application which the eviction petitioner had filed. 6. The learned Judge in the executing Court was of the view that the determination of the disputed aspect warranted an enquiry in terms of the provisions of Order 21, Rule 101 of the CPC and that it was not possible to embark on the same in the application which the eviction petitioner had filed. 6. The aggrieved eviction petitioner having preferred revision petition before the District Judge under Section 46(2) of the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 (for short, 1999 Act'), which Act had occupied the field in place of the repealed Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961, allowed the Rent Revision Petition No. 43 of 2004 in terms of the order dated 16-4-2005, held that dismissal of I.A. No. VI by the Court below was not correct, set aside the order dated 6-7-2004 dismissing the said I.A. and directed the executing Court to issue delivery warrant for possession in terms of the application. 7. It is aggrieved by this order that the tenant is before this Court invoking jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 8. I have heard submissions at great length addressed by Sri Shaker Shetty, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Sri Chikkanagoudar, learned Counsel who has entered Caveator on behalf of the respondents 1 and 2 who are the legal heirs of the erstwhile landlord. 9. The question is as to whether the order passed by the learned District Judge as per the order impugned and direction issued therein calls for interference. 10. Sri Shaker Shetty, learned Counsel for the petitioner has raised several legal grounds, some quite interesting also. Learned Counsel submits that any decree to be executable should be one passed by the Court with jurisdiction; that a decree passed without jurisdiction is of no consequence and can be resisted by any person who claims he is affected by the decree at any place or forum where such a decree is sought to be used against the person complaining. Learned Counsel also submits that no Court has jurisdiction to pass a decree beyond the pleadings and the prayer. Learned Counsel also submits that no Court has jurisdiction to pass a decree beyond the pleadings and the prayer. He also submits that even if such a decree is justified on the facts and circumstances of the case, that should be done by the Court adjudicating the inter se dispute between the parties and by a suitable amendment to the pleadings so that the decree is amended by the Court competent to pass a decree and not by the executing Court. Such arguments are pressed into service to contend that the executing Court cannot go beyond the scope of the eviction order; that the eviction order Was in respect of premises in CTS No. 4524; that the petitioner tenant, in fact, had without any resistance, voluntarily had given possession of such premises in favour of the eviction petitioner and if that is so, the eviction order has been given effect to and nothing remains thereafter; that it is not the function of the executing Court to examine further questions beyond the eviction order, assuming that the eviction petitioner is otherwise entitled to possession of some more portions or area not subject-matter of the petition and the order. 11. It is also alternatively contended that the proceedings are one initiated under the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961; that the proceedings come to an end with the passing of an eviction order; that the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 and the Successor Act, the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 do not by themselves provide for implementation or execution of the eviction order passed by the designated Court, a special Forum or Tribunal constituted under the provisions of these enactments; that insofar as execution of such eviction order is concerned and as declared by the Division Bench of this Court execution as contemplated under Order 21 of the CPC is levied for the effectuation of the eviction order and in that process, the execution proceedings are only before the Civil Courts and not before the Special Tribunal under the enactments. This argument is pressed into service for contending that if execution proceedings are before the Civil Court, the question of revision under Section 46 of the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999, does not arise; that the order passed by the learned District Judge impugned in the writ petition is one without jurisdiction and therefore is liable to be quashed. This argument is pressed into service for contending that if execution proceedings are before the Civil Court, the question of revision under Section 46 of the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999, does not arise; that the order passed by the learned District Judge impugned in the writ petition is one without jurisdiction and therefore is liable to be quashed. Apart from such questions touching upon the jurisdiction and competence of the Courts to examine the matters and pass orders, learned Counsel for the petitioner has also submitted that having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, the executing Court was fully justified in passing the order on I.A. No. VI; that the application was rightly rejected by observing that having regard to the nature of dispute that had arisen, it was necessary for the eviction petitioner to come up with an application under Order 21, Rule 97 of the CPC, which provided scope for an enquiry to be conducted by the Court below and there was absolutely no occasion for the learned District Judge to have interfered with such an order by setting aside such order and for allowing the application under I.A. No. VI; that such course virtually preempts even a proper enquiry into the disputed aspects between the parties; that the impugned order is one which apart from being one without jurisdiction, not warranted interference even on the facts and circumstances and on such ground also the impugned order is required to be quashed. It is in support of these submissions that the learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the following decisions, namely: (a) M/s. Trojan and Company v. R.M.N.N. Nagappa Chettiar (b) Kiran Singh and Others v Chaman Paswan and Others; (c) Vasudeu Dhanjibhai Modi v Rajabhai Abdul Rehman and Others; (d) Shafiqur Rehman Khan and Another v Smt. Mohammad Jahan Begum and Others; (e) Om Prakash Gupta v Ranbir B. Goyal. 12. The sum and substance of the submissions is that when once an eviction order is implemented in terms of the very order and in respect of the subject-matter, no further question arises before the executing Court and assuming such question remain as a dispute between the parties, the Court is bound to follow the procedure contemplated under Order 21 of the CPC for such purposes and that cannot be avoided. The Court below having directed the parties to resort to such course of action, there was absolutely no occasion for the revisional Court to have interfered with such an order. 13. The writ petition is resisted by the respondents. Objections have been filed on behalf of the respondents by Sri Chikkanagoudar, learned Counsel for the respondents. 14. It is contended that the application in I.A. No. VI was quite tenable; that what was sought for under the application was for giving full effect to the order of eviction passed by the Court/Special Tribunal under 1961 Act; that so long as that order was not fully given effect to, the eviction petitioner can maintain an execution petition of this nature; that what had been handed over to the possession of the eviction petitioner was something short of what was required to be handed over in terms of the eviction order; that in terms of the pleadings and understanding of the parties before the Court at first instance before the revisional Court, more particularly, when the matter was before this Court in H.R.R.P. No. 177 of 1997, it was clear as between the parties that subject-matter included t/1.e portion in respect of which delivery was sought for in terms of I.A. No. VI before the executing Court and therefore the revisional Court is fully justified in setting aside the order of executing Court dismissing such an application and directing issue of delivery warrant in respect of the portion mentioned in the application. 15. 15. Sri Chikkanagoudar, learned Counsel for the respondents has also submitted that the revision petition in terms of Section 46 of the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 before the learned District Judge was very much tenable; that it was a proper course of action on the part of the respondents to have preferred such revision invoking Section 46 of the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999; that proceedings in HRC case which is before the Tribunal simply does not come to an end with the passing of an eviction order; that the eviction order is one for handing over possession of the premises in question to the eviction petitioner and handing over possession is very much part of the proceedings in the eviction petition; that passing of the eviction order is not an end by itself; that even under the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 and Rule 33 of the Karnataka Rent Rules, 2001, the provisions of CPC are made applicable to such of those aspects in respect of which 1999 Act itself does not provide for any particular procedure; that in view of Rule 33 of the Rules, the provisions of Order 21 which is resorted to for enforcing of an eviction order becomes very much part of the proceedings under the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 and an application or petition for implementation of an eviction order cannot be construed as an independent proceeding before a Civil Court, but a proceeding before the very Tribunal under the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999. Incidentally, such Tribunal being a Civil Court as the Court having jurisdiction itself is one as defined in Section 3(c)(iii) of the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999, which reads as follows.- "3. Definitions.- x x x (c) "Court" means,- (i) in respect of the area comprised within the limits of the City of Bangalore, the Court of Small Causes; (ii) in such other area as the State Government, may, in consultation with the High Court, by notification specify, the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division) having territorial jurisdiction over such area; and (iii) in respect of areas other than those referred to in sub-clauses (i) and (ii), the Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division) having territorial jurisdiction over such area". The proceeding under the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 before such a Court including a proceeding for implementation of the order though by invoking procedure under Order 21 of the CPC is nevertheless a proceeding taken under the provisions of the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999. If so, any order or even during the pendency, the proceeding in a matter can be examined by the District Judge in terms of the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 46 which reads as follows.- "46. Revision.-(1) The High Court may, at any time call for and examine any order passed or proceeding taken by the Court of Small Causes or the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division) referred to in items (i) and (ii) of clause (c) of Section 3 for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or correctness of such order or proceeding and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit. (2) The District Judge may at any time call for and examine any order passed or proceeding taken by the Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division) referred to in item (iii) of clause (c) of Section 3 for the purpose of such order or proceeding and may pass such order in reference thereto as he thinks fit. (3) The costs incidental to all proceedings before the High Court or the District Judge shall be in the discretion of the High Court or the District Judge as the case may be". That in this view of the matter, the learned District Judge was fully entitled and did have jurisdiction to examine the validity or otherwise of the order passed by the executing Court on LA. No. VI that had been filed by the eviction petitioner and to have corrected the order in terms of the order impugned in this writ petition. 16. No. VI that had been filed by the eviction petitioner and to have corrected the order in terms of the order impugned in this writ petition. 16. Learned Counsel for the respondents submits that what had been sought for in I.A. No. VI is not something beyond what was within the contemplation of the parties as the properties comprised in stalls 5 and 6; that the tenant had never set up any independent title in respect of any portion of the property which is sought for delivery under I.A. No. VI independent of the landlord; that, in fact, the petition pleadings, particularly, the objection filed to the eviction petition by the tenant before the Trial Court is ample proof of this position. 17. Ii is also the submission of Sri Chikkanagoudar that though in respect of the proceedings under Order 21 of the CPC, if there should be resistance at the execution stage or disputes arise in executing a decree, the further procedure is regulated by the relevant provisions of Order 21 of the CPC itself. Insofar as implementation of the eviction petition for handing over possession of the petition premises, particularly, for the landlord taking possession from the tenant is concerned, it is neither necessary nor warranted for having resorted to such provisions, particularly, such an application under Order 21, Rule 97 of the CPC, as the matter is one that had transpired between the very parties before the Court, on which the Court had given a finding; that the determination of the points in issue to answer the disputes sought to be raised by a person who is a party to the eviction order can be found or is available in the very order and in the proceedings itself, there is no need for any further enquiry in terms of the provisions of Order 21, Rule 97 of the CPC read with Rule 99 or 101 of the CPC. 18. 18. Learned Counsel for the respondent has also submitted that when an eviction order passed in respect of a particular premises as in the present case in the premises as understood under the provisions of 1961 Act and 1999 Act, within the meaning of these provisions under Section 3(1) of 1999 Act, it is obvious that the building includes land appurtenant to the building and such surrounding places which was being used by the tenant for full and proper enjoyment of the building etc. It is in this context that the learned Counsel has placed reliance on the decision of the Division Bench in Syed Nazmuddin v N.S. Krishna Murthy as also the decision of this Court in Hassanbaba S.P. and Others v Honnappa Venkatappa Naik and in N.K. Prakash Gupta v Smt. Rukmaniyamma and Others and contend that the revision was quite tenable. 19. Though several contentions have been urged on behalf of the petitioner as well as the respondents, petition being one under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the scope of interference is rather limited and interference will be only if, as rightly urged by Sri Shaker Shetty, learned Counsel for the petitioner, if the order passed by the Court below in terms of the impugned order is one without jurisdiction. The question of lack of jurisdiction is canvassed from several aspects. An order is sought to be invalidated on the premise of lack of jurisdiction basically as the order passed by the Court is without jurisdiction. The jurisdiction exercised by the learned District Judge being under Section 46 of 1999 Act, it becomes necessary to examine as to whether the District Judge could have passed an order under Section 46 of 1999 Act. 20. The submissions by Sri Shaker Shetty, learned Counsel for the petitioner with regard to the aspect of the jurisdiction are totally untenable, not stemming out of the facts on record; submission more based on the principles of law laid down in the decisions relied upon by the learned Counsel. 21. The first and foremost aspect of jurisdiction is that the Court lacks jurisdiction to pass orders as it has passed; that so far as the executing Court is concerned, it has rightly rejected I.A. No. VI and the revisional Court had not jurisdiction to interfere with that order in exercise of power under Section 46 of the 1999 Act. 22. The first and foremost aspect of jurisdiction is that the Court lacks jurisdiction to pass orders as it has passed; that so far as the executing Court is concerned, it has rightly rejected I.A. No. VI and the revisional Court had not jurisdiction to interfere with that order in exercise of power under Section 46 of the 1999 Act. 22. The other aspect of the submission is that when once an eviction order is passed, the Court is no more a Tribunal within the meaning of the Act i.e., the Court under the Act and therefore execution of the eviction order is only under the provisions of Order 21 of the CPC. A mere glance at the provisions of Section 41 of the 1999 Act which reads as under: "41. Vacant possession to landlord.-Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, where the interest of a tenant in any premises is determined for any reason whatever and an order is made by the Court under this Act for the recovery of possession of such premises, the order shall subject to the provisions of Section 34, be binding on all persons who may be in occupation of the premises and vacant possession thereof shall be given to the landlord by evicting all such persons therefrom: Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to any person who has an independent title to such premises". Makes it very clear that it is the function of the Court under the Act to ensure recovery of possession to the petitioner-landlord on passing an eviction order and by evicting such persons i.e., the persons who have suffered eviction order or persons claiming under them. So the eviction proceedings, in the sense, execution of the eviction order is under the Act though the procedure followed is as in the Code of Civil Procedure. 23. The executing Court is one with jurisdiction to entertain an application for the purpose of effectuating the order in its totality. So the eviction proceedings, in the sense, execution of the eviction order is under the Act though the procedure followed is as in the Code of Civil Procedure. 23. The executing Court is one with jurisdiction to entertain an application for the purpose of effectuating the order in its totality. It is a Court with jurisdiction and the principle of a decree passed by the Court without jurisdiction being a nullity and the celebrated observation of Justice Venkatarama Ayyar in Kiran Singh's case that "a decree passed without jurisdiction is a nullity and its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings" does not apply to the facts and circumstances of this case. It is only when an order is passed by a 'coram non-judice', these principles apply. In the present case, order/proceedings are with jurisdiction. Likewise, the revisional Court is also a Court with jurisdiction to pass orders in respect of any order or proceeding taken by the Court under the Act in the exercise of its revisional power under Section 46 of the Act. Correctness or incorrectness of an order, legality or illegality of the order are not germane to the concept of 'coram non-judice', 24. The other aspect of jurisdiction rather lack of jurisdiction urged by Sri Shaker Shetty, learned Counsel for the petitioner is about a decree passed which is a nullity when passed without plea for granting such a decree. The argument is that in the absence of the identification of the premises in respect of which the petitioner had sought for eviction order and the description being merely stalls 5 and 6 in CTS No. 4524, the eviction petitioner-landlord cannot before the executing Court seek for delivery of possession in respect of an area beyond what is comprised in stalls 5 and 6 of CTS No. 4524 and as described in the petition. Submission is that assuming that the eviction petitioner is entitled to recover possession of some part or area belonging to him and in which the petitioner-tenant is in possession, it can be achieved only by taking recourse to a proper remedy in law like suing for recovery of possession of this part and this cannot be achieved in the guise of implementation of the eviction order passed by the HRC Court. It is in support of this proposition that reliance is placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in M/s. Trozen and Company's case and also on the decision of the Supreme Court in Shafiqur Rehman Khan's case, with regard to the identity of the property. The reliance placed on these decisions is again misplaced. 25. It cannot be disputed that the eviction order as had been passed in H.R.C. No 160 of 1984 affirmed in Rent Revision No. 28 of 1989 and further affirmed by this Court in H.R.R.P. No. 177 of 1997 is only on the ground of Section 21(I)(c) of the 1961 Act and in respect of the stalls 5 and 6 in CTS No. 4524. This eviction order has attained its finality and the legality of that eviction order in respect of premises as understood in the petition and as understood between the parties is no more open to question. In a situation of this nature, the concept of 'coram non-judice' cannot be invoked. Assuming that the Trial Court has passed the decree or eviction order beyond what had been pleaded, that cannot be questioned before the executing Court as a decree which is illegal or without jurisdiction. Even passing a decree without a plea cannot affect the jurisdiction of the Court so long as the Court has jurisdiction. If a Court with jurisdiction passes a decree without a plea, such a decree can be got over by preferring an appeal or revision or in a proceeding directly questioning the correctness of that decree before a Competent Court and not in collateral proceedings. While a decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction attracting the principle of 'coram non-judice' can be challenged even in collateral proceedings, a decree passed which is characterized as an illegal decree for want of a plea in that regard but by a Court with jurisdiction cannot be questioned in collateral proceedings. 26. Inexecutability of a decree for want of identification of the subject-matter is another concept distinct from the earlier two principles discussed. But, in the present situation, none of these principles apply. On the pleadings in the petition and as understood before the Trial Court by the parties, the unauthorised construction put up by the tenant was described as in a portion measuring 20' x 20' in the premises. But, in the present situation, none of these principles apply. On the pleadings in the petition and as understood before the Trial Court by the parties, the unauthorised construction put up by the tenant was described as in a portion measuring 20' x 20' in the premises. The extent had been corrected by way of an application for amendment and the Trial Court while passing the eviction order has expressly referred to such unauthorised construction on an extent of 20' x 20' in paragraph 3 of Its order which reads as under: " .... respondent has constructed a permanent additional projection measuring 20' x 20' without the consent of the petitioner. The respondent has located a beedi shop in the said additional projection. The respondent has contravened the provisions of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961". 27. This is what had been urged in support of an eviction petition sought for under Section 21(1)(c) of the 1961 Act. It is ultimately that the eviction order is affirmed on the ground under this provision, while H.R.R.P. No. 177 of 1997 preferred by the tenant was dismissed by this Court in terms of the order dated 13-6-2001. Even in this order, there is discussion about the unauthorised construction on abutting space of 20' x 20' in CTS No. 4524 consisting of a beedi shop and other structures as contained in Para 4 at Page 5 of the order. It leaves one with no doubt that the additional projection put up by the tenant in adjoining space 20' x 20' abutting stalls 5 and 6 was very much subject-matter of the petition and it is in respect of the very violation that the eviction order came to be passed. An eviction order under Section 21(1)(c) will be passed only when there is an unauthorised construction in the leased premises. Irrespective of the contentions urged and irrespective of the actual position also, so far as the petitioner and the respondent are concerned, the petition premises subject-matter of H.R.C. No. 160 of 1984 is one which is inclusive of this area 20' x 20' on which the additional projection had been put up by the tenant. 28. Irrespective of the contentions urged and irrespective of the actual position also, so far as the petitioner and the respondent are concerned, the petition premises subject-matter of H.R.C. No. 160 of 1984 is one which is inclusive of this area 20' x 20' on which the additional projection had been put up by the tenant. 28. In the light of this factual position and categorical finding recorded by the Courts in the eviction proceedings, it is no more open to the petitioner to contend that the area 20' x 20' which had not been handed over by the tenant when the Court Ameena sought to execute the order and in respect of which the eviction petitioner sought for delivery of possession by filing I.A. No. VI, was not the subject-matter of eviction petition. The eviction order in respect of the premises was inclusive of this area. 29. Even in terms of Section 41 of the 1999 Act, it is the duty of the Court to ensure that the landlord is put in possession of the premises in respect of which the eviction order is passed. The revisional Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 46 of the 1999 Act has rightly directed issue of delivery warrant in respect of such area in terms of I.A. No. VI filed by the eviction petitioner. 30. I have referred to the submissions on behalf of the respondent by their learned Counsel. With regard to the nature of proceeding-s under the Act, the Court in which an application can be made for recovery of possession of the premises by the landlord in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 27 of the Act is the Court as contemplated under Section 3(c) of the Act and in the instant case, having regard to the location of the premises, the Court as indicated in the provisions of Section 3(c)(iii) of the Act. This is the said Tribunal under the Act and it so happens that the Civil Court is the Tribunal. It is nevertheless a proceeding under the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 (earlier under Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961). The provisions of the CPC are supplemented to guide the Court in its procedures in respect of such situations where no express provision has been made, in terms of Rule 33 of the Karnataka Rent Rules, 2001. It is nevertheless a proceeding under the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 (earlier under Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961). The provisions of the CPC are supplemented to guide the Court in its procedures in respect of such situations where no express provision has been made, in terms of Rule 33 of the Karnataka Rent Rules, 2001. The rule itself is framed in terms of Section 66 of the 1999 Act and therefore the order passed and procedure followed is as contemplated under the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999. This matter is before the Court as defined under the Act. Now in respect of even implementation of the order though technically and procedurally the provisions of Order 21 of the CPC are invoked, it is still a part of the procedure before the Tribunal. In respect of any order or proceeding before such a Tribunal, in exercise of power under Section 46 of the Act, the learned District Judge has jurisdiction to pass orders by way of revision. When this is the legal position, the order passed by the executing Court on I.A. No. VI is very much a proceeding before the Court which is a Tribunal constituted under the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999. If that is so, the District Judge has jurisdiction to pass orders in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. That is what the learned District Judge has done in the instant case and therefore it should be held that the order passed by the learned District Judge and impugned in this writ petition cannot be characterised as one lacking in jurisdiction. 31. That still leaves a dispute regarding the procedure that was required to be taken by the eviction petitioner for the purpose of seeking possession of the portion mentioned in I.A. No. VI. While it is the submission of Sri Shaker Shetty, learned Counsel for the petitioner that as this portion was not part of the petition premises and even if the eviction petitioner is entitled for recovery of the possession of said portion, it cannot be done by executing the order passed by the Court at the first instance, but by seeking recovery of the same in any other manner known to law, the submission of Sri Chikkanagoudar, learned Counsel for the respondents is that as this portion was also very much part of the petition premises, no other procedure is necessary to be followed . 32. 32. As it is found that the portion sought for, was one within the precincts of the premises in respect of which petitioner-tenant has suffered eviction order, the argument that an independent proceedings is required is totally untenable. Even with regard to the procedure that is required to be followed, the submission of Sri Shaker Shetty, learned Counsel for the petitioner is that it should be as indicated by the executing Court in its order on I.A. No. VI. Here again, the enquiry as contemplated under Order 21, Rule 97 read with Rules 99 and 102 of the CPC, is when the delivery of the premises is resisted by the person in possession who sets up some independent title or contends that he is or bound by the decree or even when what is sought to be done is beyond the scope of the decree. It is for finding an answer to such dispute question, an enquiry under Order 21, Rule 102 has to be held in execution proceedings in respect of the decrees passed in civil suits. The further procedure for filing an appeal against such order is to avoid duplication of litigation and multiplicity of proceedings. 33. In the instant case, the proceedings are all initially under the 1961 Act and later under the 1999 Act. It is before a special Tribunal. Exercise of jurisdiction by the Tribunal is under the special enactment. The procedure generally is summary proceedings. It is to supplement such summary proceedings, the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure are called in aid. When the main proceeding itself is characterised as a summary proceedings, in respect of supplementary proceedings by way of adoption of the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, it cannot be enlarged into an independent proceeding. So long as the Tribunal and the higher revisional Court are functioning within the scope of their jurisdiction, it cannot be said that the orders passed by these Courts are without jurisdiction. What can be achieved by an application under Order 21, Rule 35 of the CPC, if is achieved by an application quoting any other provision, it does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court. Ultimately, the entire exercise is to ensure that a proceeding initiated under the 1961 Act/1999 Act is brought to a logical culmination. Order passed by the learned District Judge has achieved this. The order is also with jurisdiction. Ultimately, the entire exercise is to ensure that a proceeding initiated under the 1961 Act/1999 Act is brought to a logical culmination. Order passed by the learned District Judge has achieved this. The order is also with jurisdiction. Pointing out a plausible different procedure by itself will not vitiate the order. There is no occasion for invalidating the order on such premise. 34. What is lastly contended by Sri Shaker Shetty, learned Counsel for the petitioner is that apart from the aspect of lack of jurisdiction etc., the order passed by the executing Court was also justified on merits and no interference was called, particularly when it only sought to resolve the dispute regarding the identification of the premises. No doubt, it is true that when there is a dispute which requires resolution, an enquiry, opportunity to the parties and resolution is very much necessary. But, as found by the revisional Court, the answer to the dispute is very much available within the record. It is not necessary to go in for any separate enquiry for the sake of compliance of any procedure. It should be borne in mind that the eviction proceedings commenced in the year 1984 and it is yet to see the end of the tunnel. A tenant who has lost the case on merits is now trying his luck before the executing Court which is in the process of giving effect to the eviction order. Procedure is only the handmaid of justice and cannot be allowed to assume such proportions to defeat justice itself, by becoming an independent oppressive monster. 35. The revisional Court, on examination of the relevant aspects, found that the circumstances justify issue of delivery warrant as prayed for by the applicant-eviction petitioner and if that order is one with jurisdiction and justified on facts and circumstances, there is no scope for interference with such order. I am of the view that the order impugned in this writ petition is not one which can be characterised as illegal or even irregular, but one justified and warranted in the circumstances. 36. There is no occasion for interference. No merit in the writ petition. Writ petition is dismissed accordingly.