Honble SHARMA, J.–Concurrent findings arrived at by the learned courts below have been assailed by the State of Rajasthan and another, the appellants herein, in the instant second appeal which was filed on August 27, 1991. An application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure has also been submitted by the appellants today for taking the additional documents on record. (2). Mr. Mohd. Rafiq, learned Additional Advocate General urged that since the trial court proceeded ex-parte, the appellants could not produce evidence and the suit of the plaintiff respondent was decreed. The first appellate court also did not properly appreciate the provisions contained in Order 9 Rule 7 CPC and the appeal was dismissed, therefore, opportunity to adduce evidence may be provided to the appellants in the interest of keeping the stream of justice pure and clear and findings under appeal should not be permitted to assume finality without the examination of the witnesses of the appellants. (3). As per the facts pleaded in the plaint the tenanted premises was let out on oral tenancy by the respondent (for short `Landlord) to the appellants (for short `defendant) on a rent of Rs. 30/- per month in the year 1962. The Estate Officer, Public Works Department demanded the certificate of ownership from the Landlord, who submitted the decision of City Survey and other documents on June 25, 1962. The acquisition proceedings were also initiated in regard to the tenanted premises but on December 9, 1968 the same was dropped. The defendant on October 14, 1973 cut the Neem-tree and started to raise construction without the permission of Landlord and changed the nature of the building. Since the defendant did not pay any rent from March 1, 1962 to February 28, 1974, the Landlord instituted the suit for ejectment and recovery of Rs. 4320/- after serving notice under Section 80 CPC. (4). In the written statement the defendant averred that the premises did not belong to landlord and it was never let out. No rent deed was ever executed. The premises belonged to the State Government where Maharaja Girls School was functioning. As many as eight issues were framed out of the pleadings of the parties. The Landlord thereafter examined five witnesses and got exhibited 38 documents. On October 12, 1982 when the case was posted for cross examination of Landlords witness PW. No rent deed was ever executed. The premises belonged to the State Government where Maharaja Girls School was functioning. As many as eight issues were framed out of the pleadings of the parties. The Landlord thereafter examined five witnesses and got exhibited 38 documents. On October 12, 1982 when the case was posted for cross examination of Landlords witness PW. 5, nobody appeared on behalf of the defendant and the trial court after closing the right of defendant to cross examine the witness, proceeded exparte and posted the case for pronouncement of judgment. On October 12, 1982 application under Order 9 Rule 7 CPC was filed by the defendant for setting aside the exparte proceedings, but on December 1, 1982 when the application was listed for arguments, the defendant and his counsel again did not appear and the application was dismissed in default. Another application moved by the defendant was also dismissed on December 20, 1982 and thereafter the suit of the landlord was decreed on January 4, 1983. The first appeal preferred by the defendant against the decree of the trial Court was dismissed by the defendant against the decree of the trial court was dismissed by the appellate court on May 17, 1991. It is against these findings that the instant second appeal has been filed by the defendant. (5). Following substantial questions of law were formulated by this court on April 22, 1997:- ``(1) Whether it is open to the appellant to assail the concurrent findings of the courts below by way of second appeal particularly when the courts below have concurrently held that the property, which is subject matter of the suit is not the property owned by the State and is not a part of the school premises? (2) Whether the Rajasthan Premises (Rent, Control & Eviction) Act is not applicable to the property in question? (3) Whether the Civil suit, which was filed by the plaintiff before the learned Munsif was maintainable in absence of notice u/S. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act? (4) Whether the suit was maintainable against the State in absence of proper notice u/S. 80 CPC? and (5) Whether the findings recorded by the Courts below can be said to be perverse and contrary to the record? APPLICATION UNDER ORDER 41 RULE 27 CPC: (6). (4) Whether the suit was maintainable against the State in absence of proper notice u/S. 80 CPC? and (5) Whether the findings recorded by the Courts below can be said to be perverse and contrary to the record? APPLICATION UNDER ORDER 41 RULE 27 CPC: (6). Before adverting to the substantial questions of law, I at the outset, deem it appropriate to dispose of the application of the defendant filed under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC. (7). It is well settled that production of additional evidence under Order 41 Rule 27 is permitted only under three circumstances which are:- Where (i) the trial court had refused to admit the evidence though it ought to have been admitted; (ii) the evidence was not available to the party despite exercise of due diligence; and (iii) the appellate court required the additional evidence so as to enable it to pronounce the judgment or for any other substantial cause of like nature. (8). All the litigants before the Court of law are equal. The State can not be granted any greater indulgence in the admission of additional evidence than a private litigant as is held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in State of U.P. vs. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava ( AIR 1957 SC 912 ). (9). It is inexplicable as to why the defendant did not choose to file application under Order 41 Rule 27 before the first appellate court. Even now after 14 years of filing of the instant second appeal the defendant suddenly woke up and made the application. In my considered opinion when party failed to apply under Order 41 Rule 27 in the first appellate Court, denial of opportunity to adduce additional evidence can not be urged in second appeal. If no sufficient cause is explained for not placing the documents on the record of the courts below earlier, the documents cannot be allowed to be filed in the second appellate court as additional evidence. In A. Thiraveyam Anvial vs. Vellayam (1996 AIHC 3691 (Madras) the High Court refused to entertain an application for receiving additional evidence which was filed a day before the hearing after the lapse of 13 years after the filing of the second appeal. In the instant matter also the application has been filed today i.e. After 14 years of filing of the second appeal. (10). In the instant matter also the application has been filed today i.e. After 14 years of filing of the second appeal. (10). Under these circumstances I find no merit in the application and reject the same. ORDER 9 RULE 7 CPC: (11). This takes me to the submissions of learned Additional Advocate General (for short `AAG) regarding Order 9 Rule 7 CPC which provides as under: ``7. Procedure where defendant appears on day of adjourned hearing and assigns good cause for previous non-appearance.- Where the Court has adjourned the hearing of the suit exparte, and the defendant, at or before such hearing, appears and assigns good cause for his previous non-appearance, he may, upon such terms as the Court directs as to costs or otherwise, be heard in answer to the suit as if he had appeared on the day fixed for his appearance. (12). On June 30, 1956, the Rajasthan High Court amended the said provision thus:- ``7. Where the Court has adjourned the hearing of the suit after making an order that it be heard ex parte and the defendant at or before such hearing appears and assigns good cause for his previous non-appearance, the Court may upon such terms as it directs as to costs or otherwise, set aside the order for the hearing of the suit ex parte and hear the defendant in answer to the suit as if he had appeared on the day fixed for his appearance. (13). Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Arjun Singh vs. Mohindra Kumar ( AIR 1964 SC 993 ) indicated that where the suit is adjourned for pronouncement of judgment, Order 9 Rule 7 has no application. It was observed as under- The opening words of O.9 R. 7, are ``where the Court has adjourned the hearing of the suit ex parte. Obviously they assume that there is to be a hearing on the date to which the suit stands adjourned. If the entirety of the ``hearing of the suit has been completed and the court being competent to pronounce the judgment then and there, adjourns the suit merely for the purpose of pronouncing judgment under O. 20 R.1, there is clearly no adjournment of ``the hearing of the suit, for there is nothing more to be heard in the suit. If the entirety of the ``hearing of the suit has been completed and the court being competent to pronounce the judgment then and there, adjourns the suit merely for the purpose of pronouncing judgment under O. 20 R.1, there is clearly no adjournment of ``the hearing of the suit, for there is nothing more to be heard in the suit. In such a case O. IX R. 7 could have no application and the matter would stand at the stage of O. IX R. 6 to be followed up by the passing of an ex parte decree making R. 13 the only provision in Order IX applicable. (14). Learned AAG took me to the order sheets of the trial Court and urged that since the final arguments were not heard the case could not have been posted for pronouncement of judgment. In such a situation ratio indicated in Arjun Singh vs. Mohindra Kumar (supra) was not applicable. It is next contended that secondary evidence regarding alleged rent deed could not be admissible and both the courts below misdirected themselves in appreciating question of law and placed onus on wrong party. It is further canvassed that even if the defendant was proceeded exparte, the court could not admit any inadmissible evidence and permit its decision to be influenced by irrelevant evidence. Reliance is placed on various judicial pronouncements. (15). I now proceed to scan the case law on which reliance is placed by learned AAG. In G.P. Srivastava vs. R.K. Raizada ( 2000 (3) SCC 54 ) = (RLW 2000(1) SC 125), wherein the Honble Apex Court held that where sufficient cause is made out by defendant for non-appearance, he cannot be penalised for any previous negligence. (16). In M/s. Gulab Chand Ramdas Jewellers vs. The Bank of Rajasthan (1991 (2) WLC (Raj.) 434, it was observed by the learned Single Judge of this Court that ample opportunity to lead evidence should be given to parties to defend their case. (17). In G. Ramegowda Major vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer (1988) 2 SCC 142 , the Honble Apex Court held that where the delay occurred due to fraud and unusual conduct of Government Pleaders, Court may condone the delay in the interest of justice. (18). (17). In G. Ramegowda Major vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer (1988) 2 SCC 142 , the Honble Apex Court held that where the delay occurred due to fraud and unusual conduct of Government Pleaders, Court may condone the delay in the interest of justice. (18). In Krishna Mohan Kul vs. Pratima Maity (2004 (9) SCC 468), it was held that onus of proof to prove due execution of documents in accordance with law is always on donee/beneficiary. It was also indicated that though scope for interference with concurrent findings of fact in second appeal is very limited, but where trial court and first appellate court misdirected themselves in appreciating question of law and placed onus on wrong party, certainly there is scope for interference after formulating a substantial question of law. (19). Kulwant Kaur vs. Gurdial Singh Mann ( 2001 (4) SCC 262 ), was the case where the Honble Apex Court observed that where lower courts finding is perverse, would come within the ambit of substantial question of law. It was also held that Judicial Approach, today, is justice oriented and no court ought to base its decision on technicality alone. (20). In Ramesh Chand Ardawatiya vs. Anil Panjwani (2003 (7) SCC 350) = (RLW 2002(1) Raj. 546), it was held that even in ex-parte proceedings necessity of proof by the plaintiff of his case to the satisfaction of the court cannot be dispensed with. Merely because of absence of written statement the court cannot admit any inadmissible evidence and permit its decision to be influenced by irrelevant or inadmissible evidence. (21). In Hari Shanker vs. Gobind Prashad Jagdish Prashad ( 2001 (10) SCC 301 ) = (RLW 2003(1) SC 121), it was indicated in para 7 thus:- ``7. It is a general practice in the High Courts that the advocates identify their case in the ``cause list of the day. An advocates non appearance in a case when the case is taken up on the ground that his name was not shown in the ``cause list is indeed a sufficient cause. (See G. Raj Mallaiah case). However, the High Court remarked that the advocate did little more than filing the vakalatnama and that the appellant was negligent and cavalier in prosecuting his case. (See G. Raj Mallaiah case). However, the High Court remarked that the advocate did little more than filing the vakalatnama and that the appellant was negligent and cavalier in prosecuting his case. In our view those remarks would be relevant in a case where in spite of showing the name in the ``cause list the advocate did not appear. In a case where the name has not been shown in the ``cause list the petitioner or his counsel cannot be found fault with for non appearance. In this view of the matter, we set aside the order under challenge and restore the second appeal to the file of the High Court, to be heard and decided afresh, in accordance with law. (22). In Vasantha Vishwanathan vs. V.K. Elayalwar ( 2001 (8) SCC 133 , it was held that copy of the true copy of document issued by the RTO presented in court without any seal of the court or certificate of endorsement is not admissible in evidence. (23). In Ashok Dulichand vs. Madhavlal Dube ( AIR 1975 SC 1748 ) it was held that the photostat copy being not above suspicion the petitioner could not be permitted to lead secondary evidence in the shape of photostat copy when there was neither any averment nor any material to show that original document was in possession of successful candidate. (24). In Poonamchand vs. Motilal (AIR 1955 Rajasthan 179) = (1955 RLW 322, 434), the Division Bench of this Court held that where original documents were not produced, their copies are not admissible in evidence. (25). Hafazat Hussain vs. Abdul Majeed ( 2001 (7) SCC 189 , the Honble Apex Court held that rule of non interference is not an absolute rule of universal application. (26). I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions advanced by learned Additional Advocate General and carefully scanned the case law cited. (27). I find myself unable to agree with the argument of learned AAG that ratio indicated in Arjun Singh vs. Mohindra Kumar (supra) was not applicable to the facts of this case. On October 12, 1982 the defendant had to cross examine the plaintiffs witness and when he failed to do so, he was proceeded exparte and the case was posted for pronouncement of judgment. On October 12, 1982 the defendant had to cross examine the plaintiffs witness and when he failed to do so, he was proceeded exparte and the case was posted for pronouncement of judgment. The entirety of the ``hearing of the suit had been completed and the suit was adjourned for pronouncement of judgment under Order 20 Rule 1 CPC. Thus application under Order 9 Rule 7 was not maintainable. When the exparte decree was passed against the defendant, he could have moved under Order 9 Rule 13 for setting it aside on the ground that he was prevented by any ``sufficient cause from appearing when the suit was called on for hearing. The defendant however did not choose to file application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC. (28). Having gone through the findings arrived at by the courts below I find that notice under Section 80 CPC was served on the defendant but it was ignored. As already noticed the Landlord examined 5 witnesses and got exhibited 38 documents. I have closely scanned the material on record and I notice that both the courts below properly considered ocular and documentary evidence and concurrently held that the tenanted premises was not the property owned by the State. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Kondiba Dagadu Kadam vs. Savitribai Sopan Gujar ( 1999 (3) SCC 722 = (RLW 2000(1) SC 89), held that the concurrent findings of facts howsoever erroneous cannot be disturbed by the High Court in exercise of the powers under Section 100 CPC. It was further held that it is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate the grounds on which the findings were arrived at, by the last court of fact, being the first appellate court. (29). In G. Ramegowda Major vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer (supra) their Lordships of Supreme Court indicated that Government, like any other litigant must take responsibility for the acts or omissions of its officers. But a some what different complexion is imparted to the matter where government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross-purposes with it. In the instant case acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of officer incharge or Govt. pleader have not been shown. In the instant case acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of officer incharge or Govt. pleader have not been shown. Learned AAG only made request to remand the case ignoring the negligence of the Government officials. I am unable to accede this request. In my opinion after a lapse of 23 years giving latitude to the State Government will not be in the interest of justice. (30). For these reasons, I find no merit in the instant appeal and the same stands dismissed without any order as to costs.