D. S. R. VARMA, J. ( 1 ) HEARD both sides. ( 2 ) THIS is a unique case where bureaucratic inertia is being demonstrated in flying colours. ( 3 ) THE facts, shorn of, are that the petitioner is a Public Limited Company engaged in production of caustic soda. The unit was started initially with a load factor of 0. 9, which is the minimum. It is also not in dispute that the petitioner-company was the only company in the entire country started using a unique technology called "bi-Polar cell Membrane Technology". The petitionercompany initially, i. e. , somewhere in the year 1987, made an application to grant power supply with 0. 9 load factor. That was not considered by the respondents. In the meanwhile, keeping in view the representations of various other companies, the Government had constituted a Standing committee (for brevity "the Committee") somewhere in the year 1988. The said committee made certain recommendations and issued guidelines, out of which guideline Nos. 7. 4 and 7. 6, which are significant and relevant for the present purpose are extracted as under: 7. 4: The Committee noted that there are certain enterprises, which manufacture products for which no alternate source is available either because of Governmental licensing requirements or for some strategic reasons units, which fall into these categories. For example, Government distilleries, defence installations should be permitted to consume power within excess of quota without disconnection but they have to pay twice the tariff. 7. 6: Higher Load factors: - Committee decided that Load Factors notified by the Board are considered reasonable unless a new technology was involved in respect of any individual unit necessitating higher load factors. According, a Caustic Soda manufacturing Unit was conceded 0. 9 LF as the technique is changed from Mercury Diaphragm process to membrane Cell Process. Also in the case of Steel Industry using induction furnaces a load factor of 0. 6 instead of 0. 4 is approved by the standing Committee. According, a Caustic Soda manufacturing Unit was conceded 0. 9 LF as the technique is changed from Mercury Diaphragm process to membrane Cell Process. Also in the case of Steel Industry using induction furnaces a load factor of 0. 6 instead of 0. 4 is approved by the standing Committee. " ( 4 ) THE very constitution of the Committee by the State Government was obviously exercising the jurisdiction under Sec. 78-A of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 (for brevity "the 1948 Act") and Section 22-B of the indian Electricity Act, 1910 (for brevity "the 1910 Act"), which are as under:"section 78-A: Directions by the State government: (1) In discharge of its functions, the board shall be guided by such directions on questions of policy as may be given to it by the State government. (2) If any dispute arises between the board and the State Government as to whether a question is or is not a question of policy, it shall be referred to the Authority whose decision thereon shall be final. Section 22-B: Power to control the distribution and consumption of energy. (1) If the State Government is of opinion that it is necessary or expedient so to do, for maintaining the supply and securing the equitable distribution of energy, it may by order provide for regulating the supply, distribution, consumption or use thereof. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by subsection (1), an order made thereunder may direct the licensee not to comply, except with the permission of the State government with- (i) the provisions of any contract, agreement or requisition whether made before or after the commencement of the Indian electricity (Amendment) Act, 1959 (32 of 1959), for the supply of energy to any person, or (ii) any requisition for the resumption of supply of energy to a consumer after a period of six months, from the date of its discontinuance, or (iii) any requisition for the resumption of supply of energy made within six months of its discontinuance, where the requisitioning consumer was not himself the consumer of the supply at the time of its discontinuance. " ( 5 ) FROM the above recommendations, it is absolutely clear that the Caustic Soda manufacturing Unit was conceded 0. 9 LF as the technique is changed from Membrane mercury Diaphragm process to Membrane cell Process. " ( 5 ) FROM the above recommendations, it is absolutely clear that the Caustic Soda manufacturing Unit was conceded 0. 9 LF as the technique is changed from Membrane mercury Diaphragm process to Membrane cell Process. ( 6 ) ACTUALLY that was the only Caustic soda unit in the State, which started functioning with 0. 9 LF. There was never change from one technique to the other. The institution of the unit was with Membrane cell Process. The language used in guideline No. 7. 6, which was referred to above, should be understood that for the first time this unit had shifted from the traditional technology to a new and different technology. But, it shall not be understood that the institution of the unit was with a particular technology and then shifted to a different technique. As already pointed out, it was a change in the traditional technology by the unit in that particular branch of production. ( 7 ) THIS, perhaps, is the reason for the respondents to say that the recommendations/guidelines of the committee appointed by the Government are applicable only prospectively but not retrospectively. Admittedly, the unit was started in the year 1987, and these recommendations/guidelines were made by the Committee only in the year 1988. ( 8 ) FROM a bare perusal of the impugned proceedings and from the submissions made by the learned Standing Counsel for a. P. TRANSCO, appearing for the respondents, it appears that the guidelines shall not be made applicable retrospectively. ( 9 ) IN my considered view, the said submission is a lopsided one, though not ludicrous. ( 10 ) EARLIER, Writ Petitions Nos. 3946 of 1988,4200 of 1988 and 9742 of 1988, were filed and the same were dismissed by a learned single Judge of this Court by a common judgment, dated 26-8-1988, and the same had been challenged by way of writ appeals in W. A. Nos. 1328 of 1988,1329 of 1988 and 1330 of 1988 and a Division bench of this Court dismissed the said writ appeals with the following observations:"the contention of the appellant is that the Committee constituted by the government has fixed the load factor at 0. 9 and the proceedings were issued by the Board on 24-12-1988 and that decision is applicable retrospectively from 1-12-1987 onwards as there was regular power cut in each year. 9 and the proceedings were issued by the Board on 24-12-1988 and that decision is applicable retrospectively from 1-12-1987 onwards as there was regular power cut in each year. The appellant is entitled to the benefit which the Committee has recommended. The decision of the Committee is after the dismissal of the writ petition and so the same could not be brought to the notice of the single Judge. Thereafter, the appellant made representations to the board on 29-12-1988 and 14-5-1990, but the same are not disposed of. Heard Sri K. N. Jwala, Counsel for the electricity Board. The above facts show that the Committee constituted by the government has fixed the load factor 0. 9 after the dismissal of the Writ petitions. Thereafter, the appellant made representations which have to be considered by the first respondent. In view of the above, the first respondent is directed to dispose of the representations of the appellant, dated 28-12-1988 and 14-5-1990, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. The interim order granted in the Writ Appeal will continue until the 1st respondent disposes of the representations, if they are pending. If the representations are already disposed, the first respondent shall communicate the copy of the order to the appellant. " ( 11 ) FROM the above, it is further obvious that a Division Bench of this Court had taken note of all the facts including the fact that the government had fixed the load factor as 0. 9 after dismissal of the writ petitions by the learned single judge of this Court. This does not mean that the decision of the government shall be made applicable to the year 1988 but not 1987. ( 12 ) AT the cost of repetition and also in view of the discussion made above, the change of the unit from one technology to the other shall not be understood as change of technology at the time of institution to the other at a later date. The very unit was established and started functioning with a new technology which was not known to caustic Soda Industry in the entire country even as of to-day. The very unit was established and started functioning with a new technology which was not known to caustic Soda Industry in the entire country even as of to-day. ( 13 ) IN view of the judgment rendered by the Division Bench of this Court, representations have been made and the same have been considered and the order, darted 15-4-2001, which has been impugned in the earlier writ petitions, has been issued by the Chief Engineer/comml. , A. P. TRANSCO, Hyderabad, and communicated to the petitioner. The reasons therein, for ready reference, are as under:"1. The Standing Committee recommended load factor of 0. 9 for the randc period of 1988 covered by b. P. Ms. No. 1065, dt. 23-11-1988 i. e. , from 30-11-88 onwards. This load R and c period of 1987 covered by b. P. Ms. No. 1013, dated 14-11-1987 i. e, from November, 87 onwards, as the decision of the Committee applies only for R and C period of 1988. Further the committee took decision in respect of many consumers and all these decisions are made applicable for 1988 randc period and not retrospectively. You cannot claim retrospective application as a matter of right. 2. You are fully aware of the implication of exceeding the quotas fixed under the randc orders of 1987 and you have exceeded for quotas for your own benefit of production, in clear violation of the condition imposed by APSEB to maintain equitable supply of power shortage situation prevailing at that time. Hence you are liable to pay the penalties prescribed for such violation of the R and C orders. 3. At no point of time the APSEB agreed for such retrospective application as contended by your representatives during the personal hearing on 16-10-97. 4. While dismissing the W. P. No. 3486, 4200 and 9742 of 1988, the Hon ble high Court of A. P. , rejected your plea for telescopic application holding that the rectified procedure of B. P. 417, dt. 16-5-88 can be applied only prospectively i. e, from the date of issue of order (16-5-88) and not retrospectively. Thus your request for telescopic application of power cuts for the R and C period of 1987 cannot be accepted. 16-5-88 can be applied only prospectively i. e, from the date of issue of order (16-5-88) and not retrospectively. Thus your request for telescopic application of power cuts for the R and C period of 1987 cannot be accepted. " ( 14 ) WHEN the same was challenged before this Court in W. P. No. 19986 of 2002, this Court made several observations and taking into account various circumstances, which need not be repeated at this point of time since they are already on record. Eventually, the said writ petition was disposed of through judgment, dated 1-7-2003, with a direction to the respondents to have a re-look at the whole issue with pragmatic approach, pointing out various aspects. ( 15 ) THERE would have been no wonder for this Court had there been an order passed by the respondents in favour of the petitioner by adopting a realistic approach, as indicated therein itself. ( 16 ) TO the utter dismay, if not utter disregard, the present order had been passed. ( 17 ) A bare perusal of the impugned proceedings would show that it is almost a replica of the proceedings impugned in the earlier writ petitions in the first round of litigation. This Court expresses its excruciating feelings for the way in which the respondents responded to the judgment passed by this Court in W. P. No. 19986 of 2002, dated 1-7-2003. This Court had a strong belief that the order or this Court has not even been looked into, if not cared by the respondents. ( 18 ) NORMALLY, this Court would not interfere with the Policy decisions of the state or its instrumentalities unless they are ex facie arbitrary or irrational or violative of the principles of natural justice or the rights conferred upon a citizen by the Constitution are vitiated. Instead of substituting its views, in normal course, the Court would only direct the State or its instrumentalities to consider a particular case in a particular manner. In other words, this Court would not usurp the jurisdiction and power or duty of the State. Nevertheless, in given circumstances, this court would not hesitate to interfere if the orders of the Courts are either ridiculed or made superfluous. In other words, this Court would not usurp the jurisdiction and power or duty of the State. Nevertheless, in given circumstances, this court would not hesitate to interfere if the orders of the Courts are either ridiculed or made superfluous. ( 19 ) I do not feel that it is necessary to give reasons once again since the reasons given by this Court in the said judgment in w. P. No. 19986 of 2002, dated 1-7-2003, are in detail and can be understood by the respondents without any difficulty. However, in brief, the reasons are as under:" (1) If the factors which were considered and weighed with the Standing committee existed right from the institution of the company and record reveals that for the purpose of calculating consumption deposit load factor was fixed at 0. 9 but for the purpose of arriving entitlement of energy it was fixed at 0. 6, meaning thereby that for one purpose the load factor was fixed at 0. 6 and for another purpose as 0. 9. This, normally, has to be corrected. (2) The technologies like prospective or retrospective shall not be prime considerations for the authorities to reject the applications of the 20 petitions the other practical difficulties as highlighted by the petitioners for running the industry and in view of these unique nature also should be taken into consideration. (3) The technology adopted by the petitioner at the institution of the industrial unit and as on the date of recommendation by the Standing committee were one and the same and after all the time gap between these two was about a year. (4) In spite of the dismissal of the earlier writ petitions in W. P. Nos. 3846 of 1988, 4200 of 1988 and 9742 of 1988, through a common judgment, dt. 26-8-1988, by a learned single Judge of this court, the Government exercising its statutory jurisdiction under section 87-A of the 1948 Act conceded the request of the petitioner in view of the recommendations of the Standing committee. Therefore, while rejecting the claim of the petitioner for the previous year some additional reasons ought to have been recorded, to reject for the previous year i. e. , 1987-1988. Therefore, while rejecting the claim of the petitioner for the previous year some additional reasons ought to have been recorded, to reject for the previous year i. e. , 1987-1988. (5) The earlier decision by the government was taken to constitute a Committee to look into the problems of the petitioner along with others was taken by the government and their rejection in spite of the recommendations of the committee was done by the Board. The powers of the Government and the Committee constituted by the government exercising the jurisdiction under Section 87-A and section 22-B of the 1948 Act are certainly on higher pedestal of the board. At best, the Board could have asked or suggested the government the reasons to reject the case of the petitioner. In other words, there was no coalition between the decision/recession and the purpose of the Government to constitute the Committee and the order passed by the Board in so far as the petitioner is concerned. (6) A direction was given to the respondents to consider the representation of the petitioner having regard to the reasons and the recommendations made by the standing Committee, constituted by the Government, giving a practical look to the present controversy and also taking into account all the grievances presented by the petitioner. " ( 20 ) TO put it precisely, the very purpose and object of constituting the Committee by the State Government under its exclusive and superior statutory authority has been watered down, though not defeated. ( 21 ) HENCE, in view of the attitude of the respondents in replicating its orders not giving due weight to the orders of this Court, i feel it expedient to set aside the impugned proceedings, dated 9-12-2003, the letter, dt. 9-12-2003, and the letter, dt. 27-9-2002, issued by the second respondent, and accordingly the same are set aside. ( 22 ) IN the result, the writ petition is allowed, as prayed for, at the stage of admission. However, there shall be no order as to costs.