Judgment (Delivered by Hon'ble P.C. Verma, J.) This petition has been filed by the petitioner seeking writ of certiorari quashing the Order/Communication dated 07-08-2000 (Annexure No. 5 to the writ petition) passed by respondent No.1 and with further prayer to issue writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to refund the excess amount paid by the petitioner towards the electricity charges. 2. The case of the petitioner, in brief, is that the petitioner planning to setup a Health Spa was attracted by concession granted by the respondents in addition to the concession proposed in the U.P. Tourism Policy. In view the concessions granted by the respondents the petitioner prepared a project report wherein the cost factor and returns thereon were considered and finding the same feasible setup a Health Spa, Mandarin Oriental Ananda The Himalayas at Narendra Nagar, Tehri Garhwal; that the respondent No.1 in consonance with the Government Tourism Policy offered concessions In the form of Development rebate of 50% on new connection for a period of 5 years from the date of commencement of supply in the hill districts of Uttar Pradesh (since created as a new State of Uttaranchal). The said concessions have been detailed in Paragraph-7 of Rate Schedule LMV-2 issued by respondent No.1; that In view of the commitment made in writing with regard to the concession, the petitioner applied for a connection of 500 KVA while setting up the Health Spa (Mandarin Oriental Anand The Himalayas) at Narendra Nagar Tehri Garhwal (Uttaranchal); that the respondent No.1 granted the connection of 500 KVA to the petitioner in the month of January 2000 and ever since the petitioner was granted the 50% hill rebate on electricity bills until 20th August 2000, when the same was withdrawn; that when the petitioner was supplied with electricity bills without giving hill rebate, he approached the respondent No.1 and he was Informed that the hill rebate has been withdrawn with effect from 09-08-2000 through Communication/Order dated 07-08-2000 made by respondent No.1; that ever since the petitioner has been making the payment on revised tariffs to the respondents under protest. The petitioner raised grievance before the respondents through protest letter/ representations but nothing has been heard till date. 3. The petitioner raised grievance before the respondents through protest letter/ representations but nothing has been heard till date. 3. The petitioner filed this writ petition on the grounds, inter alia, that in view of the promise made in writing with regard to the concession, the petitioner applied for a connection of 500 KVA while setting up the Health Spa at Narendra Nagar, District-Tehri Garhwal, one of the most backward districts of Uttar Pradesh now in Uttaranchal and availed the concession till the unilateral withdrawal of commitment in form of canceling the hill rebate which is illegal and arbitrary and unsustainable in the eyes of law. The respondent No.1 granted the connection of 500 KVA to the petitioner in the month of January 2000 and ever since the petitioner was granted 50% hill rebate on electricity bills upto 20th August, 2000. Because withdrawing the hill rebate from 09-08-2000 by respondent No.1 is admittedly a unilateral exercise and in violation of agreement and thus unsustainable in the eyes of law. Because in view of the withdrawal of the hill rebate towards electricity charges, the petitioner has been facing tremendous financial hardship. The unilateral withdrawal of hill rebate of 50% on electricity bills by the respondents is an illegal and arbitrary exercise and cannot be upheld In view of the application of Doctrine of Promissory Estoppels. 4. The respondent No.2 Uttaranchal Power Corporation in its counter affidavit denied the contents of the writ petition and alleged that no any concession was allowed to the petitioner by the Uttaranchal Power Corporation Limited with regard to concession granted to the consumers by virtue of notification dated 25-01-1999. In facts, concession was earlier allowed by the Uttar Pradesh State Electricity Board through notification dated 25-01-1999 and as per new tariff introduced on 09-08-2000 there is no such concession allowed by the tariff schedule prior to appointed date I.e. before creation of State of Uttaranchal. More so, after creation of Uttaranchal State the State of Uttaranchal has got a right to allow the concession or to withdraw the concession and there is no right of the consumer to claim the concession. More so, after creation of Uttaranchal State the State of Uttaranchal has got a right to allow the concession or to withdraw the concession and there is no right of the consumer to claim the concession. The respondent in its counter affidavit further alleged that the rebate which was given by UPSEB was given In following terms in the old tariff as the consumer is of LMV 2 tariff and the concession is no more available in the present case to the petitioner and thus the petitioner cannot claim any such concession. The respondent No.2 further alleged that whatever is being said in paragraph .Nos. 3 & 4 of the petition is being said for LMV 2 consumer in the policy of the Uttar Pradesh and the Uttaranchal has refused to follow the same and thus the petitioner cannot compel the Uttaranchal State to grant the concession. More so, such concession has not been allowed by tariff schedule of 09-08-2000 and the rate/tariff schedule of the U.P. Power Corporation Limited of 09-08-2000 is valid and applicable to the Uttaranchal area and thus it is apparently clear that the petitioner has got no right to claim the concession which was allowed earlier. It is also contended that hill rebate of 50% In the bill was granted earlier in terms of the tariff of 25-01-1999. After the tariff was changed by the U.P. State Electricity Regulatory Commission, then In that case the hill rebate was not applicable and thus In the instant case the claim of the petitioner is wholly misconceived. The hill rebate has already been withdrawn in the new tariff Introduced from 09-08-2000 and the petitioner is bound to pay the entire bill raised by the respondent No.2. The Uttaranchal Government is following the same policy, which is being followed by the U.P. State Electricity Regulatory Commission and in fact the said Commission has decided to drop the concession in the instant case and as such new tariff was introduced from 09-08-2000 without the facility of 50% hill rebate. Therefore, in the Instant case it is clear that the petitioner has illegally claimed the rebate. It is also alleged by the respondent No.2 that the petitioner is also not paying full bills and w.e.f. August 2001 he is only paying half bill illegally. 5. Therefore, in the Instant case it is clear that the petitioner has illegally claimed the rebate. It is also alleged by the respondent No.2 that the petitioner is also not paying full bills and w.e.f. August 2001 he is only paying half bill illegally. 5. In the rejoinder affidavit, the petitioner rebutted the contentions of the respondent No.2 made in the counter affidavit and submitted that the contention of the respondent that after the creation of Uttaranchal State the State of Uttaranchal has got a right to allow the concessions or to withdraw the concession is not only misconceived but also against the settled principles of law as has been laid down by the Apex Court in series of judgments. The petitioner in Its rejoinder affidavit reiterated the facts of the writ petition and stated that the policy of U.P. Power Corporation Limited of the year 2000 is valid and applicable to the Uttaranchal area. 6. We have heard Sri U.K. Uniyal, learned counsel for petitioner and Sri Ranjeet Saxena, learned counsel for the respondents. The State of U.P. in order to induce and allure new entrepreneurs to establish industrial units in Zero Industrial Zones of hill areas of U.P. repeatedly declared exhaustive industrial policies with the consent of U.P. Electricity Board, Sales Tax Department, Industries Department etc. and declared rebate in electricity bills to industrial units which would be established in hill areas of U.P. To implement new industrial Policy, State of U.P. issued directions to the U.P. State Power Corporation under Sec. 78-A of Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). The State Power Corporation in order to give effect the new industrial policy in compliance to direction issued under Section 78 (a) in exercise of its power under Sec. 49 of the Act, by notification No. 92-HC/SEB-V-1974-1204-C/99, dated Jan. 25, 1999 granted concession on the bills of power consumption for a period of five years to new industrial units which will be established in following areas of hill districts, namely, Almora district, Pithoragarh district, Chamoli district, Uttarkashl district, Pauri Garhwal district excluding Nagarpalika area of Kotdwara, Nainital district excluding Haldwani, Rudrapur, Gadarpur, Kashipur, Bajpur, Ramnagar, Jaspur, Khatlma and Sitarganj blocks, Tehri Garhwal district excluding Muni-ke-Reti town area and Dhalwala village under Narendra Nagar Block and Dehradun ,district excluding Doiwala, Raipur, Sahaspur and Vikasnagar Blocks. Notification dated 25-1-1999 aforesaid reads as under : - "In partial modification of their notification No. 1622-HC/SEB-V-1974-1204 C/94 dated 15-07-1994, regarding rates and tariffs for supply of electrical energy by the Board, and as amended from time' to time, and in exercise of the powers under section 49 'of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 (Act No.54 of 1948) and all other powers in this behalf and in super session of all previous notifications, on the subject, the U.P. State Electricity Board hereby notify that : (i) Existing rate Schedules LMV-1, LMV-2, LMV-3, LMV-4, LMV-6, LMV-9, HV-1, HV-2 and HV-3, are hereby deleted and substituted by rate schedules LMV-1, LMV-2, LMV-3, LMV-6, LMV-9, HV-1, HV-2, HV-3 & HV5 appended thereto. These rate schedules will apply to all concerned consumers in respect of supply of electricity throughout the State of Uttar Pradesh directly served by U.P. State Electricity Board. (ii) The enclosed rate schedules shall come into force with effect from 28, 1999. It is hereby clarified that consumption of consumers recorded through meter readings taken for the first time on any date after the issue of this notification shall be bifurcated into earlier and present revised tariff on a pro-rata basis for number, of days in each period. (iii) The aforesaid rate schedules shall, besides, be subject to levy of such charges or surcharges and Electricity Duty as may be Imposed by the Government and/or Board from time to time. 2. The rate of charge, conditions of supply and other matters specified in the schedules annexed hereto shall replace the existing rate of charge and corresponding provisions in the existing schedules and din the existing agreements, if any, with the Board with effect from January 25, 1999 except an mentioned in the proviso to sub-paragraph (ii) of the preceding paragraph". 7. The petitioner is LMV-2 consumer. Rate schedule given with the aforesaid notification for LMV-2 consumers contains in clause 7 in following terms : "7. Concessions: In respect of connections other than cinemas and theatres for their light, fan, projectors, air-conditioner and air-cooling plants etc. as may be located in under mentioned areas of hill districts are U.P. a development rebate of 50% on the amount or the bill as computed under item 4, 5 & 6 above will be given to new connections for a period of five years from the date of commencement of supply. as may be located in under mentioned areas of hill districts are U.P. a development rebate of 50% on the amount or the bill as computed under item 4, 5 & 6 above will be given to new connections for a period of five years from the date of commencement of supply. This rebate will also be admissible for the unexpired period of five years to those existing connections, which have not completed five years from the date of commencement of supply. Provided that the above development rebate shall not be admissible to the Departments / Corporations / Undertakings of State / Centre Govt. and Local Bodies. Further in cases where the supply has been commenced between April 01, 1990 to March 31, 1995 inclusive of both dates) in the period of development rebate shall be five and half years in place of five years". The area of Hill Districts described in this rate schedule has also been mentioned above. 8. While this notification dated 25-1-1999 was enforced the petitioner established a Health Spa and entered into an agreement with the Power Corporation on 15th July, 2000. The relevant clauses of agreement for the purposes of this writ petition are clause 7 and clause 11 which read as under :- "7- a. The consumer shall pay for the supply of electric energy at the rates enforced by the supplier from time to time as may be applicable to the consumer. b. The rate schedule applicable to the consumer at the time of execution of this agreement is annexed hereto, as Annexure-2. c. The rate schedule above mentioned may, at the discretion of the Supplier, be revised by the Supplier from time to time and in the case of revision, the rate schedule so revised shall be applicable to the consumer. "11- This agreement shall subject hereinbefore provided be and remain In force for two years from the date of commencement of supply (hereinafter called the initial period of supply) and thereafter from year to year basis on the terms and conditions herein contained. "11- This agreement shall subject hereinbefore provided be and remain In force for two years from the date of commencement of supply (hereinafter called the initial period of supply) and thereafter from year to year basis on the terms and conditions herein contained. Provided that either party shall be at liberty to determine this agreement at any time after the expiration of the initial period of supply on giving one month's notice in writing of such intention, and on the expiration of such notice, this agreement shall absolutely case and determine, but without prejudice to the rights and remedies if any, of either party, which may have accrued or arisen hereunder in the meantime. Provided further that if the person taking supply of electrical energy due to any reason, he shall be liable to pay to the supplier necessary charges as per provision made in the regulation framed by the Supplier under Sections 49 & 79 of Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948". 9. The U.P. Power Corporation Ltd. by its notification No. 1208/HC/ UPPCL-V-1974-1204/2000 dated 7th August, 2000 revised the rate schedule for LMV 2 consumers. The following schedule was appended thereto - "Rate Schedule LMV-2 Commercial Light, Fan and Power 1. Applicability: This schedule shall apply to all consumers using electric energy for light, fan and power load for commercial purposes, all type of shops, Non-Govt. Hospital, nursoing homes, dispensaries, hotels, restaurants, marriage homes, showrooms, commercial establishments, Railways (excluding traction and industrial premises), Cinema and Theatres, X-ray plants, commercial institution, societies, research institutes, coaching institutes, schools/ colleges not receiving Govt. aid, museums, power looms upto 4 KW load and not covered under any other rate schedule. 2. Character of service : a. Alternating Current, 50 cycles, single phase, 230 Volts upto a load of 4 KW. b. Alternating Current, 50 cycles, three phase for 400 Volts and above depending upon the availability of voltage, for the above 4 KW. Note: Supply of new connections of more than 150 kw (127.5 w) and upto 3000 KVA (2550 KW) shall not released to voltage less than 11 KV and loads above 3000 VA 2550 KW and upto 10,000 (8500 KW) below the supply voltage of 33 KV. Loads above 10,000 (8500 W) shall not be given below supply voltage of 132 KV. 3. Point of supply : Energy shall be supplied to the consumers at a single point. 4. Loads above 10,000 (8500 W) shall not be given below supply voltage of 132 KV. 3. Point of supply : Energy shall be supplied to the consumers at a single point. 4. Rate of Charge . Description Fixed Charge [Tar For villages/towns having Rs. 95/- per month. population less than 10,000 as per 1991 census and load upto 2 KW getting unmetered supply as per rural schedule. (b) In other cases, including Fixed Charge Plus Energy consumers getting supply through Rs. 35 per connection for Charge First rural feeders exempted from oad upto 1 KW on single 100 Units/ scheduled rosterings/restrictions or phase/month Rs. 75 per month : 425 through co-generating radial feeders connection for load upto paise/unit in villages/towns having population 1 KW on single phase/ Remaining less than 10,000 as per 1991 census. month Rs.225 per connection Units/month for 3 paise load/month. 450paise/ unit. Note: In case of defective meter, energy consumption shall be assessed and billed using a load factor of 30% on the contracted load. For this purpose the contained load of less than 0.5 KW shall be treated as 0.5 KW. But this shall be limited to three month's period and within this period the meter should be set right. 5. Rebates/Surcharge: (i) The above rate at time no. 4 (a) is subject to a rebate of Rs. 5/- per connection per month provided the bill is paid by the due date specified therein. If the bill is not paid by the due date surcharge shall be levied as at 5 (iii) below. (ii) The above rates at item no.4 (b) is subject to a rebate of 10 paise per KWh provided the bill is paid by the due date specified therein. If the bill is not paid by the due date surcharge shall be levied as at 5 (iii) below. (iii) If the bill is not paid by the due date specified therein, a late payment surcharge shall be charged @ 2% per month or part thereof on the unpaid amount of the bill for the period by which the payment is delayed beyond the due date specified In the bill without prejudice to the right of the UPPCL to disconnect the supply. (iv) If the supply is given at voltage above 400 Volts, a rebate of 5 percent will be admissible on "Rate of Charge". (iv) If the supply is given at voltage above 400 Volts, a rebate of 5 percent will be admissible on "Rate of Charge". (v) Power looms with connected load upto 4 KW will get a rebate of 10% in energy charges. (vi) The above rebates shall be subject to the condition that the net amount payable after allowing these rebates shall not be less than the amount of minimum charge. 6. Minimum Charges: For Consumers billed under rate of charge 4 (b) above a. For consumers having load Rs. 190/- per KW or part thereof per upto 5 KW month. b. For consumers having load Rs. 220/- per KW or part thereof Per upto 10 KW month. c. For consumers having load Rs. 250/- per KW or part thereof per above 10 KW month. d. For consumers having load Rs. 5,280/- per KW or part thereof per more than 10 KW on whose year chargeable @ Rs. 440/- per KW or premises MDI has been part thereof per month provided that- installed on their request on (i) The minimum charge as mentioned recorded /assessed demand. above for the month shall be charged on the actual maximum demand on 75% of the contracted load, whichever is higher, subject to final adjustment in last bill of the year of account. (ii) If the maximum demand of the consumer in any month exceeds the contracted load, such excess demand shall be charged at an thereof per month over the normal rate. This at the normal rate on excess load over and above the contracted load, shall not be taken into account towards aforesaid amount of minimum charge. (iii) Existing consumers can avail an opportunity, but only once, to reduce their contracted load." 10. After the aforesaid notification, the Chief General Manager issued the impugned circular to all concerned that the rebate to the hill areas has been now slashed. In the Hindi notification it is written "'"" and accordingly the impugned bills were raised on the revised rate schedule. From the perusal of the notification No.92-HC/SEB-V-1974-1204-C/99, dated Jan. 25, 1999 with the notification No. 1208/HC/UPPCL-V-1974-1204/2000 dated 7th August, 2000 it is clear that no provision has been made in the subsequent notification relating to concession. It does not provide for withdrawal of the concession already granted by the earlier notification. From the perusal of the notification No.92-HC/SEB-V-1974-1204-C/99, dated Jan. 25, 1999 with the notification No. 1208/HC/UPPCL-V-1974-1204/2000 dated 7th August, 2000 it is clear that no provision has been made in the subsequent notification relating to concession. It does not provide for withdrawal of the concession already granted by the earlier notification. No public interest was shown in this notification which could stop the application of doctrine of promissory estoppel. The petitioner has established the Health Spa on the basis of promise to grant concession of 50% upto 5 years is not disputed. In the agreement it was also agreed to provide concession for 5 years. In identifiable facts and circumstances of the case in Pawan Alloys &. Casting Pvt. Ltd., Meerut versus U.P. State Electricity Board and others, reported in (1997) 7 Supreme Court Cases, page 251 the Hon'ble Supreme Court after considering the rival contentions formulated the following four question for determination :- 1. Whether the respondent-Board on the doctrine of promissory estoppel was liable to be restrained from enforcing the impugned notification dated 31-7-1986 against the appellants so far as the unexpired period of three years available to them under earlier notifications granting development rebate was concerned. 2. Whether the appellants on account of agreements entered into by them with the Board while taking supply of electricity for their industries were barred from challenging the impugned notification of 31-7-1986. 3. Whether the impugned notification was having any retrospective effect. 4. If the appellants fail on merits, whether this Court in exercise of its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India on the peculiar .facts and circumstances of these cases would relieve the appellants of their obligation to pay the late payment surcharge dues to the Board. The Apex Court in the aforesaid judgement while considering the applicability of the promissory estoppel considered all earlier judgements held as under in paragraph Nos. 30, 31, 32 which are reproduced as under :- "30. Shri Dave next invited our attention to a three-Judge Bench judgement of this Court In the case of Shrijee Sales Corpn. [(1997) 3 SCC, 398] wherein AM. Ahmadi, C.J., speaking for the Bench considered the correctness of the aforesaid decision in Kasinka Trading [(1995) 1 SCC, 274}. As the decision in Shrijee Sales Corpn. Shri Dave next invited our attention to a three-Judge Bench judgement of this Court In the case of Shrijee Sales Corpn. [(1997) 3 SCC, 398] wherein AM. Ahmadi, C.J., speaking for the Bench considered the correctness of the aforesaid decision in Kasinka Trading [(1995) 1 SCC, 274}. As the decision in Shrijee Sales Corpn. has laid down the parameters of the field in which the doctrine of promissory estoppel can apply it is necessary to closely refer to the relevant observations found in the said judgement. It may be mentioned that the very same customs exemption notification which was considered by the Bench of two learned Judges in Kasinka Trading was considered by a three-Judge Bench in Shrijee Sales Corpn. While upholding the said notification Ahmadi, C.J, in paras 3 and 4 of the Report observed as under : (SCC pp. 403-04). "3. It is not necessary for us to go into a historical analysis of the case-law relating to promissory. estoppel against the Government. Suffice it to say that the principle of promissory estoppel is applicable against the Government but in case there is a supervening public equity, the Government would be allowed to change its stand; it would then be able to withdraw from representation made by it which induced persons to take certain steps which may have gone adverse to the interest of such persons on account of such withdrawal. However, the Court must satisfy itself that such a public interest exists. The law on this aspect has been emphatically laid down in the case of Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of V.P. [(1979) 2 SCC, 409}. The portion relevant for our purpose is extracted below: (SCC pp. 443-44, para 24) "It is only if the Court is satisfied, on proper and adequate material placed by the Government, that overriding public interest requires that the Government should not be held bound by the promise but should be free to act unfettered by it, that the Court would refuse to enforce the promise against the Government. The Court would not act on the mere ipse dixit of the Government, for it is the Court which has to decide and not the Government whether the Government should be held exempt from liability. This is the essence of the rule of law. The Court would not act on the mere ipse dixit of the Government, for it is the Court which has to decide and not the Government whether the Government should be held exempt from liability. This is the essence of the rule of law. The burden would be upon the Government to show that the public interest in the Government acting otherwise than in accordance with the promise is so overwhelming that it would be inequitable to hold the Government bound by the promise and the Court would insist on a highly rigorous standard of proof in the discharge of this burden. But even where there is no such overriding public interest, it may still be competent to the Government to resile from the promise "on giving reasonable notice, which need not be a formal notice, giving the promise a reasonable opportunity of resuming his position" provided of course it is possible for the promisee to restore status quo ante. If, however, the promisee cannot resume his position, the promise would become final and irrevocable. Vide Emmanuel Ayodeji Ajayi v. Briscoe [(1964) 3 All ER, 556].' 4. Two propositions follow from the above analysis : (1) The determination of applicability of promissory estoppel against public authority/Government hinges upon balance of equity or 'public interest'. (2) It is the Court which has to determine whether the Government should be held exempt from the liability of the 'promise' or 'representation'." x x x x "It is, therefore, obvious that even though it may be found that the Government or any other competent authority had held out any promise on the basis of which the promisee might have acted, if public interest required recall of such a promise and such a public Interest outweighed the interest of the promisee then the doctrine of promissory estoppel against the Government would lose its rigour and cannot be of any avail to such promisee". x x x x "To adopt the line of reasoning in Emmanuel Ayodeji Ajayi v. Briscoe [(1964) 3 ALL ER, 556] quoted in M.P. Sugar Mills [(1979) 2 SCC 409] even where there is no such overriding public interest, it may still be within the competence of the Government to resile from the promise on giving reasonable notice which need not be a formal notice, giving the promisee a reasonable opportunity of resuming his position, provided, of course, it Is possible for the promisee to restore the status quo ante. If, however, the promisee cannot resume his position, the promise would become final and irrevocable" . The Apex Court after examining as to whether there was any public interest as the superior equity which can override individual equity found that the Board has not been able to establish any public interest and held in Para Nos. 34 and 35 as under :- "34. Consequently it must be held that relying upon the representations held out by the Board in these earlier notifications assuring grant of incentive rebate of 10% on the total bill of electricity consumption charges these new industries being assured that for three years this concession will be available had burnt their boats and spent large amounts and had established their industries in the area falling in the operative jurisdiction of the Board in the State of U.P. 35. Under these circumstances when no public interest was sought to be pressed into service by the Board for withdrawal of this incentive rebate, as seen earlier, the equity which had arisen in favour of the appellants remained untouched and undisturbed by any overwhelming and superior equity in favour of the Board entitling it to withdraw this development rebate in a premature manner leaving these promisees high and dry before the requisite period of three years earlier guaranteed to them by way of development rebate had got exhausted. This takes us to the consideration of the second aspect of the matter". While considering question No. 2 the Apex Court considered the clause 7 (a), (b) & (c) of the contract which is quoted above and same as quoted in the judgment and after considering how standard forum of contract is to be considered, in Para 51 & 52, held as under ;- "51. While considering question No. 2 the Apex Court considered the clause 7 (a), (b) & (c) of the contract which is quoted above and same as quoted in the judgment and after considering how standard forum of contract is to be considered, in Para 51 & 52, held as under ;- "51. It must, therefore, be held that clause 7(b) of the agreement was not even remotely connected with the question of development rebate which stood on its own and had no part to play In the computation and preparation of the bill for electricity consumption charges. Item 8 operated at a stage posterior to the computation of electricity charges bill In the light of the rate schedule. Therefore, when the term "rate schedule" is employed in clause 7(b) of the agreement it only deals with the general rates for the charge of electricity as fixed by the Board from time to time under Section 49(1). On the same line of reasoning the words "rate schedule" as employed by clause 7(e) have to be understood. Consequently what the consumer as a contracting party agreed under clause 7(b) was to the effect that the general rate schedule as mentioned in Annexure 2 at the time of the execution of the agreement could be revised and that the general rates of electricity charges could be either increased or decreased by the supplier from time to time and to that exercise undertaken by the Board, that is the supplier of the electricity, the consumer would have no objection as a contracting party. The term "revision of rate schedule" as employed by clause 7(c) itself indicates that the rates of charges of electricity being general tariff could be either increased or decreased. That has nothing to do with the scheme of incentive development rebate which is entirely a different concept and withdrawal of development rebate cannot be said to be an upward revision of the general rate schedule for charging the consumer while being supplied the electricity. These types of standard contracts have to be examined in the light of the express language found therein and by implication nothing can be read which obviously would be miles away from the real intention of the persons signing such contracts in standard forms. 52. These types of standard contracts have to be examined in the light of the express language found therein and by implication nothing can be read which obviously would be miles away from the real intention of the persons signing such contracts in standard forms. 52. It is difficult to appreciate how the High Court could persuade Itself to hold in the light of clause 7(c) that the appellants while signing such agreements for taking electricity supply for the first time for their new Industries as if by a side wind agreed to give up their right to claim development rebate by handing over on a platter an absolute right to the Board to totally withdraw such development rebate at any time it liked before the three years' period, for which incentive was meant to be guaranteed, would have expired. On the express language of clause 7(a), (b) and (e) such a conclusion is Impossible to be arrived at". The Apex Court in the conclusion in Para NO.53 observed as under :- "53. It is also necessary to visualize that under the Incentive to new industries scheme as offered by the Board as per Item 8 found in the rate schedule annexed as Annexure 2 to the agreement, the Board had agreed that the new industrial units will be given for a period of three years from the date of commencement of supply, 10% development rebate on the amount of the bill pertaining to the energy charges incurred by the consumers concerned. It is also obvious that before any new industrial unit can get commencement of supply of electricity it has to enter Into such standard form agreement which included clause 7(a), (b) and (c). For the very purpose of the incentive to new industries the starting point would be entering into such a written agreement on the basis of which the electric energy supply would commence at these new industrial units". For the very purpose of the incentive to new industries the starting point would be entering into such a written agreement on the basis of which the electric energy supply would commence at these new industrial units". The Apex Court further held in Para 60 as under:- "It can be said that the Board on the one hand had given incentive to new industries by guaranteeing development rebate of 10% on the total bill of consumption of electricity for a period of three years from the date of commencement of supply but from the very Inception of that period the Board on the other hand as per the very agreement with the promisee was enabled to immediately withdraw the very same development rebate in exercise of its contractual powers as per clause 7 (c) of that very agreement. If that happens the Board would be giving on the one hand incentive to new Industries by way of development rebate of 10% and by another hand would immediately and almost simultaneously be withdrawing the said Incentive by pinning down the consumer to the terms of the agreement as found at clause 7(a); (b) and (c). This would result In a total exercise In futility. The incentive development rebate scheme would In such an eventuality be stillborn. It is also easy to visualize that a new Industrial unit which spends large amounts for establishing its infrastructure and gets lured In the light of the representation held out by the Board and establishes its plant and machinery in the new "unit, would not simultaneously and voluntarily agree by signing such an agreement with the Board to give up the very same benefit of Incentive by permitting the latter to withdraw it at any time it likes. That would be doing violence to common sense and business approach of an ordinary prudent businessman. No businessman in his senses would ever agree voluntarily to such an absurd, incongruous and inconsistent predicament. The Apex Court lastly in Paras 56, 57 & 58 concluded Its finding as under :- "56. That would be doing violence to common sense and business approach of an ordinary prudent businessman. No businessman in his senses would ever agree voluntarily to such an absurd, incongruous and inconsistent predicament. The Apex Court lastly in Paras 56, 57 & 58 concluded Its finding as under :- "56. We, therefore, hold that the new industrial units while signing the written agreements and agreeing to clause 7(a), (b) and (c) found in the standard contract forms had only undergone a formality of signing such agreements before the electric supply could commence at their new units and such clause only reaffirm the statutory power of the Board under Section 49 (1) of the Act and had nothing to do with the scheme of incentive development rebate. They had not voluntarily or by even the remotest chance agreed to give up the benefit given to them by clear representation held out by the Board as per Item 8 of the rate schedule in the light of the earlier three notifications promulgated by the Board in exercise of its powers under Section 49 read with Section 78-A of the Act. 57. It must also be held that they have neither expressly nor impliedly agreed that the board will have absolute power and discretion to withdraw this incentive of development rebate at any time prior to the expiry of three years for which it was guaranteed to them by the earlier representation held out by the Board and which representation resulted .into promissory estoppel against the Board and In favour of the. appellants. 58. In this connection we may note one aspect of the matter. As per clause 7(c) the Board could revise upwards the general rates of electricity charges at any time it liked. This had nothing to do with the scheme of incentive rebate. Learned advocates for the appellants conceded this authority of the Board. This authority was clearly available to the Board as per clause 7(c) of the agreement read with Section 49 of the Act. But this increase of general tariff rate would not adversely affect the Incentive available to new and infant industries". On the third point the Apex Court held in Para 60 as under:- "60 ..... This authority was clearly available to the Board as per clause 7(c) of the agreement read with Section 49 of the Act. But this increase of general tariff rate would not adversely affect the Incentive available to new and infant industries". On the third point the Apex Court held in Para 60 as under:- "60 ..... What the impugned notification of 31-7-1986 sought to do was to delete this first para of Item 8 of the notification of 28-1-1986, The result was that from 1-8-1986 whatever unexpired period for getting development rebate of 10% was available with the new industries covered by the sweep of the said notification got withdrawn. It could not be said and it Is also not the case of the respondent Board that in the light of the notification of 31-7-1986 whatever development rebate was granted to these new industries earlier as per the then existing scheme would 'stand withdrawn or any recovery would be' effected against them for the said amount. The case of the Board is that despite any unexpired period for earning the incentive rebate of 10% was available to the existing new industries on 31-71986, they would lose that benefit of development rebate for the rest of the unexpired period with effect from 1-8-1986 onwards. Hence it is not possible to agree with the contention of learned counsel for the appellants that the said notification had and retrospective effect. It was purely prospective and had resulted Into two consequences - (i) any new industry which entered into an agreement with the Board for supply of electricity for the first time on and after 1-8-1986 could not get the benefit of incentive of 10%.development rebate; and (ii) all existing new industries which were armed with the guarantee of 10% development rebate under the earlier notifications and had unexpired period out of the three years from the date of earlier commencement of supply of electricity to their concerns lost the benefit for that unexpired period which otherwise would have been available to them from 1-8-1986 onwards till the entire three years' period which had already commenced would have been over. Both these effects of the notification of 31-7-1986 were purely prospective in character and had no retrospective effect. Consequently it cannot be said that the said notification was liable to be struck down on the score of being retrospective in nature. Both these effects of the notification of 31-7-1986 were purely prospective in character and had no retrospective effect. Consequently it cannot be said that the said notification was liable to be struck down on the score of being retrospective in nature. The third point for consideration, therefore, is answered in the negative." The fourth question arose by the Hon'ble Supreme Court is not relevant for the present case. 11. In the present case also the facts are Identical. By subsequent notification no provision has been made for concession which was granted by the earlier notification to the hill districts. Clause 7 of the agreement is the same as has been considered by the Apex Court in Pawan Alloys's case (supra) and. the subsequent notification is also prospective as the notification and facts are similar and identical as have been noticed in Para 60 of the report as reproduced above. We have extracted the pleadings of the parties. In the counter affidavit there is no whisper of the public interest as a superior equity which may override individual equity. It is also not stated that the agreement entered into between the parties has been cancelled. Therefore, In view of clause 11 of the agreement rebate is continued upto 5 years. Therefore, petitioner is entitled to avail the benefit of concession for 5 years. The stand taken by Uttaranchal Power Corporation that the concession granted and withdrawn by State of Uttar Pradesh is not binding on the State of Uttaranchal after the appointed day. The stand taken by the Uttaranchal Power Corporation Is misconceived. Under the U.P. Reorganisation Act, 2000 the State of Uttaranchal is a successor State and is bound by all the notifications which were governing this part of the Uttaranchal prior to the reorganization of the State. Moreso, the agreement entered into between the petitioner and State of Uttar Pradesh is binding on the State of Uttaranchal under the U.P. Reorganisation Act. 12. Thus, controversy raised in the writ petition is squarely covered by the Judgement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court In Pawan Alloys's case (supra) and, accordingly, It is held that the U.P. State/Uttaranchal State Power Corporation is stopped from raising the bills at the new rate Schedule annexed with the new notification Issued on 7th August, 2000 and on the doctrine of promissory estoppel and also the notification Is prospective in nature. Accordingly, the bills raised by the respondents are hereby quashed and difference of amount deposited by the petitioner in separate head be released If It Is with the U.P. Power Corporation and If It is with the petitioner, the same may not be deposited. 13. The petition is allowed accordingly. No order as to costs.