Judgment Govind Mathur, J.-This petition for writ is directed against the order dated 08.02.2005 passed by learned Rent Tribunal, Chittorgarh in Rent Case No. 3/2004, Badam Bai vs. Mohd. Yunus. By the order impugned, learned Tribunal ordered for taking rejoinder on record subject to payment of cost of Rs. 200/-. 2. While giving challenge to the order aforesaid it is contended by Counsel for the petitioner that the order is erroneous as under Sub-section (3) of Section 14 of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 (hereinafter referred as “the Act of 2001”) the petitioner may file rejoinder within a period of 15 days only from the date of service of reply. In the present case the rejoinder was filed after a period of 30 days, therefore, it was not proper for learned Tribunal to allow rejoinder to be taken on record. Counsel for the petitioner placed heavy reliance upon the Judgment of Honble Supreme Court in the case of Kailash vs. Nanku, reported in AIR 2005 SC 2441 . In the case of Kailash (Supra), Honble Supreme Court while interpreting the provisions of Order 8 Rule 1, CPC held that extension of time in filing written statement may be allowed by way of an exception for reasons to be assigned by the defendant and also to be placed on record in writing howsoever briefly by the Court on is being satisfied. It is contended by Counsel for the petitioner that in the present case learned Tribunal deviated from the established procedure without having any sufficient cause or reason. 3. Per contra, it is contended by Counsel for the respondents that provisions of Section 14 of the Act of 2001 are procedural, hence are directory. Learned Tribunal while exercising discretion vested with it condoned delay in filing rejoinder in interest of justice and this Court while exercising powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is not required to interfere with such discretion of the Court subordinate. 4. Heard Counsel for the parties. 5. Learned Tribunal, by the order impugned ordered for taking on record the rejoinder. Being satisfied with the contention that during the period of about 30 days Presiding Officer of the Tribunal was not sitting and on the day the Presiding Officer joined the Tribunal and started working, the petitioner filed rejoinder, as such there was no intention for causing delay in proceedings.
Being satisfied with the contention that during the period of about 30 days Presiding Officer of the Tribunal was not sitting and on the day the Presiding Officer joined the Tribunal and started working, the petitioner filed rejoinder, as such there was no intention for causing delay in proceedings. There is no dispute that the provisions of Section 14 of the Act of 2001 provides procedure for revision of rent. Such provisions being procedural are directory in nature. It is always open for the Court to consider the reason for deviating from the procedure prescribed and if the Court after considering the reasons is satisfied that such deviation is bona fide and not with a view to frustrate the proceedings then may pass an appropriate order by exercising discretion to maintain the interest of justice. Honble Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Rani Kusum vs. Smt. Kanchan Devi and Others, reported in 2005 AIR SCW 3985, while dealing with the provisions of Order 8 Rule 1 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 held as under: - “11. All the rules of procedure are the handmaid of justice. The language employed by the draftsman of processual law may be liberal of stringent, but the fact remains that the object of prescribing procedure is to advance the cause of justice. In an adversarial system, no party should ordinarily be denied the opportunity of participating in the process of justice dispensation. Unless compelled by express and specific language of the Statute, the provisions of the CPC or any other procedural enactment ought not to be construed in a manner which would leave the Court helpless to meet extraordinary situations in the ends of justice. 12. The mortality of justice at the hands of law troubles a Judges conscience and points an angry interrogation at the law reformer. 13. The processual law so dominates in certain systems as to overpower substantive rights and substantial justice. The humanist rule that procedure should be the handmaid, not the mistress, of legal justice compels consideration of vesting a residuary power in Judges to act ex debito justiciae where the tragic sequel otherwise would be wholly inequitable - Justice is the goal of jurisprudence -processual, as much as substantive. (See Sushil Kumar Sen vs. State of Bihar, 1975 (1) SCC 774 . 14. No person has a vested right in any course of procedure.
(See Sushil Kumar Sen vs. State of Bihar, 1975 (1) SCC 774 . 14. No person has a vested right in any course of procedure. He has only the right of prosecution or defence in the manner for the time being by or for the Court in which the case is pending, and if , by an Act of Parliament, the mode of procedure is altered, he has no other right than to proceed according to the altered mode. (See Blyth vs. Blyth 1996 (1) ALL ER 524 (HL). A procedural law should not ordinarily be construed as mandatory, the procedural law is always subservient to and is in aid to justice. Any interpretation which eludes or frustrates the recipient of justice is not to be followed. (See Shreenath & Anr. vs. Rajesh & Ors. AIR 1998 SC 1827 . 15. Processuallaw is not to be a tyrant but a servant, not an obstruction but an aid to justice. Procedural prescriptions are the handmaid and not the mistress, a lubricant, not a resistant in the administration of justice.” 6. The Court adjudicating the lis between the parties must give prime consideration to substantial justice and to impart that, the Court is required to adopt a flexible approach in procedure. The object of prescribing procedure is to advance the cause of justice and to have a transparent method for adjudicating the lis between the parties. The procedure is an instrument to achieve just and proper decision, therefore, it should not be interpreted in a manner which frustrate basic object of judicial proceedings. .7. In the instant petition learned Tribunal accepted the application preferred by the respondent and on being satisfied that there was no intention of the party concerned to delay proceedings, therefore, it exercised jurisdiction vested with it and ordered for taking the rejoinder on record. The order was passed by the Tribunal with a view to provide an adequate opportunity to the party concerned to participate in process of justice dispensation fairly and with all vigor to place its version before the Court. I do not find any error in the order impugned which may warrant interference of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 8. The writ petition, therefore, is having no force and the same, therefore, is dismissed. 9. No order as to costs.