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2005 DIGILAW 332 (PNJ)

Ramphal v. State Of Haryana

2005-03-02

VIRENDER SINGH

body2005
Judgment Virender Singh, J. 1. Appellant Ramphal alias Dholu stands as convicted under sections 376 and 506 IPC vide impugned judgment of learned Sessions Judge, Bhiwani dated 12/14.9.1994. He has been sentenced to undergo RI for seven years and to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/- in default of payment to further undergo RI for six months under Section 476 IPC and RI for one year under Section 506 IPC. The recovery of fine was ordered to be paid as compensation. Both the sentences have been ordered to run concurrently. 2. Prosecutrix is the daughter of Ram Parkash PW6. Her name is not being disclosed in the light of the observations made in a very latest judgment rendered by Honble Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. Puttaraja, 2004(1) All India Criminal LR (S.C.) 308. She will be described as prosecutrix only. 3. On the date of occurrence. i.e. 1.11.1992 the age of the prosecutrix was 12 years and about a month. The exact date of birth as per certificate Ex. PC proved by Amrit Lal PW3, is 12.10.1980. 4. The prosecution case runs as follows. 5. Ram Parkash with his wife had gone to village Mokhra in connection with death ceremony of the maternal grand mother of the prosecutrix and when at about 4 PM, she had gone to the fields of one Bhira Jat for collecting fodder, the appellant appeared at the spot and forcibly pounced upon her. He opened the string of her Salwar, put his one hand on her month and made her to lie on the ground and thereafter committed forcible sexual intercourse with her. The prosecutrix became unconscious. The allegation is that the appellant thereafter left the spot. When the prosecutrix regained consciousness and was going back to her house, he threatened her of dire consequences, in case she disclosed the incident to anybody. It is then alleged that on the next date, Ram Parkash had come back to the village but the prosecutrix did not disclose anything to him and when her mother returned from village Mokhra after three days, she disclosed the incident to her. The father of the prosecutrix consequently was apprised of as to what had happened with the prosecutrix. It is then alleged that on the next date, Ram Parkash had come back to the village but the prosecutrix did not disclose anything to him and when her mother returned from village Mokhra after three days, she disclosed the incident to her. The father of the prosecutrix consequently was apprised of as to what had happened with the prosecutrix. Thereafter, on 7.11.1992, the prosecutrix was taken to the Police Station when on the way ASI Punjab Singh PW 10 met them at Bus Stand Bawani Khera as he was present there in connection with patrol duty. Her statement Ex.PG was recorded. A ruqa was sent by ASI Punjab Singh for recording of the formal FIR upon which formal FIR Ex. PG/2 was recorded in the concerned Police Station. She was medico legally examined on the same day by Dr. Meena Barwar PW9. Spot inspection was also done by the Investigating Officer. The statements of other witnesses were recorded. On 9.11.1992, the appellant was produced by one Nandali son of Santu. He was formally arrested. He was medico-legally examined by Dr. O.P. Charaya PW 1 on 10.11.1992. After the completion of the Investigation, the challan was filed against the appellant. He was charged under Sections 376 and 506 IPC for which he has now suffered the conviction. Hence, this appeal. 6. The case of the prosecution mainly hinges on the statement of the prosecutrix (PW5), her father Ram Parkash PW6. The prosecutrix has disclosed on oath the entire incident happened with her. Ram Parkash her father (PW6) has also stated that after her wife had come back from Mokhra, everything was disclosed to him by the prosecutrix and his wife and thereafter he took his daughter for lodging the First Information Report with the police. The medical evidence is to the effect that when the prosecutrix was examined on 7.11.1992 by Dr. Meena Barwar PW9, she noticed that her hymen was torn, margin was ragged, tenderness was there. It bled on touch also. She had opined on an application Ex.PH moved by the prosecution agency to the effect that all the findings were suggestive of the fact that intercourse was committed with the prosecutrix. The medical examination of the appellant also indicates that he was capable of doing intercourse. 7. It bled on touch also. She had opined on an application Ex.PH moved by the prosecution agency to the effect that all the findings were suggestive of the fact that intercourse was committed with the prosecutrix. The medical examination of the appellant also indicates that he was capable of doing intercourse. 7. The stand taken by the appellant as emerges from his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. is that the prosecutrix on 11.11.1992 was caught with another boy in a compromising position in her house and when the appellant told her that he would disclose the matter to her parents, he has been falsely implicated on that account. However, no evidence has been led in defence by the appellant. 8. I have heard Mr. S.A. Sheoran learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. D.S. Brar, Assistant Advocate General, for the State of Haryana. With their assistance, I have also gone through the entire record. 9. Mr. Sheoran first of all contends that there is delay of six days in lodging the report with the police and this weakness in itself speaks volumes of the false implication as the complainant side got reasonable good time to coin a story of their choice. 10. I do not agree with this contention. No doubt, there is a delay of six days in lodging the First Information Report as the occurrence is of 1.11.1992 whereas the FIR was lodged on 7.11.1992 but reasonable explanation has been brought forward by Ram Parkash, the father. Initially the prosecutrix was under threat of the appellant. When Ram Parkash came back from Mokhra after the cremation ceremony, the prosecutrix did not disclose this fact to her father and ultimately summed up the courage to vomit everything before her mother. I do not find even the slightest impurity in the statement of the prosecutrix in this regard. The prosecutrix is a rustic villager of a tender age. In villagers it is commonly seen that the girls do not talk much with their father. Even otherwise this episode was not to be disclosed by the girl to the father first of all. The prosecutrix in her wisdom thought that when her mother comes back from Mokhra she will be in a better position to disclose the entire incident to her. So she did. Thereafter the matter was disclosed to Ram Parkash by his wife. Even otherwise this episode was not to be disclosed by the girl to the father first of all. The prosecutrix in her wisdom thought that when her mother comes back from Mokhra she will be in a better position to disclose the entire incident to her. So she did. Thereafter the matter was disclosed to Ram Parkash by his wife. Then the parents might have thought thousands times before approaching the police. After all the career of young girl was at stake. Ultimately, instead of remaining silent, the father being the head of the family thought of bringing the incident to the police of the police. For this reason, in my view, if the complainant side had consumed about 8/7 days, the same cannot be said to be a delay which is going to weaken the prosecution case. 11. The other argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant is that age of the prosecutrix is not proved to be less than 16 years on the date of occurrence and in all probabilities she was more than 16 years. In this regard he has drawn my attention to some contradictions crept in the statement of the prosecutrix and her father Ram Parkash. The learned counsel in the same breath states that the prosecutrix is described by three different names in different records. Dwelling upon his arguments, the learned counsel contends that as per the Municipal records Ex. PC, the date of birth is shown as 12.10.1980 whereas in the school register it is shown as 1.1.1981. On the basis of the aforesaid submissions, the learned counsel contends that prosecution is not sticking to one stand with regard to the age of the prosecutrix and it can be comfortably said that she was certainly more than 16 years of age on the date of occurrence. 12. I do not agree with the aforesaid contentions of learned counsel for the appellant. The birth entry Ex. PC is duly proved by producing the concerned official of the Municipal Committee. According to the said injury, the date of birth is 12.10.1980. Ram Parkash father of the prosecutrix when stepped into witness box, was cross-examined from the defence side. He was not given even a suggestion that the prosecutrix had attained the majority on the date of occurrence. PC is duly proved by producing the concerned official of the Municipal Committee. According to the said injury, the date of birth is 12.10.1980. Ram Parkash father of the prosecutrix when stepped into witness box, was cross-examined from the defence side. He was not given even a suggestion that the prosecutrix had attained the majority on the date of occurrence. He is not confronted with regard to the fact that the prosecutrix was not called by a particular name which is shown in the Municipal records. The prosecutrix when stepped into witness box gives her two names. As stated above, I am cautiously not describing those names. The prosecutrix also is shown to be of 12/13 years by the doctor who examined her on the asking of the police. No doubt in the school register her date of birth is shown as 1.1.1981 but the same is not going to affect the case of the prosecution at all because for the purpose of decision of this case, the relevant age which is being considered is 12.10.1980, the date shown in the birth entry Ex.PC. The appellant has not been able to produce any record which would show that the prosecutrix had born prior to 1980. Thus, taking into consideration Ex. PC, the birth entry, the age of the prosecutrix turns out to be 12 years and about one month. It would also be important to refer to para 14 of the impugned judgment where the trial Court has observed that after he had summoned the prosecutrix in the Court to see as to what could be her age and on appearance he has observed that she does not appear to be more than 13/14 years of age. The judgment pronounced is in the month of September, 1994 whereas the occurrence was of November, 1992. Thus, from the aforesaid evidence, I do not find any difficulty in concluding that the age of the prosecutrix on the date of occurrence was 12/13 years. 13. The learned counsel then contends that there is no external or internal injury on the person of the prosecutrix and this infirmity also creates doubt about the truthfulness of the prosecution story. 14. I am not at all convinced with this argument also. In the instant case, the prosecutrix does not allege that she had a struggle with the appellant. The learned counsel then contends that there is no external or internal injury on the person of the prosecutrix and this infirmity also creates doubt about the truthfulness of the prosecution story. 14. I am not at all convinced with this argument also. In the instant case, the prosecutrix does not allege that she had a struggle with the appellant. The case of the prosecutrix is that the appellant grabbed her and immediately lied her on the ground and thereafter opened the string of her salwar. He also put his one hand on her mouth. Thereafter the appellant did his job. As stated above, the prosecutrix was of the age of hardly 12/13 years. The appellant was of the age of about 19 years. The prosecutrix was a timid girl who was not physically so strong to show any resistance against the pressure on her. She cannot be said to be mentally so bold as well. She has categorically stated that the appellant all of a sudden took her in his grip and thereafter she had fallen prey to his sexual lust. The medical evidence also corroborates the version of the prosecutrix. The defence set up by the appellant is also to the effect that the prosecutrix was subjected to sexual intercourse, maybe by some one else. So the argument advanced on this count is repelled. 15. I am not inclined to accept the defence plea of the appellant in the light of the statement of the prosecutrix who is categorically naming him. Even otherwise, the defence of the appellant hangs on a very thin thread and does not appeal to a natural prudence at all. The father of the prosecutrix would be the last person to falsely implicate the appellant and exonerate the real culprit. There was no strong motive in the bosom of the complainant party to involve him in this case falsely. 16. No other point has been urged on merits. 17. As a sequel to the aforesaid discussion, in my view, the prosecution has been able to prove its case against the appellant beyond any reasonable doubt, his conviction as recorded by the trial Court is thus, confirmed. 18. On quantum of sentence, the learned counsel for the appellant submits that he was of the age of 19 years at the time of alleged occurrence which relates to the year 1992. 18. On quantum of sentence, the learned counsel for the appellant submits that he was of the age of 19 years at the time of alleged occurrence which relates to the year 1992. The appellant remained in custody during trial and thereafter he also remained in jail for about three years as his sentence was suspended in August, 1997. According to the learned counsel, the appellant has, thus, undergone about four years out of the total substantive sentence of seven years for the main charge of Section 376 IPC and keeping in view the fact that he was of the age of 19/20 years, his case calls for a lenient approach with regard to quantum of sentence. 19. I do not agree with this contention as well. The prosecutrix in this case was of the age of hardly 12 years and about a month. The appellant in order to satisfy his sexual lust has turned to be a wolf in this case. The Honble Supreme Court has repeatedly observed that such type of accused do not deserve the least sympathy. For arriving at the said conclusion, the followilig judgments of the Honble Supreme Court can be respectfully followed : 1. Rajiv v. State of Rajasthan, 1996 (2) SCC 175; 2. State of Karnataka v. Krishanappa, AIR 2000 SC 1470; 3. State of Rajasthan v. Om Parkash, 2002 (2) RCR (Crl) 764. 20. Keeping in view the totality of facts and circumstances of the present case, the case of the appellant does not call for any reduction with regard to quantum of sentence. Consequently, the sentence of seven years as already awarded by the trial Court is also hereby affirmed. 21. The order of fine of Rs. 10,000/- to be converted as compensation to be paid to the prosecutrix shall remain as it is. 22. Resultantly, the present appeal fails on both the counts. 23. The appellant is stated to be on bail. He would now be taken into custody to serve his remaining substantive sentence. Necessary steps be taken in this regard without any delay.