Honble BALI, J.–What started of as pure and simple dispute between late Prakash Chandra Swami and the Government of Rajasthan in the matter of Mandir Madho Behariji, Station Road, Jaipur to be a government Supurdgi Class temple or Thikana temple has now petered out to be a pure and simple dispute of managing Mandir Madho Behariji which takes in its sweep succession to the properties as well between the heirs of Prakash Chandra Swami. It is conceded at all ends that in the temple in dispute, there are offerings made by the people in general and in addition to that there is considerable income which is received by those who are managing the properties in the shape of rentals for several houses and shops attached to the temple. (2). The first and foremost question that needs determination in the present special appeal filed under Sec. 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 is as to whether a dispute of the kind as mentioned above could be allowed to be converted into a succession dispute inter se members of the family of Prakash Chandra Swami. (3). With a view to determine the issue as framed even though the learned Single Judge has given the facts succinctly, the same would need reiteration. (4). Prakash Chandra Swami son of late Tota Ram Swami, Mandir Sri Madho Behariji, Station Road, Jaipur filed an application u/Sec. 17(2) of the Rajasthan Public Trusts Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as `the Act). The matter was enquired into and it was registered as a public trust on 21.12.1970 by Devasthan Department. Against the order aforesaid, Commissioner, Devasthan Deptt. ordered further enquiry. In compliance of the said order, show cause notice was issued. Mahant Shri Prakash Chandra Swami did not file any reply even though he placed on record some documents. Attention of the learned Assistant Commissioner Devasthan was drawn to the provisions of Sec. 29 of the Act and it was urged that under the said provisions, the Assistant Commissioner could conduct further enquiry only if the property was left out to be registered or any particular was left to be enquired into and not otherwise. Attention of the learned Assistant Commissioner Devasthan was drawn to the provisions of Sec. 29 of the Act and it was urged that under the said provisions, the Assistant Commissioner could conduct further enquiry only if the property was left out to be registered or any particular was left to be enquired into and not otherwise. It was further urged that under the provisions contained in Sec. 21 of the Act, registration of the Trust in dispute had already been done after following entire procedure as contemplated in the provisions of the Act and there was no legal provision providing for further enquiry into the matter to reconsider the case in which certificate of registration under Rule 19 has already been issued. Prayer was thus made not to hold any further enquiry. Learned Assistant Commissioner vide his order dated 21.7.1980 held that at the time of registration of Mandir Shri Madho Behariji, entire legal procedure was followed and all the documents perused and then registration was done, which would leave no room for any re- enquiry. It was further held ``So far as the question of declaring the Thikana Shri Madho Behariji after re-enquiry as of Supurdgi category is concerned, I am at conclusion that until the Rajasthan Government does not withdraw its order declaring that the Mandir is not of Supurdgi category, till then declaring the Mandir of Supurdgi category is not justified. Notice u/S. 24 of the Act was quashed. Inspector, Devasthan Deptt. Jaipur preferred an appeal against the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner dated 21.7.1980 and the Commissioner, Devasthan Deptt. vide order dated 26.10.1981 (Annex. 17) allowed the same and set aside the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner. Before so ordering, it was held ``Under orders of erstwhile Maharaja Man Singh of Jaipur State the disputed Mandir was entrusted to ancestor of respondent No. 1 Shri Totaram by appointing him hereditary Mahant for Sewa Puja as per procedure on customary basis and for security of property of the mandir. Therefore, inquiry by the Assistant Commissioner is required as to whether Sewa Puja is being performed by the respondent No.1 himself or not and telling rosary is being done in the name of Shriji or not. Therefore, inquiry by the Assistant Commissioner is required as to whether Sewa Puja is being performed by the respondent No.1 himself or not and telling rosary is being done in the name of Shriji or not. If as per the conditions on which the mandir was entrusted, according to them if Sewa Puja and security of estate of mandir by the respondents No. 1 is not being done, then after inquiry, the Assistant Commissioner is required to initiate proceedings to resume the mandir and its estate. By virtue of judgment rendered by the Commissioner dated 26.10.1981 notice issued to Prakash Chandra Swami for enquiry as mentioned above was revived. Aggrieved of the order dated 26.10.1981 (Anx. 17), Prakash Chandra Swami filed S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1008/1982 under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. The prayers made in the petition read as under: ``The petitioner, therefore, prays that Your Lordships will be pleased to issue a writ of Certiorari, mandamus, quo warranto or any other appropriate writ, direction or order setting aside all proceedings before the Respondents No. 2 and 3, including order dated 26.10.1981 of Respondent No. 3, Devasthan Commissioner, Rajasthan Udaipur, passed in appeal No. 23/98 against the petitioner in exercise of the powers u/S. 24 of the Rajasthan Public Trust Act and it may kindly be declared that the temple of Thakurji Shri Madho Behariji is a Thikana Temple and not a Supurdgi temple and the petitioner is the Sole Trustee and hereditary Mahant thereof, in his own rights and thus entitled to manage, deal with and possess whole of the income and endowment property of the said Temple of Thakurji Shri Madho Behariji situated at Station Road Jaipur; and also order that all or any entries in official records made in pursuance to the judgment of respondent No. 3 be cancelled and suitably amended or altered; (b) That a writ of prohibition or any appropriate writ direction or order may kindly be issued restraining respondents from interfering in the administration, management and possession of Temple and other properties of Thakurji Shri Madho Behariji and further prohibiting respondents not to take any action against the petitioner in any manner of whatsoever nature it may be and not to disturb the status of hereditary Mahant of the petitioner. (c) That an appropriate writ, direction or order may kindly be issued restraining respondents not to add, alter, amend or to effect any change in the entries in the Register kept in the office of Respondent No. 3 under the provisions of Rajasthan Public Trust Act or under any other law. (d) That any other writ, direction or orders granting appropriate relief in the facts and circumstances of the case which Your Lordships consider fit in favour of the petitioner in the facts and circumstances of the case may kindly be issued. (e) Costs of writ petition may kindly be awarded to the petitioner. (5). Prayer made in Clause (a) reproduced above would thus manifest that the writ was filed against order dated 26.10.1981 and in consequence of the setting aside of said order, it was further prayed that temple of Thakurji Shri Madho Behariji be declared to be a Thikana Temple and not a Supurdgi temple and further that the petitioner was the Sole Trustee and hereditary Mahant thereof in his own rights and thus entitled to manage, deal with and possess whole of the income and endowment property of the said Temple. (6). Prakash Chandra Swami died during the pendency of writ petition on 27.12.1986. On 23.2.1987, Mahesh Chandra Swami and Vijay Laxmi, son and daughter respectively of the deceased petitioner, filed an application under Order 22 Rule 4 CPC for substituting them as legal heirs of the deceased petitioner. On 26.3.1987, Harish Chandra Swami, the only surviving son of late Tota Ram and brother of the deceased petitioner along with Umesh Chandra Swami, Dinesh Chandra Swami and Subhash Chandra Swami other three sons of late Ramesh Chandra (another son of Tota Ram and brother of deceased petitioner Prakash Chandra Swami) moved an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India read with Sec. 151 CPC for impleading them as parties to the writ petition. In their application, they reproduced the subject matter of two old stone inscriptions having been put in the temple premises and alleged that from the said inscriptions together with Sanad (Anx. 2) dated 15.4.1947 it was fully established that temple of Shri Madho Behariji and other `Darobast properties together with shops was private having been gifted to their ancestor late Shri Totaram from generation to generation. 2) dated 15.4.1947 it was fully established that temple of Shri Madho Behariji and other `Darobast properties together with shops was private having been gifted to their ancestor late Shri Totaram from generation to generation. They further claimed that there was a joint family consisting of legal heirs of late Shri Totaramji and as such they continue to be in possession of different portions of the said temple and properties having equal and common interest in the temple and the property. They also annexed with the application pedigree of the family and alleged that after the death of Totaram, his eldest son (deceased petitioner) was `Karta of the family and as such, with the consensus of all, he was asked to perform the functions of Mahant as his other two brothers were in the legal profession. Mahesh Chandra Swami and Vijay Laxmi, son and daughter respectively of deceased petitioner, opposed this application and in their reply even though they admitted existence of inscription Nos. 1 and 2 as also the origin of the temple and the properties having been constructed by late Maharani Tanwarji wife of late Maharaja Madho Singhji it was however pleaded that it was a `State Grant. They further pleaded that their father- deceased petitioner became mahant of the temple by virtue of order dated 6.4.1951 which they claimed was an order passed under the Jaipur Matami Rules and under the law of primogeniture. They denied rights of other set of legal heirs of Prakash Chandra Swami named above in the temple and the properties. It was also pleaded that the aforesaid set of legal heirs had no locus standi and were not entitled to succeed to the temple and properties under the Hindu Succession Act after the death of their father and prayed for dismissal of the application filed by them. Along with the reply, they annexed certified copy of the application submitted by the deceased petitioner for registration of the temple as document No. 1 dated 21.12.1970 in which the mode of succession was mentioned in column 4 and in accordance with Hindu Law, in column 6, the income was stated as Rs. 6412/- out of which Rs. 6,375/- was from Devasthan Department and Rs. 37/- was as `offerings. Vide orders dated 15.7.1987 the court allowed both the applications. 6412/- out of which Rs. 6,375/- was from Devasthan Department and Rs. 37/- was as `offerings. Vide orders dated 15.7.1987 the court allowed both the applications. Whereas son and daughter of deceased petitioner Prakash Chandra Swami were arrayed as party petitioners, the other set of legal heirs named above were arrayed as respondent Nos. 5, 6, 7 and 8. (7). State of Rajasthan, Assistant Commissioner Devasthan, Commissioner Devasthan and Inspector Devasthan Deptt. who were respondent Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4, filed reply and also annexed therewith Annexure R-1 copy of the Rajasthan Rajpatra dated 25.6.1981 wherein at S1 No. 30 the temple of Madho Behariji of Maaji Sahib Tanwarji duly figured amongst as many as 62 temples declaring all those temples as `State Supurdgi Temples. This notification was issued by respondent No. 3 who had passed order (Annexure-17). Arguments were raised for supporting and sustaining the order (Anx. 17). The findings recorded by respondent No. 3 to the effect that the said grant amounted to `entrustment i.e. `the Supurdgi by the State and that the temple and the properties vest in the State Govt. were supported. It was prayed in the ultimate analysis that the properties were not liable to be registered under the Act. (8). From the respective pleadings of the parties as reproduced above, it would clearly emerge that petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was filed by Prakash Chandra Swami seeking to set aside order dated 26.10.1981 (Anx. 17). On the application made by him under Rule 17(2) of the Rajasthan Public Trust Rules, 1962 (in short `the Rules) the temple was registered as a public trust on 21.12.1970 by Devasthan Department. This order was upheld by the Assistant Commissioner Devasthan PUrsuant to show cause notice that was issued to Prakash Chand Swami who in turn challenged the said order with the result already indicated above. While passing the impugned order (Anx. 17) dated 26.10.1981 the Commissioner observed that the disputed temple was entrusted to the ancestor of respondent No.1 Totaram by appointing him hereditary Mahant for Sewa Puja and therefore, enquiry by the Assistant Commissioner was required. After enquiry the Assistant Commissioner, it was observed, was required to initiate proceedings to resume the temple and its estate. 17) dated 26.10.1981 the Commissioner observed that the disputed temple was entrusted to the ancestor of respondent No.1 Totaram by appointing him hereditary Mahant for Sewa Puja and therefore, enquiry by the Assistant Commissioner was required. After enquiry the Assistant Commissioner, it was observed, was required to initiate proceedings to resume the temple and its estate. The only question that thus was required to be decided by the learned Single Judge was as to whether order dated 21.12.1970 registering the temple as a public trust and which order was confirmed by the Assistant Commissioner and set aside by the Commissioner Devasthan, was valid or not. In the context of controversy it might have been necessary to decide as to whether the temple was a Thikana or Supurdgi. (9). Learned Single Judge before whom the matter came for final decision, however, on the respective pleadings and contentions raised by the State and two sets of legal heirs framed the following questions for determination:- (i) The nature and the status of the temple and the properties; (ii) The devolution and vesting of the temple and its shevaitship as well as other properties; (iii) Legality of the impugned order dated 26.10.1981 (Annex. 17) passed in appeal by respondent No. 3; (iv) The preliminary objections as to the maintainability of certain plea within the scope of this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. (10). Question No. (iv) reproduced above was first taken up for decision. This issue covered objections raised by those who were arrayed as petitioners with regard to the powers of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to mould the relief according to the facts and circumstances of the case; pleas of estoppel founded on the conduct and its bearing on the nature of endowment with reference to the facts of the case and whether it is a question of fact or a question of law in terms of Article 226 of the Constitution of India. (11). On the language of Article 226 of the Constitution of India and judicial precedents in State of Kerala vs. R.P. Roshna (1979) 1 SCC 572 , AIR 1966 SC 81 , 1977 (1) SCC 271 and Ram Singh vs. Special Judge ( AIR 1993 All. (11). On the language of Article 226 of the Constitution of India and judicial precedents in State of Kerala vs. R.P. Roshna (1979) 1 SCC 572 , AIR 1966 SC 81 , 1977 (1) SCC 271 and Ram Singh vs. Special Judge ( AIR 1993 All. 236 ) it held as follows: ``It is clear from the above cited law that no limitation can be imposed on the power of the court to mould or re-organise the relief, if need be, as warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case, and such power is within the ambit of the well established and recognised principle laid down by the Supreme Court as well as by the High Court as stated above. There is as usual, the residuary relief clause (d) in the writ petition authorising the court to mould the relief appropriately. Learned Single Judge further held that there was no impediment in the writ petition whether the temple and the properties is a `State Supurdgi Temple as held by respondent No. 3 by construing Annexure 1 and 2 or `the Thikana temple as urged by the petitioners construing the same basic documents of grant, or is a `private temple, as submitted by the respondent Nos. 5 to 8 for which they also rely on the construction of the same basic documents of the grant. It was further held that determination of true status of the temple and the property is rather a principal issue for adjudication urged by all the parties to the petition. The mere circumstance that the declaration was not specifically asked for `the private temple and the properties, cannot justify the argument that the court should not listen to such interpretation place on the basic documents of the grant, by respondents No. 5 to 8. After holding so, learned Single Judge relied upon judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Kerala vs. T.P. Roshana (supra). We are not concerned with other preliminary issues covered under Question No. 4 as the appellants who were arrayed as petitioner in the original lit after demise of Prakash Chandra Swami have centred their contentions on the power of learned Single Judge to grant such relief which had no connection whatsoever with the original relief asked for. It is vehemently urged by Mr. It is vehemently urged by Mr. Alok Sharma, learned counsel representing the appellants that in a dispute between the heirs of Prakash Chandra Swami Pertaining to the temple and the properties attached thereto being Supurdgi or Thikana, inter se rights of heirs of Prakash Chandra Swami with regard to the properties in dispute could not possibly be determined and such a course had to be left open to the parties to be vindicated in appropriate proceedings. (12). Learned Single Judge after dealing and deciding question No. (iv) reproduced above, then considered as to whether the property was a private temple, a public temple or was State Supurdgi temple. Learned Single Judge discussed four documents relied upon by the parties such as two stone inscriptions dated Vikram Samwat 1982 Vaishkha Shukla 10 and 22.03.1943, document dated 31.7.45 (Anx. 1) by which it was observed that the properties were inherited Shevaitship together with Rs. 6000/- per annum for the expresses of the temple having been granted to late Totaramji who was counsel of the then rules Maharaja Man Singhji in a case of adoption by the ex-ruler Madho Singhji as also document Annexure-2 dated Miti Phalguna Sudi 5 the lease deed. On the basis of documents referred to above and on the basis of some judicial precedents learned Single Judge held as follows: ``That there are other factors and characteristics suggestive of the private character of the temple and the properties for which there is no dispute as to these characteristics and feature viz., (a) that the management and the control of the said temple and the properties always remained confined to the family of Shri Tota Ramji; (b) that the temple has been constructed within the precincts of residential apartments, and the fact that the temple occupies only a small area to the total extent of the property. I, therefore, find preponderant circumstances and overwhelming material as referred to above that the temple and the properties are the private properties in the hands of heirs and successors of Late Shri Tota Ramji with partial dedication, referred to above, and, as such, it is a private trust and it is not a public trust, nor can it be termed as State Supurdagi temple by any stretch of imagination. (13). (13). State has no filed any appeal and the Court is thus not concerned as to whether in the context of the controversy as spelled out above, there was any need to give finding as reproduced above. We may however hasten to add here that the learned counsel appearing for the parties have commonly asserted that this finding was essential to the core issue pertaining to nature of the temple in its registration as a public trust or otherwise. Learned Single Judge then delved and determined the question of devolution and vesting of the temple and the properties in the context of pleadings of the legal heirs of Prakash Chandra Swami impleaded as petitioners and those who were arrayed as respondents fully described above. Learned Single Judge noted the plea of respondent Nos. 1 to 4 who sought to sustain finding of respondent No. 3 that the property vested in the State. It also noted the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the deceased petitioner was the sole heir and successor of Totaram as also contention of respondents No. 5 to 8 who wanted properties to devolve and vest in all the heirs and successors of Totaram in accordance with law of inheritance under the Hindu Law. Learned Single Judge after discussing rival contentions of the parties held as follows: ``The result is that this petition is allowed in terms that all proceedings taken up before the respondent No.2 and 3 under the Act or elsewhere including the registration of the said temple as public trust, the impugned order dated 26.10.1981 (Annex. 17), the concerned entry in the Gazette notification dt. 25.6.1981 (Annex. 16) in so far as it held the said temple as `public trust or the State Supurdagi temple or `the Thikana Temple are set aside. The Darobast temple of Shri Madho Behariji is declared as private trust with partial dedication. It is further declared that after the death of late Shri Tota Ram, the said Darobast temple and the shops devolved in succession upon all his heirs and successors. In accordance with Rules of inheritance as contemplated under the Hindu Law. The Darobast temple of Shri Madho Behariji is declared as private trust with partial dedication. It is further declared that after the death of late Shri Tota Ram, the said Darobast temple and the shops devolved in succession upon all his heirs and successors. In accordance with Rules of inheritance as contemplated under the Hindu Law. It is also declared accordingly that the properties of the said Darobast Temple in the hands of the said heirs and successors shall be subject to the charge of discharging and fulfilling the functions of Bhog, Sewa Pooja, upkeep and maintenance of the temple etc. The shops, however, shall remain wholly private. (14). Legal heirs arrayed as petitioners in the lis have challenged the findings reproduced above, which have been underlined, on the primary ground that the same have been arrived on account of dispute between the petitioner and respondents all of whom were impleaded as legal heirs in the writ petition. This private dispute inter se legal heirs of Prakash Chandra Swami was wholly foreign to the subject matter of writ petition and could to possibly be determined in proceedings lodged to challenge order Annexure-17 dated 26.10.1981. Learned counsel representing respondents No. 4 to 8 joined issues on the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner-appellants and contended that this Court in exercise of powers vested in it under Article 226 of the Constitution of India could mould relief so as to advance cause of justice. (15). We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and with their assistance, examined records of the case. (16). There appears to be considerable merit in the contention raised by learned counsel for the appellants that pure and simple private dispute of succession could not be entertained and determined in a writ petition that had nothing at all to do with the same and was exclusively directed against the order dated 26.10.1981 (Anx. 17) or for further enquiring into the matter as to the nature of temple being Supurdgi or Thikana temple. Prakash Chand Swami, as mentioned above, had challenged the order dated 26.10.81 (Anx. 17). He died during pendency of the writ petition. Applications by two sets of legal heirs were made to implead them as legal heirs under Order 22 Rules 2 and 3 CPC. (17). Prakash Chand Swami, as mentioned above, had challenged the order dated 26.10.81 (Anx. 17). He died during pendency of the writ petition. Applications by two sets of legal heirs were made to implead them as legal heirs under Order 22 Rules 2 and 3 CPC. (17). Whereas one set of legal heirs namely Mahesh Chand Swami and Vijay Laxmi Sharma son and daughter respectively of deceased petitioner Prakash Chandra Swami were impleaded as petitioners, other set of legal heirs namely Harish Chandra Swami son of Tota Ram and brother of the deceased petitioner, Umesh Chandra Swami, Dinesh Chandra Swami and Subhash Chandra Swami sons of late Ramesh Chandra Swami (another son of Totaram and brother of deceased Prakash Chandra Swami) were impleaded as respondents. Two sets of legal heirs in addition to continuing with the cause that survived after death of Prakash Chandra Swami made pleadings in support of their respective claims so as to succeed to the properties in dispute. Whereas, on the strength of pleadings, provisions of various enactments and the judicial precedents, Mahesh Chand Swami and Vijay Laxmi Sharma claimed that since their father became Mahant of the temple by virtue of order dated 6.4.1951, which they claimed was an order passed under the Jaipur Matami Rules and under the law of progeniture they alone were entitled to manage the same, the other set of legal heirs named above on the same very basis claimed it to be joint family property of legal heirs of late Totaram having equal and common interest in the temple and the properties. The respective parties so arrayed as legal heirs also relied upon some documents and in particular, inscriptions referred to above for the first time after the death of Prakash Chandra Swami. (18). Normally, the lis comes to an end having been abated on the death of a suitor. However, if the cause of action might survive, there are adequate provisions contained in Order 22 CPC which entitled the legal heirs to continue with the lis so as to vindicate the stand embedded in the cause of action that survives. (19). Legal heirs are brought on record simply with a view to carry on surviving cause of action. They cannot be permitted to settle their inter se dispute which might be wholly unconnected with the initial cause of action. (19). Legal heirs are brought on record simply with a view to carry on surviving cause of action. They cannot be permitted to settle their inter se dispute which might be wholly unconnected with the initial cause of action. Whereas it was understandable that all the legal heirs would have been brought on the records so as to jointly seek setting aside of order (Annexure-17) challenged in the writ petition, they could not be permitted to settle their inter se dispute with regard to succession of the properties. (20). Death of plaintiff or defendant shall not cause the suit to abate if right to sue survives as per Order 22 Rule 1 CPC. Where right to sue survives, the court proceeds to decide the case after bringing on record the legal heirs of the deceased as per Rules 2 and 3 of Order 22 CPC. It is crystal clear from the provisions contained in Rules 1, 2 and 3 of Order 22 CPC that it is the cause which if survives, that needs to be adjudicated upon. The cause of Prakash Chandra Swami was with regard to validity of order dated 26.10.1981 (Anx. 17) and in consequence thereof at the most to declare the properties to be Thikana Temple. The inter se dispute between his legal heirs to succeed to the properties in dispute was not even remotely in question. By no stretch of imagination this inter se dispute of succession to the property could be allowed to be agitated in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India when the whole dispute was as to whether the property in dispute was government property or private one. To illustrate, if plaintiff or the petitioner in the original lis dies who might have challenged acquisition of his property, could the Court while impleading various persons as legal heirs, determine inter se dispute between them with regard to succession of the property in case the acquisition is to be set aside. To illustrate, if plaintiff or the petitioner in the original lis dies who might have challenged acquisition of his property, could the Court while impleading various persons as legal heirs, determine inter se dispute between them with regard to succession of the property in case the acquisition is to be set aside. To clarify the illustration further, if one set of legal heirs might set up a Will whereas others might dispute the authenticity of the same and might further wish to have the properties to be succeeded by the law of succession, could the Court frame as issue with regard to validity of the Will and determine as to who out of the legal heirs would be entitled to succeed to the property. In our clear view, answer to the question has to be emphatic `No. (21). Learned counsel representing respondents No. 4 to 8 however endeavour to have this question determined and the judgment of learned Single Judge with regard to property, maintained on the dint of judicial precedents that were cited before the learned Single Judge and some others. (22). Before, however, we may do that, we would like to refer to the provisions of Article 226 of the Constitution of India as it is on the basis of said Article as well that the learned Single Judge has held that the High Court in exercise of powers vested in it under the said Article can mould relief. Every High Court has power to issue to any person or authority, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and ``for any other purpose. It is clear that the inter se dispute of succession between the legal heirs of Prakash Chandra Swami could not be settled by issuing any kind of writ as mentioned under Article 226 of the Constitution. The same also does not partake the character of any right that might have been conferred by Part III of the Constitution as well. The words `any for any other purpose in considered view of this Court could only mean purpose analogous to the kind of writs mentioned in the Article. The same also does not partake the character of any right that might have been conferred by Part III of the Constitution as well. The words `any for any other purpose in considered view of this Court could only mean purpose analogous to the kind of writs mentioned in the Article. The words `for any other purpose cannot possibly mean settlement of private dispute between the individuals. No doubt, the Court can issue writ to a person as well but if the kind of writs, as mentioned in Article 226 of the Constitution of India, can be issued to any person in matters pure and simple involving civil disputes, the civil courts established throughout the country would be of no meaning and consequence. (23). Coming now to judicial precedents relied upon by the set of legal heirs arrayed as respondents, we would like to first deal with such judgments which were relied upon by the learned Single Judge in returning the finding that the court could mould relief and in the present case, in such manner so as to determine rights of succession amongst two sets of legal heirs of Prakash Chandra Swami and Ramesh Chandra Swami. (24). In State of Kerala vs. T.P. Roshana (supra) relied upon by the learned Single Judge, it would be seen that the facts of that case were that the High Court had struck down a transitory scheme of admission to the medical colleges of the State evolved by the Government on the ground of discrimination in the distribution of seats among eligible students drawn from two separate regions of the State. Government against the order of the High Court filed an appeal seeking reversal of the judgment. (25). The question involved in the case was selections based on comparison of marks obtained by candidates in qualifying examination conducted by different Universities with different standards. Minor differentiation in examinations conducted by the different Universities was held not to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. it was also held that the University wise allocation of seats for admission to medical colleges within the State was not discriminatory. Minor differentiation in examinations conducted by the different Universities was held not to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. it was also held that the University wise allocation of seats for admission to medical colleges within the State was not discriminatory. It was held that the reservation based on geographical classification of backward regions was permissible and that the court on finding illegality should not only strike down the impugned action but also give suitable remedial directions and the events that might have already taken place should not be ignored. It was in the context of finding an illegality and striking down the impugned action and further giving suitable remedial directions that it was held by the Supreme Court as follows: ``Any incisive study of the exercise of the writ power in India may reveal that it limits its action to quashing or nullifying orders proceeding on a violation of law, but stops short of a reconstruction whereby a valid scheme may replace a void project. This is no reflection on the High Courts ruling but is symptomatic of an obsolescent aspect of the judicial process, its remedial shortcomings in practice and the need to innovate the means, to widen the base and to organise the reliefs to that the court actualises social justice even as it inhibits injustice. This community perspective of the Justice System explains why we have resorted to certain unusual directions and have shaped the ultimate complex of orders in these proceedings in a self-acting package. With this exordium we proceed to narrate briefly the necessary facts and development revelatory of the course of events and the cause of action, the impact of the High Courts judgment and the compulsions which have brought the State in appeal to this Court. (26). In Dwarka Nath vs. I.T. Officer ( AIR 1966 SC 81 ), challenge was to orders passed by the Income Tax authorities. Learned counsel for the Revenue while supporting the order of the High Court raised a preliminary objection that order of the Commissioner under Sec. 33-A of the Income Tax Act was an administrative act and therefore, no writ of certiorari could lie to the High Court to quash that order under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Learned counsel for the Revenue while supporting the order of the High Court raised a preliminary objection that order of the Commissioner under Sec. 33-A of the Income Tax Act was an administrative act and therefore, no writ of certiorari could lie to the High Court to quash that order under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. While dealing with the preliminary objection, as mentioned above, after reproducing Article 226 of the Constitution of India, Honble Supreme Court observed as under: ``(4) We shall first take the preliminary objection, for it we maintain it, no other question will arise for consideration. Article 226 of the Constitution reads: ``...every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercise jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the right conferred by Part III and ``for any other purpose. ``This article is couched in comprehensive phraseology and it ex facie confers a wide power on the High Courts to reach injustice wherever it is found. The Constitution designedly used a wide language in describing the nature of the power, the purpose for which and the person or authority against whom it can be exercised. It can issue writs in the nature of prerogative writs as understood in England; but the scope of those writs also is widened by the use of the expression ``nature, for the said expression does not equate the writs that can be issued in Indian with those in England, but only draws an analogy from them. That apart, High Courts can also issue directions, orders or apart, High Courts can also issue directions, order or writs other than the prerogative writ. It enables the High Courts to mould the reliefs to meet the peculiar and complicated requirements of this country. Any attempt to equate the scope of the power of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution with that of the English Courts to issue prerogative writs is to introduce the unnecessary procedural restrictions grown over the years in a comparatively small country like England with a unitary form of Government to a vast country like India functioning under a federal structure. Such a construction defeats the purpose of the article itself. (27). Facts in The State of Haryana vs. The Haryana Cooperative Transport Ltd. and others (1977) 1 SCC 271 (supra) reveal that a writ under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India was filed challenging the Award rendered by the Labour Court on the ground that the Presiding Officer was not qualified to hold office of the Judge of Labour Court and therefore, the Award given by him was without jurisdiction. Specifically a plea for grant of writ of quo warranto was not taken but the prayer for issue of a suitable writ, order or direction as deemed fit and proper in the facts and circumstances was included. High Court granted the relief and the State filed appeal. The State Government urged before the Honble Court that the Award given by the respondent on the ground that the appointment could not be challenged in co-lateral proceedings filed in the High Court for challenging the Award. While rejecting the aforesaid contention on factual aspect, the Honble Supreme Court further observed as follows: ``The mere circumstance that a writ of quo warranto was not specifically asked for cannot justify the argument that the appointment was being challenged colaterally in a proceeding taken to challenge the award. Considering the averments in the writ petition, it seems clear that the main and real attack on the award was the ineligibility of the Presiding Officer to occupy the post of a judge of the Labour Court, in the discharge of whose functions the Award was rendered by him. The prayer for other suitable writ or direction covered the lapse in demanding the writ of certiorari. There is no magic in the use of a formula. The facts necessary for challenging the appointment mere stated clearly in the writ petition and the challenge to his appointment was expressly made on the ground that he was not qualified to hold the post of a judge of the Labour Court. (28). There is no magic in the use of a formula. The facts necessary for challenging the appointment mere stated clearly in the writ petition and the challenge to his appointment was expressly made on the ground that he was not qualified to hold the post of a judge of the Labour Court. (28). Facts of Shri Ram Singh and another vs. Special Judge, E.C. Act (AIR 1993 Allahabad 236) which is a judgment of Single Bench of Allahabad High Court would reveal that the petitioner instituted a suit for permanent injunction restraining the defendant Lalaram from interfering with their possession over a part of plot and from raising any construction over the land in dispute as also from cutting the trees situated on the land. Relief for mandatory injunction was also sought directing defendant to close the doors and to remove constructions, if any. Plaintiffs claimed themselves to be the co-owners along with defendants. During the pendency of the suit, an application for ad interim injunction was also filed. The said application was opposed by the defendant by raising several objections. He disputed correctness of the plaint map and further pleaded that the land in dispute was acquired by him from his father who in turn had acquired the same from father of the plaintiff for valuable consideration some thirty years ago. Learned Trial Court held defendant to be in possession. Trial Court however observed that the question as to whether the land measuring 9 decimal in possession of the defendant Lala Ram stretched up to eastern wall of his house as alleged by the plaintiffs or up to east of the well as alleged by the defendant Lala Ram. According to the plaintiffs, the defendant Lala Ram had no concern with the remaining land beyond the eastern wall of his house and this question, according to the trial Court, could be effectively adjudicated upon only at the trial stage after the evidence of both the parties was adduced in the case. According to the plaintiffs, the defendant Lala Ram had no concern with the remaining land beyond the eastern wall of his house and this question, according to the trial Court, could be effectively adjudicated upon only at the trial stage after the evidence of both the parties was adduced in the case. Learned Trial Court however held that on appraisal of the report and the map prepared by the Amin that the Palani had been shown towards east of the plaintiffs house and that the defendants house had its opening towards east and since the plaintiff admitted the existence of the door and Palani, they could not be said to have any prima facie case for ad interim injunction in respect of part of the land in dispute but in respect of the remaining land measuring 9 decimal learned trial Court held that a prima facie case was made out and accordingly directed the parties to maintain status quo. Lalaram filed appeal against the order aforesaid which was allowed. It was against this order that the matter was allowed. It was against this order that the matter was taken up in the High Court by way of writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. While defending the case, learned counsel for the respondent urged that the writ petition arising out of proceedings under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC was not maintainable. While dealing with the objection aforesaid, it was held as under: ``The High Court while seized of a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution can pass any order including an order including an order in the nature of injunction against a private individual in exercise of its inherent powers. While exercising certiorari jurisdiction, the High Courts may not only demolish the erroneous orders passed by subordinate courts and direct them to perform their judicial duties in accordance with law but it can also issue orders or directions which may be considered necessary to be passed in order to ``effectuate its certiorari/mandamus jurisdiction. While exercising certiorari jurisdiction, the High Courts may not only demolish the erroneous orders passed by subordinate courts and direct them to perform their judicial duties in accordance with law but it can also issue orders or directions which may be considered necessary to be passed in order to ``effectuate its certiorari/mandamus jurisdiction. Such a course is open not only on the strength of Art. 226 of the Constitution but also on the dint of Art. 225 of the Constitution but also on the dint of Art. 225 of the Constitution which makes the High Court a Court of record having inherent jurisdiction in exercise of which jurisdiction, High Court can issue an order or direction in the nature of an injunction even against a private individual. (29). It was further observed that ``An authority having power to pass an order is necessarily vested with the power to pass any ancillary orders. An order in the nature of an injunction directing the parties to maintain status quo would tantamount to be an order directing preservation of the subject matter of writ petition and therefore, ancillary to exercise of writ jurisdiction . (30). In additional to judicial precedents referred to above which were cited before the learned Single Judge and have since been referred in the impugned judgment, set of legal heirs arrayed as respondents has also relied upon judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan vs. M/s. Hindustan Sugar Mills Ltd. and others ( AIR 1988 SC 1621 ) wherein it was held that the High Court while exercising high prerogative jurisdiction under Article 226 could have moulded the relief in a just and fair manner as required by the demands of the situation. (31). Facts of the case were that the High Court struck down notification dated January 29, 1970 issued by the Central Government authorising the levy and collection of royalty on limestone at Rs. 1.25 per ton. State of Rajasthan which was recovering royalty at the aforesaid rate under the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 had filed special appeal against order of the High Court. High Court had struck down the notification on the ground that the Central Govt. 1.25 per ton. State of Rajasthan which was recovering royalty at the aforesaid rate under the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 had filed special appeal against order of the High Court. High Court had struck down the notification on the ground that the Central Govt. had enhanced the rate of royalty by virtue of the said notification in disregard of the statutory embargo embodied in Clause (B) of the proviso to Sec. 9(3) of the Act which prohibited enhancement ``more than once during any period of four years. It was urged before the High Court that embargo engrafted by Sec. 9(3)(b) of the Act was violated by the impugned notification and consequently the said notification was null and void. High Court upheld the plea and came to the conclusion that the second enhancement would be being enforced for the first time in the fourth four year block commencing from June 1, 1970. Supreme Court accepted the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that in the circumstances High Court instead of striking down the notification in toto could well have made the notification unenforceable for a period of four months of the third four-year block expiring on 31.05.1970 without prohibiting its enforcement even with effect from June 1, 1970 from which date the fourth four year block commenced and the enhancement could have been made without any impediment in law. It was in the context of the background as mentioned above that observations quoted above were made by the Supreme Court. (32). Legal heirs arrayed as respondents in the writ petition have also placed reliance on the following observations of the Supreme Court in Shri Anadi Mukta Sadquru Shree Muktajee Vandasjiswami Suvrna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust and others vs. R. Rudani and others ( AIR 1989 SC 1607 ) ``If the rights are purely of a private character no mandamus can issue, if the management of the college is purely a private body with no public duty mandamus will not lie. These are two exceptions to Mandamus. But once these are absent and when the party has no other equally convenient remedy, mandamus cannot be denied. The law relating to mandamus has made the most spectacular advantage. Article 226 confers wide powers on the High Courts to issue writs in the nature of prerogative writs. This is a striking departure from the English Law. But once these are absent and when the party has no other equally convenient remedy, mandamus cannot be denied. The law relating to mandamus has made the most spectacular advantage. Article 226 confers wide powers on the High Courts to issue writs in the nature of prerogative writs. This is a striking departure from the English Law. Under Article 226, writs can be issued to ``any person or authority. It can be issued ``for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights and for any other purpose. The term ``authority used in Article 226 in the context, must receive a liberal meaning unlike the term in Article 12. Article 12 is relevant only for the purpose of enforcement of fundamental rights under Art. 32. Article 226 confers power on the High Courts to issue writs for enforcement of the fundamental rights as well as non-fundamental rights. The words ``any person or authority used in Article 226 are, therefore, not to be confined only to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the State. They may cover any other person or body performing public duty. The form of the body concerned is not very much relevant. What is relevant is the nature of the duty imposed on the body. The duty must be judged in the light of positive obligation owned by the person or authority to the affected party. No matter by what means the duty is imposed. If a positive obligation exists mandamus cannot be denied. It may be pointed out that mandamus cannot be denied on the ground that the duty to be enforced is not imposed by the statute. The judicial control over the fast expanding maze of bodies affecting the rights of the people should not be put into watertight compartment. It should remain flexible to meet the requirements of variable circumstances. Mandamus is a very wide remedy which must be easily available to reach injustice wherever it is found. Technicalities should not come in the way of granting that relief under Article 226. (33). The observations made above came in the context of the fact that the University had taken a decision to grant revised pay scales to teachers in affiliated colleges. Technicalities should not come in the way of granting that relief under Article 226. (33). The observations made above came in the context of the fact that the University had taken a decision to grant revised pay scales to teachers in affiliated colleges. Honble Supreme Court held that it was binding on the management as the service conditions of the academic staff were not purely of a private character and also have superadded protection by University decisions creating a legal right-duty relationship between the staff and the management and when there is existence of this relationship, mandamus could not be refused to the teachers of a college who were not given the benefit of the said pay scale. Aforesaid observations came to be made on the question raised before the Court with regard to the liability of the appellants to pay compensation under Ordinance 120E and maintainability of writ for mandamus as against the management of the College. (34). Respondents also placed reliance upon the following observations made by the Supreme Court in R. Rudani (supra): ``The High Courts exercising their jurisdiction under Art. 226 have the power to issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or to pass orders and give necessary directions where the Government or a public authority has failed to exercise or has wrongly exercised the discretion conferred upon it by a statute or a rule or a policy decision of the Government or has exercised such discretion mala fide or on irrelevant considerations or by ignoring the relevant considerations and materials or in such a manner as to frustrate the object of conferring such discretion or the policy for implementing which such discretion has been conferred. In all such cases and in any other fit and proper case a High Court can, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Art. 226, issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or pass orders and give directions to compel the performance in a proper and lawful manner of the discretion conferred upon the Government or a public authority, and in a proper case, in order to prevent injustice resulting to the concerned parties, the Court may itself pass an order or give directions which the Government or the public authority should have passed or given had it properly and lawfully exercised its discretion. (35). (35). The observations made above, it is clear, were made in the context of failure of government as a public authority to exercise or wrong exercise of the discretion conferred upon it by the statute or a rule or policy decision of the Government or has exercised such discretion mala fide or on irrelevant considerations or by ignoring relevant consideration and materials or in such a manner as to frustrate the object of conferring such discretion or the policy for implementing which such discretion has been conferred. (36). Reliance has also been placed on the following observations of the Supreme Court in Radha Raman Samanta vs. Bank of India and others ( 2004 (1) Supreme 134 ): ``13. It is too elementary to state that powers under Article 226 of the Constitution could be exercised for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights available under Part III of the Constitution, and also for any other purpose. High Courts have often exercised their powers under Article 226 of the Constitution for enforcement of a legal right. It is, therefore, open to the learned single Judge to issue an appropriate direction to the respondent-Bank, if otherwise justifiable on facts. (37). In the case aforesaid, pursuant to the directions of the Division Bench, learned Single Judge looked into the relevant documents produced by the Bank and formed an opinion that the appellant was working with the bank during the relevant period. It was held that it was not improper for the learned Single Judge to look into undisputed documents and to infer as to the status of employment of the appellant and that examination of undisputed facts was not barred in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The appellant was appointed as Badli subordinate staff against one permanent vacancy with the Bank of India and had worked there up to 16.4.1991 for about 492 days. On 16.4.1991 the Branch Manager of the Bank asked him not to work anymore. Later he made a representation to the Zonal Manager requesting to appoint him as a regular employee in the bank by quoting circular dated 7.9.1990. He did not receive any reply from the Bank and thus filed a petition in the High Court which gave directions to the Bank to absorb him as a regular employee. Later he made a representation to the Zonal Manager requesting to appoint him as a regular employee in the bank by quoting circular dated 7.9.1990. He did not receive any reply from the Bank and thus filed a petition in the High Court which gave directions to the Bank to absorb him as a regular employee. Case of the Bank was that the appellant was only working as a Coolie and not as a Badli Sepoy and therefore, he was not entitled to be considered for absorption. Learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition and directed the Bank to absorb him which decision was challenged in appeal before the Division Bench which looked into records and other material from which it came to the conclusion that the appellant was not a Badli worker and at any rate was not entitled to be absorbed in service. Learned Single Judge had not considered that aspect of the matter. It was held by the Division Bench that the learned Single Judge ought to have first found out the status of the petitioner as to in what capacity he worked with the bank. Learned Single Judge before whom the matter came, after appreciating various documents arrived at the conclusion that the appellant was working in the bank during the relevant period. It was in the context of facts as mentioned above, that the Supreme Court made the observations quoted above. (38). Mr. Alok Sharma, learned counsel in his endeavour to show that dispute with regard to succession or managing the properties in dispute inter se legal heirs could not be gone into, however, relies upon judgments of the Supreme Court in George Williamson (Assam) Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Guwahati (2005) 7 SCC 541 , Chandigarh Administration vs. Laxman Roller Flour Mills Pvt. Ltd. (1998) 8 SCC 326 , State of Punjab vs. M/s. Dial Chand Gian Chand and Co. ( AIR 1983 Sc 743 ), Rhone Poulenc (India) Ltd. vs. State of U.P. and others (2000) 7 SCC 675 and a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Jyoti Jagjiwan nagar Housing Coop. Society Ltd. vs. State of Rajasthan (RLR 1988 (2) 598). (39). ( AIR 1983 Sc 743 ), Rhone Poulenc (India) Ltd. vs. State of U.P. and others (2000) 7 SCC 675 and a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Jyoti Jagjiwan nagar Housing Coop. Society Ltd. vs. State of Rajasthan (RLR 1988 (2) 598). (39). In George Williamson (Assam) Ltd. vs. C.I.T. (supra) the question was whether reserve which was shown by the appellant in his balance sheet as `capital reserve could be covered by Explanation 1 to Rule 2 of Second Schedule to the Companies (Profits) Surtax Act, 1964 and was, therefore, not includible in the capital for computing statutory deductions for the purpose of Sec. 4 read with Sec. 2(8). Answering in the negative and in favour of the appellant, I.T.A.T. gave specific finding that the said reserve had not been brought into existence by creating or increasing the value of any book asset and therefore formed part of capital under Rule 1(iii) of Schedule II of the Act. High Court, however, reversed the decision and held that the said reserve was hit by the provisions of Explanation 1 to Rule 2 of the said Schedule. Appellant then filed appeal before the Supreme Court. Supporting the decision of I.T.A.T. the appellant contended before the Honble Supreme Court that the said reserve was not created by the appellant company but arose due to statutory requirements in following the directions of the R.B.I. On the other hand, respondent Department contended that the differential amount was nothing but a reserve which came into existence due to valuation process which could be termed as revaluation of assets. On the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the parties, as noted above, Honble Supreme Court observed as follows: ``Such a new case was neither advanced by the Revenue before the High Court, nor could such a case at all be considered by the High Court inasmuch as it did not at all arise out of the order by the Appellate Tribunal. (40). In Chandigarh Administration vs. Laxman Roller Flour Mills Pvt. Ltd. (supra) in a writ where challenge was to orders resuming a plot for violating the requirement of constructing the building within the stipulated time, High Court directed Chandigarh Administration to issue completion certificate as well in favour of the petitioner. (40). In Chandigarh Administration vs. Laxman Roller Flour Mills Pvt. Ltd. (supra) in a writ where challenge was to orders resuming a plot for violating the requirement of constructing the building within the stipulated time, High Court directed Chandigarh Administration to issue completion certificate as well in favour of the petitioner. On a question whether such relief could not be granted which was not even asked for in the petition, Honble Supreme Court observed as follows: ``4. A perusal of the relief extracted above shows that the writ petitioner-respondent never asked for any relief in the writ petition commanding the Chandigarh Administration to issue completion certificate in its favour. Learned counsel for the respondent frankly stated that there is no allegation in the writ petition to the effect that Chandigarh Administration has illegally withheld the completion certificate. It is settled law that unless the allegations are made in the writ petition, the High Court is not justified in issuing any order in excess of the relief prayed for in the writ petition. We are, therefore, satisfied that in the absence of pleading and prayer in the writ petition, the High Court fell in error in issuing directions to the appellant to issue completion certificate to the writ petitioner-respondent. (41). In State of Punjab vs. M/s. Dial Chand Gian Chand and Co. (supra) relief prayed for in the petition was to issue writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to forthwith close the country liquor vend at Gulwati and until the vend is so closed not to make recovery from the petitioner of the so called licence fee concerning the liquor vend at Bargian. Alternatively, it was prayed that a writ in the nature of mandamus be issued directing the respondents to take over the liquor vend at Bargian from the petitioner discharging him from the liability of paying the licence fee. A further prayer was made that the respondent be restrained from recovering the licence fee except with reference to the actual quantity of liquor that might be sold. High Court, however, also awarded damages in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Grant of damages having been agitated, Honble the Supreme Court observed as follows: ``Lastly, Mr. High Court, however, also awarded damages in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Grant of damages having been agitated, Honble the Supreme Court observed as follows: ``Lastly, Mr. Sharma urged that the High Court granted a prayer not sought by the respondent in the High Court and the prayer is as if damage were awarded for some wrongful act on the part of the officers of the Excise Department. The High Court having held that a direction for closing down the liquor vend at Gulwati could not be issued, it was not open to the High Court to work out for itself and re-write the contract between the parties. The respondent was under an obligation to pay the amount of the bid. (42). In Rhone-Poulenc (India) Ltd. vs. State of U.P. and others (supra), the workman had sought reference with regard to the order of his dismissal. Labour Court held dismissal to be illegal and directed reinstatement with consequential benefits. Employer challenged Award of the Labour Court by filing writ petition which was dismissed but the High Court further held the workman to be entitled to salary/arrears of salary in accordance with the specified settlement and further that the settlement was applicable to him and the employer was estopped from taking the plea of inapplicability thereof. This part of the order passed by the High Court, which granted additional relief to the workman, was questioned before the Honble Supreme Court. While accepting the contention of the employer, it was observed as follows: ``The question whether Respondent 3 is entitled or not to the benefit of settlement dated 25.6.1988 was not the subject- matter of the award which directed the reinstatement of workman in service along with consequential benefits. What consequential benefits Respondent 3 would be entitled to was not the subject matter of the writ petitions before the High Court. According to the appellant, Respondent 3 is not entitled to the benefit under the settlement whereas Respondent No. 3 claims such benefits. This question may have to be adjudicated by a competent authority at an appropriate stage when the question of grant of consequential relief is raised or it is contended that full consequential reliefs in terms of the award have been denied to Respondent No. 3. This question may have to be adjudicated by a competent authority at an appropriate stage when the question of grant of consequential relief is raised or it is contended that full consequential reliefs in terms of the award have been denied to Respondent No. 3. The stage of implementation of the award had not come when the matter was pending before the High Court. The only question before the High Court was with regard to the legality of the award and the order dated 22.9.1993 whereby the two preliminary issues were decided by the Labour Court. In this view, we set aside the impugned judgment to the extent it directs that Respondent 3 is entitled to the same amount of salary/arrears of salary which his counterparts are receiving under the settlement dated 2.5.6.1988 as also the finding that the said settlement is applicable to Respondent 3 and that the appellant is estopped from taking the plea of its non- applicability. (43). In Jyoti Jagjiwan Nagar Housing Coop. Society Ltd. vs. State of Rajasthan and others (supra) it was held that the High Court should not enter into and decide disputed questions of fact in writ petition. High Court, it was further held, would transgress its jurisdiction if it enters upon merits of the controversy by embarking upon an enquiry into the disputed facts. (44). In so far as judicial precedents cited by the learned counsel representing legal heirs arrayed as respondents are concerned, the same are not at all applicable to the facts of the case in hand. We have is sufficient details given facts of each of the judicial precedents cited before us and the observations made by the Honble Supreme Court on such facts in relation to the questions that might have been debated. We need not thus take into our hands exercise of distinguishing the judicial precedents one by one. Suffice it however to say that the observations made by the Honble Supreme Court which alone, sans facts, have been relied upon, came into being in peculiar facts and circumstances of those cases. There is not a single judicial precedent that might have been cited before us where the relief in question might pertained to pure and simple individual property dispute between the parties. There is not a single judicial precedent that might have been cited before us where the relief in question might pertained to pure and simple individual property dispute between the parties. Further, none of the judicial precedents cited before us pertains to initial controversy between a citizen and the government and which might have been converted into a dispute between individuals only. We may reiterate that the writ petition was filed by Prakash Chandra Swami challenging order dated 26.10.1981 (Anx. 17) and the only dispute was as to whether Mandir Madho Behariji, Station Road, Jaipur was a government Supurdgi Temple or Thikana Temple. Legal heirs impleaded as petitioners or respondents are happy and satisfied with the decision of the learned Single Judge who quashed the impugned order (Anx. 17). Concededly, dispute with the government had come to an end. Government has not filed appeal against the order of the learned Single Judge. There is only a part of the judgment which relates to the decision on inter se rights of the legal heirs arrayed as petitioner-respondents that the dispute survives. This kind of dispute, we are sanguine, could not possibly be agitated by way of writ petition. (45). Learned counsel representing legal heirs arrayed as respondents, as a last resort, contended that once the pleadings are complete and there is no dispute with regard to the authenticity of the documents which have been relied upon by both the parties, Court should determine the controversy relating to inter se rights of the legal heirs of Prakash Chandra Swami. We do not want to comment upon the correctness of pleadings and authenticity of documents even though it is urged by the other side that in a regular suit there was scope to lead proper evidence and more documents. Suffice it to say that a small deviation from established procedure might be permissible but wholesome violation of the same would result into laying down wrong law. A dispute which could be determined only by procedure established by law governing civil suit should not be permitted to be determined by way of writ petition and that too where original cause of action had nothing to do with the said dispute. A dispute which could be determined only by procedure established by law governing civil suit should not be permitted to be determined by way of writ petition and that too where original cause of action had nothing to do with the said dispute. Further, the dispute between legal heirs of Prakash Chandra Swami is essentially of civil nature and in our considered view, such a dispute has necessarily to be decided by civil courts that have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature. (46). Before we may part with this order, we would like to mention that learned counsel representing legal heirs of Prakash Chandra Swami arrayed as respondents, was at pains to explain to us that the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge with regard to the right of managing the property in dispute by all the legal heirs is correct and therefore, needs to be sustained. It was urged before us that the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge have no exception whatsoever and therefore, another bout of litigation would be a waste of time. Mr. Alok Sharma, learned counsel representing legal heirs arrayed as petitioners, joined issue with the counsel for the other side. Once, we are relegating parties for determination of their inter se rights with regard to the succession or management of the property in dispute to civil court or any other court competent to try the issue, we need not comment anything further as that might prejudice either of the parties before the concerned court. (47). Contention of the learned counsel representing legal heirs arrayed as respondents that the appellants had no locus standi to file the present appeal as order (Anx. 17) which was challenged in the writ petition has been set aside and therefore, there was no occasion for them to have filed the present appeal, needs to be summarily rejected. In fact, appellants are aggrieved of the part of judgment that deals with inter se rights of the legal heirs of Prakash Chandra Swami in succeeding to or managing the properties in dispute and it is only that part of the order which has been agitated in the present appeal. (48). In view of the discussion made above, the appeal is allowed. (48). In view of the discussion made above, the appeal is allowed. All observations, findings or directions as might pertain to the inter se rights of legal heirs arrayed as petitioners and respondents would stand set aside with liberty to the parties to settle this issue before an appropriate forum that might also include civil courts. In peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, costs are made easy.