DIXIT, M. — This revision has been filed under Section 230 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (thereafter referred as the Act) against the judgment of Revenue Appellate Authority Sriganganagar dated 11.11.2004 in appeal No. 41/04. (2). Brief facts of the case are that the respondents in the present case Lekhram had filed a suit in the Court of S.D.O. Sriganganagar along with an application under Section 213 read with Section 151 CPC pleading therein that the plaintiff/respondent was an Ex-serviceman and was also a member of a registered Ex-serviceman Combined Agricultural Society Ltd. chak 14 SPM. the plaintiff respondent was allotted 23.09 bigha land in chak 14 SPM in that capacity and the possession of the land was handed to the plaintiff-respondents. The title deed in the name of the above Society was issued on 25.8.72. In the meantime, Lekhram was disassociated from that Society and the above land was transferred in the name of one Kapildev on 18.11.1956. Kapildev then transferred this land to Ranveer Singh, the applicant/defendant. Meanwhile, the Assistant Registrar in compliance of the orders of Honble Rajasthan High Court passed an order to remove the name of Kapildev and restore the name of Lekhram on 27.1.1981. An appeal was made by Kapildev to the designated authority which was finally rejected on 29.11.1983 and a Writ Petition No. 157/81 preferred against this order was dismissed on 15.9.94. Lekhram then filed a suit for declaration in the Trial Court along with an application for temporary injunction under Section 212 of the Act. The Trial Court rejected the application under Section 212 along with application under Section 151 CPC against which an appeal was preferred in the Court of Revenue Appellate Authority, Sriganganagar, which was accepted on 11.11.2004 and an order imposing cash security was passed against which this revision has been preferred. (3). Putting forth his contentions the counsels for the applicant cited 2004 (1) RLW Rajasthan page 158 to state that the Honble Rajasthan High Court has laid down five principles for appointment of receiver and the case of the non-applicant does not fall within the province of these five principles. He also stated that the order of the Trial Court was reversed by the Revenue Appellate Authority. He also stated that the order of the Trial Court was reversed by the Revenue Appellate Authority. In his order the Revenue Appellate Authority, has not held the property to be in medio and has yet ordered for cash security in respect of a property under Section 212(2) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955. the approach of the Revenue Appellate Authority is against the provisions of Section 212(2). The suit was for declaration and ejectment and the relief identical to that which is asked for in the suit cannot be granted through a temporary injunction application. The title has not been proved. The findings of the Revenue Appellate Authority are based on an Ikrarnama. He has gone beyond the pleadings. 1997 DNJ Part I SC 133 has laid down the principles of appointment of receiver and violation of these principles is a material irregularity. He cited 1992 RLW Volume 1 Rajasthan page 592. He also cited 2003 RRD page 148, 2002 RRD page 620, 1982 RRD page 234 Head Note (b) in this regard. He also stated that the appellant/defendants possession has been admitted and this cannot be disturbed through a temporary injunction. (4). Before submitting his reply the learned counsel for the non- petitioner tried to wriggle out of arguments twice by putting forth frivolous objections and twice submitted applications for releasing the matter. Applications being frivolous and without any basis were rejected. After these the counsel for the non- applicants made their submissions and stated that he has made a clear averment in para 7 of his application before the Trial Court that the land was in clear danger of being wasted. The title of the land is clearly under dispute because the transfer is through an unregistered power of attorney. No suit for specific performance was filed by the transferee in spite of the transfer being through an unregistered document and the period of limitation has also expired, the appellate Court has given a finding of irreparable damage in favour of the respondents- plaintiff. In para no. 3 of the prayer for revision, a plea of adverse possession has been taken whereas no evidence of hostile possession has been given, he cited 2000 RRD page 795 to state that a transferee has no right to adverse possession. In para no. 3 of the prayer for revision, a plea of adverse possession has been taken whereas no evidence of hostile possession has been given, he cited 2000 RRD page 795 to state that a transferee has no right to adverse possession. Citing 2002 RRD page 627, be stated that when the title is in dispute, the land is in medio and looking to the irreparable loss a cash security is justified. In 2005 RRD page 570 in a similar case also a cash security was imposed when the matter was in medio. 1990 RRD page 328 was cited to stress on the principle on the basis of which a property may be held to be a medio. 1994 RRD page 671 was cited to state that a seller cannot give a better title than the one he possesses. 2000 RRD page 34 was cited stating that an unregistered sale deed cannot be taken in evidence as it does not create any right. 1978 RRD page 351 was relied upon to state that the question of appointment of receiver is covered under Section 212 of Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 and not under Order 40 Rule 1 CPC On this ground the citations 1992 RLW 592, 2004 RLW 158, and 1982 RRD page 234 were contended to be not applicable on the plaintiff/ respondents. (5). The second point in argument was raised by the learned counsel for the non-petitioner regarding the scope of revision. He relied on 1994 RBJ page 56 and 105 that the findings of fact cannot be challenged in revision. He also cited AIR 1973 SC page 76 in this regard and relied upon 1998 RRD page 353 in which the Rajasthan High Court has held that finding of fact cannot be interfered by the Board of Revenue in revisional jurisdiction without assigning good reasons. (6). The third point for argument was raised by the learned counsel for the non-petitioner regarding the validity of the unregistered document 2002 RRD page 504 was relied upon to state that no relief can be given on the basis of an unregistered agreement of sale. (7). He also stated 1996 RLW Vol. 2 page 210 to say that he has cited D.B. decision regarding the medio properties and if this Court does not agree to these findings, the matter should be referred to larger bench. (8). (7). He also stated 1996 RLW Vol. 2 page 210 to say that he has cited D.B. decision regarding the medio properties and if this Court does not agree to these findings, the matter should be referred to larger bench. (8). In his rejoinder the learned counsel for the petitioner stated that the averment in para no. 7 of the plaint has been denied specifically in their pleading and in any case what is stated in para no. 7 of the plaint have been denied specifically in their pleading and in any case what is stated in para no. 7 is only an apprehension. The Revenue Appellate Authority in his order has not treated the property in medio. As far as the question of agreement of sale is concerned, it is to be decided in the suit. The provisions of Order 10 Rule 1 are similar to the provisions of Section 212 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 and all the rulings submitted on Order 40 Rule 1 are applicable to the present case mutatis mutandis. As far as the revisional jurisdiction of the Board of revenue is concerned there is a material irregularity of jurisdiction committed by Revenue Appellate Authority, in that he failed to exercise proper jurisdiction in making an order of imposing cash security in a case where relief of temporary injunction could not have been given. (9). Learned counsel for the petitioner also stated that D.B. judgment of 2000 RRD 31 and 2002 RRD page 395 are not applicable as these were judgments passed in the matter of a suit whereas his application was under Section 212. He also stated that there is no loss to the non-petitioner because even if the suit is decreed he will be charged 15 times the rent as penalty as provided for in section 183 and this should obviate any need for cash security. He also placed reliance on 2002 RRD page 627, 2005 RRD page 570. (10). Heard the learned counsel for both the sides and carefully perused the record of the case. The legal points for determination in this revision application are (i) whether the provisions of Order 40 Rule 1 CPC and the provisions of Sections 212 are similar in nature. He also placed reliance on 2002 RRD page 627, 2005 RRD page 570. (10). Heard the learned counsel for both the sides and carefully perused the record of the case. The legal points for determination in this revision application are (i) whether the provisions of Order 40 Rule 1 CPC and the provisions of Sections 212 are similar in nature. (ii) whether any dispute regarding a title renders the land in question "in medio" (iii) whether cash security can be imposed in a matter where temporary injunction cannot be granted. (iv) whether a property which is "in medio" qualifies for imposition of cash security under the provision of Section 212(2). (v) the effect of 1996 RLW Vol. 2 page 210 First question : Provision of Order 40 Rule 1 CPC compared to Sec. 212 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 Provisions of Order 40 Rule 1 CPC:— 1. Appointment of receivers.—(1) Where it appears to the Court to be just and convenient, the Court may be order— (a) appoint any person from the possession or custody of the property; (b) remove any person from the possession or custody of the property; (c) commit the same to the possession, custody or management of the receiver; and (d) confer upon the receiver all such powers as to bringing and defending suits and for the realization management, protection, preservation and improvement of the property, the collection of the rents and profits thereof, the application and disposal of such rents and profits and the execution of documents as the owner himself has or such of those powers as the Court thinks fit. Provision of Section 212(1) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955: (1) If in the course of any suit or proceeding under this Act, it is proved by affidavit or otherwise. (a) that any property to which such suit or proceeding relates is in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated by any party thereto, or (b) that any party to such suit or proceeding threatens or intends to remove or dispose of the said property in order to defeat the ends of justice, the Court may grant a temporary injunction and if necessary appoint a receiver. (11). From a harmonious reading of these two provisions it would appear that the underlining tender and the spirit is the same. (11). From a harmonious reading of these two provisions it would appear that the underlining tender and the spirit is the same. On the other hand there is an additional provision under Section 212(2) which reads as under: 212. Provision for injection and appointment of a receiver (2) Any person against whom an injunction has been granted or in respect of whose property a receiver has been appointed under sub-section (1) may offer cash security in such amount as the Court may determine to compensate the opposite party in case the suit or proceedings is decided against such persons, and on depositing the amount of such security, the Court may withdraw the injunction or the order appointing a receiver as the case may be. (12). Applying the rule of purposive construction and the rule of contextual construction of interpretation of statutes, the first question is decided in terms that the provisions under Order 40 Rule 1 and Section 212(1) are similar and Section 212(2) is an additional provision, in which an option for offering cash security has been provided only where a temporary injunction has been granted or a receiver has been appointed. Second question : The second question has been dealt with in 1990 RRD page 328 where this Honble Court held that in case of a property "where legal title is in doubt and defendant was in actual possession land can be said to be in medio, being in stage of suspension and may finally go to either partys. (13). However, the above mentioned concept of "in medio" property could not be located by me even after a most diligent search of Ramanathan Aiyars Law Lexicon and a complete online search of SCC online. The literal meaning of in medio is given out in the Law Laxicon as in the middle, whereas all the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the non-petitioner have tried to establish that in medio property means a property in dispute bona fide or otherwise. Any concession to such a concept would render every disputed property subject to such a convoluted interpretation, which can never be the object of the statute or even the interpretation of the citation made. Any concession to such a concept would render every disputed property subject to such a convoluted interpretation, which can never be the object of the statute or even the interpretation of the citation made. Thus, the second question is answered in the term that any and every dispute about the title in terms of 1990 RRD 328 does not render the property in medio as such a concept does not exist either in law or in practice in the terms expressed. "In medio" can at best mean a property in the middle meaning thereby a property which is in enjoyment of no one. A property in dispute and in the clear enjoyment of one party or the other is not a property in medio. An in medio property can occur only when it is completely bereft of the question of either title or possession. Third question : As far as the third question is concerned the position is very clear in view of the principles laid down in 1992 RLW Vol. 1 Rajasthan page 592 and 2004 RLW (1) 158 Rajasthan High Court. The principles for appointment of receiver has been laid down in these judgments as follows: (i) The appointment of a receiver pending a suit is a matter resting in the discretion of the Court. (ii) The Court should not appoint a receiver except upon proof by the plaintiff that prima facie he has a very excellent chance of succeeding in suit. (iii) Not only must the plaintiff show a case of adverse and conflicting claims to property, but, he must show some emergency or danger of loss demanding immediate action and of this own right he must be reasonably clear and free from doubt. The element of danger is an important consideration. (iv) An order appointing a receiver will not be made where it has the effect of depriving a defendant of do facto possession since that might case irreparable wrong. It would be different where the property is shown to be in medio, that is to say, in the enjoyment of no one; and (v) The Court, on the application made for the appointment of receiver, looks to the conduct of the party who makes the application and will usually refuse to inference unless his conduct has been free from blame." (14). From a plain reading of these principles together with the provisions contained in Section 212(2) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 it is clear that: (i) a receiver can be appointed only where there is not only a case of adverse and affording claims but also some emergency or danger of loss demanding immediate action. (ii) it is also clear from the foregoing discussion that order for appointing a receiver cannot have the effect of depriving the defendants of de facto possession. Fourth question : The fourth question may, therefore, be answered quite easily. The concept of in medio property is not covered under the provisions of Section 212(2). the provisions of cash security under Section 212(2) is applicable only where a temporary injunction has been granted or a receiver has first been appointed. (15). From a plaint reading of the provisions it is evident that for imposing a cash security an order of temporary injunction or an order appointing a receiver is a condition precedent. Cash security cannot be imposed merely on the basis that property has been contended to be in medio because if that were the case then every plaintiff would contend a property to be in medio, because it is the basic contention in every suit that the plaintiff has a very good chance of success. Therefore, if the definition propounded in 1990 RRD page 328 is taken as the benchmark in imposing cash security, the very basis of Section 212(2) would be undermined. Fifth question : The effect of 1996 RLW Vol. II page 210 on on the present case does not appear to be in the term contended by the learned counsel for the non-petitioner. Firstly, the DB judgments are in respect of a suit and we are examining a temporary injunction application under Section 212(2) of the Act. Secondly the concept of in medio property/tenancy warranting a prior imposition of each security runs into conflict with the principles laid down in 1997 (5) SCC 468 , (1987) Supp. SCC 161 and (1987) Supp. SCC 166. Secondly the concept of in medio property/tenancy warranting a prior imposition of each security runs into conflict with the principles laid down in 1997 (5) SCC 468 , (1987) Supp. SCC 161 and (1987) Supp. SCC 166. 1997 (5) SCC 468 holds that CPC 1908 Order 39 Rule 2—Temporary injunction - Can be granted only if the person seeking injunction has a right capable of being enforced by way of injunction - Where Market Committee under Gujarat Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1963 invited offers for allotment of shops in new market yard for a specific price, held, respondents at that stage had no concluded right to seek injunction restraining the Market Committee from making such allotment. At best they have right to apply for and seek allotment. Courts below erred in applying their mind to consider what would be the right which was claimed to have been infringed and in issuing interim injunction and directions Specific Relief Act, 1963, Sec. 37 - Agricultural Produce Gujarat Agricultural Produce Market Act, 1963 (20 of 1964). (1987) Supp SCC 161 holds that injunction can be granted in favour of a person only if he has possession of the property if he has no possession the possession of the adversary having been confirmed no injunction can be granted. Bruce vs. Silva Raj. (1987) Supp. SCC 166 holds that when City Civil Court had refused to grant temporary injunction to the plaintiff under Order 39 Rule 1. Held High Court erred in granting Temporary injunction in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction under Order 13 Rule 1 - Ramesh Chandra Jam-nadas & Co. vs. State of Andhra Pradesh. (16). This has also been followed in AIR 1988 Raj. 188 . A reading of all these authorities firmly establishes the theory of no possession, no injunction. The later Bench of this Honble Court has cited Motiyan vs. State of Rajasthan in 2005 RRD 604 to lay down the theory of "Precedental law" according to which 1990 RRD 328, 2002 RRD 627 and 2005 RRD 570 and the DB judgment need not be followed in view of the Supreme Court decisions. (17). Let us now proceed to examine how the foregoing analysis affects the present revision. Possession of the defendant is an admitted fact. (17). Let us now proceed to examine how the foregoing analysis affects the present revision. Possession of the defendant is an admitted fact. That being so a temporary injunction cannot be granted in favour of the plaintiff as the balance of convenience and the weight of law is in favour of the defendant. If a temporary injunction cannot be granted it is axiomatic that cash security cannot be imposed as Section 212(2) lays down that the cash security can be imposed only at the request of person "against whom an injunction has been granted" or "where a receiver has been appointed." (18). The learned Revenue Appellate Authority has committed a grievous error of jurisdiction by imposing cash security in a case where a temporary injunction has not been granted or rather, could not have been granted, Section 183 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 has an inbuilt provision of annual penalty of upto 15 times of the annual rent against a person who is found liable to ejection, which should have been sufficient remedy against unlawful possession, if so found. Moreover, the basic relief sought for in the Temporary injunction application is not for a temporary injunction, but for cash security which is beyond the scope of Section 212(2) as it is a power of Court in cases where a Temporary injunction is granted or a receiver appointed and is not an available remedy. Thus, the very concept of imposing cash security on in medio property is based on rickety and shaky legal foundations. (19). In view of the foregoing analysis, I am of the view that the catena of case of law of this Honble Court regarding in medio property runs contrary to the authoritative pronouncements made by the Honble Supreme Court and the Honble Rajasthan High Court. Adopting the Precedental law theory laid down in 1981 RLW 448 and adopted by the Larger Bench of this Honble Court in para 21, 2005 RRD page 604,1 hold that the order of the learned R.A.A. is against the provisions of law and hence quashed. The revision is allowed and the order of the Trial Court is affirmed. Parties to bear their own costs. Pronounced in the open Court.