S. K. GANGELE, J. ( 1 ) APPELLANT-CLAIMANT has filed the present appeal against the award dated 31/1/2001, passed in Claim Case No. 75 of 1998. ( 2 ) THAT appellant was travelling in a tempo Trax from Dewas to Shajapur and he was dashed by a truck No. MP 07-1602 at village Maksi due to rash and negligent driving of the driver of truck and report of incident was lodged at Police Station, maksi. A criminal case was also registered against the driver. ( 3 ) APPELLANT filed an application for compensation before the Tribunal pleading that he was aged 50 years and working as labourer, he was earning Rs. 1,500 per month. He received injuries on his ribs, shoulder, left leg and ankle, there was permanent disability to him. He was admitted in District Hospital, Ujjain from 6. 10. 1997 to 14. 10. 1997. ( 4 ) DR. N. K. Gupta deposed before the tribunal that he examined the appellant and issued a permanent disability certificate, there was a fracture in scapula of right shoulder and right collarbone and also fracture of third, fifth, sixth, ninth and tenth rib. There was a fracture of pubic bone of left hip and lower pubic bone. He could not lift weight and there was less movement of 80 degree of his right shoulder, his right hand was also affected, he was feeling pain in right hip and chest, he was unable to walk freely. On the basis of above evidence I found there was 60. 5 per cent permanent disability to the appellant. ( 5 ) THE appellant himself deposed that due to disability he could not work as a labourer, there was a fracture and Claims tribunal held that there was 60 per cent permanent disability to the appellant on the basis of above evidence. However, Claims tribunal further held that X-ray was taken. Hence, it cannot be held that injuries were not grievous in nature. In my opinion, this finding of Tribunal is contrary to evidence. The appellant filed X-ray report and X-ray plate of District Hospital, Ujjain. Doctor n. K. Gupta has also deposed in his evidence that there was an X-ray of appellant and he had seen the X-ray, after that he issued the certificate. In my opinion, this finding of Tribunal is contrary to evidence. The appellant filed X-ray report and X-ray plate of District Hospital, Ujjain. Doctor n. K. Gupta has also deposed in his evidence that there was an X-ray of appellant and he had seen the X-ray, after that he issued the certificate. ( 6 ) ON the basis of above the Tribunal held that the accident was caused due to rash and negligent driving of the driver and awarded compensation of Rs. 10,000 to the appellant. ( 7 ) THE learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the findings of the Claims tribunal with regard to grant of minimum compensation are against the law, the compensation has to be awarded as per Second schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act. ( 8 ) THE learned counsel for respondent no. 3 has submitted that compensation awarded by the Tribunal is just and proper. ( 9 ) IN R. D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India) Pvt. Ltd. , 1995 ACJ 366 (SC), the apex Court has held as under with regard to grant of compensation in case of serious injuries:" (9) Broadly speaking, while fixing an amount of compensation payable to a victim of an accident, the damages have to be assessed separately as pecuniary damages and special damages. Pecuniary damages are those which the victim has actually incurred and which are capable of being calculated in terms of money; whereas non-pecuniary damages are those which are incapable of being assessed by arithmetical calculations. In order to appreciate two concepts pecuniary damages may include expenses incurred by the claimant: (i) medical attendance; (ii) loss of earning of profit up to the date of trial; (iii) other material loss. So far as non-pecuniary damages are concerned, they may include (i)damages for mental and physical shock, pain and suffering already suffered or likely to be suffered in the future; (ii)damages to compensate for the loss of amenities of life which may include a variety of matters, i. e. , on account of injury the claimant may not be able to walk, run or sit; (iii) damages for the loss of expectation of life, i. e. , on account of injury the normal longevity of the person concerned is shortened; (iv)inconvenience, hardship, discomfort, disappointment, frustration and mental stress in life. (10) It cannot be disputed that because of the accident the appellant who was an active practising lawyer has become paraplegic on account of the injuries sustained by him. It is really difficult in this background to assess the exact amount of compensation for the pain and agony suffered by the appellant and for having become a lifelong handicapped. No amount of compensation can restore the physical frame of the appellant. That is why it has been said by the courts that whenever any amount is determined as the compensation payable for any injury suffered during an accident, the object is to compensate such injury 'so far as money can compensate' because it is impossible to equate the money with the human suffering or personal deprivations. Money cannot renew a broken and shattered physical frame. (13) This court in the case of C. K. Subramonia lyer v. T. Kunhi Kuttan nair, 1970 ACJ 110 (SC), in connection with the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 has observed: 'in assessing damages, the court must exclude all considerations of matter which rest in speculation or fancy though conjecture to some extent is inevitable. ' (17 ). . . When the compensation is to be awarded towards the pain and suffering and loss of amenities of life, the special circumstances of the claimant have to be taken into account including his age, the unusual deprivation he has suffered, the effect thereof on his future life. The amount of compensation towards non-pecuniary loss is not easy to determine but the award must reflect that different circumstances have been taken into consideration. " ( 10 ) IN Grifan v. Sarbjeet Singli, 2000 acj 1370 (SC), it is held:"we have heard learned counsel for the appellant as well as learned counsel for the respondents, especially the insurance company which has to bear the burden of the compensation. Looking to the facts and circumstances of this case, in our view, an additional award of rs. 2,00,000 (rupees two lakh only) is required to be granted in favour of the claimant whose right leg was amputated due to rash and negligent driving of the respondent No. 1. The medical evidence shows that he has suffered from 80 per cent disability. But even taking the overall disability of 50 per cent and looking to his income of Rs. The medical evidence shows that he has suffered from 80 per cent disability. But even taking the overall disability of 50 per cent and looking to his income of Rs. 4,000 per month which would have risen further if appellant had not suffered from this injury at the age of 45 years, considering this aspect and keeping in view his future prospects which are affected because of this permanent injury, we deem it fit to enhance the award of compensation by a sum of Rs. 2,00,000 more in addition to Rs. 2,00,000 already ordered by the high Court. " ( 11 ) DIVISION Bench of Karnataka High court in Fakkirappa v. Yallawwa, 2004 acj 1141 (Karnataka), discussed important judgments with regard to the grant of compensation to handicapped persons and held as under:" (5) Bodily injury is to be treated as a deprivation which entitles a claimant to damages, the amount of damages varies according to gravity of the injury. Deprivation of injuries may bring with it three consequences, namely (i) loss of earnings and earning capacity, (ii) expenses to pay others for what otherwise he would do for himself, and (iii) loss or diminution in full pleasures of living. Though it is impossible to equate money with human suffering or personal deprivation, the court has to make an attempt to award damages so far as money can compensate the loss. Therefore, while considering deprivation, the court should have regard to the gravity and the degree of deprivation and the degree of awareness of the deprivation. While awarding damages in the personal injury cases, the compensation awarded by the court should be substantial and it should not be merely token damages. Lord Morris in his memorable speech in H. West and son Ltd. v. Shephard, 1958-65 ACJ 504 (HL, England), pointed out this aspect in the following words: 'money may be awarded so that something tangible may be procured to replace something else of the like nature which has been destroyed or lost. But money cannot renew a physical frame that has been battered and shattered. All that Judges and courts can do is to award sums which must be regarded as giving reasonable compensation. In the process there must be the endeavour to secure some uniformity in the general method of approach. By common assent awards must be reasonable and must be assessed with moderation. All that Judges and courts can do is to award sums which must be regarded as giving reasonable compensation. In the process there must be the endeavour to secure some uniformity in the general method of approach. By common assent awards must be reasonable and must be assessed with moderation. Furthermore, it is eminently desirable that so far as possible comparable injuries should be compensated by comparable awards. '(6) In the above case, their Lordships of the House of Lords observed that the bodily injury is to be treated as a deprivation which entitles plaintiff to damages and that the amount of damages varies according to the gravity of the injury. Their Lordships emphasised that in personal injury cases the courts should not award merely token damages but they should grant substantial amount as compensation. (7) In Ward v. James, (1965) 1 All ER 563, speaking for the Court of Appeal in England, Lord Denning while dealing with the question of awarding compensation for personal injury had laid down three basic principles: 'firstly, assessability. In cases of grave injury, where the body is wrecked or brain destroyed, it is very difficult to assess a fair compensation in money, so difficult that the award must basically be a conventional figure, derived from experience or from awards in comparable cases. Secondly, uniformity: There should be some measure of uniformity in awards so that similar decisions may be given in similar cases; otherwise there will be great dissatisfaction in the community and much criticism of the administration of justice. Thirdly, predictability: parties should be able to predict with some measure of accuracy the sum which is likely to be awarded in a particular case, for by this means cases can be settled peaceably and not brought to court, a thing very much to the public good. ' (8 ). . . The principle is sometimes referred to as restitutio in integrum', but it is manifest and universally realised that no award of money can possibly compensate a man and renew a shattered human frame. Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest in the case of Perry v. Cleaver, 1969 ACJ 363 (HL, England), said: 'to compensate in money for pain and for physical consequences is invariably difficult but. . . no other process can be devised than that of making a monetary assessment. ' (9) Damages must be full and adequate. Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest in the case of Perry v. Cleaver, 1969 ACJ 363 (HL, England), said: 'to compensate in money for pain and for physical consequences is invariably difficult but. . . no other process can be devised than that of making a monetary assessment. ' (9) Damages must be full and adequate. Field, J. in Phillips v. South Western railway Co. , (1871) 1 QBD 106, held: 'you cannot put the plaintiff back again into his original position, but you must bring your reasonable common sense to bear, and you must always recollect that this is the only occasion on which compensation can be given. The plaintiff can never sue again for it. You have, therefore, now to give him compensation, once and for all. He has done no wrong; he has suffered a wrong at the hands of the defendants and you must take care to give him full fair compensation for that which he has suffered. ' (10) Though undoubtedly there are difficulties and uncertainties in assessing the damages for personal injury case, that fact should not preclude an assessment as best as can, in the circumstances be made. Lord Halsbury in Mediana, (1900) AC 113, said: 'of course the whole region of inquiry into damages is one of extreme difficulty. You very often cannot even lay down any principle upon which you can give damages; nevertheless, it is remitted to the jury, or those who stand in place of the jury, to consider what compensation in money shall be given for what is a wrongful act. Take the most familiar and ordinary case: how is anybody to measure pain and suffering in moneys counted? Nobody can suggest that you can by any arithmetical calculation establish what is the exact amount of money which would represent such a thing as the pain and suffering which a person has undergone by reason of an accident. . . But, nevertheless, the law recognizes that as a topic upon which damages may be given. ' (12) Mcgregor on Damages, 14th Edn. , para 1157, referring to the heads of damages in personal injury actions states: 'the person physically injured may recover both for his pecuniary losses and his non-pecuniary losses. Of these the pecuniary losses themselves comprise two separate items, viz. ' (12) Mcgregor on Damages, 14th Edn. , para 1157, referring to the heads of damages in personal injury actions states: 'the person physically injured may recover both for his pecuniary losses and his non-pecuniary losses. Of these the pecuniary losses themselves comprise two separate items, viz. , loss of earnings and other gains which the plaintiff would have made had he not been injured and the medical and other expenses to which he is put as a result of the injury, and the courts have subdivided the non-pecuniary losses into three categories, viz. , pain and suffering, loss of amenities of life and loss of expectation of life. ' (13) Besides, the court is well advised to remember that the measures of damages in all these cases 'should be such as to enable even a tortfeasor to say that he had amply atoned for his misadventure'. The observation of Lord Devlin that the proper approach to the problem or to adopt a test as to what contemporary society would deem to be a fair sum, such as would allow the wrongdoer to 'hold up his head among his neighbours and say with their approval that he has done the fair thing', is quite apposite to be kept in mind by the court in determining compensation in personal injury cases. (18) In the result, for the foregoing reasons, we allow the appeal in part with costs. In substitution of the impugned award, we award a sum of Rs. 5,85,000 under the following heads with 9 per cent interest per annum from the date of claim petition till its payment. " ( 12 ) ON the basis of above principle of law and evidence on record of the case it is clear that the appellant suffered serious injuries certified by Dr. N. K. Gupta and there was permanent disability to him up to 60 per cent. His age at the time of the accident was near about 50 years and if minimum earning is to be counted that comes to Rs. 18,000 per year and looking to his age, multiplier of 11 as per Schedule has to be applied. In that event total loss of earnings comes to Rs. 1,98,000 and 50 per cent of this comes to Rs. 99,000 and for the pain and suffering the appellant is entitled to Rs. 10,000. The Tribunal has already granted Rs. 18,000 per year and looking to his age, multiplier of 11 as per Schedule has to be applied. In that event total loss of earnings comes to Rs. 1,98,000 and 50 per cent of this comes to Rs. 99,000 and for the pain and suffering the appellant is entitled to Rs. 10,000. The Tribunal has already granted Rs. 10,000 to the appellant. Consequently, the appeal of the appellant is allowed to the extent of Rs. 99,000 with an interest of 6 per cent per annum from the date of filing of the application before the Claims Tribunal. The impugned award is modified to the above extent. The appeal is allowed to the above extent accordingly, without any order of the costs. Appeal allowed. .