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2005 DIGILAW 346 (GAU)

Hindustan Paper Corporation Ltd. v. Synergy Composites Pvt. Ltd.

2005-04-29

ANIMA HAZARIKA, I.A.ANSARI

body2005
JUDGMENT I.A. Ansari, J. 1. This appeal has arisen out of the order, dated 16.03.05, passed in W.P. (C) No. 54 (SH)/05, whereby the learned Single Judge overruled the objection raised by the Appellant Corporation as regards the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that Shillong Bench of the Gauhati High Court had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. 2. Put in a narrow campass, the facts, which are material for disposal of this appeal, emerge as follows: (i) The writ Petitioner is a private company having a plant at Byrnihat, within the territorial limits of the State of Meghalaya, and produces various products made of bamboo dust and other waste materials, the writ Petitioner being hereinafter referred to as "the Petitioner Company". The Respondent, namely, Hindustan Paper Corporation Ltd., a public company, is a Govt. of India Enterprise with its registered office at Jagiroad, Marigaon, located within the State of Assam, and the same is hereinafter referred to as "the Appellant Corporation". Pursuant to a tender process, which had started on the basis of an NIT, dated 14.02.2000, issued by the Appellant Corporation, the Petitioner Company had been awarded a disposal order for collection and removal of the entire quantity of bamboo dust generated at the plant of the Appellant Corporation, at Jagiroad, until 31.03.2005 and in terms of this disposal order, the Petitioner Company had been collecting the dust for its plant at Byrnihat. In breach of this agreement existing between the Petitioner Company and the Appellant Corporation, when the Appellant Corporation had floated Anr. NIT, on 30.08.03, for disposal of their bamboo dust, the Petitioner Company approached the Shillong Bench of this High Court with W.P. (C) No. 258 (SH)/03. By judgment and order, dated 13.02.04, the said writ petition was allowed and the NIT, dated 30.08.03 was quashed. Thereafter, on 08.01.05, the Appellant Corporation issued Anr. NTT, dated 18.01.05, inviting tender for disposal of the bamboo dust from the premises of the said paper mill of the Appellant Corporation, the disposal order to be granted being with effect from 01.04.05 i.e. after the expiry of the agreement subsisting between the parties concerned (whereby the Appellant Corporation had, as indicated hereinbefore, undertaken to allow the Petitioner Company to collect bamboo dust from the plant of the Appellant Corporation till 31.03.05). The Petitioner Company participated in the tender process floated on 08.01.05, but despite the fact that the tender papers, submitted by the Respondent No. 3, namely, M/s Kiran Enterprise, Jagiroad, were not in accordance with the terms of the NIT, dated 08.01.2005, the Appellant Corporation was bent up giving disposal order in favour of the Respondent No. 3 aforernentioned, though the Petitioner Company was the highest bidder amongst the valid tenderers. The Petitioner Company was even prepared to pay, without prejudice to its rights, the amount of Rupees 251 per metric ton for bamboo dust, which was the offer of the Respondent No. 3. (ii) With the allegations that the Appellant Corporation was, thus, bent upon granting disposal order in favour of the Respondent No. 3 unjustly and unlawfully, the Petitioner Company filed the W.P. (C) 54 (SH)/2005 aforementioned, at the Shillong Bench of the Gauhati High Court, seeking issuance of appropriate writ(s) commanding the Appellant Corporation to grant disposal order of bamboo dust in terms of the NIT, dated 08.01.05, aforementioned in favour of the Petitioner Company and also an interim direction to the Appellant Corporation not to issue or give effect to any fresh contract/disposal order for collection or removal of bamboo dust with out leave of this Court. (iii) The Appellant Corporation appeared in the writ petition and raised, amongst Ors., a preliminary objection as regards its maintainability on the ground that no case of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of the State of Meghalaya and, hence, the Shillong Bench of this High Court had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. (iv) Upon hearing the objection so raised, the learned single Judge, vide the impugned order, dated 16.03.05, turned down the objection and directed the parties to maintain the status quo with regard to the issue of disposal order as on the date of the passing of the order on 16.03.05. It is this order, which stands impugned, as already indicated here-in-above, in the present appeal. 3. We have heard Mr. A.K. Phukan, learned Senior counsel, assisted by Mr. J. Roy, learned Counsel, for the Appellants, and Mr. V.K. Jindal, learned Senior counsel, assisted by Mr. L. Lyngdoh, learned Counsel, appearing on behalf of the Respondents. 4. Presenting the case on behalf of the Appellant Corporation, Mr. 3. We have heard Mr. A.K. Phukan, learned Senior counsel, assisted by Mr. J. Roy, learned Counsel, for the Appellants, and Mr. V.K. Jindal, learned Senior counsel, assisted by Mr. L. Lyngdoh, learned Counsel, appearing on behalf of the Respondents. 4. Presenting the case on behalf of the Appellant Corporation, Mr. A.K. Phukan has submitted that the Shillong Bench is one of the Benches of the Gauhati High Court and the Bench at Shillong exercises, in terms of the Notification, dated 01.02.05, issued by the Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs (Department of Justice), Government of India, jurisdiction in respect of cases, which arise within the State of Meghalaya. This Notification, which was issued in exercise of the powers contained in, amongst Ors., Section 31 of the North-Eastern Areas (Reorganisation) Act, 1971, if read with Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, would clearly reveal, contends Mr. Phukan, that the Shillong Bench of this High Court can entertain a writ petition if the cause of action or any part thereof has arisen within the territorial limits of the State of Meghalaya. In the case at hand, points out Mr. Phukan, the Appellant Corporation had floated tender from Nagaon Paper Mill Ltd., Jagiroad, in the State of Assam, the tender papers were collected by the Petitioner Company from the said paper Mill at Jagiroad, the tender papers were submitted along with necessary bank draft by the Petitioner Company at the said paper Mill, the tender papers were opened at the said paper Mill and at the time of opening of the tender papers, the parties concerned including the representative of the Petitioner Company were present there. Thus, according to Mr. Phukan, no cause of action arose within the territorial limits of the State of Meghalaya and, hence, in such a situation, the Shillong Bench of the Gauhati High Court had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition, but the learned Single judge admitted the writ petition and passed the interim order, whereby the Appellant corporation has been forced to continue to supply to the Petitioner company bamboo dust at the rate of rupees 10 per metric ton for the bamboo dust. If the order impugned in this appeal is, submits Mr. Phukan, not interfered with, the Appellant Corporation, which is an instrumentality of the State, would sustain, with effect from 01.04.05, huge revenue loss. If the order impugned in this appeal is, submits Mr. Phukan, not interfered with, the Appellant Corporation, which is an instrumentality of the State, would sustain, with effect from 01.04.05, huge revenue loss. This apart, it was one of the conditions of the NTT, dated 08.03.2005, aforementioned, points out Mr. Phukan, that all disputes between the parties would be terrible by the courts of law situated at Morigaon district. The cause of action thus having arisen, according to Mr. Phukan, entirely within the territorial limits of the State of Assam, the Shillong Bench ought not to have entertained the writ petition, for, the Shillong Bench of this High Court has, reiterates Mr. Phukan, no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. 5. Resisting this appeal, Mr. Jindal, learned Senior counsel, has submitted that the writ appeal stands on a footing different from other civil appeals and when a learned Single Judge has opted to exercise jurisdiction, the same should not be interfered with, for, points out Mr. Jindal, the writ appeal is not a regular appeal. Reliance in support of this submission is placed by Mr. Jindal on Tractor and Farm Equipment Ltd. v. Secretary to the Government of Assam, Department of Agriculture and Ors. reported in 2004 (1) GLT 117 : (2004) 2 GLR 56 (DB) . 6. Mr. Jindal also submits that the proviso to Clause (3) of the Notification, dated 01.02.1995, aforementioned gives power to the Chief Justice to transfer, in his discretion, any case or class of cases arising in the State of Meghalaya to the Principal Seat at Guwahati. Thus, the power to transfer the cases from the Shillong Bench to the Principal Seat at Guwahati vests, according to Mr. Jindal, in the Chief Justice of the High Court, which power is, contends Mr. Jindal, an administrative power and, hence, no appeal against the impugned order, dated 16.03.2005, aforementioned passed by the learned Single Judge can be entertained, when the learned single Judge has chosen to exercise the jurisdiction. 7. Mr. Jindal has further submitted that even if it is assumed, for a moment, that the Shillong Bench has no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition, the writ petition may at best, in terms of the provisions of Order VII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, be returned to the Petitioner Company for presenting the same at the Principal Seat at Guwahati. This power, however, according to Mr. Jindal, cannot be exercised by this Court, for, it is the Chief Justice, which, according to Mr. Jindal, is the only competent person to pass, in his discretion, Order (5), in terms of the proviso to Clause (3) of the Notification dated 01.02.1995, aforementioned, transferring any case or classes of cases arising in the State of Meghalaya to be heard at Guwahati. Referring to Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Mr. Jindal submits that this Section clearly shows that a suit can be instituted at the place, where the Defendant or one of the Defendants carries on business. The Appellant Corporation, according to Mr. Jindal, has been carrying on its business within the State of Meghalaya and, hence, the Shillong Bench has jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. Reliance, in support of this submission, is placed by Mr. Jindal on Union of India and Anr. v. Ladu Lal Jain ( AIR 1963 SC 1681 ) and Petal Roadways Ltd. Bombay v. Prasad Trading Co. ( AIR 1992 SC 1514 ). 8. Pointing out to the provisions of Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Mr. Jindal submits that an Appellate Court or a Revisional Court cannot reverse the order made by a trial Court unless, amongst Ors., failure of justice takes place as a result of assumption of jurisdiction by the trial Court. Reference, in this regard, is made by Mr. Jindal to Pathumma (Daughter of Koopilan Uneen) and Ors. v. Kuntalan Kutty (Son of Koopilan Uneen) dead by Lrs. and Ors. ( AIR 1981 SC 1683 ). 9. In the case at hand, contends Mr. Jindal, the Appellant Corporation have not been able to show that as a result of the assumption of jurisdiction by the Shillong Bench, any failure of justice has been caused and, hence, this appeal may not, pleads Mr. Jindal, be entertained. 10. It has also been submitted by Mr. Jindal that on the technical ground that Court lacks territorial jurisdiction, the Court cannot refuse to grant relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. Reliance of this proposition is placed by Mr. Jindal on Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust and Ors. v. V.V.R. Rudani and Ors. ( AIR 1989 SC 1607 ). It is also Mr. Reliance of this proposition is placed by Mr. Jindal on Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust and Ors. v. V.V.R. Rudani and Ors. ( AIR 1989 SC 1607 ). It is also Mr. Jindal's case that the Gauhati High Court is a common High Court for all the seven States and Shillong Bench is one of its Benches and, hence, the Shillong Bench is a part of the entity of the Gauhati High Court and this Bench is competent to entertain a writ petition dven if the cause of action arises out-side the territorial limits of the State of Meghalaya. Support for this submission is sought to be derived by Mr. Jindal from the case of Town House Building Co-operative Society Ltd. v. Special Deputy Commissioner (AIR 1988 Kart 312). 11. Repelling the submissions made on behalf of the Petitioner Company, Mr. J. Roy, learned Counsel for the Appellants, has submitted that when the pleading is read as a whole, it clearly transpires that the cause of action arose outside the territorial limits of the State of Meghalaya and, hence, in such a situation, the Shillong Bench was not legally competent to entertain the writ petition. Mr. J. Roy also points out that the proviso to Clause (3) of the Notification, dated 01.02.95, which Mr. Jindal relies upon, will come into play only when a case arises within the State of Meghalaya upon being validly instituted at Shillong Bench. The proviso to Clause (3) aforementioned would not be attracted, reiterates Mr. Roy, unless the case arises within the State of Meghalaya. In the case at hand, points out Mr. J. Roy, there is no validity instituted case at Shillong Bench and, hence, the proviso to Clause (3) of the Notification, dated 01.02.95, is not attracted. 12. Upon careful consideration of the materials on record and upon hearing the learned Counsel for the parties, following two moot questions, we find, arise for determination in this appeal: i) Whether the writ petition was maintainable for adjudication at Shillong Bench of the Gauhati High Court in the face of the contention that no cause of action arose within the territorial limits of the Shillong Bench? ii) To what reliefs, if any, the parties are entitled? Question No. 1. 13. ii) To what reliefs, if any, the parties are entitled? Question No. 1. 13. Since the challenge to the maintainability of the writ petition is posed on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction of the Shillong Bench of this High Court, it is pertinent to determine the layout of the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Article 226, as it stands today, reads, as follows: 226, Power qf High Courts to issue certain Mils. (1) Notwithstanding anything in Article 32, every High Court shall have/power, throughout the territorials in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories, directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. 2) The power conferred by Clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. 14. While considering the question of territorial limits of the jurisdiction of a High Court under Article226, it is imperative to bear in mind that Clause (2) of Article 226 did not, originally, exist. 14. While considering the question of territorial limits of the jurisdiction of a High Court under Article226, it is imperative to bear in mind that Clause (2) of Article 226 did not, originally, exist. In the absence of Clause (2) of Article 226, when the question arose as to whether a High Court can exercise jurisdiction to issue writs based on the ground that the cause of action has occurred within the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Constitution Bench, while interpreting Article 226, (as it stood then), observed, in Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao ( AIR 1953 SC 210 ) as follows: ...The rule that cause of action attracts jurisdiction in suits is based on statutory enactment and cannot apply to writs issuable under Article 226, which makes no reference to any cause of action or where it arises, but insists on the presence of the person or authority within the territories in relation to which the High Court exercises jurisdiction. 15. Thus, in Saka Venkata Subba Rao (supra), the Supreme Court had expressed the view, in no uncertain words, that in the absence of a specific provision in Article 226 on the lines of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court could not have exercised jurisdiction on the plea that the whole or part of the cause of action had arisen within its jurisdiction. In other words, what the Supreme Court in Saka Venkata Subha Rao (supra) had held was that in the absence of a specific provision in Article226 suggesting that the cause of action would attract jurisdiction to enable a High Court to issue, under Article 226, writs, the High Court could not have exercised jurisdiction on the plea that the whole or part of the cause of action had arisen within its jurisdiction and that the High Court can exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 only if the person or authority to whom the writ is sought to be issued is located within the territorial limits of the High Court. Extended logically, the decision in Saka Venkata Subba Rao (supra) conveyed that even if cause of action or part thereof had arisen within the territorial limits of a High Court, the High Court could not have issued writs unless the person or authority to whom the writ was sought to be issued stood located within the territorial limit of the High Court. The view was followed in subsequent cases. 16. When the question, once again, arose as to what are the limitations on the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court and if, on the ground of cause of action having taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, a High Court will be constitutionally competent to issue writ, the Apex Court in Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh v. The Union of India and Anr. ( AIR 1961 SC 532 ), following its earlier decisions in Saka Venkata Subha Rao (supra) and K.S. Raashid and Son v. The Income Tax Investigation Commission (1954 S.C.R. 738.), had this to say, ... Therefore, the view taken in Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao ([1953] S.C.R. 1144 ) and K.S. Rashid and Son v. The Income Tax Investigation Commission ( [1954] S.C.R. 738 .) that there is two-fold limitation on the power of the High Court to issue writs etc. under Article 226, namely, (i) the power is to be exercised 'throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction', that is to say, the writs issued by the Court cannot run beyond the territories subject to its jurisdiction, and (ii) the person or authority to whom the High Court is empowered to issue such writs must be "within those territories" which clearly implies that they must be amenable to its jurisdiction either by residence or location within those territories, is the correct one. 17. The Supreme Court further observed and held in Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh (supra) as follows: Article 226 as it stands does not refer anywhere to the accrual of cause of action and to the jurisdiction of the High Court depending on the place where the cause of action accrues being within its territorial jurisdiction. 17. The Supreme Court further observed and held in Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh (supra) as follows: Article 226 as it stands does not refer anywhere to the accrual of cause of action and to the jurisdiction of the High Court depending on the place where the cause of action accrues being within its territorial jurisdiction. Proceedings under Article 226 are not suits; they provide for extraordinary remedies by a special procedure and give powers of correction to the High Court over persons and authorities and these special powers have to be exercised within the limits set for them. These two limitations have already been indicated by us above and one of them is that the person or authority concerned must be within the territories over which the High Court exercises jurisdiction. Is it possible then to overlook this constitutional limitation and say that the High Court can issue a writ against a person or authority even though it may not be within its territories simply because the cause of action has arisen within those territories'? It seems to us that it would be going in the face of the express provision in Article 226 and doing away with an express limitation contained therein if the concept of cause of action were to be introduced in it. 18. From a close reading of what has been laid down in Saka Venkata Subba Rao (supra) and Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh (supra), it is clear that there were considered to be twofold limitations on the powers of the High Court to issue writs under Article 226, namely, (i) that the seat of the person or authority to whom the writ is issued must be within the territorial limits of the High Court meaning thereby that the writs could not have been issued by the High Court to run beyond its territorial jurisdiction and (ii) that cause of action could not be a ground for the High Court to assume jurisdiction unless the location of the person or authority to whom the writ, sought to be issued, is located within the territorial limits of the High Court. 19. The consequence of the above view, expressed in Saka Venkata Subba Rao and Lt. Col. Kliajoc Singh (supra), was that only the High Court of Punjab could exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution against the Union of India and Ors. 19. The consequence of the above view, expressed in Saka Venkata Subba Rao and Lt. Col. Kliajoc Singh (supra), was that only the High Court of Punjab could exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution against the Union of India and Ors. instrumentalities of the Union Government located in Delhi. To remedy this situation, Clause (1A) was inserted by the 15th Amendment Act, 1963, conferring thereby on the High Courts jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Article 226 against the Union of India or any other body or authority located in Delhi if the cause of action arose, wholly or in part, within its jurisdiction. Clause (1A) was, later on, renumbered as Clause (2) of Article 226. 20. Thus, Clause (2) was introduced in Article 226 of the Constitution to enlarge the scope of the writ jurisdiction of the High Court; hence, by virtue of Clause (2) of Article 226, the power conferred by Clause (1) of Article 226 on the High Court to issue writs can, now, be exercised by the High Court if the cause of action, wholly or in part, has arisen within its territorial limits. In other words, in the context of territorial jurisdiction, the maintainability or otherwise of a writ petition in a High Court, now, depends on the answer to the question as to whether the cause of action or any part thereof has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of that Court High Court. If the answer to this question is found in the affirmative, the High Court will have the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition and not otherwise. 21. The fall-out of the above discussion is that with the insertion of Clause (2) to Article 226, a High Court can, now, exercise its writ jurisdiction if the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises within the jurisdiction of the High Court even if the seat of the Government or the authority concerned to whom the direction, order or writs, sought to be issued, is not located within the territorial limits of the High Court. Conversely put, what Clause (2) of Article 226 conveys is that if the cause of action has not arisen, wholly or in part, within the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of a High Court, the High Court will not have the power to issue writ or writs even if the seat of the Government or of the authority concerned is located within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. 22. After an in depth study on the question of territorial jurisdiction of a High Court as postulated under Article 226, a Bench of three Judges of the Supreme Court in Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kr. Basu, reported in 1994 (4) SCC 711 laid down as follows: (I) 5. Clause (1) of Article 226 begins with a non obstante clause-notwithstanding anything in Article 32 and provides that every High Court shall have power 'throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction', to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, 'within those territories' directions, orders or writs, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose. Under Clause (2) of Article 226 the High Court may exercise its power conferred by Clause (1) if the cause of action, wholly or in part, had arisen within the territory over which it exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. On a plain reading of the aforesaid two clauses of Article 226 of the Constitution it becomes clear that a High Court can exercise the power to issue directions, orders or writs for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution or for any other purpose if the cause of action, wholly or in part, had arisen within the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of the, Government or authority or the residence of the person against whom the direction, order or writ is issued is not within the said territories. In order to confer jurisdiction on the High Court of Calcutta, NICCO must show that at least a part of the cause of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of that Court. This is at best its case in the writ petition. 23. In order to confer jurisdiction on the High Court of Calcutta, NICCO must show that at least a part of the cause of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of that Court. This is at best its case in the writ petition. 23. In Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. reported in 2000 (7) SCC 640 , the Apex Court, while relying, inter alia, on the decision in Utpal Kumar Basu (supra), has observed as follows: From the provision in Clause (2) of Article 226 it is clear that the maintainability or otherwise of the writ petition in the High Court depends on whether the cause of action for filing the same arose, wholly or in part, within the territorial jurisdiction of that Court. 24. Thus, the language used in Clause (2) of the Article 226 and the authorities cited above leave no room for doubt that a High Court can, now, exercise powers under Article 226 only if the cause of action arises wholly or in part within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court and not otherwise irrespective of the fact as to whether the person or authority to whom the writ sought to be issued is located within or outside the territorial limits of the High Court. 25. We may pause at this stage and refer to Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which Mr. Jindal relies upon. This Section, while laying down the place of suing, reads as follows: 20. Others suits to be instituted where Defendants reside or cause of action arises: Subject to the limitations aforesaid, every suit shall be instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction- a) The Defendant, or each of the Defendants where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain; or b) Any of the Defendants, where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain, provided that in such case either the leave of the Court is given, or the Defendants who do not reside, or carry or business, or personally work for gain, as aforesaid, acquiesce in such institution; or c) The cause of action, wholly or in part, arises. 26. 26. From a careful reading of Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is clear that Section 20envisages three different conditions in which a suit will lie within the territorial jurisdiction of a Court. While Clause (a) and (b) of Section 20, inter alia, refer to a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the Defendant or Defendants reside or carry on business or personally work for gain, Clause (c) refers to a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the cause of action wholly or in part arises. 27. What follows from a minute scrutiny of Section 20 is that a suit can be instituted under Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 20, where the Defendant or Defendants reside or carry on business or personally work for gain; but Clause (c) determines the place of suit on the basis of the cause of action. From a careful reading of the provisions of Clause (2) of Article 226, which makes cause of action the basis for the High Court to assume territorial jurisdiction, it clearly follows that while considering the question as to whether a High Court will issue writ or not, it is not material as to whether the person or authority against whom the writ sought to be issued is located within the territorial limits of the High Court or not. What is material is that the cause of action must be shown to have arisen either wholly or in part within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court concerned in order to attract the jurisdiction of the High Court. Thus, the reference made by Mr. V.K. Jindal to the two cases, namely; Ladu Lal Jain (supra) and Patel Roadways Ltd., Bombay (supra) to show that since the Appellant Corporation herein carries on business within the State of Meghalaya, the Shillong Bench has the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the present writ petition is not really material unless it can be shown that the cause of action arose, wholly or in part, within the territorial limits of the Shillong Bench of the High Court. 28. It is also worth pointing out that apart from the fact that Mr. 28. It is also worth pointing out that apart from the fact that Mr. V.K. Jindal could not show that the Appellant Corporation carries on business within the State of Meghalaya, it is imperative to note that a writ cannot be issued to a person or authority located within the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court if the cause of action has not arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. In other words, it is not material for exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 as to where the residence or location of the person or authority to whom the writ, sought to be issued, is located; what is material is that the cause of action or a part thereof must arise within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, which opts to issue writ or any direction in the nature of writs as envisaged by Clause (1) of Article 226. 29. Bearing in mind what we have pointed out hereinabove, let us, now, determine as to what the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of the Shillong Bench of the Gauhati High Court is. 30. While dealing with the above aspect of the case, it is of immense importance to note that it is the North Eastern Areas (Reorganisation) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act of 1971"), which defines the common High Court for the States of Assam, Nagaland, Meghalaya and Tripura and also the jurisdiction of this common High Court. For the sake of convenience, we quote here-in-above me relevant provisions of the said Act of 1971: 28. Common High Court for Assam, Nagaland, Meghalaya, Manipur and Tripura- 1) On and from the appointed by: a) The High Court of Assam and Nagaland shall cease to function and is hereby abolished; b) There shall be a common High Court for the States of Assam, Nagaland, Meghalaya, Manipur and Tripura to be called the Gauhati High Court (the High Court of Assam, Nagaland, Meghalaya, Manipur and Tripura); c) The Judges of the High Court of Assam and Nagaland holding office immediately before that day shall, unless they have elected otherwise, become on that day the Judges of the Common High Court. 2) Nothing in Clause (a) of sub-Section (1) shall prejudice or affect the continued operation of any notice served, injunction issued, direction given or proceedings taken before the appointed day by the High Court of Assam and Nagaland under the powers then conferred upon that Court. 29. Jurisdiction of the Common High Court-On and from the appointed day, the common High Court shall have, in respect of the territories comprised in the States of Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Nagaland and Tripura, all such jurisdiction, powers and authority as under the law in force immediately before the appointed day, are exercisable in respect of those territories by the High Court of Assam and Nagaland or the Court of the Judicial Commissioner for Manipur, or the Court of the Judicial Commissioner for Tripura, as the case may be. 30. Abolition of certain Courts-(1) On and from the appointed day, Courts of the Judicial Commissioners for Manipur and Tripura shall cease to function and are hereby abolished. (2) Nothing in Sub-section (1) shall prejudice or after the continued operation of any notice served, injunction issued, direction given or proceedings taken before the appointed day by any of the Courts abolished by that Sub-section, under the powers then conferred upon that Court. 31. Principal seat and other places of sitting of the common High Court: (1) The principal seat of the common High Court shall be at the same place at which the principal seat of the High Court of Assam and Nagaland is located immediately before the appointed day. (2) The President may by notified order provide for the establishment of a permanent bench or benches of the common High Court at one or more places within the territories to which the jurisdiction of the High Court extends, other than the principal seat of the High Court, and for any matters connected therewith: Provided that before issuing any order under this Sub-section, the President shall consult the Chief Justice of the common High Court and the Governor of the State in which the bench or benches is or are proposed to be established. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2), the Judges and Division Courts of the common High Court may also sit at such other place or places in the State of Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Nagaland or Tripura as the Chief Justice may, with the approval of the Governor of the State concerned, appoint. 31. Though the State of Meghalaya came into existence as far back as on 21.01.1972, the permanent Bench, at Shillong, was established, as late as on 04.02.1995, by Notification issued in this regard in terms of Section 31(2) of the said Act of 1971. The relevant Notification reads as follows: NOTIFICATION In exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the State of Arunachal Pradesh Act, 1986 (69 of 1986), read with Sub-section (2) of Section 31 of the North-Eastern Areas (Reorganisation) Act, 1971 (81 of 1971) the President, after consultation with the Chief Justice of the Gauhati High Court and the Governor of Meghalaya, is pleased to make the following order, namely: 1. Short title and commencement: (1) This Order may be called the Gauhati High Court (Establishment of a permanent Bench at Shillong) Order, 1995. 2. It shall come into force on the 4th day of February, 1995. 2. Establishment of a permanent Bench of Gauhatti High Court at Shillong: Theft shall be established a permanent Bench of the Gauhati High Court at Shillong, and such Judges of the Gauhati High Court, being not less than two in number, as the Chief Justice of that High Court may, from time to time nominate, shall sit at Shillong in order to exercise the Jurisdiction and powers for the time being vested in the Gauhati High Court in respect of cases arising in the State of Meghalaya: Provided that the Chief Justice of that High Court may, in his discretion, order that any case or cases of cases arising in the State of Meghalaya shall be heard at Gauhati. 32. From a careful reading of Section 28 of the said Act of 1971, it is transparent that this High Court, which was earlier known as High Court of Assam and Nagaland, came to be abolished and this High Court became a common High Court for the States of Assam, Nagaland, Meghalaya, Manipur and fripura. 32. From a careful reading of Section 28 of the said Act of 1971, it is transparent that this High Court, which was earlier known as High Court of Assam and Nagaland, came to be abolished and this High Court became a common High Court for the States of Assam, Nagaland, Meghalaya, Manipur and fripura. To these States, however, came to be included, in course of time, the States of Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh. 33. In the light of the provisions contained in Section 29 of the said Act of 1971, it is also transparent that the common High Court, as envisaged in Section 28, shall have the same jurisdiction in respect of the territories of the States comprised therein as it had been exercising in the past as the High Court of Assam and Nagaland. 34. Sub-section (2) of Section 31 of the said Act of 1971 empowers the President to notify the establishment of a permanent Bench or Benches of the common High Court at one or more places. The question, now, is as to what will be the territorial jurisdiction of a permanent Bench of the common High Court located in any of the States? The answer to this vital question will really depend upon the presidential Notification issued under Section 31(2) of the said Act of 1971, for, Sub-section (2) of Section 31, in clear terms, empowers the President to establish, by notification, permanent Benches of common High Court. In a, somewhat, similar situation, when a question arose in State of Maharastra v. Narayan Shamrao Puranik ( AIR 1983 SC 46 ) if the Presidential Notification creating a permanent Bench would bring about a territorial bifurcation of the High Court, the Apex Court observed: it is clear upon the terms of Section 51 of the Act that undoubtedly the President has the power under Sub-section (1) to appoint the principal seat of the High Court for a new State. Likewise, the power of the President under Sub-section (2) thereof, after consultation with the Governor of a new State and the Chief Justice of the High Court for that State, pertains to the establishment of a permanent Bench or Benches of that High Court of a new State at one or more places within the State other than the place where the principal seat of the High Court is located and for any matters connected therewith' clearly confer power on the President to define the territorial jurisdiction of the permanent Bench in relation to the principal seat as also for the conferment of exclusive jurisdiction to such permanent Bench to hear cases arising in districts falling within its jurisdiction. The creation of a permanent Bench under Sub-section (2) of Section 51 of the Act must therefore bring about a territorial bifurcation of the High Court. 35. What the Supreme Court has laid down in Narayan Shamrao Puranik (supra) is that the President has the power to define the territorial jurisdiction of the permanent Bench in relation to the principal seat and that the creation of a permanent Bench will necessarily bring about a territorial bifurcation of the High Court. 36. Our quest for an answer to question as to what the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of the permanent Bench at Shillong are brings us to the Notification, dated 04.02.95, aforementioned, whereby a permanent Bench of the common High Court (which is presently known as the Gauhati High Court) came to be established at Shillong. Paragraph 2 of this Notification states, in no certain words, that the permanent Bench established, at Shillong, shall sit at Shillong in order to exercise jurisdiction and powers vested in the Gauhati High Court in respect of the cases arising in the State of Meghalaya. This clearly shows that the Shillong Bench can exercise jurisdiction and powers, which were available to the common High Court; but the exercise of such powers will be in respect of only those cases, which arise in the State of Meghalaya. In the light of what Article 226(2) conveys, it becomes abundantly clear that the expression "in respect of cases arising in the State of Meghalaya", occurring in the Notification, dated 04.04.1995, will mean the cases, wherein the cause of action have arisen, wholly or in part, within the State of Meghalaya. In the light of what Article 226(2) conveys, it becomes abundantly clear that the expression "in respect of cases arising in the State of Meghalaya", occurring in the Notification, dated 04.04.1995, will mean the cases, wherein the cause of action have arisen, wholly or in part, within the State of Meghalaya. It logically follows, therefore, that if no cause of action has arisen in a given case within the State of Meghalaya, the permanent Bench, at Shillong, cannot exercise jurisdiction in respect of such a matter. 37. Referring to the proviso to paragraph 2 of the Notification, dated 04.02.1995, aforementioned, which reads, "Provided that the Chief Justice of that High Court may, in his discretion, order that any case or class of cases arising in the State of Meghalaya shall be heard at Gauhati", Mr. V.K. Jindal has submitted, as already mentioned hereinabove, that the proviso to paragraph 2 of the said Notification shows that the Chief Justice of the High Court may, in his discretion, order that any case or class of cases arising in the State of Meghalaya shall be heard at Gauhati and this, in turn, means, according to Mr. Jindal, that High Court sitting at Shillong Bench cannot return the present writ petition to the Petitioner with direction to present it before the Court of competent jurisdiction, for, it is the Chief Justice, who can direct that the writ petition be returned for being presented at the appropriate Bench. There is, to our mind, inherent fallacy in the submissions so made by Mr. Jindal. What needs to be borne in mind is that it is a cardinal rule of interpretation that a proviso to a particular provision of a statute only embraces the field, which is covered by the main provision. It carves out an exception to the main provision to which it has been enacted. The proper function of a proviso, lays down the Apex Court in Tribhovandas Haribhai Tamboli v. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal and Ors., reported in (1991) 3 SCC 442 , is to except and deal with a case, which, otherwise, falls within the general language of the main enactment and its effect has to be kept confined to that case only. The proper function of a proviso, lays down the Apex Court in Tribhovandas Haribhai Tamboli v. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal and Ors., reported in (1991) 3 SCC 442 , is to except and deal with a case, which, otherwise, falls within the general language of the main enactment and its effect has to be kept confined to that case only. Where the language of the main enactment is explicit and unambiguous, reminds the Supreme Court in Tribhovandas Haribhai Tamboli (supra), the proviso can have no repercussion on the interpretation of the main enactment, so as to exclude from it, by implication what clearly falls within its express terms. The scope of the proviso, therefore, is to carve out an exception to the main enactment and it excludes something, which otherwise would have been within the rule. It has to operate in the same field and if the language of the main enactment is clear, the proviso cannot be torn apart from the main enactment nor can it be used to nullify, by implication, what the enactment clearly says nor set at naught the real object of the main enactment. 38. If, on a fair construction, the principal provision is clear, a proviso cannot expand or limit it. Sometimes, a proviso is engrafted by an apprehensive draftsman to remove possible doubts, to make matters plain, to light up ambiguous edges. In Dwarka Prassad v. Dwarka Das Sharaf ( AIR 1975 SC 1758 ), the Apex Court, while dealing with the scope of aproviso, laid down as follows: The law is trite. A proviso must be limited to the subject matter of the enacting clause. It is settled rule of construction that a proviso must prima facie be read and considered in relation to the principal matter to which it is a proviso. It is not a separate or independent enactment. 'Words are dependent on the principal enacting words, to which they are tacked as a proviso. They cannot be read as divorced from their context' (1912 AC 544). If the rule of construction is that prima facie a proviso should be limited in its operation to the subject-matter of the enacting clause, the stand we have taken is sound. 'Words are dependent on the principal enacting words, to which they are tacked as a proviso. They cannot be read as divorced from their context' (1912 AC 544). If the rule of construction is that prima facie a proviso should be limited in its operation to the subject-matter of the enacting clause, the stand we have taken is sound. To expand the enacting clause, inflated by the proviso, sins against the fundamental rule of construction that a proviso must be considered in relation to the principal matter to which it stands as a proviso. A proviso ordinarily is but a proviso, although the golden rule is to read the whole Section, inclusive of the proviso, in such manner that they mutually throw light on each other and result in a harmonious construction. 39. What surfaces from the above discus sion as regards the scope of aproviso is that the proviso appended to paragraph 2 of the Notification aforementioned merely carves out an exception to the main provision to which it has been enacted. When the language of the main enactment i.e. of paragraph 2 is explicit and unambiguous, the proviso can have no repercussion on the interpretation of the main enactment. The proviso has to operate in the same field in which the main enactment, i.e. paragraph 2 operates. A careful reading of the proviso to paragraph 2 clearly reveals that the Chief Justice may, in his discretion, order that any case or class of cases arising in the State of Meghalaya be heard at Gauhati. This, in turn, implies that the Chief Justice can direct a case or class of cases to be heard at Gauhati provided that the case has legally and constitutionally arisen within the State of Meghalaya. If, in a given case, no cause of action has arisen within the State of Meghalaya, paragraph 2 of the Notification will not be attracted and, consequently, the question of applying the proviso to paragraph 2 or of taking recourse to paragraph 2 will not arise at all. To put it differently, if a case has not arisen, in accordance with law, within the State of Meghalaya, the permanent Bench at Shillong will have no jurisdiction and by taking recourse to the proviso to paragraph 2 of the Notification aforementioned, the Chief Justice cannot direct that the matter be heard at Gauhati. To put it differently, if a case has not arisen, in accordance with law, within the State of Meghalaya, the permanent Bench at Shillong will have no jurisdiction and by taking recourse to the proviso to paragraph 2 of the Notification aforementioned, the Chief Justice cannot direct that the matter be heard at Gauhati. The power given to the Chief Justice under the said proviso will come into play only when a case has legally arisen within the State of Meghalaya. The question as to whether the case has legally arisen within the State of Meghalaya is a question, which has to be answered judicially and cannot be decided administratively by the Chief Justice. Hence, it is the Judge or Judges hearing the matter, who will have the power to determine as to whether a case has arisen within the State of Meghalaya or not in order to attract the jurisdiction of a Bench of the common High Court. 40. A question, in fact, arose in the High Court of Rajasthan as to whether, despite the Presidential Notification establishing a permanent Bench of a High Court of Rajasthan at Jaipur, the Chief Justice of the High Court can, thereafter, artificially or indirectly, take away the jurisdiction belonging to Jaipur Bench of the High Court or/and confer the same on the Principal Seat of the High Court, at Jodhpur, by taking recourse to the proviso to the relevant Notification, which is parameteria with the proviso to paragraph 2 of the Notification, dated 04.02.95, which is presently under our consideration. 41. Repelling the contention that taking recourse to the proviso in question, the Chief Justice could take away the jurisdiction from one Bench of the High Court and confer it on the other, the Apex Court observed in Rajasthan High Court Advocates' Association v. Union of India and Ors. reported in (2001) 2 SCC 294 , as follows: The Presidential Order having established a permanent Bench of the High Court of Rajasthan at Jaipur and having appointed the lrunimum number of Judges as would sit at Jaipur proceeded to declare that the permanent Bench seat at Jaipur shall exercise the jurisdiction and power for the time being vested in the High Court in respect of cases arising in the districts, 11 in number, as mentioned therein. A discretionary jurisdiction is also conferred on the Chief Justice of the High Court to order that any case or class of cases arising in any district forming part of territorial jurisdiction of the permanent Bench at Jaipur shall be heard at Jodhpur (principal seat). The Presidential Order is clear. The jurisdiction allocated to the permanent Bench at Jaipur is by reference to territory covered by the 11 specified districts. The proviso appended to para 2 of the Presidential Order speaks of "any case or class of cases" but therefrom too, a power in the Chief Justice to define cause of action cannot be spelled out. The nature and extent of power conferred on the President by Section 51 of the Act came up for the consideration of this Court in State of Maharashtra v. Narayan Shamrao Puranik (1982) 3 SCC 519 : AIR 1983 SC 46 ). It was held: 25. It is clear upon the terms of Section 51 of the Act that undoubtedly the President has the power under Sub-section (1) to appoint the principal seat of the High Court for a new State. Likewise, the power of the President under Sub-section (2) thereof, after consultation with the Governor of a new State and the Chief Justice of the High Court for that State, pertains to the establishment of a permanent Bench or Benches of that High Court of a new State at one or more places within the State other than the place where the principal seat of the High Court is located and for any matters connected therewith' clearly confer power on the President to define the territorial jurisdiction of the permanent Bench in relation to the principal seat as also for the conferment of exclusive jurisdiction to such permanent Bench to hear cases arising in districts falling within its jurisdiction. The creation of a permanent Bench under Sub-section (2) of Section51 of the Act must therefore bring about a territorial bifurcation of the High Court. The establishment of a permanent Bench at Jaipur and defining its territorial jurisdiction brought out bifurcation of the State of Rajasthan into two for the purpose of division of territorial jurisdiction of the High Court between the principal seat and the permanent Bench seat. The Chief Justice of the State cannot, thereafter, artificially or indirectly take away the jurisdiction belonging to one and confer it on the other. The Chief Justice of the State cannot, thereafter, artificially or indirectly take away the jurisdiction belonging to one and confer it on the other. Conferring a discretion on the Chief Justice to order any case or class of cases arising in any district within the territorial jurisdiction of permanent Bench at Jaipur shall be heard at Jodhpur cannot spell out a power to define where the cause of action shall be deemed to have arisen in a writ case. 42. Reiterating the broad principle that it is depending upon the answer to the question as to whether the cause of action or the part thereof has arisen that a Bench of the High Court can exercise writ jurisdiction, the Apex Court observed in Rajasthan High Court Advocates' Association (supra) as follows: The purpose of the Presidential Order is to carve out and define territorial jurisdiction between the principal seat at Jodhpur and the permanent Bench seat at Jaipur. The cases are to be heard accordingly, unless the Chief Justice may exercise in his discretion the power vested in him by the proviso to para 2 of the Presidential Order. Clauses (1) and (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution provide how territorial jurisdiction shall be exercised by any High Court. Although the said clauses do not deal with principal seat or permanent Bench of any High Court but in our opinion, there is no reason why the principle underlying thereunder cannot be applied to the functioning of the bifurcated territorial jurisdiction between the principal seat and permanent Bench seat of any High Court. In case of a dispute arising whether an individual case or cases should be filed and heard at Jodhpur or Jaipur, the same has to be found out by applying the test from which district the case arises, that is, in which district the cause of action can be said to have arisen and then exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 43. 43. Emphasizing that it is by applying the test as to where the cause of action has arisen that the jurisdiction of a Bench of a High Court can be ascertained, the Apex Court further observed in Raj asthan High Court Advocates' Association (supra) thus: In case of a dispute arising whether an individual case or cases should be filed and heard at Jodhpur or Jaipur, the same has to be found out by applying the test from which district the case arises, that is, in which district the cause of action can be said to have arisen and then exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 44. In Rajasthan High Court Advocates' Association (supra), the Apex Court laid down, in unambiguous words: The Chief Justice of the High Court has not been conferred with the legislative competence to define cause of action or to declare where it would be deemed to have arisen so as to lay down artificial or deeming test for determining territorial jurisdiction over an individual case or class of cases. The permanent Bench at Jaipur has been established by the Presidential Order issued under Sub-section (2) of Section 51 of the Act. The territorial jurisdiction of the permanent Bench at Jaipur is to be exercised in respect of the cases arising in the specified districts. Whether the case arises from one of the specified districts or not so as to determine the jurisdictional competence to hear by reference to territory bifurcated between the principal seat and the Bench seat, shall be an issue to be decided in an individual case by the Judge or Judges hearing the matter if a question may arise in that regard. The impugned explanation appended to the order of the Chief Justice dated 23.12.1976 runs counter to the Presidential Order and in a sense it is an inroad into the jurisdiction of the Judges hearing a particular case or cases, preempting a decision to be given in the facts of individual case whether it can be said to have arisen in the territory of a particular district. The High Court-fs right in taking the view which it has done. 45. The High Court-fs right in taking the view which it has done. 45. Thus, it is clear from the case of Rajasthan High Court Advocates' Association (supra) that the Chief Justice of the High Court is not competent to define cause of action or to declare where the cause of action, wholly or in part, has arisen so as to lay down artificial or deeming test for determining territorial jurisdiction over an individual case or class of cases. The permanent Bench, at Shillong, has been established by the said Presidential Order issued under Sub-section (2) of Section31 of the said Act of 1971. The territorial jurisdiction of the permanent Bench at Shillong has to be exercised in respect of the cases arising within the territorial limits of the State of Meghalaya. Whether a case has arisen within the territorial limits of the permanent Bench, at Shillong, shall be an issue to be decided in an individual case by the Judge or Judges hearing the matter. 46. What crystallises from the above discussion is that under the Presidential Notification, dated 04.02.95, aforementioned, the Shillong Bench of the Gauhati High Court shall exercise jurisdiction to issue writ under Article 226 only when the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises within the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of the State of Meghalaya. If the cause of action does not arise within the State of Meghalaya, the Shillong Bench shall have no jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition under Article 226. The mere fact that the Chief Justice has the power to withdraw a case from the Shillong Bench for the purpose of its hearing, at Guwahati, does not mean that if no cause of action has arisen within the State of Meghalaya, a writ petition can still be filed at Meghalaya and the Chief Justice can, at his discretion, withdraw such a writ petition and fix it for hearing at the Principal Seat at Guwahati. The proviso to paragraph 2 of Notification, dated 04.02.1995, aforementioned being an exception to the general power of the High Court at the Shillong Bench indicates that when a validity instituted case has arisen at the Shillong Bench, the Chief Justice can withdraw such a case from the Shillong Bench and can direct that the matter be heard at the Principal Seat at Guwahati. This does not, however, mean, we must emphasise, that if cause of action either wholly or in part has not arisen in a given case within the State of Meghalaya and no case has been validly instituted at the Shillong Bench, the High Court, at Shillong Bench, can entertain such a writ petition under Article 226merely on the ground that the Chief Justice may, in his discretion, in exercise of the powers contained in the proviso aforementioned, withdraw such a case to the Principal Seat at Guwahati for hearing. 47. What follows, as a corollary from the above discussion is that it is the permanent Bench at Shillong, which has to decide whether a cause of action in a given case has arisen or not within the territorial limits of the State of Meghalaya and if it is found by this Division Bench that the cause of action, in the present case, has not arisen, wholly or in part, within the State of Meghalaya, the permanent bench at Shillong will have no jurisdiction to entertain such a writ petition or give relief to the parties concerned. 48. As regards the reference made by Mr. V.K. Jindal to the case of Town House Building Co-op. Spl. Dy. Commr. (FB), reported in AIR 1988 Knt. 212, we must point out that we find the decision in Town House Bulding Co-op. Spl. Dy. Commr. (FB) (supra) wholly inapplicable to the case at hand inasmuch as the case of Town House Building Co-op. Spl. Dy. Commr. (FB) (supra) is the case, which deals with the effect of an order passed by a single Bench or a Bench of two or more Judges. What Town House Building Co-op. Dy. Commr. (FB) (supra) lays down is that irrespective of the fact as to whether an order has been passed by a single Judge or by a Bench of two or more Judges, the order would be treated as an order passed by the High Court, for, the High Court is one entity. The decision in Town House Building Co-op. Spl. Dy. Commr. (FB) (supra) does not deal with the question as to what the jurisdiction and/or powers of a permanent Bench will be in the context of other Benches and/or in relation to the Principal Seat of a common High Court. 49. Though Mr. The decision in Town House Building Co-op. Spl. Dy. Commr. (FB) (supra) does not deal with the question as to what the jurisdiction and/or powers of a permanent Bench will be in the context of other Benches and/or in relation to the Principal Seat of a common High Court. 49. Though Mr. Jindal, we may point out here, has also referred to State of Manipur and Ors. v. L. Shyamsunder, reported in 2002 (3) GLT 701 to support his submission that it is the Chief Justice, who can, on the administrative side, pass necessary order (s) transferring a case from one Bench of the High Court to Anr. Bench thereof and, hence, this Division Bench is not competent to return the writ petition to the writ Petitioner if the writ petition is found by this Bench to have been instituted and entertained at Shillong Bench without jurisdiction, suffice it to point out here that what L. Shyamsunder (supra) lays down is that a puisne Judge cannot "pick and Choose" cases pending in the High Court and assign them for disposal by some other Judge or by himself, for, it is the prerogative of the Chief Justice to fix the roster, distribute business and transfer cases from one Bench to Anr. The case of L. Shyamsunder (supra) has no relevance to the facts of the case at hand, because this Division Bench, if finds that the Shillong Bench has no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition, can direct the writ petition to be returned to the writ Petitioner and it will be, then, for the writ Petitioner to present the writ petition at the appropriate Bench and if the writ petition is presented at the appropriate Bench, it will be for the Registry of the Bench, where the writ petition will be so presented, to deal with the writ petition is accordance with the relevant rules. Since the return of the writ petition will not amount to transfer of the writ petition from the Shillong Bench to the Principal Seat or any other Bench, the question of this Division Bench usurping the power of the Chief Justice under paragraph 2 of the Notification aforementioned does not arise at all. Since the return of the writ petition will not amount to transfer of the writ petition from the Shillong Bench to the Principal Seat or any other Bench, the question of this Division Bench usurping the power of the Chief Justice under paragraph 2 of the Notification aforementioned does not arise at all. We are also helped and guided to adopt this view from the observations made in Rajasthan High Court Advocates' Association (supra), which run as follows: Roster is framed generally by identifying a particular subject-matter or nature of cases which will be listed for hearing before different Benches consistently with the rules of business of the Court. Thereafter listing of cases is to be done by the Registrar in routine. Power to frame a roster vests the Chief Justice with an administrative control over the distribution of judicial work of the Court. It has nothing to do with how a Judge would then judicially function in dealing with a case listed before him as per roster. A writ case when listed before a Judge for hearing as per roster may be heard or refused to be heard by him depending on his opinion formed on the judicial side on the question whether the cause of action in that case arises within the territorial jurisdiction of the Bench seat or not. Whether or not a case arises in a district lying within the jurisdiction of bench seat-is a question to be decided judicially, in case to case, and not by an administrative order of the Chief Justice made generally. 50. Having settled the position of law that no writ petition can be entertained at Shillong Bench under Article 226 if the cause of action has not wholly or partly arisen within the State of Meghalaya, let us, now, turn to the question as to whether any cause of action arose within the State of Meghalaya, in the case at hand, in order to attract jurisdiction of the Shillong Bench of the High Court. 51. While dealing with the above aspect of the matter, it is pertinent to point out as to what the cause of action really means. 52. Cause of action implies aright to sue. The material facts, which are imperative for the suitor to allege and prove constitute the cause of action. Cause of action is not defined in any statute. 51. While dealing with the above aspect of the matter, it is pertinent to point out as to what the cause of action really means. 52. Cause of action implies aright to sue. The material facts, which are imperative for the suitor to allege and prove constitute the cause of action. Cause of action is not defined in any statute. It has, however, been judicially interpreted, inter alia, to mean every fact, which would be necessary for the Plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. Negatively put, it would mean that everything which, if not proved, gives the Defendant an immediate right to judgment, would form part of cause of action, (see Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India, reported in (2004) 6 SCC 254 ). 53. The cause of action has no relation whatever to the defence which may be set up by the Defendant, nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the Plaintiff. It refers entirely to the grounds set forth in the plaint as the cause of action, or, in other words, to the media upon which the Plaintiff asks the court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour. (See Chand Kour v. Partab Singh reported in 1887 15 JA 156 54. In Utpal Kumar Basu (supra), the Supreme Court has made it clear that the answer to the question as to whether the Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition must be arrived at on the basis of averments made in the petition, the truth or otherwise thereof being immaterial, for, in Utpal Kumar Basu (supra) observed the Apex Court thus: Therefore, in determining the objection of lack of territorial jurisdiction the Court must take all the facts pleaded in support of the cause of action into consideration albeit without embarking upon an enquiry as to the correctness or otherwise of the said facts. In other words, the question whether a High Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition must be answered on the basis of the averments made in the petition, the truth or otherwise whereof being immaterial. To put differently, the question of territorial jurisdiction must be decided on the facts pleaded in the petition. In other words, the question whether a High Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition must be answered on the basis of the averments made in the petition, the truth or otherwise whereof being immaterial. To put differently, the question of territorial jurisdiction must be decided on the facts pleaded in the petition. Therefore, the question whether in the instant case the Calcutta High Court had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the writ petition in question even on the facts alleged must depend upon whether the averments made in paragraphs 5, 7, 18, 22, 26 and 43 are sufficient in law to establish that a part of the cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. 55. What becomes transparent from the above discussion is that the expression "cause of action" means a bundle of facts, which, if traversed, a Plaintiff must prove to entitle him to receive a judgment in his favour. The cause of action bears no relation to the defence, which may be set up by the Defendant, nor does it depend upon the character of the relief (s) sought for. The cause of action is nothing, but the media upon which the Plaintiff or the Petitioner seeks the Court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour. For determining, therefore, the question as to whether the Court has territorial jurisdiction, the Court must take into account all the facts pleaded in support of the cause of action without, however, embarking upon an enquiry as to the correctness or otherwise of the facts pleaded. Thus, the question as to whether a High Court has tenitorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition must be answered on the basis of the avertments made in the writ petition, the truth or otherwise, where of being immaterial. (See Nabinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2002) 7 SCC 640 56. In the light of what is indicated by the Apex Court in Utpal Kumar Basu (supra) and Navinchandra N. Majithia (supra), it is more than clear that any controversy in a writ petition with regard to territorial jurisdiction has to be settled by the High Court on the basis of the facts pleaded in support of the cause of action without, of course, embarking upon an enquiry as to whether the facts pleaded are correct or not. 57. 57. Taking note of position of law governing the limits of territorial jurisdiction of a H igh Court or its Bench and also bearing in mind as to what a cause of action means, when we look into the pleadings in the present writ petition, we find that the clear avertments of the writ Petitioner is that the NIT, in question, was issued, on 8.1.2005, by the Appellant Corporation from their office at Jagiroad, in the district of Morigaon, which falls, admittedly, within the State of Assam. The NTT was, admittedly, meant for issuing orders for collection of bamboo dust manually from the premises of the Appellant Corporation located at Jagiroad; in response to the NIT, the Petitioner Company alongwith many Ors. submitted its tender at Jagiroad and the tenders were opened in the presence of all concerned including the representative of the writ Petitioner at Jagiroad. 58. In the above backdrop, it needs to be noted that it is the allegation of the Petitioner Company that though the Respondent No. 3, namely, M/s Kiran Enterprise did not submit valid tender, the Appellant Corporation is bent upon issuing disposal order in favour of M/s Kiran Enterprise. From a careful reading of the avertments so made in the writ petition, there can be no escape from the conclusion that the cause of action arose entirely at the premises of the Appellant Corporation at Jagiroad, which falls within the State of Assam and beyond the territorial limits of the State of Meghalaya. Situated thus, there can be no escape from the conclusion that no cause of action or any part thereof arose within the State of Meghalaya. It, therefore, logically follows that the Shillong Bench of the Gauhati High Court lacked tenitorial jurisdiction to entertain the present writ petition. 59. We must, however, bear in mind that even if a small part of cause of action arises within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, the same by itself may not be considered to be a determinative factor compelling the High Court to decide the matter on merit. In appropriate cases, the Court may refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction by invoking the doctrine of forum convenience. [See Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India, reported in (2004) 6 SCC 254 ]. 60. We may pause, at this stage, to point out that though it has been submitted by Mr. In appropriate cases, the Court may refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction by invoking the doctrine of forum convenience. [See Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India, reported in (2004) 6 SCC 254 ]. 60. We may pause, at this stage, to point out that though it has been submitted by Mr. A.K. Phukan, learned Senior counsel appearing for the Appellant Corporation that according to the terms of the NIT, the Courts at Morigaon will have the jurisdiction, what needs to be noted, in this regard, is that when a suit is possible to be instituted at more than one place, it is for the Plaintiff to decide as to where it would be instituting a suit. If a suit is possible to be instituted at more than one place, the parties to the suit may agree to give jurisdictionto one of the courts, which is, otherwise, competent to entertain the suit. (See ABC Laminart (P) Ltd. and Anr. v. A.P. Agencies Salem, ( AIR 1989 SC 1239 ). The discretion of the parties, in a civil suit, is governed by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. So far as the High Court's power to issue writs are concerned, its territorial jurisdiction is governed by Clause (2) of Article 226 and, hence, any agreement by the parties as to where a suit would lie, will not oust the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 if the cause of action or any part thereof arises within the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of the High Court, for, the Code of Civil Procedure or any other statute cannot, as indicated in the case of Saka Venkata Subba Rao (supra), either confer on the High Court or take away from the High Court the jurisdiction inasmuch as the legislature cannot alter, modify or supercede, with the help of a statute, the provisions of the Constitution, particularly, the provisions of Article 226, which have been held to be forming part of the basic structure of the Constitution. (See L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 ). 61. We may also pause here to points out that in New Moga Transport Co. Through its Proprietor Krishan Lal Jhanwar v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors., reported in (2004) 4 SCC 677 , the Supreme Court has observed as follows: ... (See L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 ). 61. We may also pause here to points out that in New Moga Transport Co. Through its Proprietor Krishan Lal Jhanwar v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors., reported in (2004) 4 SCC 677 , the Supreme Court has observed as follows: ... By a long series of decisions, it has been held that where two courts or more have jurisdiction under Code of Civil Procedure to try a suit or proceeding, an agreement between the parties that the dispute between them shall be tried in any one of such courts is not contrary to public policy and in no way contravenes Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. Therefore, if on the facts of a given case more than one court has jurisdiction, parties by their consent may limit the jurisdiction to one of the two courts. But by an agreement parties cannot confer jurisdiction on a court which otherwise does not have jurisdiction to deal with a matter (See Hakam Singh v. Gammon (India) Ltd. and Shriram City Union Finance Corporation Ltd. v. Rama Mishra). 62. What follows from the decision in New Transport Company (supra) is that the parties cannot confer jurisdiction on a Court, which does not, otherwise, have jurisdiction. Hence, if the Shillong Bench does not have jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition, even the parties cannot confer jurisdiction on the Shillong Bench. 63. It has been submitted by Mr. V.K. Jindal that under Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the appellate or revisional court cannot interfere if the trial court has assumed jurisdiction to try the suit unless there has been failure of justice. Reliance in support of this submission has been placed by Mr. Jindal on Pathumma (supra). 64. It is true that referring to Sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Supreme Court laid down in Pathumma (supra) as follows: 5. In order that an objection to the place of suing may be entertained by an appellate or revisional court, the fulfilment of the following three conditions is essential: (1) The objection was taken in the court of first instance. (2) It was taken at the earliest possible opportunity and in cases where issues are settled, at or before such settlement. In order that an objection to the place of suing may be entertained by an appellate or revisional court, the fulfilment of the following three conditions is essential: (1) The objection was taken in the court of first instance. (2) It was taken at the earliest possible opportunity and in cases where issues are settled, at or before such settlement. (3) There has been a consequent failure of justice. 6. All these three conditions must co-exist. Now in the present case Conditions 1 and 2 are no doubt fully satisfied; but then before the two appellate courts below could allow the objection to be taken, it was further necessary that a case of failure of justice on account of the place of suing having been wrongly selected was made out. Not only was no attention paid to this aspect of the matter but no material exists on the record from which such failure of justice may be inferred. 65. It is, no doubt, true that the Apex Court in Pattumma (supra) has held that be-fore the appellate or revisional Court interferes with an order passed by the trial Court assuming jurisdiction in a civil suit, the appellate or revisional Court, as the case may be, must be satisfied that all the three conditions above mentioned co-exist and that these conditions include that the appellate Corporation Court must be satisfied that the failure of justice has been caused on account of assumption of jurisdiction by the trial court which had no jurisdiction to try the suit. In other words, even if a suit is instituted in a court, which has no jurisdiction to try the suit, yet, if the trial court has assumed the jurisdiction, the appellate or the revisional court will not interment with the assumption of jurisdiction by the trial court unless the objection has been taken at the first instance and where issues have been framed, at or before the settlement of the issue, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice. If the assumption of jurisdiction in itself has caused no injustice, interference with the trial court's discretion to assume jurisdiction is not permissible. 66. The question, now, is as to whether the principles underlined in Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure can be entirely applied to the case of a High Court entertaining writ petition under Article 226. If the assumption of jurisdiction in itself has caused no injustice, interference with the trial court's discretion to assume jurisdiction is not permissible. 66. The question, now, is as to whether the principles underlined in Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure can be entirely applied to the case of a High Court entertaining writ petition under Article 226. We have already indicated hereinabove that no statute can override the constitutional provisions, particularly, the constitutional provisions relating to Article 226 and/or Article 226 of the Constitution. Hence, when the Constitution has made it a condition precedent for the High Court to exercise jurisdiction only if the cause of action has arisen wholly or in part within the territorial limits of the High Court, the assumption of jurisdiction by a High Court, where it has no jurisdiction, will not be sustainable even if no consequent failure of justice on account of assumption of jurisdiction by the High Court is shown to have taken place. To put it differently, if the cause of action or any part thereof has not arisen within the State of Meghalaya, the question of not interfering with the assumption of jurisdiction by the learned Single Judge does not arise, for, whether there is failure of justice or not, the assumption of jurisdiction is beyond the constitutionally permissible limits and cannot, therefore, be allowed to stand good on record. 67. The reference made by Mr. 67. The reference made by Mr. Jindal to the case of Tractor and Farm Equipment Limited (supra) to show that a Division Bench will not interfere, in a writ appeal, with the exercise of discretion by a Single Judge is also misplaced, for, it needs to be pointed out, in this regard, that what Tractor and Farm Equipment Ltd. (supra) has laid down is that a writ appeal is really not a statutory appeal preferred against the judgment and order of an inferior Court to the superior Court and unlike an appeal, in general, a writ appeal is an appeal on principle and that is why, unlike an appeal in an ordinary sense, such as a criminal appeal, where the whole evidence on record is examined a new by the appellate Court, what is really examined, in a writ appeal, is the legality and validity of the judgment and/or order of the Single Judge and it can be set aside or should be set aside only when there is a patent error on the fact of the record or the judgment is against the established or settled principles of law and if two views are possible and a view, which is reasonable and logical, has been adopted by a Single Judge, the same should, normally, be allowed to prevail. 68. The observations made in Tractor and Farm Equipment Ltd. (supra) clearly show that in a given case, when two views are possible and a single Judge, while dealing with a writ petition, adopts one view, the Division Bench will not opt for the other view; but if the single Judge's order suffers from patent error of fact or is against the settled principles of law, then, interference with such an order will not only be desirable, but imperative. 69. On account of the insistence of the Petitioner Company that since the learned single Judge has assured jurisdiction in the present case, this Court should not interfere, we are tempted to, once again, refer to Utpal Kumar Basu (supra), wherein compelled by the circumstances, the Apex Court reminded us thus: ...It must be remembered that the image and prestige of a court depends on how the members of that institution conduct themselves. If an impression gains ground that even in cases which fall outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Court, certain members of the court would be willing to exercise jurisdiction on the plea that some event, however trivial and unconnected with the cause of action had occurred within the jurisdiction of the said court, litigants would seek to abuse the process by carrying the cause before such members giving rise to avoidable suspicion. That would lower the dignity of the institution and put the entire system to redicule. We are greatly pained to say so but if we do not strongly deprecate the growing tendency we will, we are afraid, be failing in our duty to the institution and the system of administration of justice. We do hope that we will not have Anr. occasion to deal with such a situation. 70. We do not have even a lurking doubt in our mind that in the case at hand, the cause of auction having not arisen within the State of Meghalaya, the permanent Bench, at Shillong, had no jurisdiction to entertain the present writ petition. The entertaining of the writ petition and passing of the impugned interim order were wholly without jurisdiction and since such an order can have no force of law, the Division Bench has no option, but to interfere with the same. The impugned interim order, thus, being palpably without jurisdiction, cannot be allowed to stand good on record, for, any hesitation, in this regard, on the part of the Division Bench, may cause serious miscarriage of justice and is not permissible under the law. 71. In the result and for the foregoing reasons, we allow this appeal, set aside and quash the impugned order, 16.03.05, aforementioned and direct the Registry at the Shillong Bench to return the writ petition, in question, to the writ Petitioner by making necessary endorsement in this regard on the body of writ petition permitting the writ Petitioner to present the writ petition at the appropriate Bench. 72. With the above observations and directions, this writ appeal shall stand disposed of.