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2005 DIGILAW 346 (HP)

GURBACHAN SINGH v. RAVINDER NATH BHALLA

2005-09-15

V.M.JAIN

body2005
JUDGEMENT V.M. Jain, J.: This Revision Petition has been filed by the tenant-petitioner against the order dated 6.5.2005 passed by the Appellate Authority, Solan, whereby the appeal filed by the landlords was accepted, the order dated 23.8.2001 passed by the Rent Controller was modified and order of eviction was passed in favour of the landlords and against the tenant, on the grounds of arrears of rent, ceased to occupy and bonafide requirement of the landlords. 2. The facts which are relevant for the decision of the present revision petition are that landlords Ravinder Nath Bhalla etc. had filed a petition under Section 14 of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as the act) against Gurbachan Singh, Lambardar (tenant), seeking his ejectment form the demised premises consisting of three rooms, bath room, kitchen and latrine situated at Kasauli District Solan, (H.P). It was alleged in the petition that the tenant was in the arrears of rent with effect from September, 1989 onwards at the rate of Rs.300/-p.m. in addition to the statutory increase in rent Besides seeking ejectment of the tenant on the ground of non payment of rent, the landlords also sought the eviction of the tenant from the demised premises on the ground that the tenant had ceased to occupy the premises since July, 1988 continuously i.e. for more than 12 months, it was also alleged that the landlords required the demised premises bonafide for their won use and occupation, inasmuch as they have large number of family members and the accommodation with them at Kasauli was insufficient and some times they have to stay in hotels and guest houses when they visit Kasauli, since sufficient accommodation is not available for them in the building in question. 3. The said petition was contested by the tenant, by filing the reply, denying that the demised premises was on rent with him on a monthly rent of Rs.300/-. On the other hand, it was pleaded that the rent for the demised premises was Rs.1500/- per year and that rent had been paid upto 30.4.1996 to the tune of Rs.7650/-in the Court. It was alleged that rent was also paid in the previous petition in the Court and thereafter rent has been paid in the present petition. It was further alleged that the premises are "being used and the lock is not there". It was alleged that rent was also paid in the previous petition in the Court and thereafter rent has been paid in the present petition. It was further alleged that the premises are "being used and the lock is not there". It was also alleged that "the premises are under use. "It was further alleged that no person live here and the petition is only for getting the rent increased and that the other accommodation with the petitioners was more than desirable. 4.After hearing both the sides and perusing the record, the learned Rent Controller ordered the eviction of the tenant form the demised premises only on ground of non payment of rent, with the stipulation that in case the arrears of rent were deposited in the Court within 30 days the tenant will not be evicted from the demised premises. Dissatisfied with the order passed by the rent Controller, the landlords filed an appeal. The learned Appellant Authority after hearing both sides and perusing the record accepted the appeal of the landlords, modified the order of the Rent Controller and ordered the eviction of the tenant from the demised premises on the grounds of arrears of rent, ceased to occupy and bonafide requirement, with the stipulation that the said order of eviction shall not be executed on the ground of non payment of rent in case the arrears of rent, were deposited by the tenant within 30 days of the passing of the said order. Aggrieved against the order of eviction, passed by the learned Appellate Authority, the tenant filed the present revision petition in this Court. 5. The landlords had put in appearance through their counsel by filing caveat. The records were requisitioned. 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parities and have gone through the records carefully. 7. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-tenant submitted before me that the learned Appellate Authority had erred in law in ordering the eviction of the tenant on the grounds of ceased to occupy and bonafide requirement of the landlords. It was submitted that under Sections 14 of the Act a tenant could be ordered to be evicted from the demised premises on the ground of ceased to occupy only if the tenant had ceased to occupy the building for a continuous period of 12 months without reasonable cause. It was submitted that under Sections 14 of the Act a tenant could be ordered to be evicted from the demised premises on the ground of ceased to occupy only if the tenant had ceased to occupy the building for a continuous period of 12 months without reasonable cause. It was submitted that in the present case, the landlords had failed to prove the petitioner tenant has ceased to occupy the demised premises for a continued period of 12 months without reasonable cause. It was further submitted that the Appellate Authority had also erred in law holding that the landlords required the premises bonafide for their own use. 8. However, I find no force in these submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant. As referred to above, under Section 14(2)(v) of the Act a tenant is liable to be evicted from the demised premises if the tenant had ceased to occupy the building for a continuous period of 12 months without reasonable cause. In the present case, after continuous period of 12 months without reasonable cause. In the present case, after considering the entire evidence led by the parties, it was found by the learned Appellate Authority that the tenant had ceased to occupy the premises for a continuous period of 12 months without any reasonable cause. While coming to this conclusion it was noticed by the learned Appellate Authority that there was no consumption of electricity in the premises in dispute during the period from July 1988 to June, 1999 except for the period January, 1989 when the consumption of 40 units was shown and this fact led to the inference that the tenant was not residing in the premises during the said period. It was found that infact the meter of the tenant having been installed inside the premises and the premises being locked from outside, the Meter Reader was not able to obtain the reading. It was found that the occasional visits by the tenant would amount to non-occupation. It was also found that the tenant was not in continuous possession of the premises. The learned Appellate Authority had also placed reliance on testimony of PW-1 Vijender Bhalla, one of the landlords, who had testified that the tenant had ceased to occupy the premises since July, 1988 and the premises had remained locked for a continuous period of more than 1 V2 years. The learned Appellate Authority had also placed reliance on testimony of PW-1 Vijender Bhalla, one of the landlords, who had testified that the tenant had ceased to occupy the premises since July, 1988 and the premises had remained locked for a continuous period of more than 1 V2 years. The learned Appellate Authority had also placed reliance on the extract of consumption of electricity Ex.P-3 in respect of the demised premises, according to which the tenant had not consumed any electricity during the period from July, 1988 to December, 1988 and from February , 1989 to March, 1990 and there was consumption of only 40 units during January, 1989. 9. I have perused the entire evidence available on the record, with the assistance of learned counsel for the parties. In my opinion, the learned Appellate Authority had rightly found that the tenant had ceased to occupy the premises for a continuous period of 12 months without reasonable cause. Ex. P-3 is the abstract of year-wise consumption in respect of the electricity meter installed in the demised premises in occupation of the petitioner-tenant. This extract of electricity consumption was proved by PW-4 Tilak Ram, Senior Assistant, Electrical Sub Divisional, H.P.S.E.B, Kasuali, who had made the statement on the basis of the summoned record. He had produced the consumption record pertaining to the electricity meter installed in the demised premises, for the period form 1982 to 16.7.1990. He proved the" abstract thereof Ex.P-3. As per the said abstract, right form the year 1982 on words it was reported that the premises were found locked except in July, 1985, September, 1986, January, 1989 and thereafter in may, June and July, 1990, for which consumption of 65,5,40,10,20 and 16 units, respectively have been shown. PW-4 Tilak Raj Had categorically stated that reports regarding the premises being locked were being received in respect of the meter in question. This witness had worked as Meter Reader in the area in question form 1982 to 1988. In my opinion, from the testimony of PW-4 Tilak Ram and the extract Ex. P3 prepared from the Consumption register form April, 1982 till J7ly, 1990, it could certainly be said that the petitioner-tenant was not residing in the demised premises and had been visiting Kasuali once in a while. In my opinion, from the testimony of PW-4 Tilak Ram and the extract Ex. P3 prepared from the Consumption register form April, 1982 till J7ly, 1990, it could certainly be said that the petitioner-tenant was not residing in the demised premises and had been visiting Kasuali once in a while. I am further of the opinion that the learned Appellate Authority had rightly found that the landlords have been able to prove that the petitioner-tenant had ceased to occupy the demised premises continuously for a period of 12 months. 10. Infact, at the time when the landlord filed the ejectment petition against the petitioner-tenant, the petitioner-tenant was shown as "Gurbachan Singh, Lambardar, resident of Gali Kajethian, Shahbad, District Kurukshetra Haryana" in the ejectment petition. When the petitioner-tenant filed reply to the ejectment petition it was no where disputed by him that he was not the Lambardar and/or was not Advocate(s): resident of Gali Majethian, Shahbad, District Kurukshetra, Haryana. On the other hand, the petitioner-tenant had produced various money order receipts on the record to show about the payment of rent. On all those money order receipts Gurbachan Singh petitioner-tenant had shown himself as "Gurbanchan Singh, Lambardar, P.O. Shahbad Markanda, District Kurkashetra". These money order receipts produced by the petitioner-tenant himself would clearly show that even Gurbachan Singh, petitioner-tenant was admitting himself to be a Lambardar, Resident of Shahbad Markanda, District Kurushetra. This documentary evidence produced by the petitioner-tenant himself would give credence to the testimony of PW-1 Vijender Bahlla (landlord), PW-3 Smt. Prema Nand (Landlady) and PW-5 K. M.Chandani (Mukhtiar of the landlords) that the petitioner-tenant was residing at Shahbad and he had ceased to occupy the demised premises since July, 1988. On the facts and circumstance of the present case, in my opinion, casual visits by the tenant form Shahbad to Kasauali would not prove that he was occupying the premises in question at Kasauli. On the other hand, it would show that the petitioner-tenant had I ceased to occupy the building in question continuously for a period of 12 months without reasonable cause. In my opinion, the present case is not a case where the petitioner-tenant is residing at Kasauli and/or had left Kasuali for sometime. On the other hand, it is provided on the file that Gurbachan Singh tenant was residing at Shahbad and may be visiting Kasuali, once in a while. In my opinion, the present case is not a case where the petitioner-tenant is residing at Kasauli and/or had left Kasuali for sometime. On the other hand, it is provided on the file that Gurbachan Singh tenant was residing at Shahbad and may be visiting Kasuali, once in a while. In such an eventuality, in my opinion, it could certainly be said that the petitioner-tenant had ceased to occupy the premises for a continuous period of 12 months without reasonable cause, inasmuch as, casual visits from Shahabad to Kasauli would not constitute occupation by the tenant. 11.The oral testimony of RW-1 Gurbachan Singh tenant that for most of the time he lived at Kasauli, in my opinion, is not worthy of any reliance, keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the present case. Infact, no reliance whatsoever could be placed on the testimony of RW-1 Gurbachan Singh tenant, keeping in view of his conduct. During cross-examination, he stated that he did not know how to read and write English. However, he admitted his signatures at X and Y on the written statement. A perusal of the same would show that Grubancan Singh tenant had signed the written statement in English at X and Y. Unless Gurbachan Singh knows how to read and write English, he was not expected to sign in English and a perusal of those signature would show that the signatures are by a person who known how to read and write English. Furthermore, nothing has come on the record to show as to what Gurbachan Singh tenant used to do at Kasauli and in what connection he was residing at Kasuali. He had not produced his ration card or any other material on the record to show that he was residing in the premises in question. On the other hand, RW-2 Dharam Pal, produced by the tenant, stated during cross-examination that the petitioner-tenant was a resident of Shahbad (Haryana) and had his land, property and house at Shahbad. 12. In S. Gurbax Singh vs. Shri Kali Dass, 1980 Simla Law Cases 192 it was found that the tenant had only consumed 2 units of electricity and the ordinary place of residence of the tenant was Sundernager and he used to visit Shimla casually. 12. In S. Gurbax Singh vs. Shri Kali Dass, 1980 Simla Law Cases 192 it was found that the tenant had only consumed 2 units of electricity and the ordinary place of residence of the tenant was Sundernager and he used to visit Shimla casually. It was also found that the version of the tenant that he or his family members had been residing in the disputed premises at Shimla for about 5 months in a year was definitely wrong and it was found that the tenant had not been using the premises in question for his residence purpose. It was also found that as per the Electricity Department the premises were found in locked condition as and when they had gone there for meter reading. Taking all these facts into consideration, it was found that the tenant had a ceased to occupy the premises for a continuous period of 12 months. In my opinion, the law laid down by this Curt in the above mentioned authority fully applies to the facts of the present case. The law laid down in S.Gurbax Singhs case (supra) was followed by this Court in Mohinder Singh vs. Mohd. Ibrahim and another, ILR 1982 (Himachal Series) 268. It was held that on occasional visit by the tenant amounts to non occupation of the building and that the Tribunals below were justified in holding that the tenants had ceased to occupy the building in question for a continuous period of 12 months without reasonable cause. So far as the authority G.C. Bhatia vs. R.L. Seth, 1986 Simla Law Cases 168, relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant, is concerned, in my opinion, on the facts and circumstances of the present case the law laid down in the said authority would have no application to the facts of the present case 13. For the reasons recorded above, I am of the opinion that the learned Appellate Authority had rightly found that the tenant was liable to be evicted form the premises in question on the ground of having ceased to occupy the premises in question and no fault could be found with the same. Accordingly, I affirm the finding of the learned appellate authority in this regard. Accordingly, I affirm the finding of the learned appellate authority in this regard. 14.So far as the question regarding the landlords requiring the demised premises for their personal use is concerned, after considering the entire evidence led by the parties, it was found by the learned Appellate Authority that the demised, premises were required by the landlords for their own use and occupation and that i of their family. As referred to above, this is a finding of fact based on evidence led by the parties and does not call for any interference from this Court in the present revision petition, especially when nothing has been pointed out before me that there was any misreading of evidence or any material piece of evidence was ignored by the learned Appellate Court while coming to this conclusion. That being so, in my opinion, there is no scope for interfering with the finding of the learned Appellate j Authority that the landlords required the demised premises for their own use and | occupation and that of their family. 15. During the pendency of the revision petition, the petitioner tenant had filed an application bearing CMP No. 287 of2005 under Section 151 CPC for taking note of the subsequent development. In this application it was alleged that during the pendency of the case, the landlords had come in possession of two rooms, kitchen, bathroom and latrine, which were occupied by one Rup Lal Saklani. It was alleged that an order of ejectment was passed in favour of Smt. Ram Payari, predece3sor-in-interest of the present landlords, against said Rup Lal Saklani vide order dated 27.9.1992 and that in the execution petition said Rup Lal Saklani had filed objections which were dismissed by the learned Rant controller on 14.11.2003 and the revision petition bearing CR No. 293 of 2003 titled as Rup Lal Saklani vs. Ravinder Nath, against the aforesaid order dated 14.11.2003, was also demised by this Court on 22.12.2003 and thereafter the landlords had taken possession of the two rooms, kitchen, bath room and toilet. It was alleged that the same would meet the requirement of the landlords. It was alleged that the same would meet the requirement of the landlords. It was further alleged that the aforesaid subsequent development, about the landlords having come in possession of the additional accommodation during the pendency of the case in the building in question, deserves to be taken not of and the petitioner applicant may be allowed to prove this fact by producing the copy of the order dated 14.11.2003 passed by the learned Rent Controller and the order passed by this Court in C. R. No. 293 of 2003. It was alleged that by taking note of subsequent development, it would be clear that the landlords did not require the demised premises for their personal bonafide requirement 16. The respondents landlords filed reply to this application. It was alleged that the possession of the premises, which was earlier with Rup Lal Saklani was delivered to them on 6.4.2004 after long drawn legal battle. It W3S alleged that infact the said.portion of the building was vacated during the pendency of the appeal before the Appellate Authority. It was alleged that thus it would be clear that this was not a subsequent event, which may have happened during the pendency of the present revision petition. On the other hand, it had happened during the pendency of the appeal before the Appellate Authority. It was further alleged that infact the Appellate Authority while coming to the conclusion that the landlords required to premises bonafide for their personal use and occupation had also considered he availability of the accommodation which was earlier with Rup Lal Saklani. 17. After hearing the learned counsel for the parities and perusing the record, in my opinion, even if the allegations made in the present application filed by the petitioner-tenant are taken into consideration and the alleged subsequent development is taken note of, still, in my opinion, it could not be said that the landlords did not require the demised premises bonafide for their personal use and occupation. A perusal of the judgement dated 6.5.2005 passed by the Appellate authority would show that the learned Appellate Authority, while coming to the conclusion that the landlords required the demised premises for their won use and occupation and that of their family, had also considered the portion of the building in question which was in possession of Rup Lal Saklani and regarding which an order of ejectment had already been passed in favour of the landlords and against said tenant, namely, Rup Lal Saklani. In para 27 of the judgment. It was held by the Appellate Authority as under:- "The main building in which the premises in dispute are situate is a part of accommodation consisting of 10 rooms, kitchen, bathroom and latrine. Out of the aforesaid 10 rooms premises in dispute consisting of 3 rooms, kitchen, bath room and latrine are in occupation of the respondent. The other two rooms, one kitchen, bathroom and latrine are in occupation of Sh. Rup Lal Saklani, RW-3. The petitioners are in occupation of 5 rooms kitchen, bathroom and latrine situate on one side of building. The said building comprises of single lot and the premises in dispute and the accommodation in occupation of Sh.Rup Lal Saklani is interconnected with the premises in occupation and that of their families is compelling as in the absence of the availability of the premises in dispute the petitioners cannot use the premises in their occupation comfortably and conveniently." 18 Furthermore, in para 37 of the judgment it was observed by the learned Appellate Authority as under "The bonafide requirement of the petitioners of the premises in dispute does not stand defeated by the testimony of RW-3 Rup Lal Saklani...,. The objections of Sh.Rup Lal Saklani by the Court have already been rejected in the execution." 19. The objections of Sh.Rup Lal Saklani by the Court have already been rejected in the execution." 19. From a perusal of the above, in my opinion, it would be clear that the landlords having taken possession of a part of the building which was in occupation of the previous tenant, namely, Rup Lal Saklani, would be of no consequence, since the order of ejectment had already been passed in the year 1992 and the objections filed by Rup Lal Saklani during the pendency of the execution petition had been dismissed by the rent controller on 14.11.2003 and even the revision petition filed by Rup Lal Saklani was dismissed by this Court on 22.12.2003 and the possession of the said portion of the building which was earlier in possession of Rup Lal Saklani had been taken by the landlords on 6.4.2004 i.e. during the pendency of the appeal before the Appellate Authority. Under these circumstances, in my opinion, it cold not be said that there was no subsequent event, which required to betaken note of by this Court in the present revision petition. This is especially so when the learned Appellate authority had already considered hat portion of the building, which was earlier in possession of Rup Lal Saklani, while holding that the landlords required the demises premises bonafide for their personal use and occupation. 20. In view of the detailed discussion above, I affirms the finding of the learned. Appellate authority regarding bonafide requirement. No other point has been urged before me in this petition. For the reasons recorded above, finding no merit in this revision petition, the same is hereby dismissed