NARAYAN CHANDRA SIL, J. ( 1 ) C. O. No. 1040 is directed against the order impugned No. 8 dated March 10, 1999 and order dated March 30, 1999, passed by the learned Recovery Officer in pursuance of ex parte order/ judgment dated December 5,1996, passed by the learned Recovery Officer, Debts Recovery Tribunal, Calcutta and C. O. No. 262 of 1999 is directed against the Order No. 4, dated October 28, 1998, passed by the learned Recovery Officer in pursuance of an ex parte order/judgment dated September 17, 1997, passed by the learned Presiding Officer, DRT, Calcutta. ( 2 ) IT is clearly stated by the petitioner in C. O. No. 1040 of 1999 in paragraph 8 that both the matters are analogous in nature. Thus as the parties are in agreement for analogous hearing of the matters I have taken up both the revision applications under Article 227 of the Constitution of India for analogous hearing as the question of law in both the revisions are same and similar. ( 3 ) THE facts of the case in brief are that a mortgage suit was filed and after the introduction of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, the said suit was transferred to the Debts Recovery Tribunal and registered as T. A. No. 308 of 1995. An ex parte judgment was delivered by the Tribunal on December 5, 1996, without any notice upon the petitioner. After having come to know about the ex parte decree the petitioner filed the miscellaneous application for setting aside the ex parte judgment and certificate. But on the basis of the said ex parte judgment and certificate issued on January 6, 1997, by the learned Presiding Officer recovery proceeding being R. P. No. 13 of 1997 was initiated. It is also stated that judgment debtor No. 1 who was respondent No. 3 of the proceeding were parties in another recovery proceeding arising out of the same ex parte order and the said recovery proceeding was numbered as R. P. No. 186 of 1997. Against that recovery proceeding and the order of the Tribunal the present revision application has been filed, another revision application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India was filed and the same was registered as C. O. No. 262 of 1999. Against that recovery proceeding and the order of the Tribunal the present revision application has been filed, another revision application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India was filed and the same was registered as C. O. No. 262 of 1999. Both the matters arose out of the same ex parte judgment and order and absolutely analogous in nature. ( 4 ) IT is thus stated once again that the petitioner never received any notice for which they were deprived of any opportunity to contest the proceeding before the Tribunal. The Tribunal thus violated the principles of natural justice. In the circumstances it is prayed that the judgment and order passed in T. A. No. 308 of 1995 out of which the recovery proceeding No. 13 of 1997 arose be set aside. ( 5 ) MR. Susobhan Sengupta, Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner submits before me that the petitioner never received any notice. It is also submitted by him and not only submitted in fact it is stated in the application itself that the petitioner filed an application for setting aside the ex parte judgment which is still pending. But subsequently it was submitted by Mr. Sengupta that the said application was dismissed for default. ( 6 ) MR. Sambhu Bhattacharya, Learned Counsel has appeared for the O. P. Bank and it is submitted by him that the revision applications are not maintainable. In order to substantiate his submission he has drawn my attention to the provisions of appeal contained in the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institution Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as "act" only ). It is submitted by him that from the facts and circumstances as made out in the applications of the petitioners they should have invoked the provisions of Sections 20, 21 and 30 of the Act. But without availing of those opportunities they have come direct to the court which is not permissible. In this connection he has referred to the ratio decided in the case of Punjab National Bank v. O. C. Krishnan and Jenson and Nicholson (India) Ltd. v. Industrial Investment Bank of India. I shall discuss those case law a little later. Mr. Bhattacharya then submits that the order impugned is not at all an ex parte order and in this connection he has drawn my attention to page 14 of the petition. I shall discuss those case law a little later. Mr. Bhattacharya then submits that the order impugned is not at all an ex parte order and in this connection he has drawn my attention to page 14 of the petition. In fact at page 14 a copy of the order impugned annexed and it appears from the first sentence of the order that the learned Presiding Officer took up the ex parte hearing. But it appears from the second paragraph of the order that respondents Nos. 1, 3 and 5 were represented by their learned lawyer Mr. Saibal Biswas. It is also clearly stated that "other respondents did not turn up in spite of due service. The demeanour of respondents Nos. 1, 3 and 5 has been described by the learned Presiding Officer in all perspicuity and the same reads as under : other respondents did not turn up in spite of due service and respondents Nos. 1, 3 and 5 were given opportunity to file the written statement. Respondents Nos. 1, 3 and 5 obtained several adjournments to file the written statement. The adjournments were allowed even by awarding costs. In spite of this, no written statement was filed and, as such, the ex parte hearing. ( 7 ) MR. Bhattacharya then argues that in view of the judgment recovery proceedings was initiated for execution of the same and the mortgaged property was sold in auction and after all this was over the present revision applications were filed. ( 8 ) THUS it appears from the order impugned itself that the petitioner cannot claim that no notice was served upon them and it cannot also be taken that none of the respondents was present at that time. It is clear from the said order that how many opportunities were given to the other respondents being Nos. 1, 3 and 5 for filing written statement and even at times cost was impugned for allowing such adjournment petitions but those respondents did not avail of that opportunity and the learned Presiding Officer was constrained to take up the matter for ex parte consideration. On a perusal of the order impugned it is clear that although the ex parte order was passed but the learned Presiding Officer had considered the merits of the case also. On a perusal of the order impugned it is clear that although the ex parte order was passed but the learned Presiding Officer had considered the merits of the case also. ( 9 ) THE facts and circumstances of this case suggest a trial of dismissal order for default. These revisional applications were dismissed for default as many as on two occasions earlier, and in fact it started from the hearing of the petition filed by the present petitioners, before the Tribunal for setting aside the ex parte judgment which was also dismissed for default as it appears from the submission of the learned advocate for the petitioner. Taking everything into consideration it appears once again that the respondents before the Tribunal was absolutely reluctant, complacent and non-interested in the proceeding of the matter after availing of the credit facilities from the bank. ( 10 ) NOW, I shall discuss this case law cited by the learned advocate for the O. P. The decision of our Supreme Court in the case of Punjab National Bank reads as under : the order passed by the Tribunal directing sale of the mortgaged property was appealable under Section 20 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (for short "the Act" ). The High Court ought not to have exercised its jurisdiction under Article 227 in view of the provisions for alternative remedy contained in the Act. The correctness of the High Court's decision is not examined herein. Whether the order passed by the Tribunal was correct or not has to be decided before an appropriate forum. The Act has been enacted with a view to provide a special procedure for recovery of debts due to the banks and the financial institutions. There is a hierarchy of appeal provided in the Act, namely, filing of an appeal under Section 20 and this fast-track procedure cam not be allowed to be derailed either by taking recourse to proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution or by filing a civil suit, which is expressly barred. Even though a provision under an Act cannot expressly oust the jurisdiction of the court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, nevertheless, where there is an alternative remedy available, judicial prudence demands that the court refrains from exercising its jurisdiction under the said constitutional provisions. Even though a provision under an Act cannot expressly oust the jurisdiction of the court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, nevertheless, where there is an alternative remedy available, judicial prudence demands that the court refrains from exercising its jurisdiction under the said constitutional provisions. ( 11 ) THE learned single judge of our High Court while dissenting with the decision made in the case of Pratap Ch. Dey v. Allahabad Bank held in the case of Jenson and Nicholson (India) Ltd. v. Industrial Investment Bank of India that any order made or deemed to have been made by the Tribunal can be challenged in appeal if such order prejudicially affects an aggrieved appellant. ( 12 ) THUS from the above judicial pronouncements and the very frame of the Act it is clear that the Act was enacted with a view to provide a special procedure for Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions and the fast-track procedure contained in the Act cannot be allowed to be derailed either by taking recourse to the proceeding under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution or by filing a civil suit which is expressly barred. ( 13 ) BESIDES, in the instant applications no substantial reason is shown as to why the recourse for redress provided in the Act itself was not availed of by the petitioner. The petitioner is all along lackadaisical in the proceeding and the facts and circumstances starting from the Tribunal ending with this Court suggest that ultimately the petitioner had adopted a gimmick by filing the present applications under Article 227 of the Constitution of India instead of availing of the recourse provided in the Act itself. The revision applications are thus liable to be dismissed. ( 14 ) IN view of what has been discussed in the foregoing lines both the revisional applications are dismissed and disposed of accordingly.