Judgment- By means of this writ petition, moved under Article 227 read with Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner I tenant has sought writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the order dated 28-032001 passed In P.A. Case No. 64 of 1999 by the prescribed authority (whereby the application of landlord for release of accommodation in question is allowed) and order dated 03-02-2003 passed by the respondent No.1, whereby Rent Control Appeal No. 40 of 2001 is dismissed against the order of the prescribed authority. 2. Brief facts of the case, as narrated In the petition are that, the petitioner is tenant in shop No. 71 / 132, Narishilp Mandir Marg, Dehradun on rent at the rate of Rs. 500/- per month. The petitioner is doing business of auto repairing work in the shop from the time of his father. It is alleged that Sri Brij Lal Sehgal, original landlord, in connivance with respondent No.3 Sri Virendra Sehgal, executed a gift deed on 13-08-1999 in order to get the petitioner evicted from the shop in question. Respondent No.3 moved an application under Section 21(I)(a) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 for release of accommodation in tenancy of the petitioner. A written statement was filed by the petitioner, before the prescribed authority denying the bonafide need of the landlord and also stating that the petitioner, if evicted would suffer greater hardship as against the landlord. Learned prescribed authority after accepting evidence of parties and hearing them, allowed the release application holding that the landlord's need is bonafide and genuine. It also held that landlord would suffer greater hardship as against the tenant. Aggrieved by said order, the petitioner preferred an appeal under Section 22 of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 before the District Judge (respondent No.1), who, after hearing the parties concurred with the prescribed authority, and dismissed the appeal. Hence, this petition. In para 11 of the petition, it has been stated that during the pendency of appeal, the petitioner filed an affidavit as additional evidence stating that respondent No.3 is engaged in the construction business and has got registered a Company. And, in reply to said affidavit, the respondent No. 3 admitted doing the, business of construction. Hence, this petition. In para 11 of the petition, it has been stated that during the pendency of appeal, the petitioner filed an affidavit as additional evidence stating that respondent No.3 is engaged in the construction business and has got registered a Company. And, in reply to said affidavit, the respondent No. 3 admitted doing the, business of construction. In further paras it is stated by the petitioner that need of the landlord came to an end after he filed additional evidence that meanwhile he has done graduation in law and wants to open his office in the accommodation in question. Petitioner also challenged both the impugned orders, on the ground that the findings of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 are not only perverse but also against the law. Claiming that the respondent No.3 is doing his business with his father in the name and style of M/s Makhanlal Raj Rani Sehgal Construction Co. (Pvt.) Limited, it is further alleged that availability of as many as fourteen cabins with the respondent No.3, cannot be ignored only on the ground that the same are in the name of his father Sri Ashok Sehgal which are exhibited by the family of respondent No. 3 - 'TO LET.' 3. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondent No. 3 (landlord), in which it has been admitted that application for release of accommodation in' question was allowed by the prescribed authority and the tenants' appeal against said order is dismissed by the respondent No.1. Rest of the contents of the petition, as stated, are denied by the answering respondent. The respondent No.3 has denied that he is engaged in the construction business. He has alleged that now he is a practicing Advocate and needs the accommodation for his office: Lastly, it Is stated In the counter affidavit that the concurrent findings of fact of courts below cannot be interfered by this Court in its writ jurisdiction. 4. I heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the affidavits, counter affidavit and rejoinder affidavit alongwith annexures filed by the parties. 5. There is no dispute between the parties that the petitioner Is tenant and the respondent No.3 Is his landlord. 4. I heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the affidavits, counter affidavit and rejoinder affidavit alongwith annexures filed by the parties. 5. There is no dispute between the parties that the petitioner Is tenant and the respondent No.3 Is his landlord. The dispute in the present case is twofold : (i) Whether, while allowing release application both prescribed authority and the appellate court have erred in law in ignoring Rule 16(2)(a) and Rule 16(2)(c) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972 ? and (ii) What is the affect of additional evidence adduced by the parties before appellate court ? Learned counsel for petitioner mainly raised these points in his submissions from across the bar. 6. First of all, I take up the point No.(i) i.e. relating to Rule 16(2)(a) and Rule 16(2)(c). These relevant rules contained in the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972, are being reproduced below: "16(2). While considering an application for release under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 21 in respect of building let out for the purposes of any business, the prescribed authority shall also have regard to such facts as the following - (a), the greater the period since when the tenant opposite party, or the original tenant whose heir the opposite party is, has been carrying on his business in that building, the less justification for allowing the application; , (b) . (c), the greater the existing business of the landlords own part from the, business proposed to be set up in the leased premises, the less the justification for allowing the application, and even if an application is allowed in such a case, the prescribed authority may on the application of the tenant impose the condition where the landlord has available within him other accommodation (whether subject to the Act or not) which is not suitable for his own proposed business but may serve the purpose of the tenant, that the landlord shall let out that accommodation to the tenant on a fair rent to be fixed by the prescribed authority; (d)' " , . At the outset, before further discussion, I may mention here that above rules are directory in nature and not mandatory. Now this Court has to see in what circumstances if these rules are ignored, it would materially affect a case. At the outset, before further discussion, I may mention here that above rules are directory in nature and not mandatory. Now this Court has to see in what circumstances if these rules are ignored, it would materially affect a case. From the evidence on record the tenant is doing business of auto repairing work in shop in question for morel than thirty years. In para 4 of the written statement before prescribed authority (copy Annexure-2 to the writ petition), the petitioner has pleaded that the landlord is already doing real estate business and has posh office to work. In para 29 of grounds of appeal (copy Annexure5 to the writ petition) the petitioner has alleged that landlord and his father have constructed Sehgal Building Tower. a commercial complex. It has 14 well equipped commercial premises and nave advertised in newspapers for their sale and rent. Apart from ignoring above quoted rules, the prescribed authority, has not given any reason to reject evidence of tenant adduced in affidavit in support plea in para 4 of the written statement. Also, the learned District Judge has not discussed the evidence 'of the petitioner on aforesaid point even after being raised in grounds of appeal. Rather, learned District Judge in his judgment observed- "it is true that in original release application filed by the landlord respondent the need of the shop was required by the landlord in order to establish as a Real Estate Agent" but he Ignores said fact thereafter on the ground that now after graduating in law, the respondent No.3 has need to establish his office as an Advocate. Learned District Judge has erred in law by turning blind eye to the fact that the shopping complex with fourteen vacant Cabins owned by the respondent No,3 and his father, by merely saying that these belong to 'one Ashok Sehgal: The address of the respondent No.3 shows that Sri Ashok Sehgal in none else than his father. In these circumstances it can be safely said that respondent No.1 and 2 have erred in law in ignoring aforesaid rule while giving their findings on bonafide need of landlord and comparing hardship between the parties, 7. In these circumstances it can be safely said that respondent No.1 and 2 have erred in law in ignoring aforesaid rule while giving their findings on bonafide need of landlord and comparing hardship between the parties, 7. Now, I come to another point, that is, affect of additional evidence adduced before the appellate court, It is true that in the exceptional circumstances the subsequent events can be looked into by the courts for doing justice between the parties, But, where no amendment is sought in the application or the written statement, normally a party should be discouraged from adducing the evidence which is not corroborating the pleas It raised or rebutting the case of opposite party. On behalf of the respondent No.3, my attention was drawn to the principle of law contained In Prativa Devi Vs. T.V. Krishnan reported in (J996) 5 Supreme Court Cases Pg. 353 and argued that the landlord is the best judge of his need. I have gone through said case law. It pertains to the residential need and not the commercial one. Also, learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 referred the case law given in Hukesh Vs. XI Additional District Judge reported in A.L.R. J998 (34) Pg. 447 and It is submitted that there is no bar if the landlord wishes to change the business, as the need of accommodation still remains unchanged. In my opinion, this principle cannot be applied in the present case where the need of landlord is that of opening office of real estate agent, Had the landlord been not in the business of real estate it could have been said his hardship is comparatively greater but in present circumstances. If even the hardship of real estate businessman is treated greater as against the auto repair shop wala (tenant). I think. It certainly would amount doing injustice to the tenant. Merely for the reason that during pendency of appeal the landlord lias graduated in law and wants to practice. his earned real estate property cannot be said to have been vanished, . 8. I think. It certainly would amount doing injustice to the tenant. Merely for the reason that during pendency of appeal the landlord lias graduated in law and wants to practice. his earned real estate property cannot be said to have been vanished, . 8. In view of above discussion, this Court Is of the opinion that both the courts below have erred in law In allowing the application for release of accommodation In favour of the landlord, and their findings on bonafide need and comparative hardship In favour of landlord are perverse, 9, Therefore, this petition under Article 227 read with Article 226 of the Constitution of India is allowed. Both the orders I.e. order dated 28-03-2001 passed In P,A. Case No. 64 of 1999 by the prescribed authority, and, order dated 03-02-2003 passed by the District Judge, Dehradun in R,C.A. No, 40 of 2001 are quashed, No order as to costs,