JUDGMENT S.L. Jain, J. 1. This appeal under section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is directed against the judgment and decree dated 20-4-1999, passed by Additional District Judge, Burhanpur in Civil Suit No. 38A/98, rejecting the plaintiff's suit for declaration to the effect that she is the owner of the suit plot. 2. The facts in brief shorn of details and necessary for the disposal of the appeal lie in a narrow compass :- 1. Plaintiff/appellant Naseema Bai filed a suit stating that the suit plot situated at Mohalla Lohar Mandi, Burhanpur was received by her by way of gift from Batul Bai in the year 1974. The plaintiff was in need of some money, therefore, she mortgage the suit plot in favour of one Salma Bai for a sum of Rs. 2,000/- . As the husband of Salma Bai was transferred from Burhanpur to Ratlam, she insisted for return of Rs. 2,000/- , therefore, the plaintiff requested defendant No. 2 Rabab Bai who was the close relative of her to give Rs. 2,000/- to Salma Bai and for the security of the amount, she (plaintiff) proposed that she will mortgage the suit plot in favour of defendant No. 2 Rabab Bai to which Rabab Bai agreed. Accordingly, for the security of Rs. 2,000/- the suit plot was mortgage in favour of Rabab Bai but as per then existing practise a sham document of sale deed was executed in favour of Rabab Bai. The same was never intended to be used as sale deed and was to be used only as mortgage deed. Later on defendant No. 2 though she was only a mortgagee sold the suit plot to respondent No. 1 Jai Prakash. Jai Prakash applied for the mutation of his name on the suit plot. A notice of mutation was received by the appellant. 2. The appellant submitted her objection which was not accepted and the directions for the mutation of the name of respondent No. 1 Jai Prakash in place of appellant were given. Appeal filed by the appellant against this order of mutation was also dismissed. Thereupon, the plaintiff filed this suit for declaration that the document of sale dated 13-1-1975 alleged to have been executed by the plaintiff in favour of Rabab Bai be declared as void. She also prayed for the delivery of possession of the suit plot. 3. Appeal filed by the appellant against this order of mutation was also dismissed. Thereupon, the plaintiff filed this suit for declaration that the document of sale dated 13-1-1975 alleged to have been executed by the plaintiff in favour of Rabab Bai be declared as void. She also prayed for the delivery of possession of the suit plot. 3. During the.pendency of the suit property in dispute was sold by Jaiprakash in favour of defendants No. 4 and 5. Therefore, they have also been added as defendants. 4. Defendant No. 1 filed a separate written statement and submitted that the disputed property was sold by the plaintiff vide document dated 13-1-1975. The transaction was an out and out sale and not a mortgage. On the basis of sale deed Rabab Bai became the owner of the suit land and she was entitled to sell the plot and accordingly, she sold the suit plot to him. It is also the case of defendant No. 1 that Rabab Bai was in possession of the suit plot since 13-1-1975 and the suit is barred by limitation as the same has not been filed within 12 years. The defendant No. 1 further pleaded that the plaintiff has filed this false and vexatious suit with a view to blackmail him and therefore, he is entitle to compensatory cost. 5. Defendant No. 2 proceeded ex parte. No written statement was filed by her. 6. Defendants No. 4 and 5 also filed their written statements and claimed that they are the bona fide purchasers of the suit plot. The land was purchased by defendant No. 2 vide sale deed dated 13-1-1975. The possession of the suit land was delivered to them by Jai Prakash on 29-7-1983 to the knowledge of the plaintiff. They also pleaded that the suit of the plaintiff is barred by limitation. 7. The trial Court framed as many as 9 issues and recorded a finding that the document dated 13-1-1975 was not a mortgage deed but was a sale deed. The defendant No. 2 was entitled to sell the property to defendant No. 1. The trial Court also recorded a finding that the suit of the plaintiff is barred by limitation and dismissed the same. 3. I have heard Shri V. S. Chaudhary, Learned Counsel for the appellant and Shri Chetan Kotecha, Learned Counsel for the respondents No. 4 and 5. The trial Court also recorded a finding that the suit of the plaintiff is barred by limitation and dismissed the same. 3. I have heard Shri V. S. Chaudhary, Learned Counsel for the appellant and Shri Chetan Kotecha, Learned Counsel for the respondents No. 4 and 5. None appeared for other respondents at the time of final arguments and the case proceeded ex-parte against them. 4. Learned Counsel for the appellant first submitted that from the evidence of plaintiff Naseema Bai, it is clear that document Ex. P-1 was executed by her for the security of a loan of Rs. 2,000/- advance by Rabab Bai to her. The intention of the parties was not to execute the sale deed. The intention was to execute a mortgage deed. The document of sale deed was never to be acted upon. Earlier the plaintiff borrowed Rs. 2,000/- from Salma Bai. As the husband of Salma Bai was transferred from Burhanpur to Ratlam, Salma Bai insisted for the return of money, therefore, the plaintiff borrowed Rs. 2,000/- from Rabab Bai and executed the document in question. It was agreed between her and Rabab Bai that whenever sum of Rs. 2,000/- will be returned to Rabab Bai, she will return the document to her. The Learned Counsel for the appellant submits that there is no reason to disbelieve the evidence of Naseema Bai in this regard. 5. The contention is not acceptable. Original document has not been filed. A perusal of the copy of the document in question reveals that it is out and out sale. The plaintiff has not stated that what compelled her to execute the sale deed if the real transaction between the parties was that of mortgage. Had the intention of the parties been to execute only a mortgage deed, the possession of the suit land would not have been delivered to defendant No. 2. Had it been a loan transaction, there would have been some stipulation regarding payment of interest. The gift deed by which the plaintiff received the property from Batul Bai was also delivered to purchaser Rabab Bai. The plaintiff has also stated that she paid the property tax once or twice but no receipt of property tax was filed. She has also admitted that she never asked Rabab Bai to return her plot after accepting a sum of Rs. 2,000/- . The plaintiff has also stated that she paid the property tax once or twice but no receipt of property tax was filed. She has also admitted that she never asked Rabab Bai to return her plot after accepting a sum of Rs. 2,000/- . In this regard, she has stated that it was agreed between her and Rabab Bai that when her children will be grown up the document will be returned to the plaintiff. It is a tablet which "cannot be swallowed. Had the document been only a sham transaction for the security of loan, there was no necessity of a stipulation that the document will only be returned when the children will grow up. Such a condition appears to be unnatural. The conduct of the plaintiff that she never insisted for the redemption of mortgage or for return of document on payment of loan amount indicates that the Plot was sold by her. 6. The plaintiff has also stated in para 3 of her statement that she proposed for the execution of the mortgage but in those days since mortgage was prohibited she executed the sale deed. This explanation also cannot be accepted. There was no prohibition of mortgage at the time when the document in question was executed. 7. Learned Counsel for the appellant also submitted that plaintiff is an illiterate perdanashi Muslim woman, she innocently signed the document. 8. This contention also cannot be accepted. The plaintiff has admitted that at the time of execution of the document her father and one more relative were present and the relative who was present advised her not to sign the document. Therefore, it cannot be said that the document was signed innocently without knowing the effect of the document. 9. A bogey was raised by the Learned Counsel for the appellant that Rabab Bai was not examined. She would have been the best person to state that the document infact was a sale deed; therefore, adverse inference should be drawn for non-examination of Rabab Bai. 10. This contention also cannot be accepted. Since the document in question on the face of it is a sale deed, it was for the plaintiff to establish that the document does not contain the real intention of the parties and it was a sham transaction. 10. This contention also cannot be accepted. Since the document in question on the face of it is a sale deed, it was for the plaintiff to establish that the document does not contain the real intention of the parties and it was a sham transaction. Therefore, it was for her to examine Rabab Bai and give other evidence to prove that the parties never intended to execute the sale deed. Therefore, if at all adverse inference can be drawn due to non-examination of Rabab Bai, it can be only against the plaintiff. In view of the contents of the documents Ex. P-1, the trial Court has rightly held that the document is a sale deed and the parties also intended to execute the sale deed. 11. So far as the question of limitation is concerned, the finding of the trial Court in this regard is defensible. The sale deed was executed of 13-1-1975 and the suit was filed on 22-11-1988 after a period of more than 12 years, therefore, the plaintiffs suit is apparently barred by limitation. 12. From the above discussion, it is clear that the property in question was sold by the appellant to Rabab Bai and Rabab Bai sold the same to Jai Prakash and Jai Prakash in turn sold the same to respondents No. 4 and 5. Therefore, the respondents No. 4 and 5 are the real owners of the property in dispute. 13. The trial Court has analyzed the factual material properly. The findings of the trial Court is based on proper appreciation of evidence and cannot be lightly brushed aside by this Court. An appellate Court should always bear in mind that if the finding of the trial Court is reasonably sustainable on evidence on record, it should not be interfered with normally except for very cogent reasons. 14. In the circumstance of the case, I do not find any reason to interfere with the conclusion recorded by the trial Court. 15. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed but in the circumstances of the case parties are directed to bear their own costs.