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2005 DIGILAW 355 (MP)

Shakuntla Sharma v. State of M. P.

2005-03-07

A.K.SHRIVASTAVA

body2005
JUDGMENT By this petition, the petitioner is challenging the quashment of the proceedings filed in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chhatarpur by respondent under section 498A/34 IPC and under section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, being lack of territorial jurisdiction. The complainant lodged a report at police station Civil Lines, Chhatarpur and on the basis of the allegations made therein a case under section 498A read with section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act has been registered against the present petitioners. The investigating agency, after the investigation filed the charge sheet in the Court of CJM at Chhatarpur. The petitioners thus filed this petition under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code') complaining that CJM Chhatarpur is not having any jurisdiction to entertain the charge-sheet even if the allegations contained in the FIR are accepted in toto. According to learned counsel, no part of the cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of Chhatarpur. On the other hand, it has been contended by Smt. Sushila Paliwal, learned Government Advocate that CJM Chhatarpur is having territorial jurisdiction. In support of her contention she has placed reliance on the decision of the apex Court State of M.P. v. Suresh Kaushal and another, 2001 AIR SCW 4587. On going through the FIR, it is revealed that complainant Smt. Tanu Sharma got married with petitioner No. 5 on 20.4.2003 at Bhopal. Thereafter, she was living at Bhopal with her husband. As per the averment made in the FIR the parents of the complainant gave the articles mentioned in the FIR and also Rs. 5 lacs cash at Bhopal, but, the in-laws of complainant were not satisfied at the time of 'Vida' they made a demand of a car but it was refused by the complainant. However, when the in-laws persuaded her, she gave assurance that she would pursue her parents. Thereafter, she lived for 3-4 months at her in-laws house, however, on account of non-satisfaction of the demand of the car, her husband was harassing and also became cruel some against her which resulted her to send the message to her brother on telephone. Thereafter, her brother came to Bhopa1. Thereafter, she lived for 3-4 months at her in-laws house, however, on account of non-satisfaction of the demand of the car, her husband was harassing and also became cruel some against her which resulted her to send the message to her brother on telephone. Thereafter, her brother came to Bhopa1. The mother-in-law, father-in-law, husband and other family members of the husband were not allowing her to go to her parents house at Chhatarpur, as a result of which her brother took the assistance of Lady Police and came to Chhatarpur. After the arrival at Chhatarpur, the parents of the complainant persuaded one Vikas Marwaha who was the mediator in getting the marriage settled, and thereafter he along with Sanjay Ram and Shailendra Singh went twice-thrice to Bhopal and tried to pacify the in-laws but they did not agree and they specifically told them that they will not allow to keep the complainant till the demand of car is satisfied. Hence the FIR was lodged at Chhatarpur. It has been submitted by Shri Samaiya, learned counsel for the petitioner that the FIR itself discloses that all the incident and demand was made at Bhopal and therefore the complainant left Bhopal and came to Chhatarpur and stayed there. Even the mediator Shri Vikas Marwaha along with Sanjay Ram and Shailendra Singh pacified the in-laws of complainant at Bhopal and to them also the petitioners made demand of a car and this demand was made to them at Bhopal. It has also been putforth by him that all the allegations which are per se without any basis took place according to the complainant at Bhopal and, therefore, the Court at Chhatarpur had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance to section 177 of the Code and has also placed reliance on two decisions of the apex Court Y. Abraham Ajith and others v. Inspector of Police, Chennai and another, 2004 AIR SCW 4788, R.P. Kapoor v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866 . He has also placed reliance on another decision of the apex Court State of M.P. v. K.P. Ghiara, AIR 1957 SC 196 . In order to appreciate the rival contentions of learned counsel for the parties, it would be condign to re-write section 177 and 178 of the Code which reads thus: "177. He has also placed reliance on another decision of the apex Court State of M.P. v. K.P. Ghiara, AIR 1957 SC 196 . In order to appreciate the rival contentions of learned counsel for the parties, it would be condign to re-write section 177 and 178 of the Code which reads thus: "177. Ordinary place of inquiry and trial -- Every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. 178. Place of inquiry or trial -- (a) When it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed, or (b) where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another, or (c) where an offence is a continuing one, and continues to be committed in more local areas than one, or (d) where it consists of several acts done in different local areas, it may be inquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas. It be seen that the words used in section 177 of the Code is a general one and must be read subject to the other provisions contained in the Code. The word 'ordinarily' is having a specific connotation. All crime is local; the jurisdiction over the crime belongs to the country where the crime is committed. This has been stated by Blackstone. Section 177 to 186 of the Code deal with the venue or the place of the trial of crime. Section 177 reiterates the well established common law rule referred to in Halsbury's Laws of England Vol. 11 para 83 and 84 which reads thus: "83. Acts done on British ship in foreign territorial waters. This has been stated by Blackstone. Section 177 to 186 of the Code deal with the venue or the place of the trial of crime. Section 177 reiterates the well established common law rule referred to in Halsbury's Laws of England Vol. 11 para 83 and 84 which reads thus: "83. Acts done on British ship in foreign territorial waters. -- If a person on a British ship in the territorial waters of a foreign state, acting under the lawful orders of the foreign State, commits an act in respect of subjects of the state which would be criminal but for those orders (for example if he assaults and arrests such subjects), such person cannot be prosecuted in an English criminal Court for that act, so long as it is covered by the authority of the foreign State; but, if such an act is continued outside the jurisdiction of the State (for example by bringing the subjects of the foreign State in confinement to England), then that person can be punished in respect of so much of the act as is done outside the territory of the foreign State. 84. In general. -- At common law on one can be tried in England for a crime committed on land abroad. A statute, unless its provisions show a contrary intention, applies only to the United Kingdom; and· if it makes certain acts criminal, in the absence of provisions to the contrary, those acts are only criminal, even in the case of British subjects, if done within the United Kingdom. An alien cannot be tried in England for acts committed outside Her Majesty's dominions unless the statute creating the offence expressly so provides." At this juncture, I may also borrow sufficient light from the Corpus Juris Secundum in which also it has been enumerated that the venue of the trial should be the place where the offence was committed. I may profitably rely clause 174 and 175 in that regard. "174. Locality of offence in General - The place where the crime is committed is determined by the acts of the accused that violate the statute; an offense is committed in that locality in which the acts constituting it are done. 175. I may profitably rely clause 174 and 175 in that regard. "174. Locality of offence in General - The place where the crime is committed is determined by the acts of the accused that violate the statute; an offense is committed in that locality in which the acts constituting it are done. 175. Common-Law Rule - In the absence of constitutional or statutory provisions to the contrary, prosecution must be had in the county or district in which the offense was committed." On bare reading of above said two clauses of Corpus Juris Secundum, it can be safely said that section 177 of the Code is at par with these two clauses. The place where the crime is committed is determined by the acts of the accused that violate the statute. It be further seen that section 178 of the Code is similar to that of clause 177 of the Corpus Juris Secundum which reads thus: "177. Offenses Committed Partly in One County and Partly in Another - Under the statutes an offense committed partly in one county and partly in another may be prosecuted in either." The proper and ordinary venue for the trial of the crime is the area of jurisdiction in which, on the evidence, the facts occurred and are alleged to constitute the crime. Thus, if an offence is commenced within the jurisdiction of one Court and is completed within the jurisdiction of another Court, the provisions of section 178 of the Code are attracted and in that situation the case can be proceeded at either place. But, if the offence has been completely committed in the territorial jurisdiction of particular Court then, in the territory of that Court only the offence could be tried. There is no whisper in the complaint made in the FIR that any demand of dowry or commission of any act constituting an offence, has taken place at Chhatarpur, and if that is the position, according to me the Chhatarpur Court had no territorial jurisdiction. On bare perusal of column No.5 (b) of the FIR, the place of incidence has been shown at E-1/24 Arera Colony, Bhopal, apart from this, there is nothing in the FIR in order to stretch the provisions of section 178 CrPC so that the Court at Chhatarpur can be clothed with the territorial jurisdiction. On bare perusal of column No.5 (b) of the FIR, the place of incidence has been shown at E-1/24 Arera Colony, Bhopal, apart from this, there is nothing in the FIR in order to stretch the provisions of section 178 CrPC so that the Court at Chhatarpur can be clothed with the territorial jurisdiction. The decision of the Apex Court in the case of Y. Abraham Ajith (supra) is squarely applicable in the present case. The decision of Suresh Kaushal (supra) relied by learned Government Advocate is tangentially off the point. In that case the physical torture was made to the complainant at Indore and in consequence to the said torture her parents took her back to Jabalpur and in consequence of beating by the in-laws at Indore, the miscarriage took place at Jabalpur. In that context, it was held by the apex Court that the Jabalpur Court was also having territorial jurisdiction. For the reasons stated hereinabove, I am of the considered view that the CJM Chhatarpur is not having any territorial jurisdiction to try the case. The respondents any hereby directed to file the charge sheet in the competent Court at Bhopal which shall try the case. However, it is made clear that in case any kind of harassment or any torture or any threat is given either to the complainant or her family members or any witness or they are put to fear, complainant shall be free to move application for transfer making out a case of transfer, which shall be decided in accordance with law. This petition is allowed.