JUDGMENT Deepak Gupta, J. 1. This appeal under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) is directed against the award of the Commissioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act, Paonta Sahib (hereinafter referred to as the Commissioner) in Case No. 13 of 1996, decided on 26.3.2001. 2. This appeal was admitted on 25.7.2000 on the following substantial questions of law: 1. In case the injuries did not result from the risk which is incidental to the nature of duties whether the appellant is liable to compensate the claimant? 2. Whether the appellant is jointly and severally liable to pay the amount of compensation alongwith the contractor specially in view of the fact that his capacity is that of the principal employer? 3. As far as the first substantial question of law is concerned, the contention raised by Mr. Maniktala is that the deceased died as a result of heart attack and this had nothing to do with the nature of his work or with his employment and it had no casual connection with his death. Therefore, the claimant is entitled to compensation under the Act. 4. The question whether the death of a workman by a heart attack during his employment is an accident within the meaning of Section 3(1) of the Act has been considered in detaal by a Division Bench of this Court in FAO No. 50 of 1990, decided on 7.9.1998, H.R.T.C. and Anr. v. Rajinder Kumar and Ors. The Division Bench held as follows: Section 3 (1) of the Act provides that if personal injury is caused to a workman by "accident arising out of or in the course of his employment", his employer is liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Chapter concerned under the Act. It is by now well settled that the word 'accident' has been used in the said provision of the Act primarily in the sense of an unanticipated or an unlooked for mishap or untoward deed which is not expected or designed and it postulates an event or series of events of such nature as does or does not normally occur in the course of employment of the workman. It has also been held liable to be construed in its popular sense intended to convey what might be expressed as an accidental injury or death from the point of view of the workman who suffers or dies and held to include not only such occurrences as collusions, tripping or fall or physical obstacles but also strain which causes ruputure, exposure to exertion which will operate as strain causing stroke resulting in apoplexy and shock causing Neurasthenia etc. The phrase "arising out of and in the course of employment" has been the subject-matter of interpretation in volume of case law by Courts in this country and it would suffice in our view, to advert to only those which are nearer and relevant to the point to be decided with reference to the facts before us in issue. Thereafter the Division Bench considered a number of judgments including Saurashtra Salt Manufacturing Company v. Bai Valu Raja (1958)IILLJ249SC , General Manager, B.E.S.T. Undertaking, Bombay v. Mrs. Agnes (1963)IILLJ615SC and Mackinnon Mackenizie and Co. Private Ltd. v. Ibrahim Mahommad Issak (1970)ILLJ16SC , and held as follows: The line of interpretation commended by these and several other decisions of Courts is one of liberal construction having regard to the proclaimed object of a social welfare legislation of the kind under our consideration. It is in pursuit of such approach the theory of notional or extended liability came to be propounded and if the employee's unexplained or apparently natural death has occurred during the course of employment also indicating even any casual connection between the nature of employment and the cause of the death as also when the employment was an attributable cause or such employment operated to accelerate the death notwithstanding that even the death was not only due to the disease from which the workman was suffering but also on account of the factors which have a bearing upon or which are coupled with the employment etc. and such or similar factors were shown to present in a given case the employer cannot avoid his liability and it can be well said that the death occurred as a consequence of and in the course of employment. and such or similar factors were shown to present in a given case the employer cannot avoid his liability and it can be well said that the death occurred as a consequence of and in the course of employment. Viewed in the background of the principles laid down in the above pronouncements, we are of the view that the conclusion to be arrived at on the facts and circumstances of the case does not pose any problem or room for doubt that the death of Kewal Ram, the driver in question was on account, of an injury caused by an accident arising out or and in the course of his employment due to the stress and strain of the driving of the bus by the victim. The conclusion of ours becomes not only inevitable and inescapable on the facts found particularly in view of the fact that the Doctor was specific about the cause of the death being massive myocardial infarction and the further fact that the victim never had such ailment before and that he suffered such attack as a result of which he died while resting after bringing the Bus to the terminal destination and during the course of his resting in the bus itself that night before he had to recommence his return journey the next morning. 5. In the present case also the deceased suffered heart attack while he was on duty. In fact in the present case there is evidence on record to show that the deceased suffered heart attack because of acute respiratory failure. There is also evidence on record that he was to pack the cement in gunny bags. Therefore, it can be said that the death of the workman was directly as a result of the work in which the claimant was deployed. 6. So far as the second question is concerned, Section 12 of the Act provides as follows: 12. There is also evidence on record that he was to pack the cement in gunny bags. Therefore, it can be said that the death of the workman was directly as a result of the work in which the claimant was deployed. 6. So far as the second question is concerned, Section 12 of the Act provides as follows: 12. Contracting.-(1) Where any person (hereinafter in this Section referred to as the principal) in the course of or for the purposes of his trade or business contracts with any other person (hereinafter in this Section referred to as the contractor) for the execution by or under the contractor of the whole or any part of any work which is ordinarily part of the trade or business of the principal, the principal shall be liable to pay to any workman employed in the execution of the work any compensation which he would have been liable to pay if that workman had been immediately employed by him; and where compensation is claimed from the principal, this Act shall apply as if references to the principal were substituted for references to the employer except that the amount of compensation shall be calculated with reference to the wages of the workman under the employer by whom he is immediately employed. (2) Where the principal is liable to pay compensation under this Section, he shall be entitled to be indemnified by the contractor, (or any other person from whom the workman could have recovered compensation and where a contractor who is himself a principal as liable to pay compensation or to indemnify a principal under this Section he shall be entitled to be indemnified by any person standing to him in the relation of a contractor from whom the workman could have recovered compensation), and all questions as to the right to and the amount of any such indemnity shall, in default of agreement, be settled by the Commissioner. (3) Nothing in this Section shall be construed as preventing a workman from recovering compensation from the contractor instead of the principal. (4) This Section shall not apply in any case where the accident occurred elsewhere that on, in or about the premises on which the principal has undertaken or usually undertakes, as the case may be, to execute the work or which are otherwise under his control or management. 7. (4) This Section shall not apply in any case where the accident occurred elsewhere that on, in or about the premises on which the principal has undertaken or usually undertakes, as the case may be, to execute the work or which are otherwise under his control or management. 7. Reading of this Section makes it absolutely clear that wherever the work of some industrial establishment is contracted out, the principle employer shall continue to be responsible to pay the amount payable under the Act. However, he has a right to recover the same from the contractor. 8. In this case there is an agreement entered into between Cement Corporation of India and Contractor, Gurmeet Singh which has also been placed on record. Condition No 20.0 of the said agreement reads as follows: 20.0 The contractor shall be liable for compensation to his labourers payable under the Workman's Compensation Act, 1923 or any other Act in case of accident. In case he fails to pay the compensation, the Corporation reserves the right to make the payment and recover from any of his billsk or security deposit. Contractor must insure his labourers under the W. C. Policy of Insurance Company and also obtain licence from the Labour Authority (Assistant Labour Commissioner (Central), Chandigarh) before starting the work. Labour Licence and Insurance Premium will be the liability of the contractor. Photo copies will be submitted to the P&A Department. Before the start of the work. 9. Even as per the agreement between the parties, the contractor was to pay the compensation, but in case he fails to do so the appellant Cement Corporation of India was to pay the compensation but it has a right to recover the same from the contractor. Therefore, it is held that the Corporation is liable to pay the amount in terms of the award of the Commissioner. However, it has the right to recover the same from the contractor, Gurmeet Singh. 10. In view of the above discussion, the appeal is partly allowed and it is held that though the appellant is required to deposit and pay the amount in terms of the order passed by the Commissioner, it can recover the same from the contractor, Gurmeet Singh, respondent No. 5 by taking appropriate proceedings under Section 12 of the Act. 11. Cross objection No. 109 of 2002. 12. 11. Cross objection No. 109 of 2002. 12. None is present on behalf of the cross objector. Hence the cross objections are dismissed.