Judgment Virender Singh, J. 1. Notice of motion has been issued in all the three appeals by this Court. Operation of the impugned order has also been stayed. Admitted 2. Since it is a short matter I intend to dispose of these appeals finally. 3. Prem Lata and Ramesh Kumar Garg appellants have stood surety for Surinder Kumar appellant in a case bearing FIR No. 75 dated 25.4.2000, under Section 20 NDPS Act registered at Police Station Manimajra, U.T. Chandigarh. The case was fixed for pronouncement of the judgment on 17.5.2004 on which date appellant Surinder Kumar absented himself. He, however, appeared before the Court on 25.6.2004. He ultimately earned acquittal on 12.7.2004 vide judgment Annexure A/10. Since the proceedings were already initiated against all the three appellants under Section 446 Cr.P.C., they have been imposed a penalty of Rs. 20,000/- vide three separate orders of one and the same date i.e. 8.7.2004. Hence three appeals before me. 4. For reference, the facts in brief have been taken up from Criminal Appeal No. 1886-SB of 2004 filed by the main accused Surinder Kumar as the disposal of the said appeal would have the bearing on the other connected two appeals as well. 5. I have heard Mr. S.K. Vohra, learned counsel appearing for all the three appellants and Mr. R.S. Rai, learned counsel appearing for U.T. Chandigarh. 6. Mr. Vohra vehemently contends that Surinder Kumar (appellant) who is accused in this case was regularly appearing before the Court on each and every date but for 14.5.2004 on which date due to serious illness (being a heart patient), he could not appear. An application was moved for seeking exemption of his personal appearance and the same was also allowed vide Annexure A/4. In fact on 14.5.2004, the case was fixed for pronouncement. It was adjourned for 15.5.2004 on which date also the appellant could not appear and another application was moved for seeking exemption. The said application was also allowed vide Annexure A/6 and then the case was adjourned for 17.5.2004 for the same purpose. Even on that date also, he could not appear and then his bail/surety bonds were cancelled. Non-bailable warrants were ordered to be issued against him. He then surrendered himself before the Court on 25.6.2004 and ultimately trial Court acquitted him on 12.7.2004 vide judgment Annexure A/10. Mr. Even on that date also, he could not appear and then his bail/surety bonds were cancelled. Non-bailable warrants were ordered to be issued against him. He then surrendered himself before the Court on 25.6.2004 and ultimately trial Court acquitted him on 12.7.2004 vide judgment Annexure A/10. Mr. Vohra contends that Surinder Kumar had earlier also moved an application Annexure A/8 for his treatment when he was admitted in Model Jail, Chandigarh and the said application was allowed by the concerned Court and the accused was given medical treatment free of costs by the doctor. The learned counsel, however, very fairly states that he is not in possession of the said order. However, dwelling upon his arguments, the learned counsel then states that the first date on which the accused had not appeared was in fact for pronouncement of judgment and according to the provisions of Section 353(6) of Code of Criminal Procedure, the judgment of acquittal could be very well pronounced by the trial Court even in the absence of the accused. The personal appearance of the accused at the time of pronouncement of the judgment of acquittal is not at all required. The order passed by the learned trial Court of cancelling the personal bond/surety bond is, thus, in violation of the provisions of the law. The learned counsel then contends that even otherwise the absence of the accused was not at all intentional in this case and was on account of his chronic ailment. In this regard, he relies upon Annexure A/7 (treatment slip for heart problem of PGI, Chandigarh). 7. On the basis of the aforesaid submissions, the learned counsel contends that the impugned order of the learned trial Court dated 8.7.2004 vide which a penalty of Rs. 20,000/- has been imposed upon Surinder Kumar appellant is a harsh approach and the same is not sustainable in the eye of the law. He then contends that the other two orders of the even date vide which Ramesh Kumar Garg and Prem Lata (appellants) have also been imposed the same penalty of Rs. 20,000/- deserve to be set aside in the same terms. 8. The averments made by Mr. Vohra are contested vehemently by Mr. Rai who submits that the absence of Surinder Kumar appellant was intentional and the trial Court initially after showing some latitude to the appellant has rightly cancelled the bail/surety bond on 17.5.2004. 9. 20,000/- deserve to be set aside in the same terms. 8. The averments made by Mr. Vohra are contested vehemently by Mr. Rai who submits that the absence of Surinder Kumar appellant was intentional and the trial Court initially after showing some latitude to the appellant has rightly cancelled the bail/surety bond on 17.5.2004. 9. I find force in the submissions of Mr. Vohra. Concededly, the outcome of the main case is that appellant Surinder Kumar has earned acquittal. Admittedly on 14.5.2004 also the case was fixed for pronouncement. The flash back of the facts goes to show that on two different dates his personal appearance was exempted by the trial Court itself and that he never absented himself at any stage. It is presumed that in all probabilities the judgment was ready on 14.5.2004 itself, the first date of pronouncement. Assuming for the sake of argument even if Surinder Kumar appellant had not appeared on that date, the judgment of acquittal could very well be pronounced on the first date itself when the trial Court had exempted his personal appearance. Section 353(6) of Code of Criminal Procedure in this eventuality will come into play. For reference, the relevant provision reads thus :- "Section 353(6) :- If the accused is not in custody, he shall be required by the Court to attend to hear the judgment pronounced, except where his personal attendance during the trial has been dispensed with and the sentence is one of fine only or he is acquitted." 10 Acceptance of the application for exemption of personal attendance would amount to dispensing the personal attendance during the trial. Even if we stretch it further, the judgment of acquittal could be pronounced even on the next date i.e. 15.5.2004 and there was no need of adjourning it once again for 17.5.2004 by dispensing with the personal attendance of the accused. 11. As a sequel to the aforesaid facts, in my considered view, order passed by the learned trial Court on 17.5.2004 vide which the bail/surety bonds were ordered to be cancelled is unsustainable. The resultant effect would be that the impugned orders now passed in all the three cases imposing penalty to the main accused as well as to the sureties deserve to be set aside. So ordered. 12. Consequently, all the aforesaid three appeals stand allowed.