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2005 DIGILAW 361 (GAU)

Dilip Das v. State of Assam

2005-05-06

AMITAVA ROY, D.BISWAS

body2005
JUDGMENT Amitava Roy, J. 1. The Appellant assails the order dated 25.2.2002 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. (C) 565/2002 dismissing the writ petition in limine, rejecting thereby the challenge made to his removal from service. The Petitioner a member of the Assam Judicial Service was by order dated 21.6.2001 issued by the Secretary, Govt. of Assam, Judicial Department, removed from service following a departmental proceeding. The departmental appeal was also dismissed. 2. We have heard Mr. A.K. Bhattacharjee and Mr. P. Pathak, Sr. Advocates, assisted by Mrs. P. Barman, Advocate for the Appellant and Mr. B.C. Das, Sr. Advocate, assisted by Mr. S. Dutta and Smt. S. Roy, Advocates for the High Court. 3. The factual background in brief is necessary to better comprehend the competing arguments. The Petitioner was recruited to the Grade III of the Assam Judicial Service in the year 1980 and was appointed as Judicial Magistrate cum Munsiff in the same year. He was thereafter promoted to Grade II of the Service by order/notification dated 7.4.92 and was posted as Chief Judicial Magistrate at Lakhimpur, North Lakhimpur. During his tenure as such, the High Court by order dated 19.12.95 allowed him to hold the charge of the office of the Sessions Judge and accordingly he continued to function both as the Sessions Judge and the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lakhimpur, from 5.1.96 to 20.3.96. He was thereafter transferred and posted as Civil Judge, Senior Division, Cachar, Silchar, by order dated 6.3.97. 4. While the Petitioner was serving at North Lakhimpur in the above capacity, by letter dated 10.9.96 issued by the Registrar (I and E) of this Court, he was asked to submit an explanation on the circumstances leading to passing of bail orders in the cases mentioned therein in the capacity of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lakhimpur, and in-charge Sessions Judge, Lakhimpur and the Petitioner accordingly submitted the same following inspection of the connected records as permitted by the Registry. 5. 5. A memorandum of charges dated 29.9.97 was thereafter served on the Petitioner asking him to show cause under Rule 9 of the Assam Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1964, (hereafter referred to as Rules) read with Article 311 of the Constitution of India as to why any of the penalties prescribed under Rule 7 of the aforesaid Rules should not be inflicted on him on the charges based on the statement of allegations set out therein. The charges were under two broad heads as extracted herein below. (1) That while you had been functioning as Chief judicial Magistrate, Lakhimpur, you granted bail in the following cases arbitrarily without applying judicial mind. (2) That while you had been functioning as the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lakhimpur, and were in-charge of the Sessions Judge, Lakhimpur, during that period you granted pre-arrest anticipatory bail in the following cases injudiciously and without following judicial norms. Under both the heads, the particulars of the cases and the gist of imputations were furnished. 6. The Petitioner in view of the indictments was charged to be guilty of misconduct for having failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty in violation of Rule 3 of the Assam Civil Service (Conduct) Rules, 1965, (hereafter referred to as Conduct Rules). The memorandum of charges was accompanied by the statement of allegations on which charges were based and also a list of documents on which the disciplinary authority sought to rely to substantiate the charges. Subsequent thereto, by a communication dated 22.11.97, the Petitioner was placed under suspension. The Petitioner on 22.1.98 replied contending, inter alia, that the charges related to orders of bail passed in course of his duties as a Judicial Officer and were thus beyond the purview of consideration in a disciplinary proceeding, more so, when the bail orders had attained finality not having been questioned before this Court. He contended that the complaint submitted by the North Lakhimpur Bar, which formed the basis of the proceeding was untrue and was an yield of personal disliking of some of the members of the Bar. While denying the charges, the Petitioner admitted to have granted bail in the cases referred to in the memorandum of charges and pleaded that the bail orders had been passed by applying judicial mind on a consideration of all relevant facts. While denying the charges, the Petitioner admitted to have granted bail in the cases referred to in the memorandum of charges and pleaded that the bail orders had been passed by applying judicial mind on a consideration of all relevant facts. He maintained that while passing such orders, he exercised his judicial discretion to the best of his ability and judgment. He was categorical in asserting that the imputation under charge No. 2 was vague being devoid of material particulars causing serious prejudice to him in replying the same. 7. While detailing the reasons for granting bail in the cases under reference, the Petitioner denied the allegation that he was guilty of misconduct and that he had failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty in violation to the Conduct Rules. Without prejudice to the above, he urged that even if his reasonings in support of the bail orders were found unacceptable, those were unintentional without any element of malafide. 8. By order dated 2.3.98, Shri Habibullah, the then District and Sessions Judge, North Lakhimpur, was appointed the Enquiry Officer and Shri F.U. Laskar, the then Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sonitpur, as the Presenting Officer to conduct the disciplinary proceeding. At this stage, being aggrieved, by the initiation of the departmental proceeding against him, the Petitioner approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India questioning the validity of the proceeding as well as the order of his suspension and the appointment of the Enquiry Officer. He contended therein that the disciplinary proceeding was misconceived and without jurisdiction as by the same, his decisions in the exercise of his discretion as a Judicial Officer was sought to be questioned which was destructive of the immunity granted under the Judicial Officers (Protection) Act, 1850. The writ petition registered as CR1919/98 was dismissed by judgment and order dated 25.6.99 with a direction to complete the proceeding within a period of six months therefrom. The appeal being W.A. 306/99 was also dismissed in limine on 7.9.99. The writ petition registered as CR1919/98 was dismissed by judgment and order dated 25.6.99 with a direction to complete the proceeding within a period of six months therefrom. The appeal being W.A. 306/99 was also dismissed in limine on 7.9.99. In the Review Petition 95/99 that was filed, the Division Bench of this Court by order dated 28.1.2000 clarified that the observations made by the learned Single Judge vis-a-vis the contentions based on the Judicial Officers (Protection) Act, 1850, would not be taken to be an expression of opinion on merits of the case and that the Enquiry Officer would be entitled to take a view as permissible on the basis of the proved facts and in accordance with law. 9. In the Enquiry that proceeded thereafter, three witnesses of the disciplinary authority including Shri Ghanashyam Saikia, Ex-President of the North Lakhimpur Bar Association were examined. Several documents including the records of the cases enumerated in the list of documents were introduced in evidence. No witness was examined by the Petitioner but one document Exhibit "Ka" was proved by him. The enquiry report was thereafter submitted on 29.7.2000 wherein both the charges against the Petitioner were stated to have been proved. By a communication dated 3.11.2000, the Petitioner was forwarded a copy of the enquiry report with a request to submit his reply thereto, if any. In his reply, the Petitioner, interalia, contended that the findings of the Enquiry Officer were based on his personal opinion and not on proven facts. Reiterating that the bail orders in question have been passed by him bonafide in diligent exercise of his judicial discretion he prayed for being exonerated of the charges. 10. His reply having been rejected by this Court in its Full Court meeting, the second notice was issued to him asking him to show cause as to why the penalty of removal from service should not be imposed on him. The Petitioner in his reply reiterated his above stand and without prejudice thereto pleaded that errors if any, in passing the bail orders were without any ill motive and having regard to his unblemished long years of service as a Judicial Officer and the attending family problems confronting him, the charges be dropped as the punishment as proposed, if imposed, would result in extreme hardship to him and his family. By the impugned order dated 21.6.2001, the Petitioner was, however, removed from service on the recommendation of the High Court. The departmental appeal, preferred was also dismissed by the order dated 11.1.2002. 11. No affidavit in opposition has been filed by the Respondents though the relevant records pertaining to the impugned disciplinary proceeding and the records of the concerned bail petitions have been placed before this Court in course of the arguments. 12. Mr. Bhattacharjee has emphatically urged that the charges levelled against the Petitioner being vague and devoid of basic materials rendering those indistinct, unintelligible and unanswerable, the initiation of the disciplinary proceeding being in contravention of the Rules, the same is liable to be adjudged non est in law and consequently the impugned order of penalty and the order of rejection of the departmental appeal are liable to be set aside and quashed. The statement of allegations being mere reiteration of the charges, according to the learned Sr. Counsel, no statement of imputation of misconduct contemplated by the Rules had been furnished. Further the omission to furnish a list of witnesses also vitiated the proceeding due to non-compliance of the essential mandate thereof to the said effect in the Rules. According to Mr. Bhattacharjee as the charges and the purported statement of allegations do not disclose any failure on the part of the Petitioner to maintain integrity or devotion to duty, the same did not constitute any misconduct and therefore, the impugned disciplinary proceeding is on the face of the records unsustainable in law. The related bail orders not having been questioned before or overturned by this Court those had attained finality and, therefore, could not have, in any view of the matter, formed the basis of the charges, he argued. Mr. Bhattacherjee asserted that in absence of any questionable antecedent of the Petitioner or any allegation of irrelevant or extraneous considerations as a motive for passing the bail orders involved, there was no conceivable or logical justification for imposing the penalty of removal, more particularly, when the charges as framed had remained unproved. The bail orders having been passed by the Petitioner in exercise of his judicial discretion, and not alleged to be vitiated by any none-germane or impertinent considerations, the findings of the Enquiry Officer based on his personal notions of propriety could not have formed the basis of any disciplinary action against him, he urged. The bail orders having been passed by the Petitioner in exercise of his judicial discretion, and not alleged to be vitiated by any none-germane or impertinent considerations, the findings of the Enquiry Officer based on his personal notions of propriety could not have formed the basis of any disciplinary action against him, he urged. The learned Sr. Counsel contended that assuming that in any one or more of the cases involved, the bail orders ought not to have been passed in the manner so done, the same at the best were in erroneous exercise of the Petitioner's judicial discretion which in absence of any well defined parameters for the exercise thereof could not be denounced as a misconduct in absence of any allegation of malafide. The learned Senior Counsel emphasized that the High Court exercising its disciplinary control over the subordinate judiciary is expected to protect honest and upright judicial officers against trivial and ill-motivated complaints to avoid a demoralizing effect to the prejudice of justice dispensing system. In any view of the matter, according to him, the penalty imposed is shockingly disproportionate to the charges and is liable to be interfered with. The following decisions of the Apex Court were relied upon by Mr. Bhattacharjee. Madan Mohan Choudhary v. State of Bihar and Ors. (1999) 3 SCC 396 , P.C. Joshi v. State of U.P. and Ors. (2001) 6 SCC 491 , Registrar, High Court of Gujarat and Anr. v. C.G. Sharma (2005) 1 SCC 132 . 13. Mr. Das in reply, has argued that having regard to the office held by the Petitioner at the relevant time and the role he was expected to discharge keeping in view, the societal expectations from a judge as a repository of divine authority application of a stringent yardstick is called for while judging the conduct of a judicial officer. Considering the status and responsibility of a judicial officer and the dignity and majesty of his Office, his conduct needs to be exemplary and thus a purely legalistic approach would not be a decisive test to have a measure thereof. As the justice administration system is founded on the confidence of the society, any issue bearing on the judicial functioning of a Court has to be viewed in the context of the conduct of the officer concerned over a certain period of time and not with reference to isolated instances. As the justice administration system is founded on the confidence of the society, any issue bearing on the judicial functioning of a Court has to be viewed in the context of the conduct of the officer concerned over a certain period of time and not with reference to isolated instances. According to Mr. Das the bail orders rendered over a period taken as a whole manifested that the Petitioner had consciously acted in breach of the settled principles of law in granting bail in criminal cases and as such his conduct being unbecoming of a judicial officer, the disciplinary action based on contemporaneous materials on record does not warrant interference in the greater interest of the System. Mr. Das, in order to highlight his point that the Petitioner in exercise of his judicial discretion ought not to have granted bail in the cases involved, invited our attention to the circumstances in which such orders were passed in the enlisted cases. 14. From this, Mr. Das sought to contend that even in cases involving serious and grave offences the Petitioner readily granted regular as well as anticipatory bail which in the attending facts and circumstances could not be said to be in bonafide exercise of his judicial discretion. He, however, fairly contended that considering the charges framed, the penalty of removal from service might not be called for. The learned Sr. Counsel rested his submissions on the following authorities. High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shri Rishkumar Rangrsao Patil (1997) 6 SCC 339 : AIR 1992 SC 1233 , Union of India and Ors. v. K.K. Dhawan (1993) 2 SCC 56 , High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil and Anr. (2000) 1 SCC 416 . 15. We have extended our anxious consideration to the rival contentions. Before evaluating the arguments bearing on the charge and the proof thereof, it would be expedient to deal with the fringe issues pertaining to the procedural essentials. The disciplinary action at the outset has been questioned on the plea that the charges are indistinct and unintelligible and as the statement of allegations accompanying the charges were only reiteration thereof, no statement of imputation of misconduct were furnished as required under the Rules. Further no list of witness accompanied the memorandum of charges. 16. The disciplinary action at the outset has been questioned on the plea that the charges are indistinct and unintelligible and as the statement of allegations accompanying the charges were only reiteration thereof, no statement of imputation of misconduct were furnished as required under the Rules. Further no list of witness accompanied the memorandum of charges. 16. A bare perusal of the charges evinces that the charge No. 1 contained the allegation that the Petitioner had arbitrarily and without applying judicial mind granted bail in nine cases enlisted thereunder. Under the charge No. 2, the Petitioner has been arraigned for granting pre-arrest/anticipatory bail injudiciously and without following judicial norms in five cases listed thereunder. The circumstances under which in all the cases, the Petitioner had granted bail and the reasons, which had weighed with the disciplinary authority to form an opinion that the orders were passed arbitrarily without applying judicial mind and injudiciously without following judicial norms were set out. The statements of allegations in support of the charges contain in substance, the same narration. 17. The statements of allegations of misconduct are furnished with the charges for providing relevant and supporting facts substantiating the charges so as to facilitate better understanding thereof. However, where in a given case such facts form an integral part of the charges, obviously the statements of imputations of misconduct would essentially be a repetition of the same facts. As in the instant case, the facts which generated the satisfaction of the disciplinary authority that the Petitioner had granted bail in the enlisted cases either without applying judicial mind or injudiciously without following judicial norms form an inseparable part of the charges, the contention that no statement of imputations of misconduct having been furnished to the Petitioner, the initiation of the disciplinary action had been in contravention of the Rules does not appear to be convincing. All relevant facts in support of the charges having been furnished to the Petitioner, who is himself a judicial officer, the plea that the charges are indistinct and unintelligible is also not acceptable. So far as the list of witnesses is concerned, neither any plea to the said effect appears to have been taken in the writ petition nor the attention of this Court has been drawn to any other material on record to even suggest that any such grievance was expressed in course of the departmental enquiry. So far as the list of witnesses is concerned, neither any plea to the said effect appears to have been taken in the writ petition nor the attention of this Court has been drawn to any other material on record to even suggest that any such grievance was expressed in course of the departmental enquiry. In that view of the matter, this contention fails as well. 18. As the essence of the charges is arbitrary granting of bail without applying judicial mind and in non-compliance of judicial norms, it would be apt to notice at the outset the judicially evolved principles guiding such exercise. This is essential also in view of the contention raised on behalf of the Petitioner that the charges on the face of the records do not constitute a misconduct in absence of statutorily prescribed parameters for exercising discretionary powers by a judicial officer in such matters. 19. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. NCT Delhi and Anr. (2001) 4 SCC 208, the Apex Court held that the jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well-settled principles having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in any arbitrary manner. It held that while granting bail, the Court has to keep in mind the nature of accusation, and the evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction would entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being trampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and other similar considerations. The same view was expressed in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan alias Pappu Yadav and Anr. (2004) 7 SCC 528 . It was held therein that the Court granting bail should exercise its discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course and though at the stage of granting bail a detailed examination of evidence and elaborate documentation of the merit of the case need not be done, reasons are required to be indicated for prima facie concluding why bail was granted where the accused is charged of having committed a serious offence. Omission to record reasons was held to be indicative of non-application of mind. 20. In Masnab Ali v. Irsan and Anr. Omission to record reasons was held to be indicative of non-application of mind. 20. In Masnab Ali v. Irsan and Anr. (2003) 1 SCC 632 , the Apex Court expressed itself on the issue in the following words: The provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure confer discretionary jurisdiction on criminal Courts to grant bail to the accused pending trials or in appeals against convictions. Since the jurisdiction is discretionary, it is required to be exercised with great care and caution by balancing valuable right of liberty of an individual and the interest of the society in general. In granting or refusing the bail, the Courts are required to indicate, may be very briefly, the reasons for grant or refusal of bail. The jurisdiction is not to be exercised in a casual and cavalier fashion as has been done by the learned judge in this case. (Emphasis supplied) 21. While dealing with the scope of judicial discretion in granting anticipatory bail under Section 438 Code of Criminal Procedure, the Apex Court in Sri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and Ors. v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 565 , held that such a discretion should not be read down by reading into the statute conditions that are not found to be therein and Courts have to be allowed a little free play in the joints if the conferment of discretionary power is to be meaningful. While highlighting that there could be numerous considerations which may weigh with the Courts while granting or rejecting anticipatory bail, it cited considerations like nature and seriousness of the proposed charges, the context of the events likely to lead to the making of the charges, a reasonable possibility of the applicant's presence not being secured at the trial, a reasonable apprehension that witnesses will be tampered with and larger interest of public or the State to be borne in mind in deciding an application for anticipatory bail. While stating that there would be a risk in foreclosing categories of cases in which anticipatory bail maybe granted, the Apex Court at the same sounded a word of caution to the effect that the discretion always has to be exercised by Courts judiciously and not according to whims, caprice or fancy. 22. The words "Judicious" and "Judiciously" have received judicial interpretation and have been reproduced in Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 50, as hereunder. 22. The words "Judicious" and "Judiciously" have received judicial interpretation and have been reproduced in Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 50, as hereunder. Judicious: Directed or governed by sound judgment; rational. Judiciously: To act skillfully with discretion or wisdom; prudently; directed or governed by sound judgment; rational. 23. The judicial dicta on the grant or refusal of a prayer for bail, therefore, clearly demonstrate that the discretion exercisable by a Court while considering a prayer for bail is not unfettered. Though the list of considerations to steer the exercise of such discretion is not exhaustive and a decision has to be taken in the facts of each case, a Court has to essentially apply its mind to the prevailing facts and circumstances, notice the gravity of the offence, the penalty therefore prescribed by law, the materials existing/forthcoming against the applicant accused, the chances of his interfering with the investigation and of fleeing from justice as also the justifiability of granting bail balancing the interest of the applicant accused vis-a-vis of the society at large. It is unmistakably manifest that the discretion has to be exercised in a judicious manner and not at one's whims and humour. It is, therefore, that reasons in support of an order granting/refusing bail is insisted upon to decipher the considerations, which had weighed with the judicial officer in passing such an order. 24. So far as a Court other than the High Court or a Court of Session is concerned, the primary conditions under which bail may be granted in non-bailable offences have been set out in Section 437 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Though in the matter of pre-arrest or anticipatory bail, High Court or the Court of Session has been conferred the power to grant the same as it may think fit, the same does not postulate conferment of any uncontrolled discretion to exercise such power. In other words, the discretion conferred by law in the matter of granting or refusing bail is not absolute but has to be guided mandatorily by objectivity, rationality, prudence, reason and relevance. The charges drawn against the Petitioner, therefore, cannot be discarded on the specious ground of want of any judicially recognized criteria regulating the exercise of discretion in the matter of grant or refusal of bail. 25. The authorities cited at the bar may now be referred. 26. The charges drawn against the Petitioner, therefore, cannot be discarded on the specious ground of want of any judicially recognized criteria regulating the exercise of discretion in the matter of grant or refusal of bail. 25. The authorities cited at the bar may now be referred. 26. In Madan Mohan Choudhary v. State of Bihar and Anr. (supra), the Appellant was compulsorily retired from service for a single act of granting anticipatory bail in a criminal case under Section 307 IPC. The Apex Court in the facts of the case held that the order of bail was passed on the judicial side with all bonafide and was not a motivated order passed on extraneous considerations. The impugned decision was interfered with on the ground that there was no material on the basis of which an opinion could be reasonably formed that it was called for in public interest. The Apex Court in this context while dwelling on the aspect of disciplinary control of the High Court over the subordinate judiciary under Article 235 of the Constitution of India highlighted that the High Court's role in extending its advise or opinion to the Governor in the matter of any disciplinary action was solemn in nature and that it is not expected to act arbitrarily lest it would result in a betrayal of trust and confidence between the Governor and the High Court. 27. The decision of the Apex Court in P.C. Joshi v. State of U.P. and Ors. (supra), witnesses almost a similar fact situation where based on a decision taken by the Appellant on some applications for bail, following a disciplinary proceeding, he was terminated from service. The Apex Court noticed in the contextual facts that specific materials to indicate malafide or extraneous reasons on the part of the Appellant in passing the orders were absent. It held that though it was possible in a given set of facts to arrive at a different conclusion, it cannot be a ground to indict a judicial officer for taking one view and that too for alleged misconduct for that reason alone. It held that though it was possible in a given set of facts to arrive at a different conclusion, it cannot be a ground to indict a judicial officer for taking one view and that too for alleged misconduct for that reason alone. As there was no material to reflect on the Appellants reputation or integrity or goods faith or devotion to duty or to indicate that he had been actuated by any corrupt motive, the most that could be said was that the Appellant's view was not proper or correct but it was riot possible to impute any motive to him that he had acted in that manner for any extraneous consideration. Recalling its decision in Union of India and Ors. v. K.K. Dhawan (1993) 2 SCC 56 , wherein the eventualities in which a disciplinary action was permissible to be initiated against an officer exercising judicial or quasi judicial powers were formulated, it ruled that if in every case where an order of a subordinate Court is found to be faulty and a disciplinary action is to be initiated, the confidence of the subordinate judiciary would be shaken and the officers would be in a constant fear of writing the judgment so as not to face a disciplinary enquiry thus preventing it from acting independently and fearlessly. The dictum in K.K. Dhawan, (supra), that merely because the order is wrong, or that the decision taken could have been different, does not warrant initiation of disciplinary proceeding against the judicial officer, was reiterated. 28. The decision of the Apex Court in Registrar, High Court of Gujarat and Anr. v. C.G. Sharma (supra), has been pressed into service to highlight the oft repeated judicial edict requiring the High Court to protect its honest officers by ignoring ill-conceived or motivated complaints lest the subordinate judiciary is rendered unable to administer justice in an independent and honest manner. 29. The essential and exclusive traits of a judicial officer distinguishing him from a common man and his expected conduct in discharging his judicial functions and the image that he is supposed to project were recorded in unequivocal terms by the Apex Court in High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shri Rishkumar Rangrsao Patil and Anr. (supra). 29. The essential and exclusive traits of a judicial officer distinguishing him from a common man and his expected conduct in discharging his judicial functions and the image that he is supposed to project were recorded in unequivocal terms by the Apex Court in High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shri Rishkumar Rangrsao Patil and Anr. (supra). While highlighting in details the role of a judicial officer in the administration of justice, it was emphasized in no uncertain terms that his conduct should be above reproach so as to maintain the confidence of the people in the judiciary. The 14th report of the Law Commission, quoted with approval in All India Judges' Association v. Union of India (1992) 1 SCC 119 was referred to which we profitably quote hereunder. If the public is to give profound respect to the judges, the judges should by their conduct try and observe it; not by word or deed should they give cause for the people that they do not deserve the pedestal on which we expect the public to place them. It appears to us that not only for the performance of his duties but outside the Court as well a judge has to maintain an aloofness amounting almost to self-imposed isolation. 30. While reiterating the caution that the High Court should take care of the judicial officers and protect them from unseeming attempts or pressures so as to maintain their morale and independence and support the honest and upright officers, it held that if the evidence adduced during the departmental enquiry revealed the proclivity of corrupt conduct on the part of a judicial officer and the enquiry into his conduct is fair and germane imposition of punishment should be proportionate to the magnitude of the misconduct. 31. The Apex Court in Union of India and Ors. v. A.N. Saxena, (supra) while negating the argument that no disciplinary action could be taken for actions done or purported to be done in the course of judicial or quasi judicial proceedings, held that such a proceeding should be taken after great caution and a close scrutiny of his actions and only if circumstances so warrant. 32. v. A.N. Saxena, (supra) while negating the argument that no disciplinary action could be taken for actions done or purported to be done in the course of judicial or quasi judicial proceedings, held that such a proceeding should be taken after great caution and a close scrutiny of his actions and only if circumstances so warrant. 32. The decision of the Apex Court in Union of India v. K.K. Dhawn, (supra) has been relied upon to impress upon this Court that an officer exercising judicial or quasi judicial powers if acts negligently or recklessly or to confer undue favour on a person can be subjected to a disciplinary action. It was, however, added that no absolute rule could be presupposed in the matter and that a mere technical violation or wrong would not invite a disciplinary action. The Apex Court catalogued the eventualities when such action was permissible, two of such instances being when the officer concerned acts in a manner as would reflect on his reputation, integrity or good faith or devotion to duty or if prima facie material exists to show recklessness or misconduct in the discharge of duty. 33. The decision of the Apex Court in High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil, (supra) has been principally relied upon to underline the limited scope of interference with a decision of a departmental authority in exercise of this Court's jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The contours of judicial review of an order of administration/disciplinary authority as succinctly recorded in paragraph 16 of the judgment read thus: The Division Bench of the High Court seems to have approached the case as though it was an appeal against the order of the administrative/disciplinary authority of the High Court. Interference with the decision of departmental authorities can be permitted, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution if such authority had held proceedings in violation of the principles of natural justice or in violation of statutory regulations prescribing the mode of such enquiry or if the decision of the authority is vitiated by considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case, or if the conclusion made by the authority, on the very face of it, is wholly arbitrary or capricious that no reasonable person could have arrived at such a conclusion, or grounds very similar to the above. But we cannot overlook that the department authority (in this case the Disciplinary Committee of the High Court) is the sole judge of the facts, if the enquiry has been properly conducted. The settled legal position is that if there is some legal evidence on which the findings can be based, then adequacy or even reliability of that evidence is not a matter for canvassing before the High Court in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. 34. Having thus noticed, the graphic exposition of the relevant legal prescriptions, it is time to advert to the findings of the Enquiry officer vis-a-vis the charges, defence of the Petitioner and the contemporaneous materials having a bearing on the bail orders in question. This is deemed necessary as the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer and the reasons in support thereof had wholly weighed with the Full Court as well as the appellate authority in deciding to inflict the penalty of removal from service on the Petitioner. For this, materials available on records of the enlisted cases in which the Petitioner had passed orders of bail need be noticed to be tested on the touchstone of the judicially propounded edicts governing judicial review. Charge No. 1(I) GR Case No. 1117/89 (NLP P.S. Case No. 729/89 under Section 342/379/34 IPC) Charge sheet against the accused Prafulla Gogoi was submitted on 8.11.89 under Section 321/34 IPC. Prafulla Gogoi was granted bail on 22.9.90 but was thereafter absent without steps from 21.2.1991 and non-bailable warrants had to be issued to secure his attendance. The accused surrendered on 4.7.96 and bail was granted to him on the very same date on his prayer but no reason was recorded in the said order. The record discloses that an application for bail had been filed on his behalf contending that as he was away to Arunachal Pradesh for earning his livelihood and leave was not granted to him and further as he was not aware of the warrant of arrest he could not be present on the earlier dates. It is noticeable that the offence was under Section 341/34 IPC, which is a bailable one, and the procedure for trial is summons procedure. It is noticeable that the offence was under Section 341/34 IPC, which is a bailable one, and the procedure for trial is summons procedure. The Enquiry officer was of the view that the fact that the offence was triable by summons procedure was irrelevant as the accused had jumped bail and had been absconding and as no reason had been assigned in the order granting bail, the same lacks transparency and application of judicial mind. Having regard to the grounds taken in the application for bail and the fact that the offence is a bailable one triable by a summons procedure, the determination of the Enquiry officer that the bail order lacks transparency and application of judicial mind being in the realm of inference only without backed by any material on record is illogical and hence unsustainable. Charge No. 1 (II) GR Case No. 1293/95 (NLP P.S. Case No. 567/95 under Section 409 IPC) The accused Idrish Ali was arrested and produced on 9.1.96 and was remanded to judicial custody till 22.1.96. On 10.1.96, a bail application was filed on medical ground. The application was accompanied by a medical certificate dated 9.1.96 issued by the Sr. Medical and Health Officer, Office of the Joint Director of Health Services, North Lakhimpur. In terms of the medical certificate, the accused was suffering from "Ischaemic Heart Disease" and advised rest by the attending doctor with strict dietary control for a month w.e.f. 2/1/96. The bail order passed by the Petitioner discloses that the learned Public Prosecutor had no objection in granting bail on medical ground. The Enquiry Officer has returned a finding that the bail was granted mechanically on medical ground on the basis of a medical certificate by a private medical practitioner without either enquiring into the grounds of ailments or calling for a report from the jail doctor or getting the accused examined at the civil hospital. The enquiry officer also expressed his reservation on the ground that the offence was one of misappropriation and that the forwarding report revealed incriminating materials against the accused and that the investigation was in progress. Having regard to the fact that bail was prayed for on health ground supported by a medical certificate issued by none-less than the Sr. The enquiry officer also expressed his reservation on the ground that the offence was one of misappropriation and that the forwarding report revealed incriminating materials against the accused and that the investigation was in progress. Having regard to the fact that bail was prayed for on health ground supported by a medical certificate issued by none-less than the Sr. Medical and Health Officer, Office of the Joint Director of Health Services, North Lakhimpur, as well as the nature of the ailment and the medical advice, the conclusion of the Enquiry officer being in disregard of the relevant materials on record is unsustainable, more particularly, when the learned Public Prosecutor had no objection to the grant of bail. Charge No. 1 (III) GR Case No. 971/95 (B.P.R. P.S. Case No. 345/95 under Section 457/427/385/506/34 IPC.) The accused Shri Nilotpal Saikia was arrested and produced on 15/8/95 and was remanded up to 29.8.95. On his prayer for bail on the strength of a medical certificate dated 14.8.95 issued by Sr. Medical and Health Officer, Office of the Joint Director of Health Services, North Lakhimpur, he was granted interim bail on 15.8.92 upto 21.8.95. The medical certificate discloses that the accused was suffering from Amoebic Hepatitis. The interim bail was made absolute on 22.8.95 but no reason was recorded in support thereof. The Enquiry Officer has been of the view that the Petitioner granted bail with a predetermined mind without any objective assessment of facts by overlooking the gravity of the offence and without making any enquiry into the ground of ailment by subjecting the accused to medical examination at the civil hospital. Objection has also been taken for making the interim bail absolute without recording reasons or calling for the case diary. As the medical certificate had been issued by a Government Doctor, the grant of interim bail on the ground of the ailment mentioned in the certificate from which the accused had been suffering cannot be said to be passed with a predetermined mind. The finding of the Enquiry Officer that the Petitioner had proceeded with a predetermined mind to grant bail has no factual foundation and therefore cannot be sustained. We are, however, constrained to observe that there was a serious omission on the part of the Petitioner in making the interim order of bail absolute within a week without recording reasons therefor. The finding of the Enquiry Officer that the Petitioner had proceeded with a predetermined mind to grant bail has no factual foundation and therefore cannot be sustained. We are, however, constrained to observe that there was a serious omission on the part of the Petitioner in making the interim order of bail absolute within a week without recording reasons therefor. Charge No. 1 (IV) GR Case No. 777/96 (NL P.S. Case No. 437/96 under Section 498(a) IPC.) The accused Nasimuddin Ahmed was granted bail on 7.8.96 acting on a medical certificate dated5.8.96 issued by the Sr. Government Medical and Health Officer, Health and Family Welfare, Government of Assam posted at North Lakhimpur Civil Hospital certifying to the effect that the accused was suffering from "Peptic Ulcer Syndrome" requiring further investigation with advice for one months rest w.e.f. 1.9.96. The bail order also records that the learned Public Prosecutor had no objection to the prayer made. According to the Enquiry Officer, the bail order was passed in mechanical exercise of judicial discretion as neither the medical certificate disclosed that the accused was ailing on the date of bail nor was any document of investigation was annexed thereto in support of the illness. According to the Enquiring Officer, the allegation was grave being of cruelty due to dowry demand and that the accused ought to have been send to the civil hospital for medical examination. Considering the contents of the medical certificate dated 5.8.96 issued by the Government Doctor, the finding that the accused was not suffering from the certified illness on the date of bail is unfounded. The allegation of mechanical exercise of judicial discretion in the above setting of facts bearing in mind the absence of any objection by the learned Public prosecutor to the prayer for bail is perverse being not supported by the available facts. Charge No. 1 (V) GR Case No. 540/96 (Dhakuakhana P.S. case No. 142/96 under Section 376 IPC.) The accused Anil Bora was arrested and produced on 5.6.96 and remanded up to 19.6.96. The statement of the victim girl was recorded on 5.6.96 in course of which she stated that she consented to the act as the accused promised to marry her. No allegation of misrepresentation is traceable. The statement of the victim girl was recorded on 5.6.96 in course of which she stated that she consented to the act as the accused promised to marry her. No allegation of misrepresentation is traceable. The age of the victim girl in the recorded statement was mentioned to be 18 years and in the Doctor's report following her medical examination on 4.6.96, her age was recorded to be 20 years based on X-Ray findings. The accused was released on bail on 7.6.96 after consulting the case diary. The Enquiry Officer has entered a finding that there was no application of judicial mind in passing the bail order as apart from the allegation being grave creating a sensation in the locality, the consent of the victim girl had been obtained on misrepresentation and it was doubtful that the girl was a major. In view of the materials in the proceedings for bail noticed hereinabove, the view taken by the Petitioner was a plausible one and as the deduction of the Enquiry Officer seems to be without taking note of the relevant facts decipherable from the records, the same cannot be sustained. Charge No. 1 (VI) GR Case No. 785/96 (NL P.S. Case No. 443/96 under Section 409 IPC) The accused concerned was arrested and produced on 2.8.96 and was handed out an order of remand for 14 days. On 3.8.96, on an application for bail, the case diary was called for fixing 5.8.96. The case diary was perused on 5.8.96 and it was noticed that the statements of witnesses were recorded and that major part of the investigation was complete. The accused was released on bail subject to the condition of appearing before the Investigating Officer for the purpose of investigation and not to leave the head quarters without the prior permission of the Court. Exception has been taken by the Enquiry Officer observing that the grant of bail was in mechanical exercise of discretion as the offence involved misappropriation of huge amount of public money and the order sheet did not show that incriminating materials were absent against the accused. This finding also, according to us, overlooks reasons in support of bail as enumerated herein above and being the outcome of non-consideration of relevant materials on records, suffers from an error of law and is thus unsustainable. This finding also, according to us, overlooks reasons in support of bail as enumerated herein above and being the outcome of non-consideration of relevant materials on records, suffers from an error of law and is thus unsustainable. Charge No. 1 (VII) GR Case No. 511/96 (BPR P.S. Case No. 150/96 under Section 409/468 IPC.) The accused Phanidhar Hazarika prayed for bail on 6.6.96 on medical ground producing the medical certificate issued by the Sr. Medical and Health Officer, North Lakhimpur. The certificate indicated that the accused was suffering from "Ischaemic Heart Disease" coupled with hypertension and that he had been advised rest with dietary restriction for one-month w.e.f. 2.6.96. The bail order discloses that the Additional Public Prosecutor of the State had no objection to the grant of bail on medical ground. The Enquiry Officer has concluded mat the Petitioner in granting bail had mechanically exercised his judicial discretion inasmuch as the offence involved misappropriation of public money and that the FIR was filed by the Deputy Commissioner, North Lakhimpur. Further, according to the enquiry Officer, grant of bail on medical ground on the same date without verifying the ailment or referring the accused to a civil hospital was unwarranted. Considering the fact that bail was sought for and granted on medical ground, on a consideration of the medical certificate issued by a Government Doctor to which ho objection was raised by the learned Public Persecutor, the considerations on which the Enquiry Officer recorded his above finding appearing to be irrelevant and therefore, cannot be upheld. Charge No. 1 (VIII) GR Case No. 99/95 (Dhakuakhana P.S. Case No. 24/95 under Section 409 IPC) The accused Rudra Kanta Kachari surrendered on 21.4.95 and applied for bail on the very same date on medical ground supported by a medical certificate issued by the Medical and Health Officer, North Lakhimpur Civil Hospital. The medical certificate disclosed that the accused was suffering from "Atopic Heart Beat" and was advised rest with dietary restriction and constant medical supervision. Bail was granted on the ground of the illness of the accused acting on the medical certificate. The bail order discloses that the learned Public Prosecutor had no objection to the grant of bail. Interim bail was granted up to 21.4.95. The interim bail was, however, made absolute on 9.5.95 without recording any reason. Bail was granted on the ground of the illness of the accused acting on the medical certificate. The bail order discloses that the learned Public Prosecutor had no objection to the grant of bail. Interim bail was granted up to 21.4.95. The interim bail was, however, made absolute on 9.5.95 without recording any reason. The Enquiry Officer has recorded that though the offence involved misappropriation of huge amount of public money, bail was granted on the very date of surrender without verifying the genuineness of ailment or referring the accused person to the civil hospital. Further the interim bail was made absolute without recording any reason. So far as the grant of interim bail is concerned, we are of the considered view that the grounds cited by the Enquiry Officer are not relevant to conclude that the Petitioner had exercise his judicial discretion mechanically or on any extraneous consideration. We are, however, of the view, that while making the interim bail absolute, the Petitioner ought to have recorded reasons in support thereof, more particularly, when the interim bail had been granted on medical ground. The Petitioner appeared to be in haste in passing the final order of bail. Charge No. 1 (IX) GR Case No. 767/96 (B.P.R. P.S. Case No. 224/96 under Section 468/420 IPC.) The accused persons were arrested and produced in Court on 3.8.96 and on the prayer of the Investigating Agency was remanded police custody for 24 hours. On their production on 4.8.96, they were remanded to judicial custody. On a payer for bail on that date, they were granted interim bail upto 16.8.96 as according to the Petitioner, interrogation in the police custody did not yield incriminating materials against them. The order was passed on perusal of the FIR and the Police report. The interim bail was made absolute on 16.8.96 without recording any reason. The Enquiry Officer had been of the view that the offence, besides being grave, the interim bail ought not to have been granted without perusing the case diary. As the forwarding report indicates involvement of the accused, interim bail ought not to have been mode absolute without recording reasons. So far as the granting of interim bail is concerned, we do not consider that the reason recorded in support thereof is irrelevant or that the Petitioner had exercised his judicial discretion in an unwarranted and uncalled manner. As the forwarding report indicates involvement of the accused, interim bail ought not to have been mode absolute without recording reasons. So far as the granting of interim bail is concerned, we do not consider that the reason recorded in support thereof is irrelevant or that the Petitioner had exercised his judicial discretion in an unwarranted and uncalled manner. However, reasons ought to have been recorded by him while making the interim bail absolute. As the grant of regular bail presupposes full satisfaction about the entitlement therefor, reasons ought to have been recorded to reflect the considerations on which the Petitioner was satisfied that the interim bail deserved to be made absolute. Charge No. 2(1) Crl. Misc. Case No. 12/96 (Dibrugarh P.S. Case No. 572/95 under Section 408 IPC.) The accused Ananta Dutta applied for pre-arrest bail apprehending arrest by the North Lakhimpur Police in view of the message dated 3.2.96 issued by the Investigating Officer, Dibrugarh Police Station. Bail was prayed for on the ground of his illness. The Petitioner granted bail recording that the accused was suffering from acute Bronchitis and Hypertension. The medical certificate is not available on records and the pre-arrest bail was granted without calling for or consulting the FIR or the case diary. The Enquiry Officer has concluded that there had been no judicious application of mind by the Petitioner in granting bail inasmuch as neither the FIR nor the Police Report was called for or perused. No attempt for any objective assessment of the attending facts and circumstances was made. Having regard to the fact that the accused was granted bail on medical ground, it cannot per se be held that there had been no judicial exercise of discretion by the Petitioner. However, as the prayer was for pre-arrest bail, he ought to have, in our view, consulted the FIR and/or the case diary before passing the order of bail. The absence of medical certificate from the records also remains unexplained. Charge No. 2 (II) Crl. Misc. Case No. 5/96 (Dhakuakhana P.S. Case No. 231/95 under Section 302/365/34 IPC.) In criminal misc. case 5/96, the accused Jiten Hasda made a prayer for pre-arrest bail on 19.1.96. Case diary was called for fixing 22.1.96, 24.1.96 and 29.1.96. The absence of medical certificate from the records also remains unexplained. Charge No. 2 (II) Crl. Misc. Case No. 5/96 (Dhakuakhana P.S. Case No. 231/95 under Section 302/365/34 IPC.) In criminal misc. case 5/96, the accused Jiten Hasda made a prayer for pre-arrest bail on 19.1.96. Case diary was called for fixing 22.1.96, 24.1.96 and 29.1.96. As the case diary was not received, bail was granted on 30.1.96 recording inter alia that the accused was named in the FIR and that there was an allegation that he had taken the deceased to some unknown place and thereafter the dead body was found in the courtyard of the complainant. The bail was granted on the consideration that there was no direct implication of the accused in the offence and that he was a teacher in the local school. Though it was further recorded in the order that the accused was suffering from hypertension, the corresponding medical certificate is not on record. Criminal Misc. case 6/96 was registered on the prayer for pre-arrest bail by the accused Balin Saren involved in the same offence. He too was granted bail on 30.1.96 on the same considerations except that he was recorded to be suffering from bronchitis asthma. His medical certificate by the Sr. Medical and Health Officer, North Lakhimpur, however, is available on records. The Enquiry officer came to the conclusion that the Petitioner while granting bail overlooked material facts bearing on the involvement of the accused as was borne out by the FIR. The Petitioner further did not examine the genuineness of the ailments and left out of consideration the fact that the CD was before the High Court. Having regard to the fact that the alleged offence was of murder, we are of the opinion that the view taken by the Enquiry Officer is a plausible one. The bail order discloses that the accused persons were named in the FIR and were alleged to have taken away the deceased to some unknown place whereafter the dead body was recovered. It further transpires that at the relevant time the case diary had been produced before this Court. In view of the gravity of offence alleged and the materials on record, we are of the view that the conclusion of the Enquiry Officer is not assailable. Charge No. 2(III) Crl. Misc. It further transpires that at the relevant time the case diary had been produced before this Court. In view of the gravity of offence alleged and the materials on record, we are of the view that the conclusion of the Enquiry Officer is not assailable. Charge No. 2(III) Crl. Misc. Case No. 26/96 (Bihpuria P.S. Case No. 73/96 under Section 406/409 IPC.) The accused Mridul Phukan was granted bail on20.3.96 on the ground of delay in forwarding the FIR by the Superintendent of Police, North Lakhimpur to the Officer-in-charge, Bihpuria Police Station, for registration and that the accused being a Junior Engineer in Government Service, there was no likelihood of his absconding or interfering with the investigation. The order of pre-arrest bail has been dubbed as one without application of judicious mind by the Enquiry Officer on the ground that the Petitioner had granted bail by overlooking the gravity of offence which involved misappropriation of public money. No attempt was made to call for the FIR and/or the case diary. The consideration that the Petitioner was at the relevant time a Government Servant of the rank of Junior Engineer and that he would not abuse his liberty if granted, cannot be said to be wholly irrelevant in the exercise of powers of the grant of pre-arrest bail. Though it would have been discreet on the part of the Petitioner to consult the FIR and/or the case diary having regard to the immediate adverse consequences that would have visited the accused persons had the bail been refused, the Petitioner cannot be charged of arbitrary exercise of judicial discretion. Charge No. 2 (IV) Crl. Misc. Case No. 51/96 (North Lakhimpur P.S. Case No. 388/96 Under Section 457/354/323/366/511 IPC.) The accused Manik Saikia having applied for pre-arrest bail, case diary was called for fixing 16.7.96 and 18.7.96. However, on 17.7.96 bail was granted on perusal of the case diary. It is recorded in the order that the accused was named in the FIR and that though the allegation was that the accused had attempted to kidnap the victim, the statement of the victim girl revealed that he only gagged her mouth The bail was granted on the ground that the materials did not disclose any ingredient that there was an attempt to kidnap. The Enquiry Officer has preferred to abstain from making any comment on the order in absence of any FIR or statement of the victim girl on record. In view of the above, no determination by us on this limb of the charge is warranted, more particularly, when the reasons recorded by the Petitioner in support of the bail order are not irrelevant. Charge No. 2 (V) Crl. Misc. Case No. 50/96 (North Lakhimpur P.S. Case No. 387/96 under Section457/354/511/376 IPC.) The accused Sida Dutta having applied for pre-arrest bail on 12.7.96, the case diary was called for fixing 16.7.96 and eventually bail was granted on 18.7.96 recording that the Investigating Agency had failed to produce the case diary without any reason. The bail order discloses that the accused person was named in the FIR and that he had allegedly dragged the victim with the intention to commit rape but ran away due to presence of her husband. It was further recorded that the victim in her statement under Section 164 Code of Criminal Procedure stated that the accused had raped her. Bail was granted on the ground that the allegations made in the FIR ran counter to the statements of the victim girl and that there was no ingredient of rape. The Enquiry Officer has held mat mere has been a total non-application of mind in granting bail inasmuch as neither the FIR nor the statement of the victim girl was on record and that the written objection of the victim's husband resisting the prayer for bail was not considered. According to him, considering the gravity of the offence, the case diary ought to have been insisted upon. The application for bail having been mode on 12.7.96, considering the gravity of offence, we are of the opinion that the conclusion recorded by the Enquiry officer is neither irrational nor illogical. The bail was granted within a week of the application without perusing the case diary on being acquainted with the updated materials collected in course of the investigation. 35. Would the above revelations, therefore, justify a conclusion that the Petitioner in passing the bail orders in the cases under scrutiny had acted arbitrarily without applying judicial mind or had acted injudiciously without following judicial norms? 35. Would the above revelations, therefore, justify a conclusion that the Petitioner in passing the bail orders in the cases under scrutiny had acted arbitrarily without applying judicial mind or had acted injudiciously without following judicial norms? As noticed herein above, the penalty of removal from service was imposed on the recommendation of die High Court and the appeal against the order of penalty was dismissed. Neither the order of penalty nor the order passed in an appeal contains any discussion or reason for concurring with the findings of the Enquiry Officer presumably in view of the recommendation of the High Court to the above effect. Be that as it may, as the above aspect of the matter has not been pressed before us, we would confine our attention to the sustainability of the impugned action vis-a-vis the determinations of the Enquiry Officer. 36. As it is the judicially determined norms or the exercise of powers under judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India have by this time been authoritatively outlined. We wish to recapitulate the pristine words of the Apex Court for our benefit before we once again focus on the findings of the Enquiry Officer for our final conclusions. 37. The Apex Court in Municipal Board, Saharanpur v. imperial Tobacco of India Ltd. and Anr. (1999) 1 SCC 566 , held that while invoking it jurisdiction under Article 226and 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court would not act as a Court of appeal and only patent errors of law decipherable in the orders of the authorities could be corrected. 38. The Apex Court laid down in R.K. Jain v. Union of India (1993) 4 SCC 119 that judicial review aims to protect a citizen from breaches of non-exercise of power or lack of power. It held that the functionary concerned must be guided by relevant and germane considerations and if the proceedings, decision or order is influenced by extraneous considerations which ought not have been taken into account, it cannot stand and needs corrections no matter what the nature of the statutory body or Status or stature of the constitutional functionary is though it might have acted in goods faith. It ruled that the Court in its judicial review is not concerned with the merits of the decision but its legality and, therefore, its function is to see that the lawful authority is not abused. 39. Dwelling on the concept of "error of law, the Apex Court in Mukunda Bora v. Bangshidhar Buragohain and Ors. AIR 1980 SC 1524 held that a finding based on no evidence or purely on surmises and conjectures or which is manifestly against the basic principles of natural justice maybe said to suffer from such an error. 40. In Indian Railways Construction Company Limited v. Ajay Kumar (2003) 4 SCC 579 , the Apex Court dilating on the scope of judicial interference with the exercise of any discretionary power observed thus. One can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds on which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground is "illegality", the second "irrationality", and the third "Procedural impropriety". These principles were highlighted by Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil services. If the power to relevant factors, the exercise of power will be regarded as manifestly erroneous. If a power (wherether legislative or administrative) is exercised on the basis of facts, which do not exist and which are patently erroneous, such exercise of Power will stand vitiated. .... .... Therefore, to arrive at a decision on "reasonableness" the Court has to find out if the administrator has left out relevant factors or taken into account irrelevant factors. The decision of the administrator must have been within reasonably arrived at, having regard to the above principles, and must have been a bona fide one. The decision could be one of many choices open to the authority but it was for that authority to decide upon the choice and not for the court to substitute its view. To complete the narration on the topic, the classic passage from me judgment of Lord Green in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation (1947) 2 All ER 680, summarizing the cardinal principles relating to judicial review of administrative discretion is profitably extracted hereunder. It is true that discretion must be exercised reasonably. Now what does that mean? Lawyers familiar with the phraseology used in relation to exercise of statutory discretions often use the word 'unreasonable' in a rather comprehensive sense. It is true that discretion must be exercised reasonably. Now what does that mean? Lawyers familiar with the phraseology used in relation to exercise of statutory discretions often use the word 'unreasonable' in a rather comprehensive sense. It has frequently been used and is frequently used as a general description of the things that must not be done. For instance, a person intrusted with a discretion must, so to speak, direct himself properly in law. He must call his own attention to the matters, which he is bound to consider, He must exclude from his consideration matters, which are irrelevant to what he has to consider. If he does not obey those rules, he may truly be said, and often is said, to be acting, 'unreasonably'. Similarly, mere may be something so absurd that no sensible person could even dream that it lay within the powers of the authority.... In Anr., it is taking into consideration extraneous matters. It is unreasonable that it might almost be described as being done in bad faith; and in fact, all these things run into one Anr. 41. Applying the above judicially enounced principles, the findings of the Enquiry Officer vis-a-vis Charge 1(I), 1(II), 1(IV), 1(V), 1(VI), 1(VII), 2(III) and 2(IV) in view of our determination on the basis of the materials available on record cannot be sustained. Though there is no evidence of any malafide or any irrelevant or extraneous consideration prompting the passing of the orders in the cases illustrated under charge 1(III), 1(VIII), 1(IX), 2(I), 2(II) and 2(V), we are of the view that the Petitioner had strayed from the settled principles of law guiding the discretion of a Court in entertaining prayers for bail. As observed hereinabove, though a Court is vested with a discretion in such matters, same is not unguided or unfettered and is rather circumscribed by the statutorily ordained prescriptions and precedential edicts on the subject. A judicial officer exercising such discretion, therefore, is expected not only to be acquainted with such restrictions but also is required to be careful and circumspect in passing orders on the prayer for bail. The orders passed must not be suggestive of ignorance or defiance of legislative guidelines or the judicially evolved principles. A judicial officer exercising such discretion, therefore, is expected not only to be acquainted with such restrictions but also is required to be careful and circumspect in passing orders on the prayer for bail. The orders passed must not be suggestive of ignorance or defiance of legislative guidelines or the judicially evolved principles. A delicate yet a real balance has to be maintained between the discretion available and the exercise thereof in consonance with the guiding mandates prescribed by law or judicially pronounced. 42. In the case under charge No. 1(III), the interim order of bail passed on 15.8.95 was made absolute on 22.8.95 without recording any reason though the interim bail had been granted on medical ground. In the case under charge 1(VIII), the interim bail granted to the accused on medical ground on 21.4.95 was made absolute on 9.5.95 without recording any reason. Similarly in case under charge 1(IX), the interim bail granted on 4.8.96 was made absolute on 16.8.96 without recording any reason. Pre-arrest bail was granted to the accused under charge 2(I) without perusing and/or calling either the FIR or the case diary. In case under charge 2(II) though the offence alleged was interalia of murder, pre-arrest bail was granted to the accused persons without waiting for the case diary though it is on record that the same at the relevant time was before this Court. From the narration in the orders of bail, it is apparent that the accused persons were named in the FIR and had taken away the deceased to some unknown place before the dead body was found. Yet the Petitioner concluded that there was no direct implication of the accused in the offence and granted bail. In case under charge 2(V) though the accused person was named in the FIR and the recorded statement of the victim girl contained an allegation of rape, pre-arrest bail was granted on the ground that the materials in the case record indicated that the accused had only dragged the victim to commit rape but could not perform the act. Considering the gravity of the alleged offence, the case diary ought to have been called for. The Petitioner also overlooked the fact that the case was registered under Section 511 IPC. i.e., attempt to commit an offence. 43. Considering the gravity of the alleged offence, the case diary ought to have been called for. The Petitioner also overlooked the fact that the case was registered under Section 511 IPC. i.e., attempt to commit an offence. 43. In view of the above and having regard to the legally acknowledged and assigned role of a judicial officer, we are of the opinion that the Petitioner had failed to exercise his judicial discretion in the above cases in consonance with the judicially propounded guidelines. On a close scrutiny of the materials available, we are constrained to hold that the orders passed by the Petitioner in cases undercharge 1(III), 1(VIII), 1(IX), 2(I), 2(II) and 2(V) are not instances simpliciter of merely recording a plausible view or a wrong conclusion but reflects an injudicious, indiscreet and incautious approach departing from the laid down norms governing the exercise of discretion in considering prayers for bail in criminal cases. The Petitioner's approach in passing the aforementioned orders, according to us not only overlooks the prescribed conditions essential for exercise of his powers in granting bail but also betrays an element of negligence and recklessness reflecting on his devotion to duty. The above conduct is clearly contemplated within the eventualities approved by the Apex Court in Union of India v. K.K. Dhawan, (supra). The facts of the instant case vis-a-vis the above orders are distinguishable from those in PC Joshi, (supra), where no material reflecting on the Appellant's reputation, integrity, good faith or devotion to duty was discernible. While mere possibility of a different conclusion on the same set of facts or a wrong order on exercise of due prudence having regard to the settled principles guiding the exercise of judicial discretion in such matters, would not attract a disciplinary action, in a given fact situation, if the materials on record disclose exercise of such discretion in an imprudent, irrational or cavalier fashion, in utter disregard of the legally acknowledged norms, the judicial officer concerned in our considered opinion can be permissibly indicted for such a conduct which is antithetic to judicial discipline. The manner in which the Petitioner has passed the order for bail in cases under charge 1(III), 1(VIII), 1(IX), 2(I), 2(II) and 2(V) betrays lack of judicial mind. The manner in which the Petitioner has passed the order for bail in cases under charge 1(III), 1(VIII), 1(IX), 2(I), 2(II) and 2(V) betrays lack of judicial mind. It is true that the listed cases under the charge are only a few out of the innumerable cases that might have been entertained by him during his tenure at the station concerned but it is noticeable that the orders in the above cases have been passed during 1995-96 and are not spread over several years. We are therefore, not in a position to extend a clean chit to the Petitioner. The charge against the Petitioner under the heads 1(III), 1(VIII), 1(IX), 2(I), 2(II) and 2(V) are according to us proved. 44. Be that as it may, in view of our determination that the findings of the Enquiry Officers on all the instances cannot be sustained, the impugned order of penalty of removal calls for interference. As a corollary, the impugned orders are hereby quashed. In the normal course, we would have remitted the matter to the Government to decide on the penalty to be imposed in view of our aforementioned conclusions. However, in view of the fact that the Petitioner would be reaching the age of superannuation in the year 2006, we have considered it fit to provide for the penalty at our end so as to extend a quietus to the lingering issue. 45. The cases under the charge relate to a point of time by which the Petitioner had put in about 16 years of service. He was thus sufficiently senior in his assignment as a judicial officer and ought to have projected himself as an inspiring example for the junior members of the subordinate judiciary. The orders passed under charge 2(I), 2(II), 2(V) granting pre-arrest bail in the manner noticed herein above were passed during his brief stint as in-charge Sessions Judge, North Lakhimpur. The orders passed by the Petitioner constituting the heads of the charge held to be proved by us have the potential of undermining the probity and discipline of the judicial system likely to generate a feeling of reservation in the minds of right thinking persons in the society. The orders passed by the Petitioner constituting the heads of the charge held to be proved by us have the potential of undermining the probity and discipline of the judicial system likely to generate a feeling of reservation in the minds of right thinking persons in the society. While we may not be understood to be against granting of bail in deserving cases adhering to the judicially evolved parameters and applying the discretion prudently in consonance therewith, we cannot wee bit encourage any rash and improvident approach in such matters lest the confidence of the society in the system is eroded resulting in the collapse thereof. We are, therefore, of the considered view that in the attending facts and circumstances, having regard to the injudicious and irresponsible conduct of the Petitioner manifested by the orders under charge 1(III), 1(VIII), 1(IX), 2(I), 2(II) and 2(V), he ought not to be retained in service. However, in view of his long tenure and the adverse consequences bearing on his service benefits that would follow otherwise, we consider it fit and proper to prescribe the penalty of compulsory retirement from service. Ordered accordingly. Needless to say die Petitioner would be entitled to the consequential service benefits already earned by him under the relevant Rules. 46. The appeal thus stands disposed in the above terms. No costs.