JUDGMENT A. S. NAIDU, J. : The petitioner in this Writ applica¬tion seeks to challenge the award dated 31st October, 1995 (Annexure-7) passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Bhubaneswar in I.D. Case No.46 of 1987. 2. Admittedly the petitioner is an erstwhile employee of Prajatantra Prachar Samity, opposite party No.2. He was holding the post of Advertisement Manager. On the purported ground of abolition of the post of Advertisement Manager, the services of the petitioner were terminated with effect form 6th November, 1986. Thereafter the petitioner raised an industrial dispute. Conciliation having failed, the State Government referred the dispute to the labour Court in exercise of power conferred upon it under Sub-section (5) of Section 12 read with clause (d) of Sub-section (1) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which was registered as the aforesaid I.D. Case. The refer¬ence read as follows :- “Whether the termination of services of Sri K. Mohapatra by the management of M/s. Prajatantra Prachar Samity with effect form 6.11.86 is legal and/or justified ? If not, to what relief Sri Mohapatra is entitled ?” 3. The case of the petitioner before the labour Court was that he was appointed as the Advertisement Manager in the estab¬lishment of opposite party No.2 on 20th May, 1967 and continued as such till 1985 when certain dissensions cropped up between the petitioner and the person in management and the responsibilities of the petitioner were stripped up and vested with one Amitav Swain who was an Advertisement Executive. Thereafter the peti¬tioner took leave on 4th November, 1986 on the basis of a medical certificate. On the same day the Board of Trustees of opposite party No.2 decided that the post of Advertisement Manager should be abolished and pursuant to that decision the services of the petitioner were terminated with effect form 6th November, 1986. On 7th November, 1986 the management of opposite party No.2 sent a cheque to the petitioner for certain amount towards notice pay and compensation treating his termination to be retrenchment. According to the petitioner, the amount remitted to him was less than the statutory amount and not on the basis of the last pay drawn by him. Apart form the said fact, on 24th December, 1986 a fresh advertisement was issued by the management for filling up the post of Advertisement Manager. 4. According to the petitioner, the amount remitted to him was less than the statutory amount and not on the basis of the last pay drawn by him. Apart form the said fact, on 24th December, 1986 a fresh advertisement was issued by the management for filling up the post of Advertisement Manager. 4. The management of opposite party No.2, at the other hand, took the stand that the post of Advertisement Manager was purely a ministerial post and, therefore, the petitioner was no a workman as defined under Section 2 of the I.D. Act. The further stand of the management was that by efflux of time it was felt that there was not need of the post of Advertisement Manager and therefore the Board of Trustees took the decision bona fide to abolish the said post. After abolition of that post, whatever compensation amount was payable to the petitioner was paid to him. Therefore the termination of the services of the petitioner could neither be said to be illegal nor unjustified. 5. The labour Court, on the basis of the pleadings of the parties, framed two issues. The parties adduced both oral and documentary evidence to substantiate their respective cases. The labour Court by its award dated 29th October, 1992 (Annexure-5) arrived at the conclusion that the petitioner was a workman and the termination of his services was legal and justified. However the management of opposite party No.2 was directed to pay him balance retrenchment compensation and full back wages form the date of termination till the date of reference to labour Court. Being aggrieved by the said award Annexure-5 the petitioner filed OJC No.2368 of 1993 before this Court and the management of opposite party No.2 also filed OJC No.1161 of 1993. Both the Writ applications were heard together and disposed of by a common judgment dated 28th March, 1995. This Court, after going through the materials on record came to the conclusion that the labour Court had not considered several material items of evidence and had abruptly recorded a finding that the working Chairman having appointed another person, namely, Amitav Swain, and the important responsibilities of the petitioner having been taken away form him, that would construe that the petitioner was a workman in strict sense. This Court held that the said conclusion of the labour Court was patently erroneous and could not be sustained. This Court held that the said conclusion of the labour Court was patently erroneous and could not be sustained. On the basis of the aforesaid conclusion arrived at by this Court, the impugned award Annexure-5 was quashed and the matter was remitted back to the labour Court for fresh disposal in accordance with law after giving opportunity of hearing to both sides. 6. After remand, the I.D. Case was taken up for fresh disposal. Discussing the evidence both oral and documentary, the labour Court, vide its award Annexure-7, came to the conclusion that the petitioner was employed mainly in managerial and admin¬istrative capacity and, as such, he was excluded form the purview of the definition of ‘newspaper employee’ as contained in the Working Journalist Act, 1955 and that the status of the petition¬er could not be that of workman and, as such, he was not entitled to get any benefit under the Industrial Disputes Act. On the basis of such conclusion the labour Court held that the order of termination of the services of the petitioner was legal and justified. Being aggrieved by the said award, the petitioner has once again approached this Court in the Present Writ application. 7. A detailed counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of opposite party No.2 wherein it has been categorically stated that the functions of the petitioner were all along managerial and administrative in nature and hence he being not a workman the provisions of the I.D Act were not applicable to him. It has been further stated that the post of Advertisement Manager was abol¬ished due to introduction of ‘Central Billing System’. After observing all paraphernalia the petitioner’s services were termi¬nated, he was paid compensation which he accepted without any objection and, as such, he is estopped form challenging the order of termination of his service. The Working Journalist Act is a special statute and would prevail over the I.D. Act and that Palekar and Bachawat Awards were not applicable to administrative personnel like the petitioner. 8. A rejoinder to the counter-affidavit has been filed by the petitioner more or less repudiating the stand taken in the counter-affidavit. 9. In course of hearing, learned counsel for the petition¬er, forcefully submitted that the duties performed by an employee at the time the cause of action arises is relevant for considera¬tion as to whether he is a workman or not. 9. In course of hearing, learned counsel for the petition¬er, forcefully submitted that the duties performed by an employee at the time the cause of action arises is relevant for considera¬tion as to whether he is a workman or not. Though the petitioner was initially appointed as the Advertisement Manager after cer¬tain powers were taken away form him his status became that of a workman. This aspect the labour Court did not keep in mind, inas¬much as the labour Court only considered the past duties per¬formed by the petitioner and not the duties performed by him at the time of termination of his services. It was forcefully sub¬mitted that the labour Court has not properly appreciated the evidence and in fact has not considered certain material facts and the conclusions arrived at by it are based on surmises and conjectures and therefore it is a fit case where the impugned award Annexure-7 should be quashed. 10. Learned counsel for opposite party No.2 forcefully submitted that the petitioner was all along holding the post of Advertisement Manager but after introduction of Central Billing System the necessity of that post ceased. Accordingly the services of the petitioner were terminated. The petitioner also accepted the order of termination of his services and expressed his desire to have his own business. At his request some compensation was paid to the petitioner and he floated an Advertising Agency and had business with opposite party No.2 by offering advertisements for publication. The petitioner having accepted the compensation amount offered to him, he was estopped form challenging the order of termination of his services by raising the industrial dispute. It was further emphatically submitted that the petitioner was governed by the Working Journalist Act, 1955 and the Palekar Award under which he had put forth his claim and received the benefits and in view of that also he was estopped form raising any industrial dispute. 11. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and have perused the materials available meticulously. The moot question which needs to be determined in this case is as to whether the petitioner can be nomenclatured as a workman and the industrial dispute raised by him was maintainable. 11. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and have perused the materials available meticulously. The moot question which needs to be determined in this case is as to whether the petitioner can be nomenclatured as a workman and the industrial dispute raised by him was maintainable. This Court in the earlier Writ Petition held that the conclusion arrived at by the labour Court that important responsibilities having been taken away form the petitioner it must be held that the petition¬er was a workman in strict sense was patently erroneous and could not be sustained. On the basis of such conclusion this Court quashed the earlier award (Annexure-5) and remanded the case for fresh disposal to the Labour Court. 12. Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 defines “workman” as follows :- (s)”Workman” means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purpose of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, include any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not include any such person- (i) who is subject to the Air Force Act, 1950, or the Army Act, 1950, or the Navy Act, 1957; or (ii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee of a prison, or (iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administra¬tive capacity, or (iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity draws wages exceeding one thousand six hundred rupees per mensem or exercise, either by he nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a manage¬rial nature.” 13. Admittedly the petitioner was appointed as the Adver¬tisement Manager. When his services were terminated he was also holding the said post. According to the petitioner though he was designated as Advertisement Manager, his status and position were reduced to that of a workman after certain powers were taken away form him. Admittedly the petitioner was appointed as the Adver¬tisement Manager. When his services were terminated he was also holding the said post. According to the petitioner though he was designated as Advertisement Manager, his status and position were reduced to that of a workman after certain powers were taken away form him. In his deposition the petitioner has described his duties being that of Advertisement Manager and stated as follows :- “My duty was to scrutinize and supervise billing of adver¬tisements in the newspaper. Advertisement Assistants were also doing the work of scheduling of advertisement. I used to super¬vise their works also.” According to the petitioner by Office Order dated 3rd March, 1986 (Annexure-1), his status and position were lowered. The said Annexure-1 reads as follows :- “OFFICE ORDER For the smooth management of the Advertisement Section and for upto date billing, it is hereby notified that Sri Kedareswar Mohapatra, Advt. Manager will supervise the daily billing, col¬lection of Advertisement revenue and better management of the Section. Sri Amitav Swain, Advertisement Executive will look into the daily schedule, local and other agency contracted, publication of advertisements and also to increase advertisement revenue. Sd- Managing Trustee” 14. Law is well settled that a person holding a supervisory post and discharging the functions mainly of managerial nature by reason of the duties attached to his office cannot be treated as a workman irrespective of the salary drawn by him. The petitioner has failed to produce any material which would reveal that he came under the four exceptions defined in Section 2(s) quoted above. That apart, as would be apparent form the pleadings, the status, position, pay-scale, etc. of the petitioner had been determined as that of a Departmental Manager coming under Group-II of the administrative staff. Since Advertisement Managers as per the Wage Board Award are held to be Departmental Managers, it can be safely concluded that they discharge managerial functions. The powers of this Court in the matter of interference with the award of a Tribunal has been well settled by a series of deci¬sions of the Supreme Court. Since Advertisement Managers as per the Wage Board Award are held to be Departmental Managers, it can be safely concluded that they discharge managerial functions. The powers of this Court in the matter of interference with the award of a Tribunal has been well settled by a series of deci¬sions of the Supreme Court. It is no more res integra that this Court merely exercises supervisory jurisdiction over an inferior tribunal, and can interfere with the award of an Industrial Tribunal only when it comes to the conclusion that the said tribunal has committed any error of jurisdiction or error of law apparent on the face of the award which vitiates the ultimate conclusion, or has come to its conclusion either by taking into account any inadmissible evidence, or by ignoring any material evidence. It is settled position of law that this Court cannot re-appraise the evidence and come to its conclusion or interfere with the conclusion arrived at by the Industrial Tribunal unless the same are shocking to common sense. Of course if a tribunal has came to conclusion on certain materials, which no reasonable man can come, this Court would be justified in interfering with the decision of the tribunal. Bearing in mind the aforesaid prin¬ciples, after perusing the impugned award Annexure-7, this Court is satisfied that the labour Court has taken all the materials into consideration and has arrived at right conclusion. Over and above that, on scrutiny of the evidence, both oral and documen¬tary, the labour Court has found that as a matter of fact the petitioner was not a workman. The said finding of fact not having been shown to be irrational or perverse, this Court declines to interfere with the same. In the aforesaid scenario, I find that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief claimed by him. The Writ application is accordingly dismissed. Application dismissed.