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Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

2005 DIGILAW 365 (HP)

DARSHAN SINGH v. STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

2005-09-28

SURJIT SINGH

body2005
JUDGEMENT Surjit Singh, J.: Plaintiff Darshan Singh has filed this suit claiming damages to the tune of Rs.15,00,000/- from the defendants, as damages on account of malicious prosecution and defamation etc. 2. Facts constituting the cause of action, as disclosed in the pliant, may be summed up thus. The plaintiff was recruited as a constable in Police Department of erstwhile State of Punjab in the year 1960. On the re-organization of the said State in the year 1966, the services of the plaintiff were allocated to the State of Himachal Pradesh. Because of his sincerity, honesty and devotion to the duty, he had been getting promotions on time till the year 1993. In 1993 he was in the rank of Inspector. In June 1992 he was posted as S.H.O., Police Station, Gagret by respondent No.2, who was then working as Superintendent of Police at Una. Later on, in March, 1993 defendant No.2 posted the plaintiff as S.H.O., Police Station, Una, to bring about improvement in deteriorating law and order situation and also to curb criminal and antisocial activities. During his posting as S.H.O., Police Station, Gagret and S.H.O., Police Station, Una, the plaintiff earned good reputation, because he brought about qualitative improvement in law and order situation and the graph crime also came down. He was given several awards and certificates for various acts during the aforesaid period. Defendant No.4,who indulged in gambling and Para Satta within the jurisdiction of Police Station, Una, found it impossible to continue to indulge in his illegal activities because of the effective check and highly efficient working of the plaintiff. Said defendant No.4 had been indulging in the aforesaid illegal activities because of the patronage of high police officials, to whom he used to pay fixed amount of money at regular intervals. When he could not operate his illegal trade of Dara Satta, on account of the effective control and check by the plaintiff and incidentally did not pay the money to the high police officials, including defendants No.2 and 3, a conspiracy was hatched by defendants No.2 to 4 to falsely implicate the plaintiff in a criminal case. In furtherance of the aforesaid conspiracy, defendant No.4 made a false statement, under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that he had paid rupees one lac as gratification to the plaintiff for running the illegal business of Dara Satta. In furtherance of the aforesaid conspiracy, defendant No.4 made a false statement, under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that he had paid rupees one lac as gratification to the plaintiff for running the illegal business of Dara Satta. On the basis of that statement, a case under the Prevention of Corruption Act and some provisions of the Indian Penal Code was registered against the plaintiff. He was placed under suspension. He had to seek anticipatory bail. During the course of investigation of the said FIR., plaintiffs bank accounts were checked and inquiry into his assets was also made. Nothing incriminating was found and ultimately the case had to be cancelled. The District Attorney, Una made a recommendation for the cancellation of the case. The Special Judge, Una, accepting that recommendation, ordered the cancellation of the case. Soon after the registration of the case, defendants No.2 and 3 started issuing show cause notices to the plaintiff. They also recorded adverse entries in his annual confidential reports, with a view to harming him. Departmental proceedings were also initiated, which remained pending till a day proceeding the date of his retirement, i.e. 31.3.1998. Because of the aforesaid lodging of the false FIR, the plaintiff suffered Heat attack in October, 1993 and remained under a lot of tension and strain, which affected his physical health also. Besides, he suffered in his reputation. His credibility also got lowered. Even his friends and relatives started suspecting his truthfulness, sincerity and integrity. He has claimed Rs.14,80,000/-towards general damages and Rs.20,000/- on account of special damages (the break up of such special damages is expenses on medical treatment Rs.30,00/-and interest at the rate of 18% on the with-held 50% portion of salary during the period of suspension amounting to Rs.17,000/-. The cause of action is alleged to have accrued initially on 15.10.1993, when a false report was lodged by defendant No. 4, then on 29.7.1995, when the plaintiff made some representations to the Director General of Police, then on 15.7,1997, when the Sessions Judge, Una ordered the cancellation of the case and finally on 30.3.1998, when all the departmental proceedings, initiated against the plaintiff, terminated. 3. Separate written statements have been filed by defendants No.1 to 4, while defendants No.2 and 3 have filed a joint written statement. 3. Separate written statements have been filed by defendants No.1 to 4, while defendants No.2 and 3 have filed a joint written statement. All the defendants have raised preliminary objections that the suit is barred by time, it is not properly valued for the purposes of court fee and jurisdiction, it is bad for mis-joinder of causes of action, it is not maintainable and is false and frivolous. 4. On merits it is alleged by defendant No.1 that defendants No.2 and 3, which were posted as Superintendent of Police and Additional Superintendent of Police, respectively, at Una, were duty bound to register the case, when defendant No.4 had made an accusation against the plaintiff that he had received rupees one lac as gratification for not taking any action against him for running the illegal business of Dara Satta. It is denied that there was any conspiracy among defendants No.2 to 4 or that the registration of the case was actuated by malice. Defendants No.2 and 3, in their common written statement, have stated that their action is privileged as they acted in good faith in the discharge of their duties as police officials. They have stated that defendant No.4 made a statement alleging that the plaintiff had taken the bribe for allowing him unhindered running of Dara Satta business. They also allege that though initially them plaintiff had been tough with all those indulging in Satta operation and brought such operations to a halt, but soon thereafter he started exploiting Satta operators and thee were complaints from various quarters and also there was a lot public hue and cry and hence defendants No.2 and 3 had to take the action. Further, it is alleged that because of the public complaints, defendant No.4 volunteered to disclose the truth and consequently on the disclosure statement made by him, a case was registered against the plaintiff, vide FIR No. 462, dated 15.10.1993, under various provisions of the Indian Penal Code and the Prevention of Corruption Act. It is also sated that the plaintiff intimidated the witnesses and procured false affidavits form them and because of that the case terminated in his favour. Though the allegation of conspiracy is not denied specifically, yet denial is there is general terms. 5. Defendant No.4 denies that the accusation made by him against the plaintiff was false. It is also sated that the plaintiff intimidated the witnesses and procured false affidavits form them and because of that the case terminated in his favour. Though the allegation of conspiracy is not denied specifically, yet denial is there is general terms. 5. Defendant No.4 denies that the accusation made by him against the plaintiff was false. He also denies that the case was got registered by him against the plaintiff at the instance of defendants No.2 and 3. It is specifically denied by him that there was any conspiracy of the type alleged by the plaintiff. 6. Following issues were framed on the pleadings of the parties, vide zimni order dated 31.3.2000:- "1. Whether the plaintiff wad maliciously prosecuted by or at the instance of the defendants, as alleged? OPP 2. If issue No. 1 is decided in the affirmative, whether the plaintiff is entitled to any general and/or special damages as claimed? If so, to what extent and form which defendant? OPP (3) Whether the suit is within time ?OPP (4) Whether there is no cause of action against defendants 2 and 3, as alleged? If so, to what effect? OPD 2 and 3. 5. Whether the plaintiff is estopped from filing the present suit due to his act, conduct and acquiescence as alleged? OPD 6. Whether the plaintiff is guilty of suppressing all material facts, as allege? If so, to what effect? OPD 7. Relief." 7. After the framing of issues, an application, being OMP No. 111 of 2000, was moved, under Order 14 Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for framing additional issues that because of the false accusation, the plaintiff had been defamed and so he was entitled to damages on account of defamation in addition to malicious prosecution, and another issue claimed was that the acts of the 2006 Darshan Singh Vs. State of H.P. and ors. 161 defendants had caused physical and mental injures and financial loss to the plaintiff. The application was dismissed, vide order dated April 20, 2000, with the observation, that there was no specific plea of defamation. 8. Parties have led evidence in support of their pleas and counter-pleas, i nave gone through the evidence and heard the learned counsel for the plaintiff, learned Deputy Advocate General, who represents defendant No.1 as also Shri Rajiv Sharma, learned Senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of defendants No.2 and 3. 8. Parties have led evidence in support of their pleas and counter-pleas, i nave gone through the evidence and heard the learned counsel for the plaintiff, learned Deputy Advocate General, who represents defendant No.1 as also Shri Rajiv Sharma, learned Senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of defendants No.2 and 3. Nobody appeared for defendant No.4, who was ordered to be proceeded against ex-parte, vide Zimni order dated 13.11.2000. By then all the material evidence of the plaintiff had been led. The plaintiff himself had also been examined by that date. Findings on the aforesaid issues are as follows. Issue No.1 9. To succeed in a claim for damages for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff is required to allege and establish the following four facts;- (a) That the defendants prosecuted him, (b) That the prosecution ended in his favour, (c) That there was no reasonable and probable cause for launching such prosecution, and (d) That the prosecution was actuated by malice. 10. Each of these facts is required to be established independently, meaning thereby that no inference of the existence of one fact can be drawn on the proof of the other (s). 11. Now, I proceed to determine, by reference to the evidence on record, whether the plaintiff has been able to prove the aforesaid essentials of malicious prosecution. 12. Admittedly, on 15.10.1993 defendant No.4 Ashok Kumar made a statement to defendant No.3 Shri S.R. Sharma, who was then posted as Additional Superintendent of Police, Una, alleging therein that he had paid rupees one lac to the plaintiff as bribe, on latters demand, to allow him to operate the Para Satta without any let or hindrance and another sum of Rs.15,000/- for inspection of his opponents indulging in the same activities. He gave the details how the demand was made and where the money was paid. According to him, two constables, named Harish Kumar and Onkar Singh, approached him at his business place and told that the plaintiff, who was then posted as S.H.O. Police Station, Una, had demanded Rs.1,15,000/- and directed him to reach with the money at cremation ground on the next following day and that he went to the cremation ground on the next day with the money, where the plaintiff, along-with the above named two constables, was already present and handed over that money to the plaintiff. On the basis of this statement of defendant No.4, case was formally registered at Police Station, Una, vide FIR Ext. PW-4/B. 13. It appears that the case was investigated by the general police, i.e. by Police Station, Una, inspite of the fact that there is an Anticorruption unit, headed by a Deputy Superintendent of Police, at Una, and the accusation, which was made against the plaintiff, led to the registration of a case against him under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act besides some provisions, of the Indian Penal Code. On the completion of the investigation report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, was also drawn up and submitted to the District Attorney, Una for scrutiny, but the said District Attorney pointed out that sanction to prosecute the plaintiff was required, as one of the charges against him was under the Prevention of Corruption Act. This position is made out from a note of the District Attorney, copy Ext. PW-14/B. Thereafter the matter was submitted to the Appointing Authority of the plaintiff for according sanction, but the said authority; sent back the case with the remarks that further investigation was required in the matter. On further investigation, the matter was again submitted to the District Attorney for his opinion and the latter, per his report, copy Ext. PW-14/A, opined that there was no cogent, sufficient and legal evidence indicating that the plaintiff had committed the crime he had been accused of by defendant No.4. In view of this report of the District Attorney, the matter was submitted to the learned Special Judge, Una for cancellation of the case. The learned Special Judge ordered the cancellation of the case, vide order dated 15.7.1997, copy Ext. PW-4/C. The learned Special Judge observed that the only material on record was the statement of defendant No.4 Ashok Kumar, who, per his own statement, was a Dara Satta operator and many cases of indulging in gambling and Dara Satta and other nefarious activities were pending against him and, therefore, on the basis of his sole statement the plaintiff could not be put on trial. 14. Now, the question that arises, is whether lodging of the FIR, investigation of the case and thereafter cancellation of the case, without the plaintiff being sent up for trail to the Court, amounts to prosecution for tortuous liability under the head "malicious prosecution." 15. 14. Now, the question that arises, is whether lodging of the FIR, investigation of the case and thereafter cancellation of the case, without the plaintiff being sent up for trail to the Court, amounts to prosecution for tortuous liability under the head "malicious prosecution." 15. The learned counsel, representing defendants No.1 to 3, namely Shri Rajiv Sharma, Senior Advocate, placing reliance on some judgments of various High Courts and one judgment of Privy Council, argued that unless the case is filed in a Criminal Court and the accused is summoned by that Court to answer the charge, he cannot be said to have been maliciously prosecuted. The authorities, relied upon by him, are (i) K. Sheik Meeran Sahib vs. C.Ratnavelu Mudali, (I.L.R. 1914 (37) 181]; (ii) Raja Braja Sunder Deb and others vs. Bamdeb Das alias Pattanaik and others, [ AIR (31) 1944 Privy Council 1]: (iii) Dattatraya Pandurang Datar vs. Hari Keshav Gokhale and others, [ AIR (36) 1949 Bombay 100]; (iv) Vattappa Kone and another vs. Muthukaruppan Servai, AIR 1941 Madras 538); (v) Kambhampati Venkata Satyanarayana vs. Kambhampati Peda Subbarao and others, (AIR 1969 A.P. 29). 16. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the plaintiff Pt. Om Parkash, Advocate, urged that the test for determining whether the prosecution has taken place or not in a case of damages for malicious prosecution, is not that whether plaintiff had been sent up for trial or any process was issued against him by the Court or the cognizance of the matter was taken by the Criminal Court, but the same is whether, on account of the machinery for criminal justice system, having been set in motion, any damage has been caused to the plaintiff. He urged that if the case terminates in favour of the plaintiff, even at the stage of investigation, but damage is caused to him, that would amount to malicious prosecution entitling upon the following judicial precedents: (v) Mohamed Amin vs. Kumar Bannerjee and others, [ AIR (34) 1947 Privy Council 108]; (vi) Ramesh Chandra Basu Majumdar vs. Brojendra Nath Paui, [AIR (37) 1950 Calcutta 259]; (vii) Madan Mohan Singh vs. Bhirgunath Singh and others, (AIR 1952 Patna 283); and ] (viii) Nagendra Kumar vs. Etwari Sahu and others, (AIR 1958 Patna 329). 17. I proceed to notice the precedents, relied upon by the learned counsel for the defendants, first. 17. I proceed to notice the precedents, relied upon by the learned counsel for the defendants, first. In K. Sheik Meeran Sahibs case (supra), a Single Bench of the Madras High Court held that in a complaint case, where the Magistrate sent only a notice of preliminary inquiry to the person named as accused therein, and no summons or warrant was issued and then dismissed the complaint, it was not a case of malicious prosecution. From the reading of the judgment it appears that no damage had been caused to the plaintiff, on account of the issuance of the notice of preliminary inquiry and it was under these circumstances that the learned Judge (Mr. Justice Bakewell) held that this was not a case of malicious prosecution. 18. In Raja Braja Sunder Debs case (supra), FIR was lodged against three persons accusing them of selling and buying a minor girl for illicit intercourse. Two of these persons were sent up for trial by the police. The third one was named in the column pertaining to persons not sent up for trail. That person filed a suit for malicious prosecution. Their Lordships of Privy Counsel ruled that he could not be said to have been prosecute and hence he had no cause of action to maintain an action for damages for malicious prosecution. The question whether any damage was suffered by him, had not been raised. 19. In Dattatraya Pandurang Datars case (supra), the defendant lodged a report of theft laying suspicion on the plaintiff. The police arrested the plaintiff but later on discharged him as no evidence could be found against him. The learned Single Judge, who decided the matter, held that this was not a case of malicious prosecution, because the defendant had only expressed suspicion and so he could not be said to have been prosecuted by the defendant. In this case also no question was raised if the plaintiff had been put to any loss or damage. 20. In Vattappa Kones case (supra), the facts were that the defendant made a verbal complaint before a Magistrate accusing certain persons of robbery. The Magistrate got the complaint inquired into from the police and ^n getting report from the police that the accusation was false, dismissed the complaint. 20. In Vattappa Kones case (supra), the facts were that the defendant made a verbal complaint before a Magistrate accusing certain persons of robbery. The Magistrate got the complaint inquired into from the police and ^n getting report from the police that the accusation was false, dismissed the complaint. It was under these circumstances that the learned Single Judge, who decided the case, held that this was not a case of malicious prosecution. 21. In Kambhampati Venkata Satyanarayanas case (supra), proceedings, under Section 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, were initiated against the plaintiffs. The Honble Division Bench, which heard the matter, held that the test was to see whether the notices had been issued to the plaintiffs and whether they were asked to show cause against the proposed action to be taken under the relevant provisions in respect of which the proceedings had been started. 22. In the precedents, relied upon by the learned counsel for the plaintiff, as referred to here-in-above, the principle laid down is that the test for determination is whether the making of the false accusation to the authorities, with a view to setting the criminal justice system into motion, amounts to malicious prosecution or not, is whether any damage is caused to the plaintiff and not, whether the matter was taken to the Court or not. 23. In Mohamed Amins case (supra), their Lordships of the Privy Council (the Bench comprised of three) held that to found an action for damages for malicious prosecution based upon criminal proceedings, the test is not whether the criminal proceedings have reached a stage at which they may be correctly described as prosecution; the test is whether such proceedings have reached a stage at which damage to the plaintiff results. The principle was followed in Ramesh Chandra Basu Majumdars case (supra) by Single Bench of Calcutta High Court. 24. A Division Bench of Patna High Court in Madan Mohan Singhs case (supra) held that in an action for malicious prosecution, the test is net whether the criminal proceedings have reached a stage at which the Magistrate could take cognizance, but whether the defendant was actively instrumental in putting the criminal law into force, in other words whether the defendant set the law in motion through a constituted authority, without regard to the technical form in which the charge has been preferred. 25. 25. In Nagendra Kumars case (supra), a Division Bench of Patna High Court followed the principle laid down by their Lordships of Privicy Council in Mohamed Amins case (supra). 26. In the case on hand, it can legitimately be said that on account of the lodging of the report by defendant No.4, the plaintiff suffered damage. He was working as S.H.O. Police Station, Una at the time when the report was lodged. He was placed under suspension immediately after the registration of the case, based on the report of the defendant No.4. There is unchallenged testimony of the plaintiff, who appeared as PW-4, to this effect. Departmental proceedings were also initiated against him, in regard to the allegations made in the report of defendant No.4, which continued till the day just preceding the date of his superannuation, i.e. 30.3.1998. This fact is also established by the unchallenged testimony of the plaintiff, who appeared as PW-4. Thus, the plaintiff remained not only supposedly financially tight, on account of his having been placed under suspension as he did not get his salary, but only a portion of the salary, by way of subsistence allowance, but also went through a phrase of severe humiliation. In other wards, the lodging of the FIR by defendant No.4 and the consequential investigation of the case caused damage to the plaintiff and, therefore, in view of the law laid down in the aforesaid authorities, cited by the learned counsel for the plaintiff, particularly the judgment of the Privy Council (Mohamed Amin Vs Kumar Bannerjee and others, AIR 1947 Privy Council 108), which (law) has been followed till date, it is held that the act of defendant No.4 amounts to prosecution of the plaintiff. 27. Coming to the next essential, viz, the termination of the prosecution in favour of the plaintiff, admittedly the case had been submitted for cancellation, when the District Attorney gave the opinion, vide note Ext. PW-14/A, that there was no cogent, sufficient and legal evidence to prosecute the plaintiff. The learned Special Judge passed the order of cancellation, on being approached by the police, in this behalf. Copy of the order of the learned Special Judge is Ext. PW-14/A, that there was no cogent, sufficient and legal evidence to prosecute the plaintiff. The learned Special Judge passed the order of cancellation, on being approached by the police, in this behalf. Copy of the order of the learned Special Judge is Ext. PW-4/C. A reading of the order shows that the only material, which the investigating agency had with them, was the bald statement of defendant No.4 in support of his allegation that the plaintiff had demanded and accepted bribe of Rs.1,15,000/- from him." The learned Special Judge observed that defendant No.4 was not a reliance person, as he had been facing many cases of illegal activities like gambling and Dara Satta. So, it is held that the second essential of malicious prosecution, that the prosecution ended in favour of the plaintiff, also stands established. 28. The next essential of this kind of tort is that the prosecution lacked reasonable and probable cause. Plaintiffs case is that the accusation was false and that he had never demanded nor accepted any bribe from defendant No.4. The order of cancellation Ext. PW-4/C, passed by the learned Special Judge, as also the opinion of the District Attorney, copy Ext. PW-14/A, show that the case was cancelled for want of cogent, sufficient and legal evidence in support of the allegation. The plaintiff, while in the witness box as PW-4, has stated that while working as S.H.O., Police Station, Una, he had curbed the illegal activities of defendant No.4 and had filed various cases against him in Courts of law and because of that false case was got registered against him. No evidence in rebuttal has been led by defendant No.4. Even he himself did not step into the witness box to rebut the testimony of the plaintiff. He also did not challenge the testimony of the plaintiff that the case that was got registered against him was false, while cross-examining him through his counsel. That means the accusation that was made by defendant No.4 against the plaintiff, was false. 29. Now, when the accusation made by defendant No.4 was false, there should be no hitch in jumping to the conclusion that the prosecution of the plaintiff was without any reasonable or probable cause. So, this ingredient of the tort is also held to have been substantiated. 30. 29. Now, when the accusation made by defendant No.4 was false, there should be no hitch in jumping to the conclusion that the prosecution of the plaintiff was without any reasonable or probable cause. So, this ingredient of the tort is also held to have been substantiated. 30. Now, what remains to be seen is whether defendants No.2 to 4 or any of them acted maliciously. It may be stated at the very outset that though in the plaint it is alleged that there was a conspiracy among defendants No.2 to 4 to falsely implicate the plaintiff, the details and particulars of such conspiracy are not disclosed. In other words, the allegation is general and vague. Not only that the allegation is not specific, but also there is no specific evidence in support thereof. The plaintiff, while in the witness box, stated that there was a collusion between defendant No.4 on one side and defendants No.2 and 3 on the other. He did not elaborate the alleged collusion. He did not use the term "conspiracy" while in the witness box. Under these circumstances, the plea of the plaintiff that defendants. No.2 and 3 were party to his malicious prosecution, cannot be accepted. Moreover, j the two defendants cannot be said to be guilty of malicious prosecution, simply for the reason that they registered the case on the basis of the report lodged by defendant No.4 and conducted the investigation, though as a matter of fact, an Anticorruption cell, headed by Deputy Superintendent of Police, being there at Una, the case ought to have been got registered with the said cell and the officials manning that cell were supposed to have supposed the investigation. 31. So far as defendant No.4 is concerned, there is unchallenged statement of the plaintiff as PW-4 that he (defendant No.4) was an anti-social element and had been indulging in Dara Satta and gambling and that he (the plaintiff), in his capacity as Station House Officer, curbed his activities and because of that defendant no.4 levelled a false accusation against him (the plaintiff), vide FIR Ext. PW-4/B. That means that motive behind the lodging of the report by defendant No.4 against the plaintiff was to wreak vengeance on him and to get him removed from the post of Station House Officer, so that he could continue with his gambling and Dara Satta operations. PW-4/B. That means that motive behind the lodging of the report by defendant No.4 against the plaintiff was to wreak vengeance on him and to get him removed from the post of Station House Officer, so that he could continue with his gambling and Dara Satta operations. In other words, defendant No.4 was actuated by malice in lodging the F.I.R. 32. In view of the above discussion, it is held that the plaintiff was maliciously prosecuted by defendant No.4. The issue has been answered accordingly. Issue No.2. 33. Plaintiffs plea is that the registration of a false case against him and his consequential suspension from service caused humiliation, which resulted in a mild-heart stroke and that in addition to that his relatives developed a feeling that he was a corrupt man and that this feeling led to a situation in which the in-laws of his daughter even took out divorce proceedings against her. It is also his case that on account of his suspension, he had been getting money equivalent to 50% of his salary from the date of his suspension, i.e. 15th October, 1993, to the date of his retirement, i.e. 30.3.1998, and that the remaining 50% of his salary was received by him only after he was re-instated. So, he has calmed Rs.17,000/- on account of interest on this delayed payment of his salary. Rs.3,000/- are claimed by him on account of medical treatment. The rest of the amount is claimed by him towards general damages. 34. The evidence led by the plaintiff in support of his claim for special damages, comprises of his own testimony as PW-4 and the testimony of a doctor, namely PW-11 Dr. S.P. Samnol and a discharge slip Ext. PW-11/A. In his own testimony the plaintiff has stated that he suffered a heart attack in October, 1993, on account of the hypertension, caused by the registration of a false case against him at the instance of defendant No.4 and had to be hospitalized. 35. PW-11 Dr. S.P. Samnol has stated that on 20.10.1993 the plaintiff was admitted to District Hospital, Una as a patient of hypertension with L.B.B.B. with query C.A.D. and that he was discharged on 27.10.1993. He proved the discharged card Ext. PW-11/A, per which the plaintiff remained admitted in the District Hospital, Una from 20.10.1993 to 27.10.1993 and the primary disease was hypertension with L.B.B.B. with queried C.A.D. 36. He proved the discharged card Ext. PW-11/A, per which the plaintiff remained admitted in the District Hospital, Una from 20.10.1993 to 27.10.1993 and the primary disease was hypertension with L.B.B.B. with queried C.A.D. 36. There is no reason disbelieve the testimony of the plaintiff that the hypertension was caused due to the registration of false case and his consequential suspension. The plaintiff has claimed a sum of Rs.3,000/- as medical expenses. The amount claimed on this count cannot be said to be exaggerated. 37. His claim for interest on the delayed payment of salary, due to his having been placed under suspension, also appears to be justified and so he is held to be entitled to Rs.17,000/- on this count. In other words, he is entitled to the entire amount of Rs.20,000/- claimed by him on account of special damages. 38. As regards the claim for general damages, looking to the facts and the circumstances of the case, as noticed in the preceding paragraphs, he is held to be entitled to the sum of Rs.5,00,000/- (rupees five lacs) only. Issue has been answered accordingly. Issue No.3. 39. The prosecution terminated in favour of the plaintiff on 15.7.1997, when the learned Special Judge passed order, Copy Ext. PW-4/C, canceling the case. The plaintiff has stated that he came to know about the passing of the said order on 26.7.1997 and applied for the certified copy of the order on the same day and that very day it was supplied to him. The seal impressed certificate of attestation, appearing at the foot of the last page of the copy of the order, corroborates his testimony. The suit was filed on 4.8.1998. Limitation for filing a suit for damages for malicious prosecution is one year from the date of the termination of the prosecution, per Article 74 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963. Section 15(2) of the Limitation Act says that in computing the period of limitation, for any suit of which notice has been given in accordance with the requirements of any law for the time being in force, the period of such notice shall be excluded. The present suit has been filed not only against defendant No.4, who lodged a false report, but also against the State of Himachal Pradesh and the Superintendent of Police and the Additional Superintendent of Police. The present suit has been filed not only against defendant No.4, who lodged a false report, but also against the State of Himachal Pradesh and the Superintendent of Police and the Additional Superintendent of Police. Before filing of the suit against the State and the above-named two Police Officers, notice, under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, was required to be served. The plaintiff served the notice upon all of them. A copy of the notice is available on record. The defendants admitted that this notice was served upon them by the plaintiff before filing the suit. Under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, two months notice is required to be given. That means two months period is required to be added to the one years time limit prescribed by Article 74 of the Evidence Act. With the addition of this two months period to the period prescribed by Article 74, the suit comes within limitation. Consequently the issue has been answered in favour of the plaintiff. Issue No.4 40. In view of the finding on and discussion under issue No.1, this issue is answered in favour of defendants No.2 and 3. Issue No.5. 41. In view of the finding on issue No.1 as also the fact that no evidence has been led by the defendants even to discharge the initial onus of proof of this issue, the same is decided against the defendants. Issue No.6. 42. This issue is also decided against the defendants, as no evidence in support thereof has been led. Relief 43. As a result of the findings on issues No.1 to 3, an exparte decree form sum of Rs.5,20,000/- (Rupees five lacs, twenty thousand) with proportionate costs, is passed in favour of the plaintiff and against defendant No.4 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of filing of the suit to the date of payment of the aforesaid amount of money. Decree sheet be drawn accordingly.