Judgment KHANWILKAR A. M. ,J. ( 1 ) HEARD Mrs. Mohite-Dere for the petitioner/complainant and Mr. M. L Bansal, Mr. P. B. Dave, Mr. R. M. Tiwari, Mr. N. B. Shah, Mr. Jadhav Mr. H. H. Dave, Mr. Nilesh S. Das and Mr. Ashok Singh for the accused. ( 2 ) ALL these matters can be disposed of by a common judgment as questions involved are identical. ( 3 ) BRIEFLY stated, the complainant filed separate complaints against the respondents accused before the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate, 19th Court, esplanade, Mumbai, which have been dismissed by a common order dated 8th March, 1999, discharging the respective accused for the reasons recorded in the said order. That decision is the subject-matter of challenge in the present petitions, at the instance of the complainant. ( 4 ) THE separate complaints filed against the respective accused were in respect of offences punishable under section 5 of the Import and Export (Control) act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and also Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as i. P. C. ) being related offences such as under sections 420, 471, 468, 120-B etc. ( 5 ) THE allegations in the complaints are made on the basis of investigation carried out by the Central Bureau of Investigation (hereinafter referred to as c. B. I.)/special Police Establishment with regard to offence under section 5 of the Act. After the investigation was completed and as C. B. I, was not competent to file a report within the meaning of section 173 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Code) in view of the bar of section 6 of the Act, the Investigating Officer of C. B. I, caused the complaint to be filed through the specified Authority under section 6 of the Act. ( 6 ) THE concerned Magistrate took cognizance of the offence under section 5 of the Act and other I. P. C. offences and issued process to the accused under section 204 of the Code. While the complaints were pending, the magistrate was of the view that the complaints could not be proceeded further in law. In his opinion, three questions were required to be answered before proceeding in the matters any further. The said three questions were formulated and the parties were called upon to address on the said aspects. While the complaints were pending, the magistrate was of the view that the complaints could not be proceeded further in law. In his opinion, three questions were required to be answered before proceeding in the matters any further. The said three questions were formulated and the parties were called upon to address on the said aspects. The said questions were :"1) Under what provisions of law, A. P. P. can conduct these private complaints which are filed otherwise than on a police report? 2) Under what provisions of law, investigation papers are handed over to the agency other than police, instead of filing charge-sheet? 3) On which basis of law complaints other than police used the papers of investigation as the basis of filing the complaint?" ( 7 ) AFTER hearing the Counsel appearing for the parties, the Court proceeded to answer the issues in favour of the accused by inter alia, holding that offence under section 5 of the Act, in the setting in which it is placed, is a non-cognizable offence and as it was a non-cognizable offence, the C. B. I, could not have taken notice of the said offence reported to it and in any case, investigated into that matter, without obtaining prior permission of the Court. It has also observed that the Public Prosecutor could not have appeared for the complainant as the complaint filed was a private complaint. On the above reasoning, the Court proceeded to hold that the prosecution against the accused was vitiated and accordingly, proceeded to dismiss the respective complaints and discharged the accused named therein. This view is put in issue before this Court. On the above reasoning, the Court proceeded to hold that the prosecution against the accused was vitiated and accordingly, proceeded to dismiss the respective complaints and discharged the accused named therein. This view is put in issue before this Court. ( 8 ) ACCORDING to the petitioners, the view taken by the lower Court that the alleged offence against the accused is a non-cognizable offence, cannot be sustained in law, and if that opinion was to be effaced, than the other reasons for dismissing the complaint would become unavailable, in which cases, the complaint as filed on behalf of the complainant will have to proceed in accordance with law It is next submitted that since the offence under section 5 is a cognizable offence, the C. B. I, was competent to not only take notice of the information given to it in this behalf by virtue of Notification issued by the appropriate Authority in exercise of powers under the Delhi Police Act, but also obliged to investigate into the matter and on completion of the investigation, it had option to file complaint in the form required by section 6 of the Act through its Superintendent of Police in the Economic offences wing or as has been filed by the complainant/petitioner herein, being the Authorised Officer. On this argument, it is contended that the conclusion reached by the lower court that the complaint as filed was not maintainable, cannot be sustained. Insofar as the view taken by the lower Court that the Public Prosecutor could not appear in the private complaint, even that view has been criticised by relying on the reported decisions of the Madras High Court. ( 9 ) ON the other hand, the respondent accused have supported the conclusion reached by the lower Court and adopted the reasons stated by the lower court as their argument to support the order of dismissal of the said complaints. It is submitted that by no standards, offence under section 5 can be treated as cognizable offence. According to the respondents, it will have to be held that the said offence is a non-cognizable offence and being so, C. B. I, could not have taken note of that offence by itself, and could not have investigated into the matter, without seeking prior orders from the Court in that behalf. According to the respondents, it will have to be held that the said offence is a non-cognizable offence and being so, C. B. I, could not have taken note of that offence by itself, and could not have investigated into the matter, without seeking prior orders from the Court in that behalf. Besides, it is contended that the lower Court has rightly observed that the complaint filed by the petitioner herein, cannot be maintained because the complainant had no personal knowledge about the allegations made in the complaint. In addition, it is contended that the order issued under section 6 of the Act authorises even the Superintendent of Police in the Economic offences wing of the C. B. I, to file complaint in writing, for which reason, there was no propriety in handing over the documents collected during the investigation for filing complaint through the present petitioner, who was employed ad Deputy Chief Controller of Imports and Exports and had no personal knowledge about the nature of investigation done. According to the respondents, the tenor of the complaint as filed, clearly indicates that it is nothing but a private complaint. If it is so, no investigation could have been undertaken by the C. B. I, unless appropriate orders were to be passed by the Magistrate under section 156 (3) of the Code, requiring the C. B. I, to investigate into the said aspects. In other words, it is submitted that the investigation undertaken by the c. B. I. , on its own, prior to the presentation of the complaint, has no legal sanctity. It is, therefore, submitted that the procedure adopted in the present case is unknown to law and therefore the prosecution against all the accused named in the respective complaints, is vitiated. It was also suggested during the argument that in addition to the offence under section 5 of the Act, the allegations in the complaint also refer to the offence under sections 420, 471, 468 read with section T20-B of the I. P. C. , which are otherwise cognizable offence and after completing the investigation of the case, the C. B. I, was obliged to file report within the meaning of section 173 of the Code, which has not been done. In other words, it is argued that there is procedural irregularity in the institution of the complaint and in the course adopted for taking cognizance by the Court. ( 10 ) BOTH Counsel have relied on decisions to support their respective stand, to which, I shall make reference a little later. Indeed, Counsel for the respondents have relied on several decisions to support the contention that in a case involving non-cognizable offence, the police cannot take notice of such an offence and proceed to investigate without seeking prior order of the Court in that behalf and that, on completion of investigation, it was obligatory to file report before the appropriate Court within the meaning of section 173 of the code. ( 11 ) HAVING considered the rival submissions, in my opinion, the controversy as has been raised regarding whether the offence under section 5 of the act, can be said to be cognizable or non-cognizable one, is completely misplaced. There is no reason to doubt the position that the offence under section 5, in particular, covered by Clause (a) thereof, is a "cognizable offence". This is so, because expression "cognizable offence" has been defined in section 2 (c) of the Code to read thus :"cognizable offence" means an offence for which, and "cognizable case" means a case in which, a Police Officer may, in accordance with the First schedule or under any other law for the time being in force, arrest without warrant. " (emphasis supplied) ( 12 ) THE First Schedule to the Code provides for classification of offences. Reliance was placed on the explanatory note under the said First Schedule, which reads thus: explanatory Note.- (1) In regard to offences under the Indian Penal Code, the entries in the second and third columns against a section the number of which is given in the first column are not intended as the definition of, and the punishment prescribed for, the offence in the Indian Penal code, but merely as indication of the substance of die section. (2) In this Schedule, (i) the expression "magistrate of the First Class" and "anty Magistrate" include Metropolitan Magistrates but not Executive magistrate; (ii) the word "cognizable" stands for "a Police Officer may arrest without warrant" and (iii) the word "non-cognizable" stands for "a police officer shall not arrest without warrant. (2) In this Schedule, (i) the expression "magistrate of the First Class" and "anty Magistrate" include Metropolitan Magistrates but not Executive magistrate; (ii) the word "cognizable" stands for "a Police Officer may arrest without warrant" and (iii) the word "non-cognizable" stands for "a police officer shall not arrest without warrant. " (emphasis supplied) relying on this note, it was submitted that only in cases where Police officer can arrest a person without warrant, will have to be treated as cognizable offences. It was contended on behalf of the respondents that there is no express provision either in the Code or the Act suggest that the Investigating agency, in the present case, could have proceeded to arrest the accused without warrant. This submission, clearly overlooks the purport of section 41 of the Code. Section 41 of the Code provides that any Police Officer may, without an order from a Magistrate and without a warrant, arrest any person, amongst others, who has been concerned in any "cognizable offence", or against whom a reasonable complaint has been made, or credible information has been received, or a reasonable suspicion exists, of his having been so concerned. In other words, if this Court were to hold that offence under section 5 (a) of the act is a "cognizable offence", it would necessarily follow that the Investigation agency would have authority to arrest the accused person without warrant in exercise of powers under section 41 of the Code subject, however, to the other requirements of Law. ( 13 ) IN that sense, the core issue that needs to be addressed is: Whether the offence under section 5 is a "cognizable offence"? It cannot be disputed that the various offences described in Part-I of the First Schedule, relate to the offences under the I. P. C. and that will be of no avail for resolving the issue before us. The only relevant part of the First Schedule for our purpose is Part-II which provides for offences against other laws. ( 14 ) THE Part-II of First Schedule is subdivided into three parts. The first part relates to offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for more than seven years. This has no application to the cases on hand. ( 14 ) THE Part-II of First Schedule is subdivided into three parts. The first part relates to offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for more than seven years. This has no application to the cases on hand. In the present case, section 5 (a) of the Act provides for punishment in respect of specified cases which may extend to seven years and also with fine. It is common ground that Clause (b) of section 5 of the Act has no application to the cases before this Court; as all the cases, if at all, would be governed by section 5 (a) of the Act. On that assumption, I proceed to examine the issue before this Court. ( 15 ) IN that sense, the second part of Part-II of First Schedule will be attracted to the cases on hand. For, the same pertains to offences under other laws punishable with imprisonment for three years and upwards, but not more than seven years. This class of offences have been defined as "cognizable" and "non-bailable" under Part-II of the First Schedule, albeit offences are triable by Magistrate of the First Class. In may opinion, whether the offence is a cognizable or non-cognizable one, is to be tested on the basis of the provisions in the First Schedule of the Code, unless expressly provided to the contrary in the other laws. The offence such as section 5 of the Act, although punishable with imprisonment up to seven years, which ordinarily, is a cognizable offence, on conjoint reading of provisions in the First Schedule of the code, cannot be treated as non-cognizable on the specious reasoning that the provision in the special enactment does not envisage filing of police report under section 173 of the Code by the Investigating Agency but obligates taking of cognizance by the Magistrate only upon a complaint filed in writing by the Authorised Officer. Therefore, there is no room for doubt that offence punishable under section 5 (a) is a "cognizable" and "non-bailable" offence. ( 16 ) IT was contended on behalf of the respondents accused that under other central laws, provisions are made treating offences punishable with imprisonment extending up to seven years as non-cognizable offences. This argument clearly overlooks that the provisions of the Act in question cannot be interpreted on the basis of provisions existing in some other enactment, though a Central Legislation. This argument clearly overlooks that the provisions of the Act in question cannot be interpreted on the basis of provisions existing in some other enactment, though a Central Legislation. In other words, in absence of express provision in the subject Act to treat the offence under section 5 (a) as non-cognizable offence, it is not open for this Court to take the view that offence under section 5 (a) of the Act is a non-cognizable offence, for, that would amount to rewriting of the provisions of the subject Act, which is impermissible. ( 17 ) COUNSEL for the petitioner has rightly submitted that whenever the Legislature wanted offences punishable with sentence up to seven years to be treated as non-cognizable, express provision has been made in that behalf, to wit - the provisions of Central Excise Salt Act, 1944 (section 9-A), Foreign exchange Regulation Act, (section 56 read with section 62); whereas, offences punishable with sentence only up to three years, have been treated by the Legislature as cognizable offences by express provision contained in food Adulteration Act (section 20 (3) and Essential Commodities Act (section 10 ). It, therefore, follows that the provisions of section 5 (a) of the Act, in particular, have to be examined in the setting-in which it is placed in the Act. Viewed in this perspective, I have no hesitation in concluding that the offence under section 5 (a) is a "cognizable offence" within the meaning of section 2 (c) of the Code. ( 18 ) ONCE this conclusion is reached, it necessarily follows that the police could have acted on the basis of the information. regarding such offence provided to it by any person. In the present case, we are concerned with, amongst others, offence under section 5 of the Act. That offence is required to be investigated into by a Special Police Force, by virtue of Notifications issued from time to time dated 18th February, 1963 and 7/9th August, 1989 in exercise of powers conferred under the provisions of Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946. That offence is required to be investigated into by a Special Police Force, by virtue of Notifications issued from time to time dated 18th February, 1963 and 7/9th August, 1989 in exercise of powers conferred under the provisions of Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946. ( 19 ) IN view of the said Notifications, the offence under the provisions of the Act, can be taken note of, enquired and investigated into only by the special Police Force authorised in that behalf, being C. B. I. In that sense, no fault can be found with the investigation of the present case as has been done by the C. B. I, and as the allegations pertain to cognizable offence, it was not necessary to take prior authorisation of the Magistrate for the purpose of investigation. ( 20 ) THE question, however, is : Whether the C. B. I, who had investigated into the offence, was obliged to submit police report within the meaning of section 173 of the Code? Once again, this question will have to be tested in the context of the provisions of the Act. There can be no doubt that by virtue of special provision, such as section 6 of the Act, the Magistrate could take cognizance of such offence only upon a complaint to be filed by an officer authorised in that behalf by the Central Government, by general or special order. In other words, the requirement of filing complaint flows from the mandate of section 6 of the Act. The Magistrate could take cognizance of offence only upon such complaint being filed and in no other manner. If it is so, it cannot be said that the C. B. I, was obliged to file police report within the meaning of section 173 of the Code. Even if such a report was to be filed, it was not open to the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence on the basis of such a report. It is for that reason, the matter has been brought before the magistrate in the form of a complaint filed by the Authorised Officer and the magistrate proceeded to take. cognizance of the offence on the basis of the said complaint given in writing, as the allegations in the complaint did make out offence against the accused to be tried before it. cognizance of the offence on the basis of the said complaint given in writing, as the allegations in the complaint did make out offence against the accused to be tried before it. ( 21 ) IT was then argued on behalf of the respondents that even if the offence under section 5 of the Act was to be treated as cognizable offence, even so, the procedure adopted in the present case, is not in conformity with the requirements of the Code. According to the respondents, it was obligatory on the part of the Investigating Agency to file police report within the meaning of section 173 of the Code on completion of the investigation. It was argued that non- filing of such a report would vitiate the present proceedings. There is no substance in this submission. The submission clearly overlooks the requirement of section 6 of the Act. As mentioned earlier, it stipulates that the Court can take cognizance of the offence only upon complaint filed in writing before it by the Authorised Officer. No more and no less. If it is so, there was no obligation on the part of the Investigating Agency to file police report in respect of the offence under the Act. It was then suggested during the course of arguments that besides the offences under the provisions of the Act, the accused were also tried for offences under sections 420, 468, 471 read with 120-B of the i. P. C. and the said offences being cognizable offences, police report ought to have been filed at least with regard to those offences. This submission, however, overlooks the fact that the C. B. I, is a special police force and authorised to enquire into and investigate mainly offences under the provisions of the act. In the course of investigation of the said offence, the investigating agency has enquired into cognate offences such as sections 420, 468, 471 and 120-B of the I. P. C. , which had arisen from the same set of facts. In the course of investigation of the said offence, the investigating agency has enquired into cognate offences such as sections 420, 468, 471 and 120-B of the I. P. C. , which had arisen from the same set of facts. Although such investigation was permissible, even then, non-filing of police report does not take away the option of filing a complaint for the offence under section 5 of the Act within the meaning of section 6 of the Act; and in the said complaint, make out a case for offence under the ordinary law namely, provisions of the i. P. C. In other words, non-filing of police report by the C. B. I, will not vitiate the complaint filed by the Authorised Officer and the Court having taken cognizance of the complaint will have to proceed against the accused in respect of all the offences referred to in the complaint, if such a case is made out against the accused and take the matter to its logical end. The proceedings cannotbe terminated in between, on this account. ( 22 ) VIEWED in this perspective, non-filing of police report within the meaning of section 173 of the Code by the C. B. I, in the fact situation of the present case, will make no difference and that will have no bearing on the validity of the complaint filed by the Authorised Officer in writing. Insofar as the record collected during the investigation of the case by the C. B. I, is concerned, that cannot be treated as evidence in the case which is ignited on the basis of complaint under section 6 of the Act. This opinion is expressed by the Apex court in paragraph 2 in the case of (T. J. Stephen and others v. Parle Bottling Co. (P)Ltd. and others), reported in 1988 (3) Bom. C. R. 425 : A. I. R. 1988 S. C. 994. That decision is useful also to efface the reason which had weighed with the lower Court for dismissing the complaint. It is observed by the lower Court that the complainant had no personal knowledge about the allegations contained in the complaint, for dismissing the complaint. The similar situation was considered by the Apex Court in Stephenss case (supra) and the Supreme court with reference to the provisions of section 200 proviso (a) of the code observed that such a ground is unavailable. The similar situation was considered by the Apex Court in Stephenss case (supra) and the Supreme court with reference to the provisions of section 200 proviso (a) of the code observed that such a ground is unavailable. Even in that case, our High court had dismissed the complaint finding that it was necessary to examine the complainant. The reason which has weighed with the lower Court that the complainant should have the personal knowledge about the allegations of the complaint, therefore, cannot be sustained. ( 23 ) BESIDES this decision, reliance has been rightly placed by the Counsel for the petitioner in the case of (Charanjit Singh v. Assistant Collector of Central excise), reported in 1990 (47) E. L. T. 352 (Bom. ). In para 6, while dealing with similar contention, the Court observed that recording of statement of the complainant was dispensed with by virtue of section 200 proviso (a) of the code, as the complainant was a public servant and had made the complaint because of the Authority given to him in that behalf. It will be useful also to refer to the decision of the Apex Court reported in A. I. R. 1968 S. C. 247 in the case of (Electrical Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. D. D. Bhargava ). In para 10 of this decision, the Apex Court has enunciated about the purport of section 6 of the act. It observed that the said section only insists that the complaint is to be in writing and that, it must be made by an Officer, authorised in that behalf. It further observed that the limitation, contained in section 6, is only regarding the particular Officer who could file a complaint and, when once he satisfies those requirements, the bar is removed to the taking of cognizance by a Court, on a complaint, made in accordance with section 6. ( 24 ) THE complainant claims to be an Authorised Officer by virtue of the order issued by the Appropriate Authority in exercise of powers under section 6 of the Act being Order No. 10/65 dated 1st December, 1965 and Order No. 98/85-88 dated 29th February, 1988. The said orders clearly provide that complaint in respect of offence under the Act can be maintained by the Deputy chief Controller of Imports and Exports amongst Other Officers. The petitioner/complainant fulfils that qualification. The said orders clearly provide that complaint in respect of offence under the Act can be maintained by the Deputy chief Controller of Imports and Exports amongst Other Officers. The petitioner/complainant fulfils that qualification. ( 25 ) TO get over this position, Counsel for the respondents contended that the abovesaid orders also authorise the Superintendent of Police in the Economic offences Wing of the C. B. I, to maintain such a complaint under section 6 of the Act. It was suggested during the course of arguments that since the officer of the C. B. I, himself was competent to maintain complaint in writing, there was no propriety in handing over the papers collected during the course of investigation to the Deputy Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, who had no personal knowledge thereof, for being filed before the Magistrate in the form of a complaint, which was drawn at the instance of the C. B. I. This argument clearly overlooks the legal position which flows from section 6 of the Act read with the orders issued thereunder. By virtue of the said provision, the officers specified in the orders are officers Authorised to maintain complaint in writing under section 6 of the Act. The Superintendent of Police in the Economic Offences Wing of the C. B. I, indeed, is one of the Officer so authorised. But that does not mean that if the complaint was to be filed by other Authorised Officer, such a complaint would be bad in law. Such an argument cannot be accepted. In other words, no fault can be found even with the complaint as filed by the petitioner in terms of the authorisation prevailing in his favour by virtue of section 6 of the Act. ( 26 ) VIEWED in this perspective, neither any fault can be found with the c. B. I, for having taken notice of the offence registered with it, nor for the investigation undertaken by them or with the complaint filed by the petitioner herein. If it is so, the basis on which the Court below has proceeded to decide the issue in favour of the accused for dismissing the complaints filed by the petitioner, cannot be sustained. If it is so, the basis on which the Court below has proceeded to decide the issue in favour of the accused for dismissing the complaints filed by the petitioner, cannot be sustained. ( 27 ) COUNSEL for the petitioner had also relied on the decision of the Apex court in the case of A. I. R. 1986 S. C. 833 in the case of (J. P. Sharma v. Vinod kumar Jain and others), and decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of (Viniyoga International, New Delhi and another v. State), reported in 1985 Cri. L. J. 761, to contend that the procedure as is being followed by the Department in respect of offences under the Act has been recognised in those decisions. The apex Court in the case of J. P. Sharma (supra) in paragraph 13 has adverted to the fact that the complaint was filed by the Deputy Chief Controller of the imports and Exports in the Court of Chief Metropolitan Magistrate for offences under section 120-B of the I. P. C. read with section 5 of the Act. In para 14 of the same decision, the Apex Court observed that the complaint was under section 120-B of the I. P. C. and the substantive offence alleged was under section 5 of the said Act. It is further stated that the complaint was filed on the basis of investigation conducted by Special Police Establishment, central Bureau of Investigation and facts collected by it. This decision also refers to the fact that the respondent Shri Vinod Kumar Jain was arrested by cbi/spe/ciu (E) II on 20th September, 1983 in connection with the said offence and was released on that date under the orders of the High Court at delhi, which, to my mind, presupposes that the offence was treated to be cognizable offence, for which, arrest was effected and the accused came to be released because of the orders passed by the High Court. ( 28 ) INSOFAR as the case of M/s. Viniyoga International (supra) is concerned it will be apposite to advert to the observations contained in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the said decision. The said observations clearly spell out the scheme for the trial of the cases of the kind with which we are dealing. In paragraph 7, the Court has proceeded to observe thus :"7. . . . . . . . The said observations clearly spell out the scheme for the trial of the cases of the kind with which we are dealing. In paragraph 7, the Court has proceeded to observe thus :"7. . . . . . . . . . OFFENCE under sections 120-B, 420, 468, 471, I. P. C. and section 5 of the Imports and Exports Control Act, 1947 are no doubt cognizable offences in terms of the First Schedule to the Code and by virtue of section 156 of the Code any officer in charge of a Police Station, may without the order of a Magistrate investigate into any of these offences. The investigation in relation to an offence under section 5 of Imports and Exports (Control) Act, unlike that of the other offences mentioned above, need not culminate in a report under section 173 (2) (i) of the code because a report under that sub-section has to be forwarded to a magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a "police report". As has been pointed out above, by virtue of section 6 of the aforesaid Act, no Court can take cognizance of an offence under section 5 of the Act "except on a complaint" by a Competent Authority, and that being so, no Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance of the offence under that section "on a police report" with the result that, in so far as investigation into that offence is concerned, sub-section (2) of section 173 is inapplicable. The Investigating Officer would, however be bound to communicate the action taken by him to the officer by whom the information relating to the commission of the offence was first given and this is provided in Clause (ii) of sub-section (2) of section 173. The composite investigation in the present case could, however, lead to an anomaly. In so far as the investigation was of offences, which are outside the purview of section 6 of the Act, it could be said, with some justification, that the requirement of sub-section 2 (i) of section 173 had to be complied with, on the conclusion of investigation, and the Investigating officer must forward to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a police report, a report in the form prescribed and stating the particulars required in sub-clauses (a) to (g) of Clause (i) of sub-section (2 ). The same could not, however, be said of the investigation in so far as it pertains to an offence under section 5 of the Act because of the bar contained in section 6 of it. The effect of the composite nature of the investigation was not raised either before the trial court or in this Court and I would, therefore, assume for any present purpose that cognizance of the offence, investigated by the police, could not be taken on a police report by virtue of section 6 of the Act. . . . . . . . . . . The present proceedings obviously commenced with a compliant by a competent Authority, which would attract the procedure laid down in sections 244 to 247 of the Code, none of which in terms, entitles an accused to copies, either of the statement, or of any document, whether at the commencement of the trial or when the witness is summoned or a document is produced. Sub-section (1) of section 244 enjoins a Magistrate to hear the prosecution and take all such evidence as may be produced in support of the prosecution. Section 245 provides that, if upon taking all the evidence so produced, the Magistrate considers that no case against the accused has been made out, which if rebutted, would warrant his conviction, he shall discharge him. Sub-section (2) enables a Magistrate to discharge the accused at any previous stage of the case, if he considers the charge to be groundless. Section 246 deals with the situation where the accused is not discharged and where a charge has to be framed against the accused. Sub-section (4) of this section obliges the Court to ask the accused, if he wishes to cross-examine any of the witnesses whose evidence has been taken and such witnesses have to be recalled if the accused so desires. Sub-section (6) of this section provides for the evidence of any remaining witnesses for the prosecution being then recorded. Sub-section (4) of this section obliges the Court to ask the accused, if he wishes to cross-examine any of the witnesses whose evidence has been taken and such witnesses have to be recalled if the accused so desires. Sub-section (6) of this section provides for the evidence of any remaining witnesses for the prosecution being then recorded. On a combined reading of all these provisions, it follows that Investigating officer was not bound to forward to any Magistrate a report under section 173 (21 of the Code and since the proceedings have been instituted on a complaint, the benefit of section 207 would not be available to the accused thereby relieving the Magistrate of any duty to furnish to the accused "free of cost" copies of documents mentioned in that section and the accused is, in terms, not entitled at any stage, to either copies of statements recorded under section 161 of the Code or of any documents produced in the Court. "8. A comparison of the two distinct parts of Chapter XIX of the Code, dealing with trial of warrant cases by Magistrate one dealing with cases instituted on a police report, embodied in sections 238 to 243, and the other, in cases instituted otherwise than on a police report, embodied in sections 244 to 247 of the Code clearly brings out the distinction between the two sets of procedures provided in the trial of these cases. In cases instituted on a police report, the Court is to consider the question of charge or discharge on a consideration of the police report under section 173 and the document sent with it, and the examination of the accused, if any. The charge or discharge of an accused in case instituted otherwise than on a police report has reference to the "evidence" produced in support of the prosecution. In the first class of cases, there is no right of the accused to recall any witness, who has been examined in support of the prosecution, while in the other class of cases, there is a statutory right to recall any of the witnesses already examined. It is not difficult to see the reason why a separate and distinct procedure has to be followed in the two classes of cases. It is not difficult to see the reason why a separate and distinct procedure has to be followed in the two classes of cases. The cases instituted on a police report are duly investigated and the result of an investigation is before the Court and it is on that basis that the Magistrate proceeds. In cases instituted otherwise than on a police report, there is ordinarily no investigation. These are cases ordinarily based on what is described as a "private complaint" and section 2 (d) of the Code defines a complaint as meaning "any allegation made orally or in writing to a magistrate with a view to his taking action under the Code and does not include a police report. " Explanation to section 2 (d) provides, that a report made by a Police Officer in a case which discloses after investigation the commission of a non-cognizable offence, shall be deemed to be a complaint and the Police Officer by whom such report is made, shall be deemed to be a complainant. Complaints are ordinarily made by private parties, either because the allegations of the commission of an offence, which are not cognizable by the police, or because the police failed to take cognizance, even if it was cognizable, or the investigation led to a police report, which was not favourable to the aggrieved party. In all such cases, it is open to an aggrieved person to file a complaint direct to a Court and the explanation to section 2 (d) shows that if is in rare cases that report made by a Police Officer is deemed to be a complaint. " (emphasis supplied) ( 29 ) INDEED, one of the reason recorded by the lower Court is that the Public prosecutor could not have appeared in the matter, as it was a private complaint and for which reason, proceeded to dismiss the complaint. However, before this Court, Counsel appearing for the respondents fairly conceded that they were not supporting the said conclusion reached by the lower Court. In other words, the question whether the Public Prosecutor could have appeared in the case being a private complaint, is a non-issue before this Court. However, before this Court, Counsel appearing for the respondents fairly conceded that they were not supporting the said conclusion reached by the lower Court. In other words, the question whether the Public Prosecutor could have appeared in the case being a private complaint, is a non-issue before this Court. In any case, that question is squarely answered at least in two decisions of the Madras high Court reported in 1989 (39) E. L. T. 29 (Mad.) in the case of (Shanti swarup v. Collector of Customs), and 1992 (61) E. L. T. 595 (Mad.) in the case of (Plating Chemicals v. Dy. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports ). I have no difficulty in adopting the opinion expressed by the Madras High Court on this question. ( 30 ) ON the above reasoning, the basis on which, the lower Court proceeded to dismiss the subject complaints cannot be sustained and therefore, the said decision deserves to be set-aside and instead, the complaints restored to the file of the Magistrate to their original numbers for being tried and proceeded in accordance with law. For the view that I have taken, it is unnecessary to burden this judgment with reported decisions relied upon by the respondents to buttress the proposition that if the alleged offence is a non-cognizable offence, the police cannot take notice of the information, much less, proceed to investigate without seeking prior order of the Court in that behalf and that, on completion. of the investigation, it was obliged to file report within the meaning of section 173 of the Code. ( 31 ) IT is made clear that the concerned Magistrate will proceed with the trial on the basis of legal evidence adduced before it, uninfluenced by any of the observations in this decision, while considering the merits of the issue involved at the trial. The Magistrate shall also expedite the hearing of the cases, as the complaints pertain to offences committed in the year 1981 onwards. The trial should be concluded as expeditiously as possible and preferably within one year from the receipt of writ of this Court. ( 32 ) ALL the petitions disposed of on the above terms. The Magistrate shall also expedite the hearing of the cases, as the complaints pertain to offences committed in the year 1981 onwards. The trial should be concluded as expeditiously as possible and preferably within one year from the receipt of writ of this Court. ( 32 ) ALL the petitions disposed of on the above terms. ( 33 ) WHILE parting, I have to record a word of appreciation not only for the able assistance given by the Advocate appearing for the respective parties, but also for keeping their commitment of filing written submissions and circulating the decisions on which they wanted to rely in advance, and more particularly, for concluding their arguments within the time allocated to them. It is only on account of this assistance rendered, batch of matters could be disposed of with the pronouncement of judgment in less than three (Court working) hours. This aspect needs to be highlighted only to impress upon the members of the Bar to observe such course in every matter which, in turn, will go a long way to arrest the mounting backlog of cases. Order accordingly.