JUDGMENT A. K. PARICHHA, J. — This is an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (in short, “Cr.P.C.”) for quashing the F.I.R. in Puri Sea Beach P.S. Case No.133 of 2003. 2. Opp.Party No.2, who is the Managing Director of ‘Hotel Sea Point Private Ltd.’ Puri filed a complaint case bearing I.C.C. No.243 of 2003 in the Court of the learned S.D.J.M., Puri against the petitioners alleging commission of offences under Sections 406, 408, 409, 417, 418 and read with Section 34, I.P.C. Learned S.D.J.M. forwarded the said complaint to Puri Sea Beach P.S. for investigation under the provisions of Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. in response to the said direction investigation has now commenced. The petitioners in this petition have challenged the said order of the learned S.D.J.M. and also the process of investigation on the plea that the complaint petition does not disclose commission of any criminal offence by the petitioners and that it has been filed with ulterior motive to harass them. 3. Mr. D. K. Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that a bare perusal of the complaint petition would show that no case under any of the criminal laws is made out against the petitioners. Rather the allegations disclose a dispute of civil nature. He submits that direction for police investigation on such a complaint petition amounts to abuse of process of the Court and law and for that reason the F.I.R. of P.S. Case No.133 of 2003 and the consequential investigation should be quashed. In support of his contention he cites the decisions in Punjab Na¬tional Bank and others v. Surendra Prasad Sinha, AIR 1992 SC 1815 ; and of Sunil Kumar v. M/s. Escorts Yamaha Motors Ltd. and others, AIR 2000 SC 27 . 4. Mr. R. K. Rath, learned counsel appearing on behalf of opposite party No.2, contends that the inherent power of the Court under Section 482, Cr.P.C. cannot be invoked to quash the F.I.R. as that would amount to throttling the due process of law. According to him, the F.I.R. is simply an information to the police about commission of criminal offence or offences and it is for the police authorities to investigate and find out whether any criminal offence has actually been committed and whether charge-sheet is to be submitted against a particular accused. According to him, the F.I.R. is simply an information to the police about commission of criminal offence or offences and it is for the police authorities to investigate and find out whether any criminal offence has actually been committed and whether charge-sheet is to be submitted against a particular accused. He submits that the petition under Section 482, Cr.P.C. filed by the petitioner to quash the F.I.R. is premature and must be thrown away at the threshold without going into the merits there¬of. In support of his contention, he relies on Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi and others, AIR 1999 S.C. 1216 and Union of India v. Prakash P. Hinduja and another, AIR 2003 S.C. 2612 . In the case of Rajesh Bajaj (supra) the complainant had alleged an offence of cheating and the averments in the complaint prima facie made out a case for the said offence. In that situation, the Apex Court observed that quashing of F.I.R. will not be proper. In the case of Prakash P. Hinduja (supra), their Lord¬ships while analyzing the plea of the petitioners for quashing of the criminal proceeding initiated against them by the CBI author¬ities observed that the Court would not interfere with the inves¬tigation or during the course of investigation as the field of investigation is exclusively reserved for the investigating agency and for that reason inherent power under Section 482, Cr.P.C. is not to be normally exercised for quashing police investigation. 5. There is no straight-jacket formula that the power under Section 482, Cr.P.C. cannot be exercised for quashing an F.I.R. under any circumstances. Rather, the apex Court has in appropriate cases observed that where the allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint, if taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, the Court would be justified in quashing the F.I.R. and the investigation connected with such F.I.R. In this connection, reference may be made to S.N. Palanit¬kar and others v. State of Bihar and another, AIR 2001 S.C. 2960 wherein it was observed that where the alleged acts against the accused do not constitute any offence, the Court would be justi¬fied in exercising the inherent power under Section 482, Cr.P.C. for quashing the proceeding. 6. 6. The aforesaid decisions rendered by the Supreme Court and the wordings of Section 482, Cr.P.C. show that the Court in appropriate circumstances can exercise the power under Section 482, Cr.P.C. to quash the F.I.R. and investigation. 7. The next submission of Mr. Rath is that although the petitioners have alleged that the complaint petition of opposite party No.2 does not disclose commission of any criminal offence by the petitioners' a reading of the complaint petition itself would clearly reveal commission of offence under Sections 406, 408, 409, 417, and 418 read with Section 34, IPC by the petition¬ers. His further submission is that a criminal complaint is maintainable even in commercial or civil transactions and so, the complaint petition of opposite party No.2 in the present case should not be quashed simply because the allegations relate to a banking transaction. In support of this submission, he again relies on Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi and others (supra). He also places reliance on M. Krishnan v. Vijay Singh and another, AIR 2001 S.C. 3014 ; and State of Haryana v. Balwant Singh, AIR 2003 SC 1253 . In Rajesh Bajaj’s case (supra) allega¬tion of cheating was made in the complaint petition relating to commercial transactions. There was a contention from the side of the accused persons that criminal case is not maintainable in commercial transactions. Clarifying the position, the Apex Court observed thus : “x x x It may be that the facts narrated in the present complaint would as well reveal a commercial transactionor money transaction. But that is hardly a reason for holding that the offence of cheating would elude from such a transaction. In fact, many a cheating were committed in the course of commercial and also money transactions. The crux of the postulate is the intention of the person who induces the victim of his representation and not the nature of the transaction, which would become decisive in dis¬cerning whether there was commission of offence or not. x x x x” In the case of M. Krishnan (supra) the complainant had alleged commission of offence of cheating and fraud. The accused persons prayed for quashing of the complaint mainly on the ground that the dispute was primarily civil in nature. x x x x” In the case of M. Krishnan (supra) the complainant had alleged commission of offence of cheating and fraud. The accused persons prayed for quashing of the complaint mainly on the ground that the dispute was primarily civil in nature. Their Lordships while rejecting the plea of the accused persons observed that in most of the cases of cheating and fraud transactions are civil in nature. Therefore, a criminal Court should carefully examine the allegations made in the complaint petition and the intentions of the complainant before deciding whether prima facie case for the alleged criminal offence is available or not. In Balwant Singh (supra) the apex Court said that termination of services and punishment awarded in the departmental proceeding cannot stand as a legal bar for convic¬tion in a criminal case for the same occurrence. 8. Law as laid down by the Supreme Court as discussed above thus clearly indicates that a criminal complaint cannot be quashed for the simple plea that the transaction involved is commercial or civil in nature. Whether a complaint petition can be entertained or not, depends on the allegations made in the said petition and the surrounding facts and circumstances. In the present case, the petitioners have not only taken the plea that the transaction involved is commercial in nature, but they have also taken the plea that no case for the alleged offence is made out even if the allegations made in the complaint petition are accepted in its entirety. In that situation it is to be seen whether the complaint petition, if accepted in its entirety, reveals any prima facie case for the alleged offence. 9. The complaint petition of opposite party No.2 broadly discloses that opposite party No.2, as the Managing Director of Hotel Sea Point Pvt. Ltd., applied for financial assistance from the State Bank of India and the said Bank sanctioned and dis¬bursed the loan of Rs.75 lakhs. But as the loan amount was not disbursed in time, the company taking loan suffered loss and harassment. It is also alleged that the petitioners, who are officers of the State Bank of India, deliberately gave false promises basing on which repayments to the tune of Rs.15.5 lakhs were made by opposite party No.2, but the said repayments were not adjusted in the proper account, thereby the loanee was put to loss. 10. It is also alleged that the petitioners, who are officers of the State Bank of India, deliberately gave false promises basing on which repayments to the tune of Rs.15.5 lakhs were made by opposite party No.2, but the said repayments were not adjusted in the proper account, thereby the loanee was put to loss. 10. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the transaction was purely a commercial one between the bank and its loanee, and even if the allegations of the complaint petition are accepted in its entirety, no criminal offence is made out. He submits that the investigation based on such a complaint is nothing but abuse of the process of law and must be quashed. To support his contention, he cites the decision of the Supreme Court in Punjab National Bank and others v. Surendra Prasad Sinha (supra). In that case the principal debtor, who had taken the loan from the Bank did not repay the bank loan, whereupon the creditor-bank adjusted the fixed deposit receipt of the principal debtor after those deposits matured. The principal debtor filed a complaint case under Sections 109, 114, 409, IPC against the bank officials alleging therein that the bank officers committed cheating and misappropriation of the F.D.R. amount by adjusting the same against the loan, which was barred by limitation. The Supreme Court after carefully examining the situation observed as follows : “Judicial process should not be an instrument of oppression or needless harassment. The Court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all the rele¬vant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing lest it would be an instrument in the hands of private complai¬nant as vendetta to harass the person needlessly. Therefore, in case of default in repayment of bank loan, when the debt became time barred and the bank had adjusted the debt from the F.D.Rs. in its possession, which were deposited by the guarantor by way of security, after their maturity, and a complaint was laid by the guarantor impleading the Chairman, Managing Director of the bank and a host of officers on the charges under Sections 109, 114 and 409 of the Penal Code, it would be the responsibility and duty of the Magistrate to find whether the concerned accused were legally responsible for the offences charged for, before issuing the process. Thus, the complaint on the basis of which the process was issued was filed was vendetta to harass the persons needless¬ly, the complaint was quashed." In Sunil Kumar v. M/s. Escorts Yamaha Motors Ltd. and others (supra) also similar view was taken by the Apex Court. There, the complainant had lodged an F.I.R. alleging offences under Sections 420, 406, 468, IPC relating to a bank transaction. Taking note of the facts and circumstances of the case, their Lordships observed that the circumstances manifestly indicate that the F.I.R. was lodged with ulterior motive to pre-empt future litigation and to harass the accused persons and consequently quashed the F.I.R. In S. N. Palanitkar and others (supra), there was allegation under Section 405, Cr.P.C. for criminal breach of trust. There was nothing in the complaint petition that any property was entrusted to any of the accused at all or that the accused had any domain over any properties of the complainant, which they dishonestly converted to their own use. The Apex Court, there¬fore, said that it was a fit case where the complaint should be quashed. In all the decisions, the Apex Court have broadly indi¬cated that an F.I.R. or the complaint can be quashed if no case is made out or if such F.I.R./complaint is lodged with ulterior motive. In the case of Prakash P. Hinduja and another (supra), their Lordships more specifically indicated the grounds on which the power under Section 482, Cr.P.C. can be exercised to quash the F.I.R. or criminal proceedings. The grounds noted are : (i) Where the allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (ii) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the F.I.R. or the complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (iii) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure or the con¬cerned Acts to the institution and continuance of the proceed¬ings. 11. (iii) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure or the con¬cerned Acts to the institution and continuance of the proceed¬ings. 11. In the present case, opposite party No.2 has made cer¬tain allegations against to senior bank officers of the State Bank of India and the main beam of allegation is that those officers delayed disbursement of the loan amount and adjusted some repayments in accounts, contrary to the promise made by them. A close and careful reading of the complaint petition reveals that opposite party No.2 is somehow dissatisfied with the petitioners because of their alleged rigid attitude, but it does not indicate in any manner any mala fide or dishonest inten¬tion on the part of the petitioners. The allegations, even if taken in its entirety, also do not disclose any offence of cheat¬ing, misappropriation or forgery. Rather, the contents of the complaint petition and the tenor of the allegations give a feel¬ing that the complaint was lodged with a motive to pressurize the petitioners and to create a ground for future litigation relating to bank loan. The ratio laid down in the case of Punjab National Bank (supra) and Sunil Kumar (supra) would therefore squarely apply to the present case. 12. Considering all the above noted factors and the legal position, I feel that continuance of the F.I.R. and investigation in Sea Beach P.S. Case No.133 of 2003 corresponding to G.R. Case No. 235 of 2003 pending in the Court of the S.D.J.M., Puri would be nothing but abuse of the process of law and would put the petitioners to unnecessary harassment. 13. In that view of the matter, this CRLMC is allowed and the F.I.R. and investigation in the above noted P.S. Case are quashed. CRLMC allowed.