JUDGMENT B.K. Sharma, J. 1. Heard Mr. B.R. Dey, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. A.K. Paul, advocate for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. A. Sarma, learned counsel assisted by Mr. M. Sarma, advocate for the respondent. The matter is taken up for final disposal at the motion state itself as agreed to by the learned counsel for the parties. 2. By this writ application, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 30.11.2004 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division) No. 1, Guwahati rejecting the review application filed in respect of an order dated 3.3.2004 by which the written statement filed by the defendant, the present petitioner in a Money Suit was refused to be accepted on ground of expiry of the period prescribed for filing the same. 3. The facts material for the purpose of disposal of this writ petition are that the respondent herein as the plaintiff has instituted Money Suit No. 125/2003 in the Court of learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division) No. 1 Guwahati against the present petitioner as the defendant for realisation of a sum of Rs. 43,10,875. Summons were issued on 20.9.2003 fixing the next date as 20.11.2003 and there is no dispute that the same was served on the defendant/petitioner on 1.11.2003. As to what happened thereafter has been indicated in the writ petition vide Annexure-III, the copy of the order sheets, which is reproduced below : 20.11.2003 : Learned advocate for the plaintiff is present. Summon has been served. Defendant has filed Vakalatnama. There is no P.O. Fix 19.1.2004 for necessary order. 19.1.2004 : Learned advocate for the both parties are present. Defendant has filed a petition No. 35/04 under order 11, Rule 15, Section 151 C.P.C. P.O. is not appointed. Fix 3.3.2004 for necessary order. 3.3.2004 : Both the parties are present through their learned counsel. Defendant said he has filed their w/s today after expiry of mandatory period of 90 days. Hence the w/s filed by the defendant side can not be accepted. Since the defendant side failed to submit their w/s within the outer limit of 90 days as such suit shall proceed ex parte against the defendant. Also seen Ptn. 35/04 dated 19.1.2004 under order 11, Rule 15 C.P.C., R/ws. 151 C.P.C. filed by the defendant for inspection of documents as mentioned in the petitioner. Heard the learned counsel for the defendant. Also seen Ptn. 35/04 dated 19.1.2004 under order 11, Rule 15 C.P.C., R/ws. 151 C.P.C. filed by the defendant for inspection of documents as mentioned in the petitioner. Heard the learned counsel for the defendant. Perused the C.R. and the prayer is allowed. Plaintiff side is to produce the originals of the said documents in the Court for inspection by the defendant within 15 days from this date. Fix 18.3.2004 for evidence of the plaintiff side. On affidavit and at a time and for submission of the original documents by the plaintiff for inspection by the defendant. 4. Making a grievance against the aforesaid order dated 3.3.2004, the defendant/petitioner filed a review application vide petition No. 272/04 which was registered and numbered as Misc. Application No. 80/04. The review application has been rejected by the impugned order dated 30.11.2004, relevant portion of which is reproduced below : "It is already discussed above that under Order 8, Rule 1, defendant is allowed maximum 90 days to file the W.S. The Hon'ble Gauhati High Court in the judgment of Baliram Prasad Gupta v. Md. Isa reported in 2003 (3) GLT 30 observed that W.W. is to be filed within 30 days with extension of 60 days from the date of service of summons. From the case record it is found that the summons on the defendant was served on 1.11.2003. As per the aforesaid provision defendant ought to have filed the W.S. within 90 days from 1.11.2003. The learned counsel for the defendant has submitted that as the petition for inspection of the documents is pending for inspection of the documents is pending they are entitled to file the W.S. after allowing them to inspect the documents. But Order 8, Rule 1, is a mandatory provision. That apart the petition dated 19.1.2004 by which the defendant prayed to allow them to inspect the documents revealed they wanted to inspect the agreement, the legal notice, etc., and as submitted by the plaintiff those documents are in the possession of the defendant themselves. However, as per mandatory provision of Order 8, Rule 1, the defendant under the obligation to file the W.S. within the 90 days. Pending the petition for inspection of documents they could have filed the W.S. by reserving the right to file additional W.S. after inspection of the documents if it is felt necessary at all. However, as per mandatory provision of Order 8, Rule 1, the defendant under the obligation to file the W.S. within the 90 days. Pending the petition for inspection of documents they could have filed the W.S. by reserving the right to file additional W.S. after inspection of the documents if it is felt necessary at all. On that ground mandatory provision of Order 8, Rule 1, cannot be overlooked. Hence, I do not find any reasonable ground to review the order dated 3.3.2004, inasmuch as the matter has already been settled once and necessary order to that effect has already been passed. With this, the prayer for review of the order and to file W.S. stands rejected and the Misc. Application No. 80/04 stands disposed of on contest." 5. It is in the aforesaid backdrop, it is the case of the petitioner that since the dates, 20.11.2003 and 19.1.2004 indicated above were not effective dates in absence of the Presiding Officer and that since or 19.1.2004, an application was filed seeking inspection of documents before filing the W.S., the court below could not have passed the first impugned order dated 3.3.2004 refusing to accept the W.S. without first deciding the said application. 6. As regards the order passed on review application, it is the case of the petitioner that the same is not in accordance with law having regard to the aforesaid facts and circumstances involved in the case. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the following decisions : (1) AIR 2004 SC 3992 (Vareed Jacob v. Sosamma Geevarghese and Ors.) (2)(Kailash v. Nanhku and Ors.) 7. As per order 8, Rule 1, CPC, the defendant shall within thirty days from the date of service of summons on him, present a written statement of his defence. However, an exception has been made to such a provision by providing that the stipulated period of thirty days can be extended by another sixty days (altogether ninety days) for the reasons to be recorded in writing. 8. In the instant case, the summons were served on 1.11.2003 and so the first period of limitation for filing the W.S. was upto 30.11.2003, but the petitioner neither filed the same nor prayed for extension within the said period. It is another thing that the P.O. was not available on 20.11.2003 and 19.1.2004. 8. In the instant case, the summons were served on 1.11.2003 and so the first period of limitation for filing the W.S. was upto 30.11.2003, but the petitioner neither filed the same nor prayed for extension within the said period. It is another thing that the P.O. was not available on 20.11.2003 and 19.1.2004. The presence of the P.O. was not necessary for filing the W.S. Further extendable period of sixty days also expired on 29.1.2004 and till then also the petitioner did not file the W.S. Such extended period was also not available for the petitioner in absence of any order to that effect. However, considering the fact that the P.O. was not available on 20.11.2003 and 19.1.2004, even if such a requirement is dispensed with, then also the total period of limitation of ninety days expired on 29.12.2003. 9. It was in the aforesaid circumstances, the first impugned order dated 3.3.2004 was passed refusing to accept the W.S. placing reliance on the decision of this Court as reported in 2003 (3) GLT 30 (Baliram Prasad Gupta v. Md. Isa). After such rejection of the W.S., the petitioner initiated the review proceeding which came to an end with the passing of the second impugned order dated 30.11.2004. 10. It appears that the defendant/petitioner obtained the certified copy of the order on 22.12.2004 by applying for the same on 17.12.2004. Thus there was a delay of sixteen days in applying the certified copy. The instant writ petition has been filed on 24.03.2005, i.e., after more than three months of obtaining the certified copy. It is submitted by Mr. Sarma, learned counsel for the plaintiff/respondent that in the meantime much progress has been made in the suit by way of adducing evidence etc. Even after filing the writ petition on 25.3.2005 the same was not moved immediately and rather on both the occasions when matter was listed for motion hearing, i.e., on 1.4.2005 and 6.5.2005, the matter stood adjourned on the prayer of the petitioner. Thus there is a delay of more than four months in moving the writ petition against the review order dated 30.11.2004. 11. Mr. Thus there is a delay of more than four months in moving the writ petition against the review order dated 30.11.2004. 11. Mr. Dey, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that there being no period of limitation prescribed for invoking writ jurisdiction, the delay, even if any, in making a challenge to the order dated 30.11.2004 with which the first impugned order dated 3.3.2004 has merged will not be fatal. This submission of Mr. Dey will have to be considered not only in the context of scope, limit and ambit of writ jurisdiction in such matters, but also in the context of purpose and object for which the stringent clause limiting the time frame for filing the W.S. has been emphasised. 12. There is no gainsaying that the whole object and purpose of substituting the original provision for filing W.S. is to reduce delay in the disposal of civil cases. The Court will have to be cautious so that the force, impact and vigour of Order 8, Rule 1, CPC for the purpose and object for which got incorporated by the amendment of 2002 is not frustrated. 13. In the instant case, the Money Suit was instituted by the plaintiff/respondent on 15.9.2003 and the summons were served on 1.11.2003. The petitioner never prayed for any extension of time for filing W.S. firstly on expiry of thirty days and secondly before expiry of ninety days. The petitioner cannot expect the Court to grant any extension suo motu. Admittedly the petitioner filed the W.S. much after expiry of ninety days and that too without any prayer for acceptance of the same by granting extension. 14. The plea of the defendant/petitioner that since they had prayed for the documents by filing an application on 19.1.2004 and that the documents were required for the purpose of filing the W.S. and in absence of any order from the Court, they could not file the W.S., is also not tenable. Such an application was filed just before expiry of 90 days (10 days before) from the date of service of summons on the defendant/petitioner on 1.11.2003, unmindful of the fact that the first period of limitation of 30 days had already expired and that there was no prayer seeking extension of time. 15. The above plea of the defendant/petitioner is also not acceptable on another count. 15. The above plea of the defendant/petitioner is also not acceptable on another count. The W.S. was filed on the next date fixed, i.e., on 3.3.2004 without even awaiting for an order on the application seeking furnishing of the documents. If the petitioner could fill the W.S. without the documents on 3.3.2004, I see no reason as to why the same could not be done within the stipulated period as envisaged in Order VIII, Rule 1, CPC. Thus, really speaking, such a plea of the defendant petitioner loses its force on their own conduct and not tenable. This, coupled with the conduct of the petitioner towards filing the writ petition after more than four months of the order passed on review rejecting the prayer of the petitioner, leave no room for making any extension to the mandate of Order 8, Rule 1, CPC. 16. The decision of the Apex Court in the case of Vareed Jacob (supra) has been pressed into service to emphasise that while main body of the Code consisting of sections creates jurisdiction, the other part consisting of rules indicate the manner in which the jurisdiction has to be exercised. The decision has also been pressed into service to put emphasis on the inherent power of the Court under Section 151 of the CPC. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the provision of Order 8, Rule 1, CPC being procedural, no rigidity could be attached to the same. 17. Section 151, CPC recognises inherent power of the Court by virtue of its duty to do justice and this power is in addition and complementary to powers conferred under CPC, expressly or by implication. This power will not be exercised in conflict with any of the powers expressly or by implication conferred by other provision of CPC. Order 8, Rule 1, CPC days down an inbuilt provision relating to the time limit of fixing W.S. which cannot be flouted falling back on the provision of Section151 of the CPC. Moreover, the conduct of the petitioner as narrated above, will also have to be borne in mind. 18. This Court in the aforesaid decision of Baliram Prasad Gupta (supra) has held that the W.S. is required to be filed within the time frame provided under Order 8, Rule 1, CPC and on failure to do so, the Court will have no discretion in the matter. 18. This Court in the aforesaid decision of Baliram Prasad Gupta (supra) has held that the W.S. is required to be filed within the time frame provided under Order 8, Rule 1, CPC and on failure to do so, the Court will have no discretion in the matter. Similar view has been expressed by this Court in the decision reported in 2005 (1) GLT 538 (Robin Das v. Civil Judge, Sr. Division, Nagaon). 19. The case of Kailash v. Nanhku and Ors. (supra) is in respect of an election petition. While holding that Section 86 of the Representation of People Act would empower the High Court trying an election petition to adjourn the petition beyond the following day and the filing of W.S. being a stage in the "trial" of an election petition, the provision would empower the High Court to grant a reasonable time for filing W.S., though for reasons to be recorded, also dealt with the question, whether the time limit of 90 days as prescribed under Order 8, Rule 1, CPC is mandatory or directory in nature. While answering the question in paragraph 40 of the judgment to the effect that the provision has to be construed as directory and not mandatory, the Apex Court held that in exceptional situations the Court may extend the time for filing W.S. though the period of 30 days and 90 days referred to in the provision has expired. 20. Recording the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner, specially the respondent No. 1 that if the Court was to take a liberal view of the provision and introduce elasticity into apparent rigidity, the whole purpose behind enacting Order 8, Rule 1, CPC in the present form may be lost, the Apex Court observed as follows : (40) We find some merit in the submissions made by the learned counsel for both the parties. In our opinion, the solution - and the correct position of law - lie somewhere midway and that is what we propose to do placing a reasonable construction on the language or Order VIII, Rule 1. (41) Considering the object and purpose behind enacting Rule 1 of Order VIII, in the present form and the context in which the provision is placed, we are of the opinion that the provision has to be construed as directory and not mandatory. (41) Considering the object and purpose behind enacting Rule 1 of Order VIII, in the present form and the context in which the provision is placed, we are of the opinion that the provision has to be construed as directory and not mandatory. In exceptional situations, the Court may extend the time for filing the written statement though the period of 30 days and 90 days, referred to in the provision, has expired. However, we may not be misunderstood as nullifying the entire force and impact the entire life and vigour of the provision. The delaying tactics adopted by the defendants in law courts are now proverbial as they do stand to gain by delay. This is more so in election disputes because by delaying that trial of election petition, the successful candidates may succeed in enjoying the substantial part, if not in its entirety, the terms for which he was elected even though he may loose the battle at the end. Therefore, the Judge trying the case must handle the prayer for adjournment with firmness. The defendant seeking extension of time beyond the limits laid down by the provision may not ordinarily be shown indulgence. (42) Ordinarily, the time schedule prescribed by Order VIII, Rule 1, has to be honoured. The defendant should be vigilant. No sooner the writ of summons is served on him he should take steps for drafting his defence and filing the written statement on the appointed date of hearing without waiting for the arrival of the date appointed in the summons for his appearance in the Court. The extension of time sought for by the defendant from the Court whether within 30 days or 90 days, as the case may be, should not be granted just as a matter of routine and merely for asking more so, when the period of 90 days has expired. The extension can be only by way of an exception and for reasons assigned by the defendant and also recorded in writing by the Court to its satisfaction. The extension can be only by way of an exception and for reasons assigned by the defendant and also recorded in writing by the Court to its satisfaction. It must be spelled out that a departure from the time schedule prescribed by Order VIII, Rule 1, of the Code was being allowed to be made because the circumstances were exceptional, occasioned by reasons beyond the control of the defendant and such extension was required in the interest of justice, and grave injustice would be occasioned if the time was not extended. (43) A prayer seeking time beyond 90 days for filing the written statement ought to be made in writing. In its judicial discretion exercised on well-settled parameters, the Court may indeed put the defendants on terms including imposition of compensatory costs and may also insist on affidavit, medical certificate or other documentary evidence (depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case) being annexed with the application seeking extension of time so as to convince the Court that the prayer was founded on grounds which do exist. (44) The extension of time shall be only by way of exception and for reasons to be receded in writing, however brief they may be, by the Court. In no case, the defendant shall be permitted to seek extension of time when the Court is satisfied that it is case of laxity of gross negligence on the part of defendant or his counsel. The Court may impose costs for dual purpose : (i) to deter the defendant from seeking any extension of time just for asking and (ii) to compensate the plaintiff for the delay and inconvenience caused to him. (45) However, no straitjacket formula can be laid down except that the observance of time schedule contemplated by Order VIII, Rule 1, shall be the rule and departure therefrom an exception, made for satisfactory reasons only. We hold that Order VIII, Rule 1, though couched in mandatory form, is directory being a provision in the domain of processual law. (46) We sum up and briefly state our conclusions as under (i) . . . (ii) . . . (iii) . . . (iv) . . . We hold that Order VIII, Rule 1, though couched in mandatory form, is directory being a provision in the domain of processual law. (46) We sum up and briefly state our conclusions as under (i) . . . (ii) . . . (iii) . . . (iv) . . . (v) Though Order VIII, Rule 1, of the CPC is a part of Procedural Law and hence directory, keeping in view the need for expeditious trial of civil causes which persuaded the Parliament to enact the provision in its present form, it is held that ordinarily the time schedule contained in the provision is to be followed as a rule and departure therefrom would be by way of exception. A prayer for extension of time made by the defendant shall not be granted just as a matter routine and merely for asking, more so when the period of 90 days has expired. Extension of time may be allowed by way of an exception, for reasons to be assigned by the defendant and also be placed on record in writing, howsoever briefly, By the Court on its being satisfied. Extension of time may be allowed if it was needed to be given for the circumstances which are exceptional, occasioned by reasons beyond the control of the defendant and grave injustice would be occasioned if the time was not extended. Costs may be imposed and affidavit or documents in support of the grounds pleaded by the defendant for extension of time may be demanded, depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case." (emphasis added) 21. From the aforementioned observations of the Apex Court, it will be seen that the whole emphasis is on the observance of rigidity attached to the provisions of Order 8, Rule 1, CPC. It is in rarest of the rare cases, an exception can be made and that too on making out a clear case warranting such exception. 22. In the instant case, can it be said to be a case falling under such exception? Certainly not. The conduct of the defendant/petitioner has been noticed above. It did not make any prayer for extension either after expiry of thirty days or before expiry of ninety days. 22. In the instant case, can it be said to be a case falling under such exception? Certainly not. The conduct of the defendant/petitioner has been noticed above. It did not make any prayer for extension either after expiry of thirty days or before expiry of ninety days. After creating the situation in which the trial Court was left with no option than to refuse to accept the W.S. by its order dated 3.3.2004, they filed the review petition seeking review of the order unmindful of their own duty, promptness and vigilance in such a matter of rigid application, as if it was the duty of the Court to suo motu find out an exception of the kind as envisaged by the Apex Court in the aforesaid case. 23. Even after rejection of the review petition, the petitioner has delayed the matter by more than four months in invoking the writ jurisdiction which gives an impression that the real intent and purpose of the defendant/petitioner is to somehow delay the matter, a device for eradication of which the amendment to the provision was brought. The object behind substituting Order 8, Rule 1, CPC is to expedite the hearing and not to scuffle the same. Here is a case in which a suit instituted in September 2003 is being dragged on, on the issue of application of Order 8, Rule 1, CPC till this very date. 24. In view of the above, I am of the considered opinion, that no case has been made not for making a kind of exception as indicated by the Apex Court in its aforesaid decision of Kailash. Consequently, there is no infirmity in the impugned order warranting any interference of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Cogent and sound reasons have been assigned in both the impugned orders towards rejecting the prayer of the defendant/petitioner. 25. Writ petition stands dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their Petition dismissed.