Judgment D. D. SINHA, J. ( 1 ) RULE returnable forthwith. Heard Smt. Dube, learned Counsel for the petitioner, and Shri. Loney, learned additional Public Prosecutor for the respondent. ( 2 ) SMT. Dube, learned Counsel for the petitioner, states that petitioner is undergoing life imprisonment in Central prison, Nagpur for the offence punishable under Section 302 of Indian Penal Code. It is submitted that as per fourteen years' rule, which came into existence on 16-11 -1978 and made applicable with effect from 18-12-1978, after completion of fourteen years of actual imprisonment, the petitioner should have been categorized in an appropriate category depending on nature of offence committed by him and this power is vested in the State government under the above referred Rule. However, request of the petitioner for premature release is rejected by the Home department of the State Government vide order dated 27-7-2004 only on the ground that if petitioner is prematurely released there is danger to the life of the complainant. It is contended that the said order of the Home department is inconsistent with the above referred Rule and, therefore, cannot be sustained in law. It is further contended that in view of fourteen years', rule petitioner is entitled for premature release from the prison particularly when this benefit is extended to other prisoners, who are undergoing life imprisonment. It is, therefore, submitted that the impugned order is discriminatory and cannot be sustained in law. ( 3 ) SHRI. Loney, learned Additional public Prosecutor for the respondent, submits that under the fourteen year's Rule, report of the petitioner was submitted to the Home department, Government of Maharashtra, mantralaya, Mumbai through Inspector general of Police, Pune for necessary orders vide letter dated 7-10-2002. The State government has taken a decision vide order dated 27-7-2004 and rejected the proposal of the petitioner for premature release. It is submitted that on receipt of the order of the state Government, the contents of the order were read over to the petitioner. ( 4 ) LEARNED Additional Public prosecutor Shri. Loney has submitted that re-enquiry report was called from the Additional police Commissioner (Crime), Nagpur by the senior Jailer, Nagpur Central Prison. The said report dated 24-11-2004 is received by the superintendent of Central Prison, Nagpur, which is of adverse nature. ( 4 ) LEARNED Additional Public prosecutor Shri. Loney has submitted that re-enquiry report was called from the Additional police Commissioner (Crime), Nagpur by the senior Jailer, Nagpur Central Prison. The said report dated 24-11-2004 is received by the superintendent of Central Prison, Nagpur, which is of adverse nature. Similarly, re-enquiry \report dated 28-10-2004 from the district Magistrate, Nagpur has been received by the Senior Jailer, Central Prison, Nagpur. The same is also adverse to the petitioner. It is further submitted that both these reports are forwarded to the Advisory Board, which will review matter of the petitioner pursuant to order dated 27-7-2004. ( 5 ) LEARNED Additional Public prosecutor Shri. Loney further submits that petitioner as on 28-2-2005 has undergone 24 years, 4 months, 26 day's imprisonment including set off period, State remission and other remission. It is contended that when person is sentenced for imprisonment for life, same ordinarily means imprisonment for whole of remaining period of convict's natural life. A convict undergoing such sentence may earn remission of part of sentence under the prison Rules or Rules framed by the respective state Government, but such remission in absence of any order of appropriate government remitting the entire balance of his sentence does not entitle the convict to be released automatically before full life term is served. It is submitted that in the present case, the State Government rejected the claim of the petitioner by the impugned order for premature release and in view of law laid down by the apex Court in Life Convict Laxman Naskar vs. State of West Bengal and another ( AIR 2000 SC 2762 ), the impugned order is neither arbitrary, discriminatory or violative of right of the petitioner. It is contended that matter is pending with the Advisory Board for review and, therefore, appropriate direction, if necessary, may be given to the Advisory board. ( 6 ) LEARNED Additional Public prosecutor Shri. Loney brought to the notice of this Court that original fourteen years' guideline, which came into existence on 16- 11-1978 and made applicable with effect from 18-12-1978 is revised vide Government notification dated 11-5-1992, which is, as on today, holding the field and State Government is now required to categorize prisoners as per guidelines mentioned in the said notification. ( 7 ) WE have considered the contentions canvassed by the respective counsel for the parties. ( 7 ) WE have considered the contentions canvassed by the respective counsel for the parties. Before we consider he issue of premature release of the petitioner,. t will be appropriate to consider the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Life convict Laxman Naskar (cited supra ). In the said case, the Apex Court was considering the claim of the prisoner for premature release under Section 61 (1) of the West Bengal correctional Services Act, XXXII of 1992. The relevant observations of the Apex Court in para (3) of the judgment read thus : "after examining the legal position as to the nature of the power arising under section 432, Cr. P. C. Read with Article 161 of the Constitution and the relevant rules relating to remissions of sentence it is observed in the State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Ratan Singh, (1976)3 SCC 470 : AIR 1976 SC 1552 : (1976 Cri. L. J. 1192) as under: (1) That a sentence of imprisonment for life does not automatically expire at the end of 20 years including the remissions, because the Administrative Rules framed under the various Jail Manuals or under the Prison act cannot supersede the statutory provisions of the Indian Penal Code. A sentence of imprisonment for life means a sentence for the entire life of the prisoner unless the appropriate Government chooses to exercise its discretion to remit either the whole or a part of the sentence under section 401 of the Code of Criminal procedure, 1898 : (2) That the appropriate Government has the undoubted discretion to remit or refuse to remit the sentence and where it refuses to remit the sentence, no writ can be issued directing the State Government to release the prisoner. "similarly, observations of the Apex Court in para (4) of its judgment are also relevant for the purpose of controversy in issue and those observations read thus : "in Naib Singh Vs. State of Punjab, (1983)2 SCC 454 : ( AIR 1983 SC 855 : 1983 Cr. "similarly, observations of the Apex Court in para (4) of its judgment are also relevant for the purpose of controversy in issue and those observations read thus : "in Naib Singh Vs. State of Punjab, (1983)2 SCC 454 : ( AIR 1983 SC 855 : 1983 Cr. L. J. 1345), it was noticed that a distinction between 'imprisonment for life' and 'imprisonment for a term' has been maintained in the Indian Penal Code in several of its provisions and moreover, whenever an offender is punishable with 'imprisonment for life', he is not punishable with 'imprisonment which may be of either description' within the meaning of Section 60, I. P. C. and, therefore, we cannot come to the conclusion that the court by itself, could release the convict automatically before the full life term is served. This aspect was highlighted in gopal Vinayak Godse Vs. State of maharashtra (1961 )3 SCR 440: ( AIR 1961 sc 600 : 1961 (1) Cri. L. J. 736), wherein it was held that sentence for 'imprisonment for life' ordinarily means imprisonment for the whole of the remaining period of the convicted person's natural life; that a convict undergoing such sentence may earn remissions of his part of sentence under the prison Rules but such remissions in the absence of an order of an appropriate government remitting the entire balance of his sentence under this Section does not entitle the convict to be released automatically before the full life term is served. It was observed that though under the relevant rules a sentence for imprisonment for life is equated with the definite period of 20 years, there is no indefeasible right of such prisoner to be unconditionally released on the expiry of such particular term, including remissions and that is only for the purpose of working out the remissions that the said sentence is equated with definite period and not for any other purpose. In view of this legal position explained by this Court, it may not help the petitioner even on the construction placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on Section 61 (1) of the West bengal Correctional Services Act XXXII of 1992 with reference to explanation thereto that for the purpose of calculation of the total period of imprisonment under this Section, the period of imprisonment for life shall be taken to be equivalent to the period of imprisonment for 20 years. Therefore, solely on the basis of completion of a term in jail serving imprisonment and remissions earned under the relevant rules or law will not entitle an automatic release, but the appropriate Government must pass a separate order remitting the unexpired portion of the sentence. "( 8 ) THE law laid down by the Apex cour! in the above referred judgment clearly demonstrates that sentence of imprisonment for life means sentence of entire life of the prisoner unless appropriate Government chooses to exercise its discretion to remit either whole or part of sentence under Section 201 of Code of Criminal Procedure. At the same lime, it is also quite evident that it is the sole discretion of the appropriate Government to remit or refuse to remit sentence and where it refuses to remit the sentence, no writ can be issued directing the State Government to release the prisoner. However, in para (6) of the above referred judgment the Supreme court has issued certain guidelines as to the basis on which convict can be released prematurely. The observations of the Apex court in para (6) read thus : "this Court also issued certain guidelines as to the basis on which a convict can be released prematurely and they are as under: 1. Whether the offence is an individual act of crime without affecting the society at large. 2. Whether there is any fruitful purpose of confining of this convict anymore. 3. Whether there is any chance of future reoccurrence of committing crime. 4. Whether the convict has lost his potentiality in committing crime. 5. Socio-Economic condition of the convict's family. " ( 9 ) THE observations of the Apex court in para (6) of the above referred judgment demonstrate that Authority of the state Government, which is required to consider case of the premature release of convict, is expected to consider above referred guidelines and thereafter is required to take a decision as per relevant procedure/rule or notification applicable in this regard. For our purpose, the relevant notification in this regard is dated 11-5-1992 issued by the State government. For our purpose, the relevant notification in this regard is dated 11-5-1992 issued by the State government. ( 10 ) ON the backdrop of the above referred well settled legal position, we have perused the impugned order dated 27-7-2004 passed by the competent Authority of the State government whereby claim of the petitioner for premature release is rejected only on the ground that release of the petitioner will endanger life of the complainant. Perusal of the impugned order makes it evident that competent Authority has not taken into consideration any of the factors, which are evolved by the Apex Court in para (6) of its above referred judgment in the form of guidelines to be considered by the competent authority while considering issue of premature release of the convict and rejected the claim of the petitioner for premature release only on the ground that release of the petitioner would endanger life of the complainant. In our considered view, reason given by the competent Authority for rejecting claim of the petitioner for premature release in the impugned order is not just and proper. ( 11 ) IT is no doubt true that case of the petitioner is pending with the Advisory board for review. However, we are of the view that basic order passed by the competent authority dated 27-7-2004 itself is not proper and does not disclose proper application of mind by the competent Authority particularly in accordance with the above referred guidelines issued by the Apex Court and, therefore, it will be proper to remand the matter back to the competent Authority for reconsideration of the case of the petitioner for premature release and appropriate Authority shall re-consider the case of the petitioner keeping in view above referred guidelines issued by the Apex Court in para (6) of its judgment as well as procedure contemplated under notification dated 11-5-1992. ( 12 ) FOR the reasons stated hereinabove, we quash and set aside the impugned order dated 27-7-2004 passed by the competent Authority and direct the competent authority to re-consider the case of the petitioner for premature release in the light of observations made by us in the present judgment as well as guidelines evolved by the apex Court in the case of Life Convict laxman Bhaskar (cited supra) and procedure contemplated under notification dated 11-5- 1992 as early as possible and in any case not beyond the period of four months from the date of receipt of this judgment. ( 13 ) THE rule is made absolute in the above terms. Petition allowed.