C. Y. SOMAYAJULU, J. ( 1 ) SINCE these two appeals arise out of the same suit, they are being disposed of by a common judgment. ( 2 ) APPELLANT in A. S. No. 1920 of 1987 filed the suit against his brother and mother seeking partition of the properties specified in the schedules a b , c and d appended to the plaint. Subsequently, appellants in A. S. No. 1413 of 1987 filed a petition to implead themselves as Defendants 3 and 4 in the said suit on the ground that some of the properties covered by the plaint b schedule, in fact, belong to them and not to the parties to the suit. That petition was allowed and the appellants in a. S. No. 1413 of 1987 were brought on record as Defendants 3 and 4 in the said suit. ( 3 ) FOR the sake of convenience, I would hereinafter refer to the parties are they are arrayed in the Trial Court. ( 4 ) THE case, in brief, of the plaintiff is that he is the adopted son of the second defendant and her late husband malgireddi Ramaiah and that after his adoption first defendant was born to his adopted parents and that after he and his father, who were in management of the joint family property, have acquired the properties specified in plaint b schedule from out of the income derived from the joint family properties i. e. plaint a schedule properties and thus properties specified in the plaint a and b schedules along with the movable properties specified in the plaint c schedule are the joint family properties. He contracted debts specified in the plaint d schedule for the joint family necessities and since he wanted to get divided from the first defendant, he requested the first defendant for partition and since first defendant is not co-operating with hirn for partition of the joint family properties, he is obliged to file the suit. He contracted debts specified in the plaint d schedule for the joint family necessities and since he wanted to get divided from the first defendant, he requested the first defendant for partition and since first defendant is not co-operating with hirn for partition of the joint family properties, he is obliged to file the suit. ( 5 ) DEFENDANTS 1 and 2 filed a common written statement admitting the relationship between them and the plaintiff and contending that there, in fact, was a partition between the first defendant and the plaintiff during which the properties specified in the Annexure-I to the written statement along with some other properties were allotted to the share of plaintiff, and the properties specified in Annexure-II of the written statement were allotted to his share. Since the debts mentioned in the plaint d schedule are the personal debts of the plaintiff they have no liability to discharge those debts. In fact, plaintiff admitted the partition between him and first defendant in O. S. No. 73 of 1977 filed by him. Since no share was allotted to the second defendant in the earlier partition, she also is entitled to a share in the properties covered by plaint a and b schedules. Since properties mentioned in the plaint c schedule are not in existence, plaintiff is not entitled to any relief. ( 6 ) THE case of third defendant is that lands in S. Nos. 578, 584 and 585 of Damera bheemanapally Village exclusively belong to him and that neither the plaintiff nor defendants 1 and 2 have any right in the said lands and so the suit in respect of those lands is not maintainable. ( 7 ) THE case of fourth defendant is that he is in possession of land in S. Nos. 641, 642 and 646 of Damera Bheemanapally village after having purchased them from the plaintiff and others under a simple sale deed and got his name mutated in the revenue records and so the plaintiff and defendants 1 and 2 are not entitled to seek partition of those lands. ( 8 ) BASING on the above pleadings, the trial Court framed six issues for trial. In support of his case, plaintiff examined himself as P. W. I and six other witnesses as P. Ws. 2 to 7 and marked Exs. A. 1 to a. 17. Exs. ( 8 ) BASING on the above pleadings, the trial Court framed six issues for trial. In support of his case, plaintiff examined himself as P. W. I and six other witnesses as P. Ws. 2 to 7 and marked Exs. A. 1 to a. 17. Exs. X. 1 to X. 6 were marked through his witnesses. On behalf of Defendants 1 and 2, first defendant examined himself as d. W. 1 and another witness as D. W. 2 and marked Exs. B. 1 to B. 4, B. 11 and B. 12 on their behalf. Third defendant examined himself as D. W. 3 and marked Exs. B. 5 to b. 10 on his behalf. Fourth defendant examined himself as D. W. 4, but did not adduce any documentary evidence. ( 9 ) ON the basis of the evidence adduced the Trial Court, held on Issues 1 to 3, which relate to the question whether the plaint schedule properties are joint properties and if there was a prior partition between the plaintiff and the first defendant as alleged by the first defendant, and whether the debts specified in d schedule of the plaint were contracted by the plaintiff for joint family necessity and are binding on the first defendant, held that plaintiff did not contract the debts specified in the plaint d schedule for the purpose of joint family necessities and hence are binding on Defendants 1 and 2 and that there was no final partition by metes and bounds between the plaintiff and first defendant and that plaint a and b schedule properties are the joint family properties liable for partition in two equal shares among the plaintiff and the first defendant. On Issues 4 and 5, which relate to the question whether 3rd defendant is the owner and possessor of the lands in s. Nos. 578, 584 and 585 and are not the joint family properties of plaintiff and defendants 1 and 2 and whether the fourth defendant is the exclusive owner and possessor of land in S. Nos. On Issues 4 and 5, which relate to the question whether 3rd defendant is the owner and possessor of the lands in s. Nos. 578, 584 and 585 and are not the joint family properties of plaintiff and defendants 1 and 2 and whether the fourth defendant is the exclusive owner and possessor of land in S. Nos. 641, 642 and 646 having purchased them from the plaintiff, held against the Defendants 3 and 4, and consequently, on Issue 6, which relates to the relief, passed a preliminary decree for partition of the plaint a and b schedule properties, with a direction that during final partition, lands mentioned in Annexure-I of the written statement filed by Defendants 1 and 2 be allotted to the plaintiff as far as possible and the lands mentioned in annexure-II of written statement filed by defendants 1 and 2 be allotted to the first defendant as far as possible. Aggrieved by the said preliminary decree, Defendants 3 and 4 preferred A. S. No. 1413 of 1987 and aggrieved by the finding in respect of the debts in the plaint d schedule, plaintiff preferred A. S. No. 1920 of 1987. After disposal of the suit by the Trial Court, fourth defendant died and so his legal representatives were brought on record in both the appeals. ( 10 ) C. M. P. No. 15310 of 2004 is filed by the 3rd defendant and the legal representatives of the 4th defendant to receive the release deed dated 23-4-1971 as additional evidence in the appeal on the ground that it was traced recently, and so it could not be filed in the Trial Court. ( 11 ) THE points for consideration in these appeals are: (1) Whether Ac. 6-20gts in S. Nos. 578, 584 and 585 and Ac. 12. 00 in s. Nos. 641, 642 and 646 of Damera bheemunipalli Village belong to defendants 3 and 4 respectively and hence are not available for partition among plaintiff and first defendant? (2) Whether the movable properties specified in c schedule and the debts shown in d schedule are available for partition between the plaintiff and first defendant? (3) To what relief ? 641, 642 and 646 of Damera bheemunipalli Village belong to defendants 3 and 4 respectively and hence are not available for partition among plaintiff and first defendant? (2) Whether the movable properties specified in c schedule and the debts shown in d schedule are available for partition between the plaintiff and first defendant? (3) To what relief ? ( 12 ) THE main contention of the learned counsel for Defendants 3 and 4 is that since land in S. No. 578 is an Inam land by virtue of the ratio in Lokraj v. Kishan Lal, 1995 (3) SCC 291 , Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a suit for partition in respect of the said land, and it is only a tribunal constituted under Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Abolition of Inams act, 1955, that has jurisdiction to decide the title thereto and since plaintiff as P. W. 1 admitted that Defendants 3 and 4 are the pattadars of the land in S. Nos. 578, s. Nos. 641, 642 and 646 of Damera bheemanapally Village and since the copies of the pahanies produced by the plaintiff also show that fact and since in yadarao Dabija Shrawane v. Nanilal harakchand Shah, 2002 (6) SCC 404 at page 415, it is held that admissions of parties or their witnesses are relevant pieces of evidence, and is entitled to due weightage by Courts, the Court below was in error in passing a decree in favour of the plaintiff though he admitted that defendants 3 and 4 are the pattadars of the lands claimed by them. It is his contention that since plaintiff failed to prove Exs. A. 7 and A. 8 by examining the attestors or scribe of those documents, the court below was in error in passing a preliminary decree for partition of those lands. Relying on Ambika Prasad v. Ram ekbal Rai, AIR 1966 SC 605 , he contended that since title to land cannot pass on mere admissions, and since weakness of the case of defendant cannot be a ground for passing a decree in favour of the plaintiff the decree of the Trial Court is not sustainable. Relying on Ambika Prasad v. Ram ekbal Rai, AIR 1966 SC 605 , he contended that since title to land cannot pass on mere admissions, and since weakness of the case of defendant cannot be a ground for passing a decree in favour of the plaintiff the decree of the Trial Court is not sustainable. Relying on Ganpatrao gulabrao Pawar and others v. The State of Maharashtra, 1992 (1) Scale 783 , and k. Ampaiah v. P. Alpuramma, 1996 (2) ald 1025 , he contended that the Court below was in error in passing a decree for partition in respect of the aforesaid lands merely because plaintiff filed a declaration under the A. P. Land Reforms (Ceiling on agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973. ( 13 ) THE contention of the learned counsel for plaintiff is that the Trial Court having rightly held that there was no prior partition of plaint A and B schedule properties, was in error in giving a direction that during the final partition, properties specified in Annexures-I and II of the written statement of Defendants 1 and 2 should be allotted to the plaintiff and the first defendant as far as possible, without assigning any reasons for giving such direction. It is also his contention that the Court below was in error in not passing a decree in respect of plaint c schedule movable properties and contends that since the evidence of pws. 2 to 7 clearly establishes that plaintiff contracted debts mentioned in plaint d schedule for the benefit of joint family and for purchase of lands, the Court below was in error in not giving a direction to the first defendant to discharge half share of the debts covered by the plaint d schedule. It is his contention that on the basis of the evidence adduced by the plaintiff, the Court below rightly negatived the contention of Defendants 3 and 4 and so the decree of the Trial Court may be modified by passing a preliminary decree for partition of the plaint A to C schedules into two equal shares by metes and bounds with a direction to discharge half share of the debts mentioned in the plaint d schedule. ( 14 ) THE contention of the learned counsel for first defendant is that since the trial Court by giving cogent reasons held that the properties mentioned in Annexures i and II of the written statement of the first defendant should be allotted as far as possible to the plaintiff and first defendant respectively during final decree proceedings and contends first defendant did not feel aggrieved by any of the findings of the Trial court and so he did not prefer cross objections or cross appeal, and so the fact that first defendant did not file cross objections or prefer a cross appeal is not and cannot be a ground for giving a finding against him and contends that there are no grounds to interfere with the findings of the Trial Court. Point No. 1: ( 15 ) IN my considered opinion, the contention of the learned Counsel for defendants 3 and 4 that inasmuch as the land in S. No. 578 is an Inam land Civil court ceases to have jurisdiction in respect of that land cannot be accepted because 3rd defendant did not allege in his written statement that the land in S. No. 578 is an Inam land and so Civil Court cannot entertain a suit in respect thereof. No doubt in Ex. B. 7, which is a copy of pahani for the year 3978-79, in Column No. 12 relating to the details about possession (J3 ^ciq. ^ L> A *i) it is mentioned in respect of 578/1 as inam . In Ex. B. 6, which is a copy of pahani for the year 1977-78, in column No. 12 relating to 578, it is mentioned as hissadar but not as inam . In Ex. B. 8, which is a pahani for the year 1979-80, in column No. 12 it is mentioned as inamdaru . In Ex. B. 9, which is a copy of pahani for the year 1980-81, in Column No. 12, it is mentioned as inam . In Ex. B. 10, which is a copy of pahani for the year 1981-82, in column No. 12 it is mentioned as hissadar . In Ex. A. 1 which is a copy of pahani for the year 1972-73, in Column No. 12 relating to s. No. 578 it is mentioned as hissadar . In Ex. B. 10, which is a copy of pahani for the year 1981-82, in column No. 12 it is mentioned as hissadar . In Ex. A. 1 which is a copy of pahani for the year 1972-73, in Column No. 12 relating to s. No. 578 it is mentioned as hissadar . In view of the fact that there is no clear proof to show that the land in S. No. 578 is an Inam land, and since there is no such plea in the written statement of 3rd defendant, I do not agree with the contention of the learned Counsel for Defendants 3 and 4 that in view of the ratio in Lokraj case (supra) the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to pass a decree for partition in respect of that land. If the land in S. No. 578 is in fact an Inam land and if the 3rd defendant is really granted an Occupancy certificate, he is at liberty to take steps under A. P. (Telangana Area) Abolition of inams Act, 1955, but, he cannot be heard to say for the first time in appeal without taking such plea in the written statement that suit in respect of the said land is not maintainable in Civil Court. ( 16 ) FROM the evidence of P. W. 1 it is evident he purchased the land in S. No. 578 from the 3rd defendant, because he in his cross-examination on behalf of Defendants 3 and 4, stated " I have purchased the said land from D-3. I have filed the said document in the Court. " Exs. A. 7 and A. 8 are two unregistered documents in Urdu said to be containing the thumb impressions without stating the name as to whose thumb impressions they are. With regard to Exs. A. 7 and A. 8 the evidence of P. W. 1i is that 3rd defendant sold the land in s. Nos. 578, 584 and 585 to him in 1971 for rs. 4,825/- and that he paid the entire sale consideration and obtained Ex. A. 6 receipt (wrongly typed as Ex. With regard to Exs. A. 7 and A. 8 the evidence of P. W. 1i is that 3rd defendant sold the land in s. Nos. 578, 584 and 585 to him in 1971 for rs. 4,825/- and that he paid the entire sale consideration and obtained Ex. A. 6 receipt (wrongly typed as Ex. A. 5 in the deposition) and that in 1973 3rd defendant along with Patwary, Mali Patel and one Nareddy ram Reddy came to Deverakonda for the purpose of execution of a registered sale deed with Thummaluri Ram Reddy and that a sale deed in respect of S. No. 578 was engrossed on stamp papers and another sale deed in respect of S. Nos. 584 and 585 was also engrossed on requisite stamp papers and that 3rd defendant affixed his thumb marks on those sale deeds and that they were attested by N. Ram Reddy and thummaluri Ram Reddy and that those sale deeds are Exs. A. 7 and A. 8 (wrongly typed as Exs. A. 6 and A. 7 in the deposition) and that after execution of those documents and before going to the Office of the Sub- registrar they went to a hotel for taking meals and that the Patwary who kept exs. A. 7 and A. 8 in a bag, gave that bag to the 3rd defendant for safe custody and when he and Patwary and others came out of the hotel after talking meals, 3rd defendant was found missing along with the bag containing Exs. A. 7 and A. 8, and when in spite of search they could not find 3rd defendant he gave a report in the marriguda Police Station and that the police apprehended the 3rd defendant and recovered Exs. A. 7 and A. 8 from him but the Sub-Inspector of Police did not file a charge-sheet against the 3rd defendant and kept Exs. A. 7 and A. 8 with him, and that he, after filing of the case, went to the Police station and requested the S. I. of Marriguda to return Exs. A. 7 and A. 8 and took them from him. The above said evidence of P. W. 1, to say the least, is artificial and cannot be accepted because whenever stolen property is recovered from the accused, police are bound to produce it before the Magistrate and cannot keep the property with them. A. 7 and A. 8 and took them from him. The above said evidence of P. W. 1, to say the least, is artificial and cannot be accepted because whenever stolen property is recovered from the accused, police are bound to produce it before the Magistrate and cannot keep the property with them. According to the plaintiff, the documents i. e. Ex. A. 7 and Ex. B. 8 were stolen in 1973. He gave evidence in 1985. So, according to the plaintiff, Exs. A. 7 and A. 8 were with the police for 12 long years. If really the police registered a case against the 3rd defendant and apprehended him, as stated by P. W. 1, there should be an FIR. No FIR is produced by the plaintiffs Except the interested oral evidence of the plaintiff as P. W. 1 there is no documentary evidence regarding his giving a police report relating to theft of Exs. A. 7 and A. 8 by 3rd defendant. Moreover, if the plaintiff really intended to obtain a registered sale deed from 3rd defendant, when he could get Exs. A. 7 and A. 8 executed, nothing prevented him from filing a suit for specific performance. He could have presented exs. A7 and A. 8 for registration and took steps under Registration Act. It is not the case of the plaintiff that he took any such steps. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for Defendants 3 and 4, since sxs. A. 7 and A. 8 are unregistered documents they cannot be relied upon for holding that plaintiff purchased the land covered thereby from the 3rd defendant. That apart, for reasons best known to him, plaintiff did not think it fit to examine any of the attestors or the scribe of Exs. A. 7 and A. 8 to establish that they in fact contain the thumb impressions of the 3rd defendant. He did not even take steps to send the thumb impressions in Exs. A. 7 and A. 8 for comparison with the admitted thumb impressions of 3rd defendant to an expert for his opinion if they in fact contain the thumb marks of 3rd defendant or not. In those circumstances, on the mere assertions of the plaintiff that Exs. He did not even take steps to send the thumb impressions in Exs. A. 7 and A. 8 for comparison with the admitted thumb impressions of 3rd defendant to an expert for his opinion if they in fact contain the thumb marks of 3rd defendant or not. In those circumstances, on the mere assertions of the plaintiff that Exs. A. 7 and A. 8 were executed by 3rd defendant and were stolen by him and that they were in the custody of police for 12 long years and that that is the reason for the delay in producing them into court. Exs. A. 7 and A. 8 cannot be taken a proved. ( 17 ) EVEN assuming for argument sake that Exs. A. 7 and A. 8 were executed by 3rd defendant, since they are unregistered documents they do not confer title, or convey the title of the 3rd defendant to plaintiff. The observation of the Court below that the 3rd defendant is not a necessary party to the suit and that he ought to have taken steps to file a separate suit and establish his rights, is not a correct view. It is no doubt true that there was no necessity for the 3rd defendant to come on record in a suit for partition filed by the plaintiff against 1st defendant. But when once he (3rd defendant) came on record as a person interested in the property in which the plaintiff is claiming a right, plaintiff ought to have made the necessary pleadings, by filing a rejoinder explaining as to how he acquired title to the property in respect of which 3rd defendant is claiming a right. From the evidence of plaintiff and the documents produced by him, it is clear that he purchased the property covered by s. Nos. 578, 584 and 585 from the 3rd defendant under Exs. A. 7 and A. 8. Since exs. A. 7 and A. 8 do not confer title in the land covered thereby to the plaintiff, the Trial court was in error in passing a decree for partition of the land in S. Nos. 578, 584 and 585. If the plaintiff feels that he acquired title to the property in his possession as a purchaser, he has to establish his right in the said land by taking recourse to proceedings against the 3rd defendant. 578, 584 and 585. If the plaintiff feels that he acquired title to the property in his possession as a purchaser, he has to establish his right in the said land by taking recourse to proceedings against the 3rd defendant. But, he cannot without establishing his title seek relief of partition in respect of the said lands. CMP No. 15310 of 2004: ( 18 ) DEFENDANTS 3 and 4 filed this petition to receive an unregistered and unstamped release deed dated 23-4-1971 as additional evidence in these appeals. Since an unstamped and unregistered document cannot convey or transfer rights, and cannot be used in evidence to establish transfer, and cannot be admitted in evidence, the petition is dismissed. ( 19 ) COMING to the lands covered by s. Nos. 641, 642 and 646 the case of the 4th defendant is that he purchased the said lands from the plaintiff under a simple sale deed in 1971 for Rs. 2,600/ -. No such document is filed into Court. It is well known that unregistered and unstamped sale deeds do not convey title to the properties worth more than Rs. 100/ -. Therefore, the contention of the 4th defendant that he is the owner of the lands in S. Nos. 641, 642 and 646 as the vendee from plaintiff cannot be accepted. If 4th defendant has any right in S. Nos. 641, 642 and 646, he is at liberty to pursue the remedies open to him but he cannot resist the suit for partition without adducing reliable evidence to show that he is the owner of the said lands. ( 20 ) FOR the above reasons, I hold that the lands in S. Nos. 578, 584 and 585 are not available for partition but the lands in s. Nos. 641, 642 and 646 are available for partition between the plaintiff and the first defendant The point is answered accordingly. Point No-2: ( 21 ) NO reliable evidence relating to the existence of the plaint c schedule property is adduced that too when Defendants 1 and 2 denied existence of those properties. For reasons best known to him, plaintiff did not even seek an inventory of the articles also. Therefore, the Trial Court not passing a decree in respect of the c schedule property cannot be said to be erroneous. For reasons best known to him, plaintiff did not even seek an inventory of the articles also. Therefore, the Trial Court not passing a decree in respect of the c schedule property cannot be said to be erroneous. ( 22 ) COMING to the debts covered by d schedule to the plaint, it is no doubt true that the plaintiff examined P. Ws. 2 to 7 to show that they have lent some amounts to him (plaintiff ). But, in my opinion, their evidence is of no help to establish that those debts were contracted by the plaintiff for the purpose of the joint family necessity, binding on the first defendant, more so because plaintiff in his cross-examination admitted that his father was managing the joint family properties during his lifetime and after the death of his father, his mother (2nd defendant) was managing the affairs of the joint family. When the second defendant was managing the affairs of the joint family, question of first defendant contracting the debts for the benefit, or for purpose of the joint family does not arise. So, the debts shown in plaint d schedule of the plaint are but the personal debts of the plaintiff, for which the first defendant has no liability to discharge. Therefore, the finding of the Court below that the first defendant is not liable to discharge any of the debts covered by the plaint d schedule needs no interference and I confirm the said finding. ( 23 ) OBVIOUSLY, basing on the answers given by P. W. 1 during the cross-examination on 27-9-1983 the Trial Court gave a direction that the property specified in the annexures I and II of the written statement shall be allotted to the plaintiff and first defendant during final partition as far as possible. I find no grounds to interfere with the said finding. The point is answered accordingly. Point No. 3: ( 24 ) THEREFORE, A. S. No. 1920 of 1987 is dismissed and A. S. No. 1413 of 1987 is allowed in part and the suit in respect of the lands in S. Nos. 578, 585 and 585 is dismissed and the preliminary decree as passed by the Trial Court in respect of other items of plaint a and b schedules is confirmed. Parties are directed to bear their own costs in these appeals.