ASHIM KUMAR BANERJEE. J. ( 1 ) THE writ petitioners were working as teachers in the school set up by Dandakaranya Development Authority. In the year 1985-86 the government decided to hand over those schools to the state administration and the surplus employees working therein were transferred to the personnel department of the Central Government and thereafter redeployed in various departments of the State Government. During this period the Central Government set up a commission for examining the terms and conditions of teachers working throughout the country and for setting up uniform scale of pay for them. Professor D. P. Chattopadhyay commission ultimately in April, 1986 submitted their final report, wherein certain financial benefits were given to the teachers. The disputes arose, as to whether the teachers working under Dandakaranya development Authority would be entitled to avail the benefits of the recommendation of the commission. The matter went up to the Apex Court level. The Apex Court in the case of Union of India vs. Bijoy Lal Ghosh and Ors. reported in JT 98 Vol. II SC Page 318, observed that since the teachers working under the authority were declared surplus and were transferred firstly to the personnel department to the Central Government and thereafter redeployed in various departments of the Government they would be entitled to the benefit as according to the Apex Court as on the effective date being January 1, 1986 they were teachers and were entitled to the said benefit. ( 2 ) IF we look to paragraph 2 of the said decision, it would appear that the teachers of subject group were declared surplus and they were taken on roll of Central Surplus Staff Cell under the personnel department vide order dated April 28, 1986 and they were transferred to the personnel department with effect from April 1, 1986 and consequently, they were redeployed in various departments with effect from September 22, 1986. The concerned writ petitioners in that case thereafter joined their respective departments on or after September 22, 1986. In that backdrop, the Apex Court observed that as on January 1, 1986 those writ petitioners should have been considered as teachers and the benefits under the commission report should be extended to them. Paragraph 28 of the said judgment being relevant herein for the purpose is quoted below:"28.
In that backdrop, the Apex Court observed that as on January 1, 1986 those writ petitioners should have been considered as teachers and the benefits under the commission report should be extended to them. Paragraph 28 of the said judgment being relevant herein for the purpose is quoted below:"28. After giving our due consideration both to the facts and the law, which we have referred above, it is not in dispute that the respondents were teachers working, with the Central Government between 1st January, 1986 and 1st April, 1986. The Government absorbed them in its various departments at the same pay scale which they were drawing then. The Central Government has accepted the National Commission (Chattopadhyay Committee)report-and gave benefit to all its teachers working in the Union territory and some of its departments and that all the States in india have also accepted the same. The documents on record also reveals, apart from the teachers working in the Union Territory, central Government approved other teachers working in some other departments. The pith and substance and spirit of the reply at the parliament indicates at least Central. Government's total acceptance for all its teachers to whom the said report was applicable. The appellant,namely,union of India, has not brought_on record anything to the contrary to show the exclusion of respondents room giving the said benefit on the relevant date, as were given to all the teachers, who were placed in the same position as the respondents. The only argument advanced was, not on the basis of any record but as submission that since the institutions under ddp were handed over to the States of Orissa and Madhya Pradesh on the 1st January, 1986 and that not being in existence, respondents baring been taken as surplus and were in due time absorbed in the various departments, the benefit of the increase in pay scale as recommended by the National Commission was not given to them. Apart from the fact that there is nothing on the record to show even this reasoning for declining the said claim, we find even otherwise, this submission has no merits.
Apart from the fact that there is nothing on the record to show even this reasoning for declining the said claim, we find even otherwise, this submission has no merits. The respondents are not claiming all or other benefits which were given and to be received in future to the teachers but confining their claim to the period when, admittedly, they were teachers and all the teachers irrespective of the fact that they were taken by the state Government or with the Central Government were given that benefit. If that be so, there could be no justifiable reason to exclude that benefit to the respondents. " ( 3 ) ON a plain reading of the paragraph quoted (supra) it would appear that the Apex court observed that the report would apply to the teachers to whom the said report was applicable. The Apex Court also observed that the concerned writ petitioners were teachers on the relevant date (01. 01. 1986)irrespective of the fact that they were taken by the State Government or the Central Government subsequently and it Would not be justified to exclude them from the benefits available under the report of the commission. ( 4 ) THE writ petitioners contend that they were similarly circumstanced with the writ petitioners in the case of Bijpy Lal Ghosh (Supra) and as such they were entitled to have the benefits under the said report which was denied by the Department of Telecommunication (later on BSNL ). ( 5 ) ON a careful analysis of the fact appearing in the pleadings in appears to me that tin 1985 the writ petitioners were declared surplus and they were also absorbed by the department of telecommunication (later on BSNL) in 1985. Hence, everything happened before 01. 01. 1986 ( 6 ) THE letter of rejection dated 30. 08. 1999 contains as follows:"the undersigned is directed to refer to DOT ND Letter No. 1-2 (7)/ 99-PAT, dated 5th July, 1999 and to intimate that the benefit of the National Pay Commission because they did not work as teachers in the DNK Project as on 01. 01. 1986. " ( 7 ) LEARNED counsel appearing in support of this application contends that the crucial date being 1st January, 1986 should be considered as an effective date for the purpose of extension of benefit and nothing else.
01. 1986. " ( 7 ) LEARNED counsel appearing in support of this application contends that the crucial date being 1st January, 1986 should be considered as an effective date for the purpose of extension of benefit and nothing else. The facts that the writ petitioners were teachers under Dandakaranya development Authority and they were declared surplus and then redeployed in the respondents' departments, are identical to the situation which was before the Apex Court in the case of Bijoy Lal Ghosh (Supra ). According to him, because of the mere fact that the writ petitioners were redeployed on a later date. ( 8 ) LASTLY, he contends that in case of two employees namely, R N. Haider and A. C. Biswas, benefits were extended to them, although they joined the new department prior to 1st January, 1986 and in support of his contention he has relied upon the relevant posting orders and fixation of pay of Sri Halder and Sri Biswas annexed to the writ petition appearing at pages 70-73 thereof. The respondent authority in their Affidavit-in-Opposition could not successfully controvert such statement. ( 9 ) LEARNED counsel for the BSNL authority contends that whether the benefit was extended to any other employee by any other department, is a fact, immaterial for the purpose of consideration of the point in issue. According to him, the benefit was extended to this group of people by virtue of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Bijoy Lal Ghosh (supra), which clearly stipulates a cut off date being 1st January, 1986. Since the writ petitioners joined the new department prior to 1st January, 1986, they are not entitled to claim such benefit. ( 10 ) I have carefully perused relevant documents and the pleadings. I have also given my anxious thought over it. I have also gone through the decision of the Apex Court. ( 11 ) IN my view, the Apex Court was considering a situation where similarly circumstanced people being the teachers under Dandakaranya development Authority were redeployed in other department after January 1, 1986. They were accorded benefit by the Apex Court considering such fact. The Apex court, however, did not have any occasion to consider the case like the present one.
They were accorded benefit by the Apex Court considering such fact. The Apex court, however, did not have any occasion to consider the case like the present one. Hence, the Apex Court decision, in my view, cannot help the petitioners in any way and the decision to reject the claim by the authority to that extent is justified. ( 12 ) THERE is no circular and/ or government notification by which the benefit was extended to those people who were teachers at one point of time and later on placed in various departments as non-teaching employees. The benefit was availed of by them by virtue of the decision of the Apex Court. The principal ratio of the decision as I understand, is that once a benefit was given to the teachers working as on 1st January 1986, all teachers working on that date were entitled to that benefit admittedly, the writ petitioners in the case of Bijoy Lal Ghosh (supra)were teachers as on 01. 01. 1986 and they ceased to be teachers with effect from April, 1986, when they were declared surplus and transferred to the personnel department of the Central Government These facts are totally different from the present one. Hence, I feel that the respondent authority was justified in rejecting the claim of the petitioners herein. ( 13 ) THE petitioners cited at least two instances of discrimination, i. e. the case of Sri Haider and Sri Biswas where they were redeployed in other departments of the Government prior to January 1, 1. 986 and were extended identical benefits by virtue of the Apex Court decision. I have no hesitation to hold that R. N. Halder, A. C. Biswas and the petitioners. are similarly circumstanced and they cannot be discriminated from each other. In case, Sri Haider and Sri Biswas are allowed to enjoy the same benefit, I do not see any reason why the petitioners would be deprived from the same. Hence, I feel that the petitioners Should be entitled such benefits but for the discrimination referred to above.
are similarly circumstanced and they cannot be discriminated from each other. In case, Sri Haider and Sri Biswas are allowed to enjoy the same benefit, I do not see any reason why the petitioners would be deprived from the same. Hence, I feel that the petitioners Should be entitled such benefits but for the discrimination referred to above. ( 14 ) HENCE, in such circumstances, I direct the respondent authority being Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited, which is now a corporate entity under die direct control of the Central Government to take up the issue with the Union of India, so that such anomaly can be removed 1 once again reiterate that in case the benefits extended to Sri Haider and Sri biswas are allowed to be continued, the petitioners must get the same. ( 15 ) WITH these observations the writ petition being W. P. 15627 (W) of 2003 is disposed of. There will be no order as to costs. Urgent xerox certified copy of this order shall be supplied to the parties, if applied for.