Judgment :- Ramachandran. J., The Original Petition/Writ Petitions and the Writ Appeal challenge the proceedings of the Kerala State Electricity Board (for short KSEB), whereby they had brought about a revision of the rental rates of the poles offered for third party use. A copy of the order dated 16-02-2002 is marked as Ext.P12 in O.P.No.32310 of 2002. The Board had in fact invited applications from interested cable T.V. operators for drawing Cable TV lines through the LT/11 K.V. poles owned by them. Paragraph 1 of the order dealt with the set of poles, which were not is use as on the date of he order. It had been prescribed that Floor rate is fixed at Rs.108/- per pole per year for urban and semi-urban areas, and a concessional floor rate of Rs.54/- per pole per year for the rural areas. Tenders were invited at Divisional levels in respect of the said poles, which were yet to be put in use. The period of contract would have been up to ten years with the condition that the rates shall be increased by 12.5% every year, In case there was only a single application forthcoming, the poles required to be allotted by the concerned Executive Engineer at the floor rate or the quoted rate, whichever is higher. If there was overlapping of cable, the right of drawing cables was to be awarded to the bidder, who quoted the highest rate in the overlapped area. 2. Paragraph 3 of the order dealt with the case about which agreements were in existence. The rate of Rs.108/- and Rs.54/-, referred to earlier, were to be the price from the date of expiry of the existing agreement, in respect of valid subsisting agreements and no concessions were available. As far as the petitioner in O.P.No.32310 of 2002 (hereinafter referred to as Asianet), it was made specific that the rates were effective from 19-11-2002, which was the date of expiry of the existing agreement as between them and the Board. A new agreement was to be executed with Asianet for a period, which may extend to a maximum of 10 years, with the increments suggested earlier. Otherwise, the poles occupied by/allotted to them were to be offered to others after dismantling the cables. 3. A new agreement was to be executed with Asianet for a period, which may extend to a maximum of 10 years, with the increments suggested earlier. Otherwise, the poles occupied by/allotted to them were to be offered to others after dismantling the cables. 3. In view of the interim orders that had been passed, although there was no agreement entered into between the parties, Asianet, is continuing the occupation/use of the poles, which of course is on provisional basis. 4. Asianet, referred to earlier, is the petitioner in O.P.No.32310 of 2002. They contend that so far as they are concerned, Ext.P12 has been promulgated in an irrational manner and the fixation of the rate is arbitrary. A unilateral decision, after the tenure of the initial agreement, was never in the contemplation of parties. On principles of fairness, equity and legitimate expectation, the order in so far as it is prejudicial to them, has to be read down or appropriately interfered with. 5. More or less identical contentions have been raised by Mr. Ranjith Thampan, appearing for the appellant in W.A.No.998 of 2005 and Sri. Antony Dominic, who appeared for the petitioners in W.P.(C).NO.16119 of 2005. the objections raised by Sri. Thampan on behalf of his client did not find favour with the learned single Judge, according to whom, the matter was purely in the realm of contract, and as no statutory rights were involved, the writ petition was not maintainable. 6. We had also opportunity to hear Shri Kodoth Sreedharan, standing Counsel for the Kerala State Electricity Board, and Shri M. Rajasekharan Nair, who had appeared for the interveners. Though substantial materials had been placed, and the decisions of this Court as also the Supreme Court had profusely been made available, in support of the rival contentions, the matter lies in a narrow compass, namely as to whether the KSEB was within its rights to prescribe the terms in the order under attack, and if not whether it suffered from the vice of arbitrariness and discrimination. 7. We may notice that for the first time the arrangements, whereby anybody was given permission to draw T.V. Cables using the Board’s LT/11 K.V. Poles in the State had come about consequent to an agreement entered into between the Asianet and the KSEB on 20-11-1992 (Ext.P1). 7. We may notice that for the first time the arrangements, whereby anybody was given permission to draw T.V. Cables using the Board’s LT/11 K.V. Poles in the State had come about consequent to an agreement entered into between the Asianet and the KSEB on 20-11-1992 (Ext.P1). The arrangement brought about thereby was to remain valid for a period of ten years, with a proviso that the terms and conditions, including the rates, will be reviewed, if necessary, after every three years. A reading of Ext.P1 would show that rather than a commercial or business proposal, the Board was more concerned about the vast benefits that would accrue to the people of Kerala in terms of information flow through the Scheme. The premium prescribed therefore was nominal and the agreement provided that in consideration of the facilities provided by the Board, Asianet was to pay Rs.50/- per kilometer of the cables drawn and an annual payment of Re.1/- per pole to the Board. Notwithstanding the reservation incorporated in the agreement for periodical revision, such rights had not been exercised by the Board for the initial block years. Perhaps their energy was spent away and attention split on litigation, because of the intervention of third parties. We see that a series of writ petitions came to be filed, wherein both the Board and Asianet were respondents. A few of the cable T.V. operators, who did not get such facilities or an opportunity to draw cables through the poles belonging to KSEB had took up a contention that Asianet was being singled out for favourable and preferred treatment and thereby they were being subjected to discrimination. The power of the Board for the grant of largesse also had been challenged. However, the challenge had been repelled in O.P.No.17601 of 1993. Of course in the later decisions (O.P.No.10645 of 1997 and connected cases), this Court had directed that the rest of the cable T.V. Operators also may be extended such privileges and opinion of the experts, including the Government, are to be invited about the modalities. These proceedings and received a finality thus on 27-01-1998 only and therefore it may be gatherable that the Board did not get a breathing time for enforcing their right for revision reserved by Ext.P1 agreement. These proceedings and received a finality thus on 27-01-1998 only and therefore it may be gatherable that the Board did not get a breathing time for enforcing their right for revision reserved by Ext.P1 agreement. It seems proposal had been made thereafter for a general revision of the rentals and Asianet, by their letter dated 30.09.1999 (Ext.P5), offered that considering the amount of revenue they are paying consequent to the agreement. A revision of the pole rent from Re.1/- to Rs.2/- or Rs.3/- per pole may be acceptable. In their subsequent letter dated 17.11.1999 (Ext.P6), they had indicated that perhaps it would have been justifiable for the Board to charge pole rental of Rs.8% per pole per annum and this itself was an increase of 800% of the initial agreed rate. However, the Board was of the view that the increase as suggested was too low to be accepted. By order No.2757/99 dated 14.12.1999, to Rs.17/- per pole per annum. Arrears had been demanded. 8. An Original Petition had been filed challenging the above said revision, and because of interim orders, payment at the rate of Rs.12/- began to be made, but ultimately the learned Judge had held that the increase as ordered should not have been considered as arbitrary or unreasonable or imposed without taking into consideration the views of the petitioner. The Original Petition had been dismissed. 9. A writ appeal (W.A.No.305 of 2001) had been filed therefrom, but by our judgment delivered on this day, we have held that interference with the above decision was not found required. 10. In the meanwhile, the petitioner had pointed out that Ext.P1 agreement was to expire by 19-11-2002 and had solicited for appropriate steps for a renewal, taking notice of all relevant aspects. It was during the pendency of the writ appeal that Ext.P12 had come to be passed. The pole charges stood enhanced to Rs.108/- per year, with liability for annual increase. 11. Mr. V. Giri, counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner in O.P.No.32310 of 2002, of course concedes that the issue is substantially in the realm of contract. Therefore, we are spared of an enquiry as to whether the Board had jurisdiction to prescribe the enhancement. They had every right for setting down their terms in so far as there is no allegation that there is any mala fides involved. 12. Therefore, we are spared of an enquiry as to whether the Board had jurisdiction to prescribe the enhancement. They had every right for setting down their terms in so far as there is no allegation that there is any mala fides involved. 12. The counsel nevertheless has put forward the arguments on broad guidelines that being a statutory authority, the freedom of the Electricity Board for imposition of conditions should be circumscribed by self imposed restrictions and when it is possible for a party to point out that there is non-application of mind or even arbitrariness, this Court has not only the power but also the duty to set right the mischief. The contention is crisp and pointed. According to him, when the Board disclosed that the decision had been arrived at on set parameters and constituents, simultaneously it had a duty to substantiate the credentials and claims beyond any point of doubt. He submits that if it is found that arguments placed or the decision taken by the Board are found as factually incorrect or if reliance is placed on palpably inconsistent or illogical presumptions, although the decision is administrative in character, the Court is required to iron out the creases and come to the rescue of persons, who might be adversely affected by the above illogical edict. It is further submitted that the parties to the contract were unequal and the difficult position in which a person was placed could not have been made a circumstance for getting away with a prize, which was unjusty. The Board has to act in a fair manner; it is a facet of public duty. The petitioner had immersed up to the shoulders and it would have been unfair to make capital out of the situation, when there was opportunity to continue to maintain good relations, on the policy of living and letting another one to live. The arrangements had commenced in 1992 with a sensible understanding of the situation. A public sector enterprise was offering its mite for public good and in public interest, and there was no change in the position, and both parties could have hardly located partners in the venture, if the arrangements were to discontinue. Therefore introduction of commercial elements and converting its wares as an unaffordable merchandise was altogether unfair. 13. A public sector enterprise was offering its mite for public good and in public interest, and there was no change in the position, and both parties could have hardly located partners in the venture, if the arrangements were to discontinue. Therefore introduction of commercial elements and converting its wares as an unaffordable merchandise was altogether unfair. 13. In support of the submission, that the increase in the rental rate of poles suffered from arbitrariness, Mr. Giri, the counsel had adverted to the stand that could have been gatherable from the earlier proceedings. The increase from Re.1/- to Rs.17/- was sought to be justified by the Board, on plea that the expenditure incurred by them requires to be compensated adequately. Ext.P8 is the copy of the statement filed by the Electricity Board in the said proceedings viz., O.P.No.3655 of 2000. As a reason for the revision, it had been stated that a methodology had been adopted on the basis of the cost incurred by the Board for erecting the electric post. The cable T.V. operators had been permitted to draw one cable with its guide wire. There was nothing illogical in asking them to share the cost at the ratio of 4:1, since the Board was having 4 conductors strung for supplying the consumers and the Asianet was permitted to use space for one. However, a lesser rate had been prescribed. Further, overheads also had to be duly taken notice of, including the cost of the pole, the installation charges and maintenance thereof. Therefore, there was logic behind the increase, even at that time, it had been asserted. 14. The learned counsel for the petitioner points out that this methodology itself was inherently absurd. Whether or not there was a guide wire belonging to the cable T.V. operator, it was the duty of the Board to erect poles without reference to the expenditure, as it was their statutory duty to supply electricity to the consumers. Further more, the expenditure incurred for installation of a post could not have been the yardstick, since the poles were already in existence and the idle capacity alone was being used. Thus, no convincing arguments, according to him, had ever been presented. 15. In respect of the contentions raised in the counter affidavit of the Board here, the self same objections have been raised. Thus, no convincing arguments, according to him, had ever been presented. 15. In respect of the contentions raised in the counter affidavit of the Board here, the self same objections have been raised. The Chief Engineer of the Board had sworn to a counter affidavit dated 12.12.2002, whereby effort had been taken to justify the decision. 16. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the figures supplied as cost of pole including installation charges, maintenance and the element of interest, which had shown as justifying an increase in the rental suffered from the same defect. It was boosted and realistic. Since Ext.P12 very well showed that as far as the Asianet was concerned, the existing facilities were only being extended for a further term, the arguments were only presumptive. Counsel also submits that the projected figures on the basis that the life of a concrete electric pole was only 10 years, was factually incorrect, since the average life span of the electric post was over 30 years and this made their arithmetic thoroughly unreliable. The argument was that if this was the basis for the proposed increase, it became unacceptable totally, when it had been possible for the petitioner to substantiate that the inputs were artificial. 17. Mr. Giri had thereafter taken us through the decision which, according to him, had a bearing on the subject. Citing the decision of the Supreme Court in Ramana v. I.A. Authority of India {AIR 1979 SC 1628), the counsel submits that the observations made by the learned Judges, in paragraph 20 of the decision, were extremely relevant. When an instrumentality of the Government exercised its power or discretion, it is subject to the same constitutional or public law limitations as a State. Arbitrariness is to be avoided when the Corporation is dealing with the public, whether by way of giving jobs or entering into contracts. The Court had indicated that the rule as above flows directly from the doctrine of equality embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The State has the right to trade, but the State has a duty to observe equality. They had no discretion to avoid a person, as it would have become discriminatory. 18. Thereafter reliance was made on Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi and others v. State of U.P. and others (1991 (1) SCC 212). The State has the right to trade, but the State has a duty to observe equality. They had no discretion to avoid a person, as it would have become discriminatory. 18. Thereafter reliance was made on Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi and others v. State of U.P. and others (1991 (1) SCC 212). It was pointed out that all executive actions of a governmental authority are to be tested with Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The requirement of the said Article was the duty to act fairly, justly and reasonably. There was nothing which militates against the concept of requiring the State always to act thus even in contractual matters. Adverting to Wade on Administrative law (6th Edition), the Supreme Court had observed therein that the action is reviewable, irrespective of the sphere in which it is exercised. 19. We find that the decision is indeed an authority for the proposition that in contractual matters also, judicial review to test its validity on the anvil of Article 14 is preserved and is available. Test of reasonableness has to be satisfied when the issue is agitated at the instance of a party who might be affected by the State action. 20. Mr. Giri submits that Shrilekha Vidyarthi’s case also has laid down a position that the impugned State action could be challenged, if it is uninformed by reason or where there is no discernible principle on which it is based or when it is contrary to the prescribed mode of exercise of the power or when it is shown as one unreasonable. With reference to paragraph 39 of the judgment, it is pointed out that when once this aspect is highlighted, the burden is shifted to the State to repel the attack by disclosing the material and reasons which led to the action. However, we have to caution ourselves that it may not always be applicable vis-à -vis the regions of contract and the State action. The principle, referred to in the context of the judgment, has to be understood as required to be laid down on the facts of the case. This is especially so, since the standing counsel for the Board points out that what is required is a holistic view of the situation, including the materials that had been supplied, justifying the terms which had been laid down for award of the rights under the contract. 21. Mr. This is especially so, since the standing counsel for the Board points out that what is required is a holistic view of the situation, including the materials that had been supplied, justifying the terms which had been laid down for award of the rights under the contract. 21. Mr. Giri had thereafter referred to a decision in Style (dress Land) v. Union Territory, Chandigarh (1999 (7) SCC 89). A State authority is not expected to make capital out of a difficult situation in which the litigant is placed. The Court had indicated in the said decision that the Government cannot act like a private individual in imposing the conditions solely with the object of extracting profits from its lessees and governmental actions are required to be based on standards which are not arbitrary or unauthorized. Rational, relevant and non-discriminatory standard or norm required to be followed, unless it was established that such action was based on valid principle, and the Court had agreed with the observations in this regarded in Punnen Thomas v. State of Kerala (1986 K.L.T. 800 (FB)). Counsel had also invited our attention to the decision reported in AIR 1990 SC 1031 (Mahabir auto Stores v. Indian Oil corporation); 1991 (3) SCC 91 (G.B. Mahajan v. Jalgoan Municipal Council) and AIR 1990 SC 1851 (O. & N.G. Commission v. Assocn. Of N.G.C. Industries of Gujarat) for highlighting the above proposition. Since Asianet was placed at a point of no return and had sunk in hundreds of crores of rupees in the project, it could not have left the scene altogether or accepted the decision which would have landed themselves in greater peril, it was Hobson’s choice for them. Mr. Giri points out that rental arrangement pertained already to more than six lakhs of poles. In any case, by the nature and magnitude of their activities, a yardstick which was proposed to be adopted with small scale operators should not have been applied as far as Asianet was concerned. When the other cable operators were looking for franchise arrangement of a few hundreds poles alone the financial consequences faced by them was very small and the directions in Ext.P12 was totally forgetting the realities. When the other cable operators were looking for franchise arrangement of a few hundreds poles alone the financial consequences faced by them was very small and the directions in Ext.P12 was totally forgetting the realities. As could be gatherable from the nature of the activities, it was possible to see that the arrangements were not for any specified terms, but of perpetual and perennial character and steps where by conditions amounting to strangulation come without grace. 22. The counsel had also referred to the principles of legitimate expectation, as could be applied from the decisions of the Supreme court. Food Corporation of India v. Kamadhenu Cattle Feed Industries (AIR 1963 SC 1601) and Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. V. Commercial Tax Officer and others (2005 (1) SCC 625) were cited in this context. The principle highlighted was that a person may have a legitimate expectation of being treated in a certain way by an administrative authority even though he has no legal right, in private law, to receive such treatment, and the expectation may arise either from a representation, and implied suggestion or from consistent past practice. Its presence cannot at all be ignored. Such expectation does not require to be fulfilled, where an overriding public interest requires otherwise, but then, the undeniable presence of public interest has to be there withholding such benefits and every circumstance for negativing the claims should be appropriately demonstrated. Counsel points out that the policy of the Board was to continue the arrangements of permitting the cable T.V. operators to make use of the spare capacity and never was a decision to discontinue the arrangement. He concluded by submitting that denying the opportunity especially to the petitioner to function by introducing impossible conditions would have gone against public interest, because the benefit of modern communication facilities were thereby denied to general public, including younger generation. Plus whatever revenue earned was likely to be forfeited for all time to come, as there was hardly any replacement available. 23. Mr. Ranjith Thampan, appearing for the appellant in W.A.No.998 of 2005 more or less adopted the same argument. The Board’s order, referred to earlier, had come to the detriment of his client, who was a cable T.V. operator, from renewing his contract and from the date of expiry of his initial contract period. 23. Mr. Ranjith Thampan, appearing for the appellant in W.A.No.998 of 2005 more or less adopted the same argument. The Board’s order, referred to earlier, had come to the detriment of his client, who was a cable T.V. operator, from renewing his contract and from the date of expiry of his initial contract period. A learned Judge had refused to interfere in the matter pointing out that the contract as above did not come within the statutory functions of the Board as envisaged under the Electricity Supply Act or the Electricity Act, 2003. According to him, the decision was forgetting the principles that even in a contract entered into by a statutory authority, element, of arbitrariness vitiated the transactions, warranting judicial interference. Further, right of hearing was necessary before proposing any such hike and reliance had been placed by him on the decisions in Navjyoti Coo-Group Housing Society v. Union of India (AIR 1993 SC 155) as also State of Kerala v. K.G. Madhavan Pillai (AIR 1989 SC 49). 24. Identical contentions had been raised by the petitioner in W.P. (C).No.16119 of 2005 as well. Mr. Antony Dominic, on behalf of the petitioner, had attempted to establish that the rentals currently demanded in respect of poles was unimaginably exorbitant and there has not been application of mind. In paragraph 6 of W.P.(c).No. 16119 of 2005, it is stated that on the suggested lines the rent per pole will be Rs.136.69 in the 2nd year, Rs.153.78 in the 4th year and Rs.311.76 in the 10th year. The sum total, according to the petitioner, would have by far exceeded the cost of the pole and this indicated they unreasonable nature of the proposal. 25. Mr. Dominic had also adverted to the decisions of the Supreme court to highlight the contentions raised as above. Advertance was made to the decision in Union of India v. Cynamide India Ltd. (1987) (2) SCC 720). Though price fixation is neither the function nor the forte of the Court, necessarily an enquiry will have to be made as to whether the policy and the factors were in the mind of the authorities while specifying the price. Reference also had been made to State of U.P. v. Renusagar Power Co. (1988 (4) SCC 59), especially paragraph 86 thereof. We find that the proposition is well settled. Reference also had been made to State of U.P. v. Renusagar Power Co. (1988 (4) SCC 59), especially paragraph 86 thereof. We find that the proposition is well settled. The resultant products, be it the progeny of legislative or administrative, is liable to be set aside, if there is manifest error in the exercise of such power or the exercise of the power is established as arbitrary. Non-application of mind to relevant factors could be considered as manifestly erroneous approach. The argument built upon was that the decision has come to be passed on irrelevant principles and therefore amenable to correction at the hands of this Court. Mr. Antony Dominic had also adverted to the decision in Shri Sitaram Sugar Co. Ltd v. union of India (1990 (3) SCC 223) as also India Cement Ltd. V. union of India (1990 (4) SCC 356), but however the letter decision does not appear to have much relevance. In Shri Sitaram Sugar’s case, the observation was that “any act of the repository of power, whether legislative or administrative or quasi judicial, is open to challenge, if it is in conflict with the Constitution or the governing Act or the general principles of the law of the land or it is so arbitrary or unreasonable that no fair minded authority could ever have made it.� Counsel had also referred to the decision in ABL International ltd. V. Export Credit Guarantee corpn. Of India Ltd. (2004 (3) SCC 553). The observations in Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi’s case (cited supra) had been quoted with approval, when the Court held that once the State or an instrumentality of the State is a party to a contract, it has an obligation in law to act fairly, justly and reasonably which is the requirement of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Mr. Dominic submits that without consultation of whatever nature and contrary to public interest, the Board had prescribed unilateral rates and it has acted contrary to the Constitutional guarantee. He had also drawn the attention of the Court to the Budget Estimates of the Board, in an attempt to show that the basic contentions that had been raised about the distribution expenses for the year 2001-2002 did not tally with the submissions made before this Court leading to a presumption that the court was not being taken into confidence. He had also drawn the attention of the Court to the Budget Estimates of the Board, in an attempt to show that the basic contentions that had been raised about the distribution expenses for the year 2001-2002 did not tally with the submissions made before this Court leading to a presumption that the court was not being taken into confidence. Hardly there was any maintenance work to be attened to the electric poles once they were installed. Advertence was also made to Ext.P6 in his writ petition so as to show that the board was receiving poles in bulk for a far lesser cost than that had been claimed in their counter affidavit. Without bona fides imaginary expenditure were being claimed so as to lend colour of credibility. Rental charges were prescribed knowing well that there was no alternative for them than to succumb, the State action therefore was thoroughly unreasonable. 26. Mr. Giri, by way of conclusion, had also made available the opinion of a learned author (S. Arrowsmith), as appearing in the Law Quarterly Review, volume 106, about the Judicial Review and the Contractual Powers of Public Authorities, which had been quoted by the supreme court in one of the judgments with approval. The gist of the argument was that a public authority can have no prima facie claim to the freedom of action enjoyed by private individuals in the exercise of contractual rights. It is the public nature of the body which should give rise to an obligation to treat citizens fairly and reasonably. 27. However, the submissions as above are not relevant or acceptable, according to the Standing Counsel for the Board, who submits that indeed a long rope had been given to the cable T.V. operators and time had come for entering into realistic arrangements by way of contracts duly taking notice of the interest of the Board, and keeping itself informed of the commercial potentials, which at the initial stages had been sidelined. He had invited our attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in Bihar State Electricity Board v. Green Rubber Industries (1990 (1) SCC 731). A consumer’s liability under the agreement for payment of minimum, guaranteed charges, irrespective of consumption of electricity had been declared as reasonable and valid. The court had observed that the contract, which frequently contains many conditions is presented for acceptance and is not open to discussion. A consumer’s liability under the agreement for payment of minimum, guaranteed charges, irrespective of consumption of electricity had been declared as reasonable and valid. The court had observed that the contract, which frequently contains many conditions is presented for acceptance and is not open to discussion. Every contract is to be considered with reference to its object and whole of its terms, and accordingly the full text in the context must be considered while endeavouring to collect the intention of the parties, even if the immediate object of enquiry might be the meaning of an isolated clause. According to him, during 1992 when an agreement was entered into for the first time, hardly any levy had been insisted apart from a token amount of Re.1/- per pole per annum. For some reason or other, for about seven years, no increase had been brought about and the refixation of rental in 1999 was really marginal and a learned Judge had occasion to hold that in spite of offers of Rs.25/- per pole, from the industry in a most realistic term, the quantum had been fixed at Rs.17/-. Thereafter, also in deference to the observations made by this court, an Expert Committee had gone into all relevant aspects, and the Board had come to a decision, which was reasonable to the core. By the nature of the offer, there was no requirement that a consultation with the existing beneficiaries was to be made. The materials given in the counter affidavit amply showed that every facet of the matter had been looked into. The expenditure perennially incurred by the board, which was expected to function with commercial viability could have been recouped when new vistas had opened up and it was not as if the past expenses of whatever nature were to be segregated and not to be taken notice of while the price was fixed. The cost of poles, the expenses incurred for replacing and maintaining them and the general up-keep of lines were some of the contributing inputs, but arithmetic precision or accountability was not there on the part of the Board to satisfy the customers, who had been offered to share the infrastructural facilities. They had no locus standi or legal right to insist that the mechanism employed were to be fully disclosed. They had no locus standi or legal right to insist that the mechanism employed were to be fully disclosed. At best, they were only beneficiaries of an arrangement, and had no legal right to insist that they deserved an upper hand in the bargain. By permitting the cable T.V. operators to draw lines, the Board was voluntarily imposing restrictions on themselves, and such installations to certain extent interfered with the routine work of maintenance. A premium and a substantial contribution to the Board’s corpus could not at all have been characterized as an unfair earning. Mr. Sreedharan, Standing Counsel had further submitted that it is not as if every administrative action requires interference; only in exceptional circumstances, the discretion was justiciable. Referring to Shri. Sitaram Sugar Co. Ltd. case (cited supra), he states that for interference the State action should be so arbitrary or unreasonable that no fair minded authority could ever have made it. The Standing Counsel had also adverted to the decision in M.P. Oil Extraction v. State of M.P. (1977 (7) SCC 592). The scope of enquiry, according to him, was explained in paragraph 46 of the judgment. If there is an objective and rational foundation for the fixation of royalty (in that case), the Court will not interfere with the exercise of governmental decision by itself undertaking an exercise to find out as to whether better fixation was possible or not. It is pointed out that the court went to the extent of stating that “it needs to be noted that in matters of economic rights and policy decision, the scope of judicial review is limited and circumscribed�. The respondent, of course, should not be obsessed by the only consideration of more revenue, but that could not have been the case here, as the suggested price was reasonable, and the parties had potential to bear such expenses. 28. Counsel had also referred to the observation of the Supreme Court in the decision in Rayalaseema Paper Mills Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P. (2003 (1) SCC 341). Only in a case of fixation of an impossible price, it could be termed as unreasonable or arbitrary requiring the stepping in of the courts. The principle, according to him, is settled that the Court seldom intervenes especially when the matter is not governed by any statute or statutory order. of A.P. (2003 (1) SCC 341). Only in a case of fixation of an impossible price, it could be termed as unreasonable or arbitrary requiring the stepping in of the courts. The principle, according to him, is settled that the Court seldom intervenes especially when the matter is not governed by any statute or statutory order. The observation was that “Even where the matter is governed by a statute or a statutory order, the scope of judicial enquiry is limited�. 29. Standing Counsel had also heavily relied on the decision of the Supreme court in Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Association of Natural Gas Consuming Industries of Gujarat (1990 (Supp) SCC 397). 30. We may examine the facts of the said case. The ONGC in the course of its drilling and exploration of oil had discovered oil-bearing fields. The natural gas so found initially had been burnt away as it interfered with the normal activities of the Corporation, but later on, company had conceived of an idea for making available the natural gas as fuel as supplementing oil, for industries. Price had been fixed and supply had commenced in favour of the intended customers. Shortly thereafter, a demand had been raised that the price of gas should be reduced, ostensibly because it was a bye-product, and procured by the ONGC as a windfall. However, the ONGC took a stand that the purchasers cannot have a say in the matter and they were to pay on alternative fuel cost basis. A few years later, they had fixed the price based on the cost of production. Still later, it had been revised on the basis of thermal equivalence of coal price. A writ petition had been filed by the Association requiring inter alia that the break up on the basis of which the price structure was arrived at, was to be given and the cost is to be fixed after negotiation as, according to them, there was discriminatory pricing. 31. It may not be necessary for us to go to further details. The High Court had granted reliefs to the consumers and the issue had come up to the Supreme court at the instance of the O.N.G.C. It was not disputed that the ONGC is a “State� Coming within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. 31. It may not be necessary for us to go to further details. The High Court had granted reliefs to the consumers and the issue had come up to the Supreme court at the instance of the O.N.G.C. It was not disputed that the ONGC is a “State� Coming within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. They also agreed that there was duty for them to act reasonably and fairly, so as not to infringe the provisions of Articles 14 and 19 of the constitution. But, the contention was that right had been reserved with the company for fixing the price and entering into contract, demanding a price at their discretion. Examining the contentions of the contesting parties from various angles, the supreme Court recorded in paragraph 35 of the judgment as following: “In the light of the foregoing discussion, we are of opinion that it would not be right to insist that the ONGC should fix oil (sic natural gas) prices only on cost plus basis. Indeed, its policy of pricing should be based on the several factors peculiar to the industry and its current situation and so long as such a policy is not irrational or whimsical, the court may not interfere.� 32. We feel that the issue presently before us also has to be considered substantially in the light of the yardstick that had been suggested by the Supreme Court, duly bearing in mind principles presented by the petitioners as well. Although the Board had not placed before us the adequate materials to sit upon the figure of a rental of Rs.107/- per pole per annum, we do not think it will be justified for the above said reason alone, to conclude otherwise. It has come out that Electricity Boards of other states had been charging much more than this sum, in respect of the facility granted to third parties. It may not be possible to countenance the argument that the Board has a duty to install poles as part of its regular activities and whatever comes by way of rental is an addition and commercial or profit making motive ought not have been the hall-mark. This, but is only a self-serving argument, since there is no legal right for the petitioners to claim that the Board should continue to strain itself so as to accommodate third parties. This, but is only a self-serving argument, since there is no legal right for the petitioners to claim that the Board should continue to strain itself so as to accommodate third parties. What the petitioners are engaged in is not a public utility service as is commonly understood, but mostly recreational in nature, although the services led to educational as well as economical advancement. When, thus the petitioners are engaged in a commercial venture, it may not be possible for the cable T.V. operators to insist that their venture requires to be subsidized by the Electricity Board. 33. Therefore, we find ourselves unable to accept the contention raised by the cable T.V. Operators that the Board has acted irrationally or whimsically in issuing Ext.P12. 34. Mr. Rajasekharan Nair, counsel appearing for the additional respondents, submits that his clients were interested in stepping on to the field of cable T.V. operation. They are always prepared to pay the rates suggested by Ext.P12, since the prices are extremely reasonable. The presence of Asianet and the interim orders passed by this Court, at their instance are interfering with their aspirations. However, it is submitted by Mr. Giri that being a small group, who might be catering to the needs of very limited geographical areas, the impact created by Ext.P12 may not be great, so far as such groups are concerned. Perhaps, he is justified. He submits that paragraph 3 of Ext.P12. which concerns them should receive particular attention while the issue is being considered. 35. We may refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in Pallavi refractories v. Singareni collieries Co. Ltd. (2005) (2) SCC 227), in this context. Although on a difference context, the Supreme Court had held that on certain occasions a dual price fixation would be permissible, so as to meet a special situation. We feel that as far as the petitioner in O.P.No.32310 of 2002 is concerned, they stand on a totally different pedestal than the rest of other cable T.V. operators. They have inextricably involved themselves in the business, at a cost. In addition to being cable T.V. Operators, they have established a cable super highway and have installed over fifty sophisticated satellite signal receiving centers in the State. Their counter parts have described them as a multinational corporation, as they have gone global. They have inextricably involved themselves in the business, at a cost. In addition to being cable T.V. Operators, they have established a cable super highway and have installed over fifty sophisticated satellite signal receiving centers in the State. Their counter parts have described them as a multinational corporation, as they have gone global. They have commissioned two satellite earth stations for Internet services with allotted international gateway. It is clear that value added service are provided by them, like internet, cable telephony, E-Commerce, E-Education, computer data transfer, subscriber paging etc. They are certified as an Infra Structure Provider by the BSNL (formerly Telecom) and are registered with the Government of India, pertaining to the activities of supply of information. Underground Optic Fiber Cables have been laid by them covering the whole area of the State and their investment appears to be substantial. It has come out that they have engaged themselves in operating T.V. channels, themselves, and the magnitude of the operators, as submitted by the counsel, requires for special terms as far as they are concerned. Otherwise, it would come within the vice of discrimination, it is argued. We are inclined to observe that there is merit in the submission as above made, when their background, involvement and infrastructure expenditure are taken notice of. 36. We are therefore of the opinion that their cause has to be separately taken up by the Board. It may not be irregular or out of place, if more congenial terms than what was prescribed by Ext.P12 are made admissible to them. The said petitioner may make an application in this regard and in that case, an opportunity for hearing them on their grievances may be arranged expeditiously. However, we leave it to the discretion of the Board to arrive at a decision. It is made clear that till such time decision is taken, the petitioner will have the responsibility to conform to the requirements of Ext.P12, if they opt to get the permission from the Electricity Board for carrying on the work, and can only opt for adjustments in the eventuality of a favourable treatment being extended to them, from the date of expiry of Ext.P1 arrangement. The writ Petitions and the Writ Appeal are disposed of as above. No costs.