JUDGEMENT Surjit Singh, J (Oral).: Heard and gone through the record. The present writ petition has been filed by Shri Tapinder Singh, presently holding the office of Vice President, Municipal Council Paonta Sahib which was 11 elected members. Section 25 of the H.P. Municipal Act, 1994 says that no confidence motion against the President and Vice-President may be moved in accordance with the procedures laid down in the Rules. Rules have been framed, for making of no confidence motion vide Annexure: P-1. Rule 8-A of the said Rules, called H.P. Municipal (Reservation and Election to the office of the President and Vice-President Rules, 1995 which pertains no confidence motion against the President and Vice-President is reproduced below: "(1) A motion of no confidence against the President-vice-President of Advocate(s): municipality may be made though a requisition given in writing addressed to the Deputy Commissioner signed by not less than majority of its total elected Members. Provided that the Members who have made such a motion may withdraw the same before the meeting is convened for the purpose. (2) The Deputy Commissioner or such other officer not below the rank of Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil) authorized by the Deputy Commissioner, shall circulate to each Member a copy of the requisition for the use of the members. (3) The Deputy Commissioner or such other officer not below the rank of Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil) authorized by the Deputy Commissioner shall convene a special meeting by giving a notice of not less than fifteen days for the consideration of the motion referred to in sub-rule (1) and shall preside over at such meeting. (4) If the no confidence motion is carried out with the support of majority of elected members present and voting at such special meeting, the quorum of which is not less than one half of its local elected members, the President or Vice-President as the case may be, shall be deemed to have vacated his office.1" 2.
(4) If the no confidence motion is carried out with the support of majority of elected members present and voting at such special meeting, the quorum of which is not less than one half of its local elected members, the President or Vice-President as the case may be, shall be deemed to have vacated his office.1" 2. Seven elected members of the Municipal Council, Paonta Sahib submitted a no confidence motion against the writ petitioner through a requisition given in writing to the Deputy Commissioner as per sub-rule 8-A. The Deputy Commissioner wrote to the Sub Divisional Officer (Civil), Paonta Sahib is convene a meeting of the Municipal Councilors within fifteen days as per the requirement of sub rule (3) of Rule 8-A. The Sub Divisional Officer (Civil) issued notice to the elected Municipal Councilors on 8th August, 2005. The notices were personally delivered to the present writ petitioner and one majority of other elected members, on 11th August, 2005 or thereafter. As per those notices, the meeting was to held on 24th August, 2005 at 11 A.M. The Writ petition was challenged the notice on two grounds, namely (a) the Deputy Commissioner has not authorized the Sub Divisional Officer (Civil) to convene the meeting as per requirement of law and (b) fifteen days clear notice has not been given to other elected members. According to him, the notices were delivered on 11th August, 2005 or thereafter, while the meeting was scheduled, as per the contents of that notice, to be held on 24th August, 2005. 3. The writ petitioner has impleaded the Municipal Council, the Deputy Commissioner and the Sub Divisional Officer (Civil) as respondents in this writ petition. Those seven elected Municipal Councilors, who addressed the motion of no confidence to the Deputy Commissioner, have filed an application, being CMP No. 1882 of 2005, imleadment as party to the present writ petition (as respondents) because according to them they are going to be effected by the decision of the case. After hearing the learned counsel representing these seven elected members of the Council and the learned counsel for the writ petitioner, we feel that no prejudice will be caused to the writ petition, if the application is allowed and these seven members are ordered to be impleaded as respondents to the present writ petition. So, we allow the application.
After hearing the learned counsel representing these seven elected members of the Council and the learned counsel for the writ petitioner, we feel that no prejudice will be caused to the writ petition, if the application is allowed and these seven members are ordered to be impleaded as respondents to the present writ petition. So, we allow the application. Amended memo of parties filed with the said application is ordered to be taken on record. Necessary corrections in the cause title be carried out in red ink. The said respondents have already submitted their reply to the main writ petition along with the application. That too is ordered to be -taken on record. Other respondents have already filed the replies which are on record. 4. We have heard learned counsel for the writ petition, the learned counsel representing the original respondents as also the counsel representing the newly added respondents. 5. We find no merit in the contention of the writ petitioner that the Sub Division Officer (Civil) had not been authorized by the Deputy Commissioner to convene the meeting, as per requirement of law. We have seen the original record maintained in the office of respondent No.3 i.e. Sub Divisional Officer (Civil) Paonta Sahib. We find a communication dated 4th August, 2005 addressed by the Deputy Commissioner to the Sub Divisional Officer (Civil) Paonta, Sahib, whereby the latter has been directed to convene a meeting of the members of the Municipal Councillors in connection with no confidence motion addressed to the former (Deputy Commissioner) by seven elected members of the Council. Though, in this communication, it is not specially mentioned that the Sub Divisional Officer (Civil) is authorized to convene the meeting, that in our considered view is a defect of form and not of substance. Thus, the first ground of challenge to the notice, is not tenable. 6. As regards the next contention, we feel that the requirement of sub-rule (3) of the above reproduced rule 8-A of H.P. Municipal (Reservation and Election to the office of the President and Vice-President Rules, 1995 has not been met. Sub-rule (3) of rule 8-A (supra) provides for giving a notice of not less than fifteen days for the consideration of the motion. Giving a notice does not mean the mere signing of the notice by the concerned authority and dating that notice or even dispatching it.
Sub-rule (3) of rule 8-A (supra) provides for giving a notice of not less than fifteen days for the consideration of the motion. Giving a notice does not mean the mere signing of the notice by the concerned authority and dating that notice or even dispatching it. It means the delivery of the notice to the person addressed, though, it may not be necessary that it must be accepted by such person. It such person, on being offered the notice, refuses to accept the same, that would amount giving the notice. In our view that giving of the notice, implies the delivery of the notice to the concerned person. We are supported in this view of the matter by a judgment of the apex Court in K.Narasimhiah Vs. H.C. Singri Gowda and others. AIR 1966 Supreme Court 330). 7. It has been urged, with a great deal of vehemence, by the counsel representing the Municipal Council as also the newly added respondents that no prejudice has been caused to the writ petitioner, on account of the short-fall of two days, in the period of notice. We are not convinced by the submission. When the legislature has in its wisdom mandated that a notice of not less than fifteen days is to be given, the notice for a lesser period cannot be said to be a valid and lawful one. The Legislature must have provided for this period with some purpose in its mind, which we need not venture to speculate. The Honble Supreme Court in Ramphal Kundu Vs. Kamal Sharma (2004) 2 Supreme Court cases 759 has held that legislature does not waste words and is presumed to have inserted every part to the statute for a purpose and hence should be given effect to. 8. The learned counsel for the newly added respondents argued that the writ petition has become infructuous because what the writ petitioner has sought is that the meeting should not be held pursuant to the notice (Ext.P-2) and since the meeting has already been held, no relief is now available to the writ petitioner. The argument has been noticed only to be rejected.
The argument has been noticed only to be rejected. This matter was taken up by a Division Bench of this Court on 24th August, 2005 and an interim order was passed that the meeting fixed for 24th August 2005 may be held but the result of voting on no confidence motion, shall not be declared and the same shall be kept in a sealed cover. Now, when the declaration of the result has been injuncted upon by this Court, the holding of the meeting pursuant to the impugned notice and the result of voting during such meeting are subject to the final decision of the writ petition and, therefore, the aforesaid argument advanced on behalf of the newly added respondents cannot be accepted. 9. For the foregoing reasons, we allow the writ petition. The notice (Annexure:P-2) is quashed and the result of voting on no confidence motion during the meeting held pursuant to the aforesaid notice is dismissed to be nonest. The parties are directed to bear their own costs. 10. In view of the disposal of the main appeal writ petition, all the miscellaneous applications are also disposed of.