JUDGMENT A.B. Pal, J. 1. Heard Mr. B. Das, learned senior Advocate assisted by Ms. S. Das, learned Advocate for the petitioners and Mr. P. Gautam, leaned Advocate for the second respondent, the Divisional Manager, National Insurance Company Ltd., Agartala Division. None has appeared for the first respondent, the owner of TR-02-1210 (Mini Bus). 2. By this writ petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners, who are the mother and sister of the deceased workman have questioned the legality and correctness of the impugned order dated 1.6.2004 passed by the Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation, West Tripura, Agartala in Civil Misc. 293 of 2003 arising out of T.S.(W.C) No. 55 of 2003 whereby the prayer for condoning delay of 264 days in presenting the application under Sections 4, 4A and 10 of the Workmen's Compensation Act claiming compensation for the death of Bappi Das alias Biplab Das, a workman during the course of his employment has been rejected. 3. The prayer for condonation of delay having been rejected only on the ground that no cogent reason explaining the delay could be shown, the only question this Court is called upon to decide is whether the learned Commissioner by such rejection has committed manifest error by ignoring the legal principles settled by the Apex Court on the subject. 4. Mr. Das submits that in the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay, the petitioner in para-3 has specifically averred that the applicants are illiterate and they did not know about the compensation available under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Moreover, some persons including the Opposite Party No. 1 told the applicants that the deceased having died due to extremist attack, not by any motor accident, no compensation would be admissible under any law and on that understanding and belief they did not file application for compensation within time specified in the said Act. 5. Mr. Das submits that ignorance of the legal remedy available under certain special law should have been treated as sufficient ground for condoning the delay. In support of this submission he placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court, in Ram Sumiran v. D.D.C. reported in AIR 1985 SC 606 where a delay of six years in presenting petition for bringing the legal representatives of the deceased on record was condoned. In support of this submission he placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court, in Ram Sumiran v. D.D.C. reported in AIR 1985 SC 606 where a delay of six years in presenting petition for bringing the legal representatives of the deceased on record was condoned. While condoning the delay, the principles underlying Section 5 of the Limitation Act has been enunciated, thus : It is true that no steps were taken by the appellants for bringing the legal representatives of the deceased respondent No. 5 on record for about 6 years even though according to respondent No. 4 the appellants knew about the death of respondent No. 5. But merely because no application was made by the appellants for bringing the legal representatives of the deceased respondent No. 5 on record we do not think that in the circumstances of the present case that would be a valid ground for refusing to grant the application of the appellants for setting aside the abatement and bringing the legal representatives of the deceased respondent No. 5 on record because the appellants are admittedly from the rural area and in a country like ours where there is so much poverty, ignorance and illiteracy, it would not be fair to presume that everyone knows that on death of a respondent, the legal representatives have to be brought on record within a certain time. The ends of justice require that the application for bringing the legal representatives of the deceased respondent No. 5 should have been granted. Mr. Das placed reliance on another decision or the Supreme Court in K. Rudrappa v. Shivappa reported in 2004 AIR SCW 5106. In that case ignorance about pendency of an appeal filed by the father or the petitioner was considered to be sufficient ground for condoning the delay. Again, the principles of condonation of delay has been explained by the Apex Court in para-10 of the judgment, which is quoted below : 10. Having heard learned Counsel for the parties, in our opinion, the appeal deserves to be allowed. The case of the appellant before the District Court was that he was not aware of the pendency of the appeal filed by his father against the order-passed by the Tehsildar. Having heard learned Counsel for the parties, in our opinion, the appeal deserves to be allowed. The case of the appellant before the District Court was that he was not aware of the pendency of the appeal filed by his father against the order-passed by the Tehsildar. The father of the appellant died in June, 1994 and the appellant came to know about the pendency of appeal somewhere in September 1994 when he received a communication from the advocate engaged by his father. Immediately, therefore, he contacted the said advocate, informed him regarding the death of his father and made an application. In such circumstances, in our opinion, the learned Counsel for the appellant is right in submitting that a hyper-technical view ought not to have been taken by the District Court in rejecting the application inter alia observing that no prayer for setting aside abatement of appeal was made and there was also no prayer for condonation of delay. In any case, when separate applications were made, they ought to have been allowed. In our opinion, such technical objections should not come in doing full and complete justice between the parties. In our considered opinion, the High Court ought to have set aside the order passed by the District Court and it ought to have granted the prayer of the appellant for bringing them on record as heirs and legal representatives of deceased Hanumanthappa by directing the District Court to dispose of the appeal on its own merits. By not doing so, even the High Court has also not acted according to law. The Apex Court has given much emphasis on the need of advancing substantial justice and declared that technicality should in no way be allowed to frustrate the same. The Apex Court further observed that the liberal approach in matters of condonation taken by the Apex Court has not percolated down to all other Courts in the hierarchy. In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Anr. v. Mst. Katiji and Ors. reported in (1987) I LLJ 500 SC, the Supreme Court formulated six good reasons in support of taking a liberal approach which reads, thus : 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal fate. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal fate. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay ? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other sidle cannot claims to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. 6. Mr. Das submits that in terms of the above principles, it is to be understood that when it reveals that the legal heirs of the deceased are entitled to certain benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act, the same shall not be denied only on the ground that they have come late in presenting the petition. 7. Mr. Gautam, learned Counsel for the respondent oppose the prayer submitting that Section 10 of the Workmen's Compensation Act has clearly provides that a petition for compensation must be presented within a period of two years from the date of death of the workman. In this case, the dead body of the workman was recovered on 28.1.2001 and the petitioners preferred the claim on 19.11.2003, i.e., after a delay of 264 days. Unless sufficient reasons can be shown, such unusual delay cannot be condoned. In support of his submission, Mr. Gautam has relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR 2003 SC 3044 . Unless sufficient reasons can be shown, such unusual delay cannot be condoned. In support of his submission, Mr. Gautam has relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR 2003 SC 3044 . The relevant part on which he has placed reliance is in para-38 of the judgment, where the Apex Court has dealt with the extent of certiorari jurisdiction by the High Court. The relevant part reads, thus : Certiorari, under Art. 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction, i.e., when a subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none, or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified, and thereby occasioning failure of justice. 8. It may be noticed that in para-3 or the petition for condonation of delay, the petitioners have frankly stated that they were not aware about the benefits available under the Workmen's Compensation Act for the death of the only bread-earner who was killed by extremists during the course of employment. Even persons including opposite party No. 1 misled them about admissibility of a claim. Whatever may be the controversy, the fact remains that but for the delay the petitioners being the legal heirs, would be legally entitled to the benefits of the Workmen's Compensation Act, a beneficial and welfare legislation and if on the anvils of the legal principles laid down by the Supreme Court for taking a liberal approach, as discussed above, the facts situation is placed for consideration, it would essentially and convincingly appear that such delay, though pretty long, on the grounds of ignorance of the benefits of the welfare law should not be allowed to defeat the substantial justice. 9. In view of the above discussions, the impugned order or the learned Commissioner is hereby set aside and the delay of 264 (two hundred and sixty four) days in presenting the petition before the Commissioner seeking compensation is hereby condoned. 10. The writ petition is allowed to the above extent. Petition allowed