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2005 DIGILAW 39 (GAU)

Mcleod Russel (India) Ltd. v. Agricultural Income Tax Officer

2005-01-18

RANJAN GOGOI

body2005
JUDGMENT Ranjan Gogoi, J. 1. Heard Dr. A.K. Saraf, learned Counsel for the petitioner. None has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the present proceedings. 2. A notice dated February 26, 1997, issued under the provisions of Section 30 of the Assam Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), is the subject matter of challenge. The short ground urged is that the aforesaid notice is barred under Section 30 of the Act and therefore the proceedings proposed on the basis of the aforesaid notice are as initio void. 3. Section 30 of the Act as on the date of the impugned notice is extracted below: 30. Income escaping assessment. If for any reason any agricultural income chargeable to agricultural Income Tax has escaped assessment for any assessment year, or has been assessed at too low a rate or has been the subject of undue relief under this Act, the Superintendent of Taxes or Agricultural Income Tax Officer may at any time within eight years of the end of that assessment year serve on the person liable to pay agricultural Income Tax on such agricultural income, or in the case of a company on the principal officer thereof, a notice containing all or any of the requirements which may be included in a notice under Sub-section (2) of Section 19, and may proceed to assess or reassess such income, and the provisions of this Act shall, so far as may be, apply accordingly as if the notice were a notice issued under that Sub-section: Provided that the tax shall be charged at the rate at which it would have been charged if such income had not escaped assessment for full assessment, as the case may be: Provided further that in computing the period of eight years mentioned in this section the period during which the Superintendent of Taxes or the Agricultural Income Tax Officer was restrained or prevented from issuing the notice under this section by an order or injunction of any court or authority shall be excluded. 4. A bare perusal of Section 30 of the Act would go to show that the Legislature has fixed a time limit of eight years from the end of the assessment year in respect of which reopening of the assessment is sought to be made by issuing a notice under Section 30. 4. A bare perusal of Section 30 of the Act would go to show that the Legislature has fixed a time limit of eight years from the end of the assessment year in respect of which reopening of the assessment is sought to be made by issuing a notice under Section 30. In the present case, the notice dated February 26, 1997, would go to show that reopening the assessment for the year 1984-85 has been sought. Admittedly, the assessment year in respect of which assessment is sought to be reopened is beyond eight years from the date of issuance of the notice. Nothing has been brought on record by the respondents to show that the, second proviso to Section 30 is attracted to the present case. 5. Consequently, little persuasion would be required for this Court to hold that the impugned notice dated February 26, 1997 (annexure III to the writ petition), is barred by limitation as provided by Section 30. Consequently, while quashing the assessment order and setting aside the notice dated February 26, 1997, I allow this writ petition. In favour of Assessee.