JUDGMENT B.P. Katakey, J. 1. This appeal is by the State for enhancement of the sentence awarded by the learned Additional District Magistrate (Judicial), Alzawal District, Aizawl, where by the respondents was convicted by a judgment of conviction dated 29-8-2002 under Section 376/342, IPC and sentencing him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 2 (two) years only passed in G.R. No. 514/98. This appeal has been listed before this division bench pursuant to the order dated 6-5-05 passed by a single bench of this Court. 2. A notice of the appeal was sent to the respondent and in spite of the receipt of the same as none has entered appearance Mr. George Raju, learned counsel has been appointed as Amicus Curiae vide order dated 31-3-2004 for the purpose of defending the respondent. 3. We have heard Mr. N. Sailo, the learned P.P. and also Mr. George Raju, the learned Amicus Curiae appointed by the Court. 4. The prosecution story in brief is that on 20-3-1998 a first information report was lodged by the victim in Aizawl police station alleging that on 19-3-1998 at about 10-11 am she along with her friend Lawmpari (P. W. 2), intended to go to Police Training College for which they proceeded to Company Peng where they met Lalrinkhuma, (the accused), who offered them to take to P.T.C. in his Maruti Van and accordingly they boarded the said vehicle and reached Police Training College. While coming back to Aizawal in the same vehicle, the accused in stead of taking them to Aizawl drove the vehicle to Salrang and stopped in the inspection Bungalow at Sairang, where he tried to commit rape of the victim but when she shouted loudly, calling her friend Lawmpari, the accused left her. When they came back the accused again stopped the vehicle near the P.T.C. junction but they were not allowed to go out of the vehicle. While the victim was trying to open the door, the accused hit her on her face with his fist and also hit with his elbow on her nose and lips. The accused took liquor, thereafter drove vehicle towards Bungkawn Nursery College Junction and allowed the victim's friend U Pari to go off from the vehicle but restraining the victim from coming out of the said vehicle and thereafter took her towards Shivaji Tillah in his Maruti Van. The accused took liquor, thereafter drove vehicle towards Bungkawn Nursery College Junction and allowed the victim's friend U Pari to go off from the vehicle but restraining the victim from coming out of the said vehicle and thereafter took her towards Shivaji Tillah in his Maruti Van. The accused thereafter committed rape of the victim forcibly against her will inside the van at Bungkawn Nursery college junction. The police on receipt of the said information registered Aizawl police station case No. 221/98 under Section 342/376, IPC. During investigation the investigating officer recorded the statements of the witness including the victim and also arrested the accused person. The investigating officer also got the victim as well as accused examined by the doctor. Upon completion of investigation the charge-sheet under Section 376/342 IPC was filed against the accused person. 5. The learned Additional District Magistrate thereafter framed the charge under Section 376, IPC on 14-9-1998. On being read over and explained to the accused, he pleaded not guilty and claimed for trial. 6. The learned trial Magistrate on the basis of the evidences adduce by the prosecution including the deposition of the victim and after recording the statement of the accused under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code convicted the accused (respondent herein) under Section 376/342 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 2 (two) years vide judgment and order dated 29-8-2002. 7. The prosecution in order to bring home the charge levelled against the accused, examined 9 (nine) witnesses including the victim, as P.W. 1, her friend Lawmpari, who accompanied the victim on that fateful day, as P.W. 2, doctor who medically examined the victim and the accused as well as the investigating officer. 8. The victim who was examined as P.W. 1 in her deposition has given a vivid description of how the accused respondent has committed rape. The victim in her deposition has stated that on 19-3-1998 they left Sairang about 4.00 p.m. and reached Aizawl at dusk and proceeded towards Khatla Bungkawn where the accused stopped vehicle below the Bungkawn Church Building and the person accompanied the accused went out for a short while and thereafter they again proceeded towards Sairang and reached the inspection Bungalow at about 7 p.m. The accused then sent the victim's friend Lawmpari to bring the Coca Cola from the van. Taking advantage of the situation when the accused compelled her to lie down, then she shouted for help and hearing her cry her friend came back. A little while later all of them boarded the van again for proceeding towards Aizawal and when reached Bungkawn Nursery the accused stopped and compelled P.W. 2 to get down. The vehicle was then again driven towards Shibaji Tillah where he stopped again. The accused then asked the victim to get down from the. vehicle and thereafter he opened the back side of the vehicle and pushed the victim inside the van and had sexual intercourse twice against her will. After that the accused dropped the victim near the place where her friend was dropped. The victim thereafter on reaching her home in the morning i.e. on 20-3-98 reported the matter to her father. During cross-examination the victim could not be dislodged by the defence and no material contradictions could be brought out. 9. P.W. 2 Lawmpari, who accompanied the victim on that fateful day has also supported the version of the prosecutrix and narrated incident how the accused first attempted to commit rape of the victim in Sairang I.B. as to how on hearing the cry of the victim she came to the place of occurrence and saved her friend. This witness has also stated in her evidence that the accused did not allow them to come out of the vehicle even for attending natures' call and while reaching at Bungkawn Nursery the accused compelled her to get: down from the vehicle and when her friend, the victim tried to get down also from the vehicle, accused pulled her back and though her friend cried and shouted for help, the accused took her in his vehicle and drove towards Bungkawn a high speed. 10. The evidence of the prosecutrix was well supported by the medical evidence. Dr. Ramdinthari who medically examined the accused as well as the victim has deposed before the Court that upon examination he found some stain on the underwear and clothes of the victim and also found the following injuries i.e. (i) Swelling & erythema right side of nose (ii) Superficial abrasion on the inner upper lip (iii) Skin abrasion in between the breast. The doctor has also stated in his deposition that the hymen of the victim was found to be raptured. 11. The doctor has also stated in his deposition that the hymen of the victim was found to be raptured. 11. The Apex Court in State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewal-chand Jain, reported in 1990 CriLJ 889 has held that the statement of a rape victim must be accepted without requiring further corroboration and conviction can be founded on that basis if she does not lack of understanding. The relevant paragraph of the decision of the Apex Court is quoted below : "16. Prosecutrix of a sex offence cannot be put on par with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Evidence Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118 and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. What is necessary is that the court must be alive to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of the charged levelled by her, if the Court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no rule of law or practice incorporated in the Evidence Act similar to illustration (b) to Section 114 which requires it to look for corroboration. If for some reason the court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration require in the case of an accomplice. "The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. But if a prosecutrix is an adult and of full understanding the Court is entitled to base a conviction on her evidence unless the same is shown to be infirm and not trustworthy. "The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. But if a prosecutrix is an adult and of full understanding the Court is entitled to base a conviction on her evidence unless the same is shown to be infirm and not trustworthy. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case discloses that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the Court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence. We have, therefore, no doubt in our minds that ordinarily the evidence of a prosecutrix who does not lack understanding must be accepted. The degree of proof required must not be higher than is expected of an injured witness. For the above reasons we think that exception has rightly been taken to the approach of the High Court as is reflected in the following passage : "It is only in the rarest of rare cases if the Court finds that the testimony of the Prosecutrix is so trustworthy, truthful and reliable that other corroboration may not be necessary." With respect, the law is not correctly stated. If we may say so, it is just the reverse. Ordinarily the evidence of a prosecutrix must carry the same weight as is attached to an injured person who is a victim of violence, unless there are special circumstances which call for greater caution, in which case it would be safe to act on her testimony if there is independent evidence lending assurance to her accusation". In State of Rajasthan v. Om Prakash, reported in 2002 CriLJ 2951 the Apex Court has also reiterated that the conviction can be based on the sole testimony of the Prosecutrix. 12. In State of H. P. v. Shree Kant Shekari, reported in 2004 CriLJ 4232 the Apex Court has also held that there is no rule of law that the victim's testimony cannot be acted upon without corroboration in material particulars. 12. In State of H. P. v. Shree Kant Shekari, reported in 2004 CriLJ 4232 the Apex Court has also held that there is no rule of law that the victim's testimony cannot be acted upon without corroboration in material particulars. It has further been held that the victim is standing on a higher pedestal than an injured witness and if the Court on facts finds it difficult to accept the version of the prosecutrix on its face value it may search for evidence, direct or circumstantial, which would lend assurance to her testimony and assurance, short of corroboration, as understood in the context of an accomplice, would suffice. The Apex Court in the said case has explained as to how the fundamental right of the victim guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India is violated by sexual violence, relevant portion of which is quoted below : "3. Sexual violence apart from being a dehumanizing act is an unlawful intrusion on the right of privacy and sanctity of a female. It is a serious blow to her supreme honour and offends her self-esteem and dignity. It degrades and humiliates the victim and where the victim is a helpless innocent child or a minor, it leaves behind a traumatic experience. A rapist not only causes physical injuries but more indelibly leaves a scar on the most cherished possession of a woman i.e. her dignity, honour, reputation and not the least her chastity. Rape is not only a crime against the person of a woman, it is a crime against the entire society. It destroys, as noted by this Court in Bodhisattwa Gautam v. Subhra Chakraborty AIR 1996 SC 922 the entire psychology of a woman and pushes her into deep emotional crisis. It is a crime against basic human rights, and is also violative of the victim's most cherished of the fundamental rights, namely the right to life contained in Article 21 of the Constitution. The Courts are, therefore, expected to deal with cases of sexual crime against women with utmost sensitivity. Such cases need to be dealt with sternly and severely. A socially sensitized Judge, in our opinion, is a better statutory armour in cases of crime against women than long clauses of penal provisions, containing complex exceptions and provisos." 13. The Courts are, therefore, expected to deal with cases of sexual crime against women with utmost sensitivity. Such cases need to be dealt with sternly and severely. A socially sensitized Judge, in our opinion, is a better statutory armour in cases of crime against women than long clauses of penal provisions, containing complex exceptions and provisos." 13. As discussed above the prosecutrix in her deposition has specifically stated about the sexual intercourse i.e. penetration of the male organ of generation by the accused into her vagina. There is no reason as to why the statement of the victim is to be disbelieved. Though the corroboration of the testimony of the victim is not required for the purpose of conviction under Section 376, IPC the victim's version was well corroborated by the testimony of P.W. 2 as well as the medical evidence. Therefore, the accused respondent was rightly convicted by the learned Court below under Section 376, IPC. However, the learned trial Magistrate has also convicted the accused respondents under Section 342, IPC though no charge was framed against the accused under the said provision of law and hence the conviction of the accused under Section 342, IPC cannot be maintained and as such the conviction under Section 342 is set aside. 14. The State has filed the present appeal for enhancement of the sentence, as the minimum sentence awardable under Section 376, IPC has not been awarded by the learned Magistrate after recording the judgment of conviction against the accused respondent. The accused has not filed any appeal challenging the judgment of his conviction and hence his conviction under Section 376, IPC has been accepted by him. 15. Now the question is to be decided whether the learned Magistrate after recording the judgment of conviction under Section 376, IPC can pass a sentence less than the minimum sentence awardable under Section 376, IPC. 16. 15. Now the question is to be decided whether the learned Magistrate after recording the judgment of conviction under Section 376, IPC can pass a sentence less than the minimum sentence awardable under Section 376, IPC. 16. Section 376, IPC has prescribed the punishment for rape, which provides that whoever, except in case provided by Sub-section (2), commits rape shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than 7 (seven) years but which may be for life or for the term which may extend to 10 years and shall also be liable to fine, unless the woman raped is his own wife or is not under 12 years of age, in which case, he shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years or with fine or with both. 17. In the instant case the victim was not the wife of the accused and she at the relevant point of time was about 19 years old. Therefore, the minimum sentence awardable is 7 years but which may be extended to life or for the term of 10 years and also shall be liable to fine. In the instant case the learned Magistrate after recording the judgment of conviction convicting the accused under Section376, IPC has sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 2 (two) years only and without imposing any fine which is less than the minimum sentence awardable under Section 376, IPC. The learned magistrate after recording the judgment of conviction of the accused under Section 376, IPC cannot pass a sentence less than the minimum sentence prescribed under the law, which is 7 years and also the fine. 18. In a similar situation the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. Puttaraja, reported in 2004 CriLJ 579 has held that there is non scope for awarding sentence lesser than the prescribed minimum. In the said case the accused though was convicted under Section 376 was sentenced to 5 years rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 2000/- which was reduced by the High Court to the period of imprisonment already under gone i.e. 4G days, considering that the accused was a collie and agriculturist and was aged 22 years and as long time has elapsed since the occurrence. 2000/- which was reduced by the High Court to the period of imprisonment already under gone i.e. 4G days, considering that the accused was a collie and agriculturist and was aged 22 years and as long time has elapsed since the occurrence. The Apex Court while setting aside the judgment of the High Court did not interfere with the sentence imposed by the learned trial Court, though the same was less than minimum sentence prescribed under the law, as the State has not filed any appeal against the said sentence awarded by the learned trial Court. 19. The Apex Court in Puttaraja ease has also held that leniency in matters involving sexual offence is not only undesirable but also against public interest. Such types of offences are to be dealt with severely and with iron hands showing leniency in such matters would be really a case of misplaced sympathy. The acts which led to the conviction of the accused are not only shocking but outrageous in their contours. Rape is violation with violence of the private person of the victim, an abominable outrage by all canons. 20. The Apex Court in Puttaraja case has further held as under : "6. The law regulates social interests, arbitrates conflicting claims and demands. Security of persons and property of the people is an essential function of the State. It could be achieved through instrumentality of criminal law. Undoubtedly there is a cross cultural conflict where the living law must find answer to the new challenges and the Courts are required to mould the sentencing system to meet the challenges. The contagion of lawlessness would undermine social order and lay it in ruins. Protection of society and stamping out criminal proclivity must be the object of law which must be achieved by imposing appropriate sentence. Therefore, law as a cornerstone of the edifice or "order" should meet the challenges confronting the society. Friedman in his "Law in Changing Society" stated that, "State of criminal law continues to be - as it should be - a decisive reflection of social consciousness of society". Therefore, in operating the sentencing system, law should adopt the corrective machinery or the deterrence ideology based on factual matrix. By deft modulation, sentencing process be stern where it should be, and tempered with mercy where it warrants to be. Therefore, in operating the sentencing system, law should adopt the corrective machinery or the deterrence ideology based on factual matrix. By deft modulation, sentencing process be stern where it should be, and tempered with mercy where it warrants to be. The facts and given circumstances in each case, the nature of the crime, the manner in which it was planned and committed, the motive for commission of the crime, the conduct of the accused, the nature of weapons used, the indelible impact on the victim and his family and all other attending circumstances are relevant facts which would enter into the area of consideration." 7. Undue sympathy to impose inadequate sentence would do more harm to the justice system to undermine the public confidence in the efficacy of law and society cannot long endure such serious threats. It is therefore, the duty of every Court to award proper sentence having regard to the nature of the offence and the manner in which it was executed or committed etc. This position was illuminatingly stated by this Court in Sevaka Perumal v. State of T. N. 8. The criminal law adheres in general to the principle of proportionality in prescribing liability according to the culpability of each kind of criminal conduct. It ordinarily allows some significant discretion to the Judge. In arriving at a sentence in each case, presumably to permit sentences that reflect more subtle considerations of culpability that are raised by the special facts of each case, Judges in essence affirm that punishment ought always to fit the crime, yet in practice sentences are determined largely by other considerations. Sometimes it is the correctional needs of the perpetrator that are offered to justify a sentence, sometimes the desirability of keeping him out of circulation, and sometimes even the tragic results of his crime. Inevitably, these considerations cause a departure from just deserts as the basis of punishment and create cases of apparent injustice that are serious and widespread. 9. Proportion between crime and punishment is a goal respected in principle, and in spite of errant notions, it remains a strong influence in the determination of sentences. Inevitably, these considerations cause a departure from just deserts as the basis of punishment and create cases of apparent injustice that are serious and widespread. 9. Proportion between crime and punishment is a goal respected in principle, and in spite of errant notions, it remains a strong influence in the determination of sentences. The practice of punishing all serious crimes with equal severity is now unknown in civilized societies, but such a radical departure from the principle of proportionality has disappeared from the law only in recent times on account of misplaced sympathies to the perpetrator of crime leaving the victim or his family into oblivion. Even now for a single grave infraction drastic sentences are imposed. Anything less than a penalty of greatest severity for any serious crime is thought then to be a measure of toleration that is unwarranted and unwise. But in fact, quite apart from those considerations that make punishment unjustifiable when it is out of proportion to the gravity of the crime, uniformly disproportionate punishment has some very undesirable practical consequences." 21. In the instant case the trial Magistrate has awarded the sentence of rigorous imprisonment of two years by showing misplaced sympathy on the accused, who was found to have committed offence of rape, on the ground that there was no previous conviction against the accused and he is the sole supporter of his family. As held by the Apex Court in Puttaraja case such leniency is not to be shown to the person, who is convicted for commission of the rape, which in fact violets the fundamental right of the victim guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Hence the sentence of imprisonment imposed by the learned trial Magistrate sentencing the accused/appellant to undergo rigorous imprisonment of 2 (two) years cannot be sustained. 22. We have heard learned Amicus Curiae as well as learned Public Prosecutor on the question of sentence. Hence the sentence of imprisonment imposed by the learned trial Magistrate sentencing the accused/appellant to undergo rigorous imprisonment of 2 (two) years cannot be sustained. 22. We have heard learned Amicus Curiae as well as learned Public Prosecutor on the question of sentence. Keeping in view the facts of this case and also fact that the accused respondent No. 1 has already been released from jail after serving out the sentence of two years imposed by the learned Magistrate and also keeping in view the fact that the accused respondent No. 1 is the sole earning member of the family, we consider it fit and proper to impose minimum sentence of imprisonment awardable for the offence under Section 376, IPC i.e. rigorous imprisonment for 7 (seven) years and to pay a fine of Rs. 2000 in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a further period of one month. 23. The appeal filed by the State is therefore, allowed. The period of sentence imposed by the learned Magistrate stands modified and enhanced to rigorous imprisonment of seven years and to pay a fine of Rs. 2000/-, in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a further period of one month. The respondent is directed to surrender before the learned Additional District Magistrate (Judicial), Aizawl, for the purpose of serving out the remaining period of sentence. The accused respondent shall be entitled to set off under Section 428, Cr. P.C. 24. The fee of the learned amicus curiae is fixed at Rs. 2,500/-. The Registry is directed to send down the records immediately. Appeal allowed