Judgment :- In this original petition, the petitioner is challenging his removal from the service of the Calicut university as “Professor in Library Science” by the 2nd respondent vice Chancellor of Calicut university by Ext.P14 order. This case has a chequered history as revealed from the facts of the case which are not much in dispute except for some minor variations and are as under. 2. The petitioner entered the service of the 1st respondent University as a deputy Librarian on 28.3.1977. He was selected and appointed as University Librarian in 1987. In 1988, the University conducted a selection to the post of Professor in Library Science to which the petitioner and two others namely M/s. Raju M. Mathew and M. Parameswaran applied. Finding the petitioner to be the lone candidate possessing the requisite qualifications, the screening committee rejected the applications of the other two. The minutes of the screening committee was approved by the Syndicate, which constituted a Selection Committee in accordance with the statutes. The Selection committee selected the petitioner for appointment. Challenging the rejection of his application the said Sri. Raju. M. Mathew approached the University Appellate Tribunal, in appeal the dismissal of which was taken up before this Court in O.P.No.5446/1990. He filed another independent O.P. also as O.P.No.9346/1990. the said Sri. M. Parameswaran also filed O.P.No.9335/90 challenging rejection of his application. A learned Single Judge of this Court allowed the O.Ps holding that the screening committee has no power to reject applications. The learned Single Judge also directed issue of fresh notification in view of amendment of the Regulations prescribing qualifications. 3. Appeals were filed against the decision of the learned Single Judge, both by the petitioner and the University. In the appeal filed by the University namely W.A.No.686/1994 the University moved C.M.P.No.5804/1998 in which a Division Bench of this Court by Ext.P1 order dated 6.11.1998 permitted the University to fill up the post of Professor in Library Science on the basis of the recommendation made by the Selection committee on a provisional basis pending disposal and subject to the final outcome of the appeal. Pursuant thereto, the University appointed the petitioner as Professor in Library Science by Ext.P2 order dated 24.12.1998. 4. Subsequently in W.A. Nos.824/1994 and 488/1994, filed by the University, against the judgment in OP.No.9335 of 1994 filed by Sri. Pursuant thereto, the University appointed the petitioner as Professor in Library Science by Ext.P2 order dated 24.12.1998. 4. Subsequently in W.A. Nos.824/1994 and 488/1994, filed by the University, against the judgment in OP.No.9335 of 1994 filed by Sri. Parameswaran, considering, his request to withdraw the O.P., the appeals were allowed in so far as it affects the interest of Sri. Bavakkutty, the petitioner herein, and the University and dismissed O.P.No.9335/1990. 5. Pursuant to the report of a Sub Committee report on austerity measures the Senate in its meeting held on 18.11.2000, the extract of the minutes of which is Ext.P4, resolved to combine the posts of Professor of Library Science and University Librarian and redesignated the combined post as “Professor of Library Science and University Librarian”. Along with the same in two other departments also posts were so combine and redesignated as a single post. Pursuant to the same, by Ext.P6 order dated 7.12.2000, the petitioner was posted in the post of “Professor of Library Science and University Librarian’, which was also designated as a teaching post by that order. As evidenced by Ext.P7 minutes of its meeting held on 19.06.2001, the syndicate approved the report of the Sub Committee and the posting of the petitioner as the ‘Professor of Library Science and University Librarian’. By Ext.P8, University office Note dated 13.7.2001, it was clarified that ‘as per the orders dated 10.7.2001 of the vice Chancellor, Dr. M. Bawakkutty (petitioner), holding the integrated post of Professor of Library Science and University Librarian, will continue in service up to 60 years of age and needs to retire only on 31.7.2006.’ It was also stated therein that’ these orders are based on legal advice obtained in the matter. By Ext.P9 order dated 18.5.2002, the probation of the petitioner in the post of Professor of Library Science and University Librarian was declared with effect from 6.12.2001. 6. When W.A.Nos.476/1994, 543/1994, 686/1994 and 825/1994 filed by the University and the petitioner against the judgments in O.P.Nos.5446/1990 and 9346/1990 came up for hearing, the counsel for the University submitted that though proceedings were issued on the basis of the order dated 6.6.1988, since it was not given effect to, the grievance raised by the writ petitioners stands redressed. 6. When W.A.Nos.476/1994, 543/1994, 686/1994 and 825/1994 filed by the University and the petitioner against the judgments in O.P.Nos.5446/1990 and 9346/1990 came up for hearing, the counsel for the University submitted that though proceedings were issued on the basis of the order dated 6.6.1988, since it was not given effect to, the grievance raised by the writ petitioners stands redressed. Therefore, without examining the validity or otherwise of the impugned orders as well as correctness or otherwise of the judgment of the learned single Judge, the writ appeals were disposed of. Since, on disposal of the writ appeals news items appeared in the newspapers stating that the appointment of the petitioner to the integrated post of ‘Professor in Library Science and University Librarian’ stands set aside by this court, the petitioner filed Ext.P11 petition for clarification (CMP No.1999/2002) in which the Division Bench clarified that this court has disposed of the appeal on the basis of statement by the standing counsel that notification dated 6.6.1988 was not being given effect to. 7. Sri. Raju M. Mathew filed O.P.No.5117/2002 against the functioning of the petitioner as professor of Library Science and University Librarian and to prevent the petitioner from drawing salary in any capacity from the Calicut University Funds. It was contended therein that the petitioner was liable to retire at the age of 55 years, which he had already passed. In the same, the University filed Ext.P12 counter affidavit justifying the continuance of the petitioner beyond the age of 55 years in the post of ‘Professor of Library Science and University Librarian” which is a teaching post. The said O.P. is still pending. An Association of University employees by name “Calicut University Employees Forum” filed O.P.No.20829/2001 challenging Ext.P6 order, which is also pending. 8. The Syndicate in its meeting held on 11th and 12th of December, 2002 resolved to delink the posts of University Librarian and Professor of Library Science which was implemented by Ext.P13 order dated 19.12.2002. Accordingly, the petitioner was relieved from the duties of University Librarian by Ext.R.1(b) order dated 18.12.2002 and the petitioner continued in the post of Professor in Library Science. 9. Accordingly, the petitioner was relieved from the duties of University Librarian by Ext.R.1(b) order dated 18.12.2002 and the petitioner continued in the post of Professor in Library Science. 9. However, by Ext.P14 order dated 30.1.2002, the 2nd respondent vice Chancellor, invoking his powers under Section 10(13) of Chapter III of the Calicut University Act, 1975, ordered that the petitioner stands removed from the post of Professor of Library Science on the ground that after taking into consideration all the facts narrated in the order and the opinion of the standing counsel it has been found that the continuance of Dr. M. Bawakkutty (the petitioner), in the post of Professor of Library Science, is illegal and without jurisdiction. The petitioner is challenging in this O.P., Ext.P14 order on the grounds of absence of jurisdiction, non-compliance of principles of natural justice, malafides, and also on the ground that since he is validly holding the post, which is a teaching post, he is entitled to continue upto 60 years. 10. The Third respondent Sri. T.K. Ummer, the Registrar of the University, who has been impleaded in his personal capacity to prove malafides, has filed a counter affidavit for himself and on behalf of respondents 1 and 2 justifying Ext.P14 order. The petitioner has filed a reply affidavit also. 11. I shall first consider the contention of the petitioner regarding want of jurisdiction on the part of the 2nd respondent to pass Ext.P14 order. Admittedly, the 2nd respondent Vice chancellor had issued Ext.P14 order invoking powers under Section 10(13) of the Chapter III of the Calicut university Act, 1975 which provision reads thus: “10(3). If at any time, except when the Syndicate or the Academic Council is in session, the Vice chancellor is satisfied that an emergency has arisen requiring him to take immediate action invoking the exercise of any power vested in the syndicate or the Academic council, as the case may be, report the action taken by him to that authority for such action as it may consider necessary.” 12. The counsel for the petitioner submits that there was absolutely no “emergency” for the Vice Chancellor to enable him to invoke the above provision of the Act, which is a condition precedent to confer jurisdiction on him to invoke such power. The counsel for the petitioner submits that there was absolutely no “emergency” for the Vice Chancellor to enable him to invoke the above provision of the Act, which is a condition precedent to confer jurisdiction on him to invoke such power. The petitioner takes me to the meaning of the word, ‘emergency’ at page 197 of the “Legal Thesauras” (second Edition) by William C. Burton which reads as follows:- “EMERGENCY, noun, accident, casus, climacteric, condition of insufficiency, crisis, critical point, crucial period, difficulty, dilemma, discrimen, exigency, extremity insufficiency of service, last minute need, necessitousness, need, need for action, needfulness, plight, predicament, pressing necessity pressing need, strait, sudden peril, tempus, trouble, unexpected happening, unforeseen condition, unforeseen occurrence, urgency.” The counsel also takes me to the meaning of ‘emergency’ as given in the “The Living Webster Encyclopedic Dictionary of English Language” which runs thus:- “emergency. ………. A sudden, usu. Unexpected, occasion or combination of events calling for immediate action.” 13. This contention should be dealt with based on the reasons given for invocation for such power in the impugned order itself. The order proceeds on the basis that the petitioner was continuing in the post of Professor of Library Science by virtue of his provisional appointment pursuant to the interim orders in CMP No.5804/1998 in W.A.No.476/1994, which is subject of final order in the W.A. and since the W.A. was disposed of and C.M.P.No.5804/1998 was dismissed the petitioner ceases to have authority to hold the post. It is stated in Ext.P14 that the audit report for the year 2000-01 has observed that the continuance of the petitioner was unauthorized. It is further stated that several complaints have been received from teachers with regard to the legality and authority of the petitioner to continue in service and O.P.No.5117/2002 challenging his continuance filed by Dr. Raju. M. Mathew is pending. In the above circumstances, the 2nd respondent has sought legal opinion of the standing counsel of the University in the matter. It is stated. It is the above circumstances based on which the 2nd respondent found that the situation warranted invocation of the emergency clause under S.10(13) and the continuance of the petitioner is illegal and without jurisdiction. In the above circumstances, the 2nd respondent has sought legal opinion of the standing counsel of the University in the matter. It is stated. It is the above circumstances based on which the 2nd respondent found that the situation warranted invocation of the emergency clause under S.10(13) and the continuance of the petitioner is illegal and without jurisdiction. In the meantime, the Finance Officer has sought clarification as to whether the salary bill of the petitioner for the month of January 2003 can be passed which is also cited as a reason for invoking the emergency clause. 14. The Counsel for the petitioner contends that the above circumstances stated in Ext.P14 do not spell out an emergency situation as contemplated in Section 10 (13) necessitating invocation of S.10 (13) of the Calicut University Act, 1975. 15. As claimed by the 2nd respondent himself, the starting point of the so called illegality of continuance of the petitioner is the disposal of W.A.No.476/1994, which is a situation created by the University itself by submitting before the Division Bench in W.A.No.476/1994 that the notification dated 6.6.1988 is not being given effect to. The W.A. was consequently dismissed on 8.11.2001. From that date till 30.1.2003, for the period of 1 year and 2½ months the 2nd respondent did not perceive any emergency in the situation of continuance of the petitioner. If till 8.11.2001 the continuance of the petitioner was legal. I am at a loss to understand as to how the audit report for the year 2000-2001 (which can only be for the period from 1.4.2000 to 31.3.2001) can observe that the continuance of the petitioner in the University service is unauthorized. So also, if the petitioner could validly draw salary in the post from 8.11.2001 to 31.12.2002, it is incomprehensible as to why the Finance Officer sought clarification as to whether the salary bill of the petitioner for the month of January 2003 alone, could be passed. In the meantime as admitted in the counter affidavit, the Syndicate was in session at least on 11/12-12-2002 in which meeting the question of delinking of the posts of Professor of Library Science and University Librarian was decided. Further pursuant to the decision in the said meeting the petitioner was relieved from the post of University Librarian and he was allowed to hold the post of Professor in Library Science. Further pursuant to the decision in the said meeting the petitioner was relieved from the post of University Librarian and he was allowed to hold the post of Professor in Library Science. The petitioner submits that during the period there were two sessions. The Vice Chancellor did not find any emergent situation then also. 16. The situation of emergency contemplated in Section 10(13) is such of a nature that if allowed to continue even for a few days, the same would jeopardize the day to day working of the University. If postponement of the decision regarding such situation can, without affecting the day to day working of the University, wait till the next meeting of the Syndicate, certainly the powers under Section 10(13) cannot be invoked. In this even going by the reasons given in Ext.P14, the situation arose as early as on 8.11.2001 and continued till 30.1.2003, during which period the Syndicate was actually in session at least once. If the situation could be tackled for more than a year without affecting the working of the University, it cannot be stated to be an emergency coming within the ambit of Section 10(13). I have no hesitation to hold that absolutely no emergency had arisen in January 2003 warranting invocation of powers under Section 10(13) as claimed by the 2nd respondent in Ext.P14. 17. The Counsel for the University contends that since by Ext.R1(c) the Syndicate had ratified the action of the Vice chancellor, the jurisdiction of the 2nd respondent to pass Ext.P14 cannot be questioned. I do not agree. When the invocation of the power itself is without jurisdiction the same cannot become with jurisdiction by subsequent ratification as the same is ab initio void. Moreover, at the time of Ext. R1 (c), this original petition had already been filed and the matter was already sub judice as pointed out in the note of dissent by some Syndicate members in Ext.P17. In this connection it may be noted that subsequent to filing of the counter affidavit containing Ext. R1(b) minutes of the meeting of the Syndicate dated 22.2.2003, the petitioner has produced Ext.P17 minutes of the meeting dated 10.3.2003 of the Syndicate in which the minutes of the meeting dated 22.2.2003 was confirmed with substantial modifications. In this connection it may be noted that subsequent to filing of the counter affidavit containing Ext. R1(b) minutes of the meeting of the Syndicate dated 22.2.2003, the petitioner has produced Ext.P17 minutes of the meeting dated 10.3.2003 of the Syndicate in which the minutes of the meeting dated 22.2.2003 was confirmed with substantial modifications. From Ext.P17 it is seen that several members had dissented inter alia on the specific ground that the matter was sub judice before the High Court of Kerala in this O.P. This original petition was filed on 4.2.2003 challenging Ext.P14 on the ground of want of jurisdiction. Further on 14.5.2002, the University had by filing Ext.P12 counter affidavit in O.P.No.5117/2002 justified the continuance of he petitioner. In the circumstances, the consideration of the question of ratification of Ext.P14 by the Syndicate was according tome, improper, if not illegal. Therefore, I hold that there was absolutely no situation existing for the 2nd respondent to invoke the powers under S.10 (13) of Chapter III of the Calicut University Act, 1975 and therefore, Ext.P14 was issued without jurisdiction. 18. The next question which arises for consideration is whether Ext.P14 order has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice and hence arbitrary. The counsel for the petitioner submits that Ext.P14 was passed without issuing any notice and without giving an opportunity of hearing. According to him, the petitioner’s removal from service involves civil consequences to him negation of his right to livelihood under Article 21 and therefore the same could not have been legally passed without notice or hearing to him. He submits that there is no provision anywhere in the Calicut University Act, Statutes or ordinances enabling the authorities to remove an employee from service except pursuant to disciplinary proceedings. Counsel draws my attention to S.23(x) of Chapter IV of the Calicut University Act wherein it is stipulated that the power of the Syndicate to suspend, discharge, dismiss or otherwise take any disciplinary action against teachers and other employees of the University is only after giving them reasonable opportunity to defend their position. 19. The standing counsel for the University, on the other hand, would submit that Ext.P14 was not pursuant to any disciplinary action and was a natural and procedural consequence arising from the decision of this Court in W.A.No.476/1994 by Ext.P10 judgment. 19. The standing counsel for the University, on the other hand, would submit that Ext.P14 was not pursuant to any disciplinary action and was a natural and procedural consequence arising from the decision of this Court in W.A.No.476/1994 by Ext.P10 judgment. He contends that therefore no notice or hearing was mandatory before passing Ext.P14 and hence there is no violation of principles of natural justice. 20. At the outset I may point out that the contention of the University is disproved by their own showing. Ext.P10 judgment was on 8.11.2001. Subsequently Dr. Raju. M. Mathew filed O.P.No.5117/2002 challenging the continuance of the petitioner in service. In the same the University filed Ext.P12 counter affidavit on 14.5.2002. In that the University took the definite stand that since subsequently the petitioner was appointed in the integrated post of Professor in Library Science and University Librarian as sanctioned by the Syndicate the contention that the appointment of the petitioner to the integrated post is based on the interim order of this court in the W.A. is not correct. Hence the contention that Ext.P14 was the natural procedural consequence of Ext.P10 judgment is totally unsustainable. 21. To substantiate the necessity of compliance with the principles of natural justice the counsel for the petitioner drew my attention to an English decision as well as several decisions of our supreme Court. I shall briefly advert to those decisions. 22. The English decision cited is that of Council of Civil Service Unions and others v. Minister for the Civil Service reported in (1984) 3 All. E.R. Ch.D.935. the counsel took me to the following passages of the decision at pages 943, 949 and 953. At page 943. “The duty to consult Counsel for the appellants submitted that the minister had a duty to consult the CCSU, on behalf of employees at GCHQ, before giving the instruction on 22 December, 1983 for making an important change in their conditions of service. His main reason for so submitting was that the employees had a legitimate, or reasonable, expectation that there would be such prior consultation before any important change was made in their conditions. It is clear that the employees did not have a legal right to prior consultation. The Order in Council confers in no such right, and art 4 makes no reference at all to consultation. It is clear that the employees did not have a legal right to prior consultation. The Order in Council confers in no such right, and art 4 makes no reference at all to consultation. The Civil Service handbook (handbook for the new civil servant (1973 edn, as amended 1983), which explains the normal method of consultation through the departmental Whitley Council, does not suggest that thee is any legal right to consultation; indeed, it is careful to recognize that, in the operational field; considerations or urgency may make prior consultation impracticable. The Civil Service Pay and Conditions of Service Code expressly states: ‘The following terms and conditions also apply to your appointment in the Civil Service. It should be understood, however, that in consequence of the constitutional position of the Crown has the right to change its employees’ conditions of service at any time, and that they hold their appointments at the pleasure of the Crown.” But even where a person claiming some benefit or privilege has no legal right to it, as a matter of private law, he may have a legitimate expectation of receiving the benefit or privilege, and, if so, the courts will protect his expectation by judicial review as a matter of public law. This subject has been fully explained by Lord Diplock in O’Reilly v. Mackman [1982] 3 All. ER 1124, [1983]2 AC 237 and I need not repeat what he has so recently said. Legitiamate, or reasonable, expectation may arise either from an express promise given on behalf of a public authority or from the existence of a regular practice which the claimant can reasonably expect to continue. Examples of the former type of expectation are Re Liverpool Taxi owners’ Association [1972] 2 All ER 589, [1972] 2 QB 299 and A-G of Hong kong v. NG Yuen Shiu [1983] 2 All ER 346, [1983] 2 AC 629. (I agree with Lord Diplock’s view, expressed in the speech in this appeal, that ‘legitimate’ is to be preferred to ‘reasonable’ in this context I was responsible for using the word “reasonable” for the reason explained in NG Yuen Shiu, but it was intended only to be exegetical of ‘legitimate’). (I agree with Lord Diplock’s view, expressed in the speech in this appeal, that ‘legitimate’ is to be preferred to ‘reasonable’ in this context I was responsible for using the word “reasonable” for the reason explained in NG Yuen Shiu, but it was intended only to be exegetical of ‘legitimate’). An example of the latter is R v. Hull Prison Board of Visitors, ex p St Germain (1979) 1 All ER 701, [1979] QB 425, approved by this House in O’Reilly v. Mackman (1982) 3 All ER 1124 at 1126, [1983]2 AC 237 at 274. The submission on behalf of the appellants is that the present case is of the latter type. The test of that whether the practice of prior consultation of the staff on significant changes in their conditions of service was so well established by 1983 that it would be unfair or inconsistent with good administration for the government to depart from the practice in this case. Legitimate expectations such as are now under consideration will always relate to a benefit or privilege to which the claimant has no right to private law, and it may even be to one which conflicts with his private law rights. In the present case the evidence shows that ever since GCHQ began in 1947, prior consultation has been the invariable rule when conditions of service were to be significantly altered. Accordingly, in my opinion, if there had been no question of national security involved, the appellants would have had a legitimate expectation that the minister would consult them before issuing the instruction of 22 December 1983. The next question, therefore, is whether it has been shown that consideration of national security supersedes the expectation.” Page 949 “To qualify as a subject for judicial review the decision must have consequences which affect some person (or body of persons) other than the decision maker, although it may affect him too. The next question, therefore, is whether it has been shown that consideration of national security supersedes the expectation.” Page 949 “To qualify as a subject for judicial review the decision must have consequences which affect some person (or body of persons) other than the decision maker, although it may affect him too. It must affect such other person either (a) by altering rights or obligations of that persons which are enforceable by or against him in private law or (b) by depriving him of some benefit or advantage which either (i) he has in the past been permitted to continue to do until there has been communicated to him some rational ground for withdrawing it on which he has been given an opportunity to comment or (ii) he has received assurance from the decision-maker will not be drawn without giving him first an opportunity of advancing reasons for contending that they should not be withdrawn. (I prefer to continue to call the kind of expectation that qualifies a decision for inclusion in class (b) a ‘legitimate expectation’ rather than a ‘reasonable expectation’, in order thereby to indicate that it has consequences to which effect will be given in public law, whereas an expectation or hope that some benefit or advantage would continue to be enjoyed, although it might well be entertained by a ‘reasonable’ man, would not necessarily have such consequences. The recent decision of this House in Findlay v. Secretary of State for the Home Dept [1984] 3 All ER 801, [1984] 3 WLR 1159 presents an example of the latter kind of expectation. “Reasonable” furthermore bears different meaning according to whether the context in which it is being used is that of private law or of public law. To eliminate confusion it is best avoided in the latter).” Page 953 “ …….. But your Lordships are vitally concerned with that branch of judicial review which is concerned with the control of executive action. This branch of public or administrative law has evolved, as with much or our law, on a case by case basis and no doubt hereafter that process will continue. Thus for this evolution has established that executive action will be the subject of judicial review on three separate grounds. This branch of public or administrative law has evolved, as with much or our law, on a case by case basis and no doubt hereafter that process will continue. Thus for this evolution has established that executive action will be the subject of judicial review on three separate grounds. The first is where the authority concerned has been guilty of an error of law in its action, as for example purporting to exercise a power which in law it does not possess. The second is where it exercises a power in so unreasonable a manner that the exercise becomes open to review on what are called, in lawyers’ shorthand, Wednesbury principles, (see Associated Provincial Picture Hoses Ltd. V. Wednesbury Corp [1947] 2 All ER 680, [1948] 1 KB 223). The third is where it has acted contrary to what are often called ‘principles of natural justice.’ As to this last, the use of this phrase is no doubt hollowed by time and much judicial repetition, but is a phrase often widely misunderstood and therefore as often misused. That phrase perhaps might now be allowed to find a permanent resting-place and be better replaced by speaking of a duty to act fairly. But that latter phrase must not in its turn be misunderstood or misused. It is not for the courts to determine whether a particular policy or particular decisions taken in fulfillment of that policy are fair. They are only concerned with the manner in which those decisions have been taken and the extent of the duty to act fairly will very greatly from case to case as, indeed, the decided cases since 1950 consistently show. Many features will come into play including the nature of the decision and the relationship of those involved on either side before the decision was taken. My noble and learned friend Lord Diplock in his speech has devised a new nomenclature for each of these three grounds, ‘calling them respectively ‘illegality’ ‘irrationality’ and ‘procedural impropriety’, words which, if I may respectfully so, have the great advantage of making clear the differences between each ground. In the present appeal your Lordships are not concerned with the first two matters already mentioned, with the exercise of a power which does not exist or with Wednesbury principles. But this appeal is vitally concerned with the third, the duty to act fairly. In the present appeal your Lordships are not concerned with the first two matters already mentioned, with the exercise of a power which does not exist or with Wednesbury principles. But this appeal is vitally concerned with the third, the duty to act fairly. The particular manifestation of the duty to act fairly which is presently involved is that part of the recent evolution of our administrative law which may enable an aggrieved party to evoke judicial review if he can show that the had ‘a reasonable expectation’ of some occurrence or action proceeding the decision complained of and that ‘reasonable expectation’ was not in the event fulfilled. The introduction of the phrase ‘reasonable expectation’ into this branch of our administrative law appears to owe its origin to Lord Denning MR in Schmidt v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs [1969] 1 All ER 904 at 909, [1969] 2 Ch 149 at 170 (when he used the phrase ‘legitimate expectation’). Its judicial evolution is traced in the opinion of the Judicial committee delivered by Lord Fraser in A-G of Hong Kong v. NG. Yuen Shiu [1983] 2 All ER 346 at 350-351, [1983] 2 AC 629 at 636-638. Though the two phrases can, I think, now safely be treated as synonymous for the reasons there given by my noble and learned friend, I prefer the use of the adjective ‘legitimate’ in this context and use it in this speech even though in argument it was the adjective ‘reasonable’ which was generally used. The principle may now said to be firmly entrenched in this branch of the law. As the cases show, the principle is closely connected with ‘ a right to be heard’. Such an expectation may take many forms. One may be an expectation of prayer consultation. Another may be an expectation of being allowed time to make representations, especially where the aggrieved party is seeking to persuade an authority to depart from a lawfully established policy adopted in connection with the exercise of a particular power because of some suggested exceptional reasons justifying such a departure.” 23. The first of the decision of our Supreme Court cited is that of Canara Bank and others v. Debasis Das and others reported in (2003) 4 SCC 557. Paragraphs 13 to 19 lay down the principles of natural justice ingrained in our system of rule of law. The first of the decision of our Supreme Court cited is that of Canara Bank and others v. Debasis Das and others reported in (2003) 4 SCC 557. Paragraphs 13 to 19 lay down the principles of natural justice ingrained in our system of rule of law. Those paragraphs run as follows: “13. Natural justice is another name for common-sense justice. Rules of natural justice are not codified canons. But they are principles ingrained into the conscience of man. Natural justice is the administration of justice in a common-sense liberal way. Justice is based substantially on natural ideals and human values. The administration of justice is to be freed from the narrow and restricted considerations which are usually associated with a formulated law involving linguistic technicalities and grammatical niceties. It is the substance of justice which has to determine its form. 14. The expressions “natural justice” and “legal justice” do not present a watertight classification. It is the substance of justice which is to be secured by both, and whenever legal justice fails to achieve this solemn purpose, natural justice is called in aid of legal justice. Natural justice relieves legal justice from unnecessary technicality, grammatical pedantry or logical prevarication. It supplies the omissions of a formulated law. As Lord Buckmaster said, no form or procedure should ever be permitted to exclude the presentation of a litigant’s defence. 15. The adherence to principles of natural justice as recognized by all civilized States is of supreme importance when a quasi-judicial body embarks on determining disputes between the parties, or any administrative action involving civil consequences is in issue. These principles are well settled. The first and foremost principle is what is commonly know as audi alteram partem rule. It says that no one should be condemned unhard. Notice is the first limb of this principle. It must be precise and unambiguous. It should apprise the party determinatively of the case he has to meet. Time given for the purpose should be adequate so as to enable him to make his representation. In the absence of a notice of the kind and such reasonable opportunity, the order passed becomes wholly vitiated. Thus, it is but essential that a party should be put on notice of the case before any adverse order is passed against him. This is one of the most important principles of natural justice. In the absence of a notice of the kind and such reasonable opportunity, the order passed becomes wholly vitiated. Thus, it is but essential that a party should be put on notice of the case before any adverse order is passed against him. This is one of the most important principles of natural justice. It is after all an approved rule of fair play. The concept has gained significance and shades with time. When the historic document was made at Runnymede in 1215, the first statutory recognition of this principle found its way into the “Manga Carta”. The classic exposition of Sir Edward Coke of natural justice requires to “vocate. Interrogate and adjudicate”. In the celebrated case of cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works the principle was thus stated: (ER p. 420) “{Even God himself did not pass sentence upon Adam before he was called upon to make his defence. ‘Adam’ (says God), ‘where art thou? Hast thou not eaten of the tree whereof, I commanded thee that thou shouldest not eat?” Since then the principle has been chiseled, honed and refined, enriching its content. Judicial treatment has added light and luminosity to the concept, like polishing of a diamond. 16. Principles of natural justice are those rules which have been laid down by the courts as being the minimum protection of the rights of the individual against the arbitrary procedure that may be adopted by a judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative authority while making an order affecting those rights. These rules are intended to prevent such authority from doing injustice. 17. What is meant by the term “principles of natural justice” is not easy to determine. Lord Summer (then Hamilton, L.J.) in R.V. Local Govt. Board (KB at p.199) described the phrase as sadly lacking in precision. In General Council of Medical Education & Registration of U.K. v. Spackman Loard Wright observed that it was not desirable to attempt “to force it into any Procrustean bed” and mentioned that one essential requirement was that the Tribunal should be impartial and have no personal interest in the controversy, and further that it should give “a full and fair opportunity” to every party of being heard.” 18. Lord Wright referred to the leading cases on the subject. Lord Wright referred to the leading cases on the subject. The most important of them is Board of Education v. Rice where Lord Loreburn, L.C. observed as follows: (All ER p.38 C-F) “Comparatively recent statutes have extended, if they have not originated, the practice of imposing upon departments or officers of State the duty of deciding or determining questions of various kinds. It will, I suppose, usually be of an administrative kind; but sometimes it will involve matter of law as well as matter of fact, or even depend upon matter of law alone. In such cases, the Board of Education will have to ascertain the law and also to ascertain the facts. I need not add that in doing either they must act in good faith and listen fairly to both sides, for that is a duty lying upon everyone who decides anything. But I do not think they are bound to treat such a question as though it were a trial …… The Board is in the nature of the arbitral tribunal, and a court of law has no jurisdiction to hear appeals from their determination, either upon law or upon fact. But if the court is satisfied either that the Board have not acted judicially in the way which I have described, or have not determined the question which they are required by the Act to determine, then there is a remedy by mandamus and certiorari.” Lord Wright also emphasized from the same decision the observation of the Lord Chancellor that “the Board can obtain information in any way they think best, always giving a fair opportunity to those who are parties to the controversy for correcting or contradicting any relevant statement prejudicial to their view”. To the same effect are the observations of Earl of Selbourne, L.O. in Spackman v. Plumstead district Board of Works where the learned and noble Lord Chancellor observed as follows:- “No doubt, in the absence of special provisions as to how the person who is to decide is to proceed, law will imply no more than that the substantial requirements of justice shall not be violated. He is not a judge in the proper sense of the word; but he must give the parties an opportunity of being heard before him and stating their case and their view. He is not a judge in the proper sense of the word; but he must give the parties an opportunity of being heard before him and stating their case and their view. He must give notice when he will proceed with the matter and he must act honestly and impartially and not under the dictation of some other person or persons to whom the authority is not given by law. There must be no malversation of any kind. There would be no decision within the meaning of the statute is there were anything of that sort done contrary to the essence of justice. Lord Selbourne also added that the essence of justice consisted in requiring that all parties should have an opportunity of submitting to the person by whose decision they are to be bound, such considerations as in their judgment ought to be brought before him. All these cases lay down the very important rule of natural justice contained in the oftquoted phrase “justice should not only be done, but should be seen to be done.” 19. Concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. Rules of natural justice are not rules embodied always expressly in statute or in rules framed thereunder. They may be implied from the nature of the duty to be performed under a statute. What particular rule of natural justice should be implied and what its context should be in a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the statute under which the enquiry is held. The old distinction between a judicial act and an administrative act has withered away. Even an administrative order which involves civil consequences must be consistent with the rules of natural justice. The expression “civil consequences” encompasses infraction of not merely property or personal rights but of civil liberties, material deprivations and non-pecuniary damages. In its wide umbrella comes everything that affects a citizen in his civil life. The next is the oft cited decision of Union of India Vs. Tulsiram Patel reported in (1985) 3 SCC 398, paragraphs 95 to 100 of which quoted below deal with the principles of natural justice. “95. In its wide umbrella comes everything that affects a citizen in his civil life. The next is the oft cited decision of Union of India Vs. Tulsiram Patel reported in (1985) 3 SCC 398, paragraphs 95 to 100 of which quoted below deal with the principles of natural justice. “95. The principles of natural justice have thus come to be recognized as being a part of the guarantee contained in Article 14 because of the new and dynamic interpretation given by this Court to the concept of equality which is the subject-matter of that article. Shortly put, the syllogism runs thus: violation of a rule of natural justice results in arbitrariness which is the same as discrimination; where discrimination is the result of State action, it is a violation of Article 14; therefore, a violation of a principle of natural justice by a State action is a violation of Article 14. Article 14, however, is not the sole repository of the principles of natural justice. What it does is to guarantee that any law or state action violating them will be struck legislation and State action but also where any tribunal, authority or body of men, not coming within the definition of ‘State’ in Article 12, is charged with the duty of deciding a matter. In such a case, the principles of natural justice require that it must decide such matter fairly and impartially. 96. The rule of natural justice with which we are concerned in these appeals and writ petitions, namely, the audi alteram parterm rule, in its fullest amplitude means that a person against whom an order to his prejudice may be passed should be informed of the allegations and charges against him, be given an opportunity of submitting his explanation thereto, have the right to know the evidence, both oral or documentary, by which the matter is proposed to be decided against him, and to inspect the documents which re relied upon for the purpose of being used against him, to have the witnesses who are to give evidence against him examined in his presence and have the right to cross-examine them, and to lead his own evidence, both oral and documentary, in his defence. The process of a fair hearing need not, however, conform to the judicial process in court of law, because judicial adjudication of causes involves a number of technical rules of procedure and evidence which are unnecessary and not required for the purpose of a fair hearing within the meaning of audi alteram partem rule in a quasi-judicial or administrative inquiry. If we look at clause (2) of Article 311 in the light of what is stated above, it will be apparent that clause is merely an express statement of the audi alteram partem rule which is implicitly made part of the guarantee contained in Article 14 as a result of the interpretation placed upon that article by recent decision of this Court. Clause (2) of Article 311 requires that before a government servant is dismissed, removed or reduced in rank, an inquiry must be held in which he is informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. The nature of the hearing to be given to a government servant under clause (2) of Article 311 has been elaborately set out by this court in Khem Chand case in the passages from the judgment extracted above. Though that case related to the original clause (2) of Article 311, the same applies to the present clause (2) of Article 311 except for the fact that now a government servant has no right to make any representation against the penalty proposed to be imposed upon him but, as pointed out earlier, in the case of Suresh Koshy George v. University of Kerala such an opportunity is not the requirement of the principles of natural justice and as held in Associated Cement Companies Ltd. V. T.C. Shrinivastava neither the ordinary law of the land nor industrial law requires such an opportunity to be given. The opportunity of showing cause against the proposed penalty was only the result of the interpretation placed by the Judicial Committee of the Privy council in all case upon Section 240(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935, which was accepted by this Court in Khem Chand case. The opportunity of showing cause against the proposed penalty was only the result of the interpretation placed by the Judicial Committee of the Privy council in all case upon Section 240(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935, which was accepted by this Court in Khem Chand case. If, therefore, an inquiry held against a government servant under clause (2) of Article 311 is unfair or biased or has been conducted in such a manner as not to give him a fair or reasonable opportunity to defend himself, undoubtedly, the principles of natural justice would be violated, but in such a case the order of dismissal, removal or reduction rank would be held to be bad as contravening the express provisions of clause (2) of Article 31 and there will be no scope for having recourse of Article 14 for the purpose of invalidating it. 97. Though the two rules of natural justice, namely, nemo judex in causa sua and audi alteram partem, have now a definite meaning and connotation in law and their content and implications are well understood and firmly established, they are nonetheless not statutory rules. Each of these rules yields to and changes with the exigencies of different situations. They do not apply in the same manner to situations which are not alike. These rules are not case in a rigid mould nor can they be put in a legal strait-jacket. They are not immutable but flexible. These rules can be adapted and modified by statutes and statutory rules and also by the constitution of the Tribunal which has to decide a particular matter and the rules by which such Tribunal is governed. There is no difference in this respect between the law in England and in India. It is unnecessary to reproduce what Ormond, L.J., said in Norwest Holst Ltd. V. Secretary of State for Trade (at page 227): The House of Lords and this Court have repeatedly emphasized that the ordinary principles of natural justice must be kept flexible and must be adapted to the circumstances prevailing in any particular case. One of the most important of these circumstances, as has been said throughout the argument, is, of course, the provisions of the Act in question, in this case Sections 164 and 165 of the 1948 Act. 98. One of the most important of these circumstances, as has been said throughout the argument, is, of course, the provisions of the Act in question, in this case Sections 164 and 165 of the 1948 Act. 98. In India, in Suresh Koshy George v. University of Kerala this Court observed (at page 322): The question whether the requirements of natural justice have been met by the procedure adopted in a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of the case in point, the constitution of the Tribunal and the rules under which is functions. After referring to this case, in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India Hegde, J., observed (at page 469): (SCC p.272, para 20) What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of the case, the framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened the court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case. 99. Again in Union of India v. Col. J.N. Sinha it was said (at page 794-5): (SCC p. 460, para 8). As observed by this Court in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India “the aim of rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words they do not supplant the law but supplement it”. It is true that if a statutory provision can be read consistently with the principles of natural justice, the courts should do so because it must be presumed that the Legislatures and the statutory authorities intend to act in accordance with the principles of natural justice. But if on the other hand a statutory provision either specifically or by necessary implication excludes the application of any or all the principles of natural justice then the court cannot ignore the mandate of the legislature or the statutory authority and read into the concerned provision the principles of natural justice. But if on the other hand a statutory provision either specifically or by necessary implication excludes the application of any or all the principles of natural justice then the court cannot ignore the mandate of the legislature or the statutory authority and read into the concerned provision the principles of natural justice. Whether the exercise of a power conferred should be made in accordance with any of the principles of natural justice or not depends upon the express words of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power conferred, the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of the exercise of that power. 100. In Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India [(1984)2 SCR 533], Chinnappa Reddy, J. in his dissenting judgment summarized the position in law on this point as follows (at page 591): (SCC p.712, para 106). The principles of natural justice have taken deep root in the judicial conscience of our people, nurtured by Binapani, Kraipak, Mohinder Singh Gill, Maneka Gandhi, etc. They are now considered so fundamental as to be ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’ and, therefore, implicit in every decision-making function, call it judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative. Where authority functions under a statute and the statute provides for the observance of the principles of natural justice in a particular manner, natural justice will have to be observed in that manner and in no other. No wider right than that provided by statute can be claimed nor can the right be narrowed. Where the statute is silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice. The implication of natural justice being presumptive it may be excluded by express words of statute or by necessary intendment. Where the conflict is between the public interest and the private interest the presumption must necessarily be weak and may, therefore, be readily displaced.” 24. Lastly the counsel for the petitioner cites the decision of Olga Tellis & others v. Bombay Municipal corporation and others reported in (1985 3 SCC 545 in support of his contention that the action of the respondents has resulted in violation of Article 21 of the constitution which includes right to livelihood. Paragraph 32 of the said decision lays down that:- “32. Paragraph 32 of the said decision lays down that:- “32. As we have stated while summing up the petitioners’ case, the main plank of their argument is 21 includes the right to livelihood and since, they will be deprived of their livelihood if they are evicted from their slum and pavement dwellings, their eviction is tantamount to deprivation of their life and is hence unconstitutional. For purposes of argument, we will assume the factual correctness of the premise that if the petitioners are evicted from their dwellings, they will be deprived of their livelihood. Upon that assumption, the question which we have to consider is whether the right to life includes the right to livelihood. We see only answer to that question, namely, that it does. The sweep of the right to life conferred by Article 21 is wide and far reaching. It does not mean merely that life cannot be extinguished or taken away as, for example, by the imposition and execution of the death sentence, except according to procedure established by law. That is but one aspect of the right to life. An equally important facet of that right is the right to livelihood because, no person can live without the means of living, that is, the means of livelihood. If the right to livelihood is not treated as a part of the constitutional right to life, the easiest way of depriving a person of his right to life would be to deprive him of his means of livelihood to the point of abrogation. Such deprivation would not only denude the life of its effective content and meaningfulness but it would make life impossible to live. And yet, such deprivation would not have to be in accordance with the procedure established by law, if the right to livelihood is not regarded as a part of the right to life. That, which alone makes it possible to live, leave aside what makes life livable, must be deemed to be an integral component of the right to life. Deprive a person of his right to livelihood and you shall have deprived him of his life. Indeed, that explains the massive migration of the rural population to big cities. They migrate because they have no means of livelihood in the villages. Deprive a person of his right to livelihood and you shall have deprived him of his life. Indeed, that explains the massive migration of the rural population to big cities. They migrate because they have no means of livelihood in the villages. The motive force which propels their desertion of their hearths and homes in the village is the struggle for survival, that is, the struggle for life. So unimpeachable is the evidence of the nexus between life and the means of livelihood. They have to eat to live: Only a handful can afford the luxury of living to eat. That they can do, namely, eat, only if they have the means of livelihood. That is the context in which it was said by Douglas, J. in Baksey that the right to work is the most precious liberty that man possesses. It is the most precious liberty because, it sustains and enables a man to live and the right to life is a precious freedom. “Life”, as observed by Field, J. in Munn v. Illinois, means something more than mere animal existence and the inhibition against the deprivation of life extends to all those limits and faculties by which life is enjoyed. This observation was quoted with approval by this court in Kharak Singh v. State of U.P.” On the basis of these decisions, the counsel submits that by removing the petitioner from service he has been denied his right to livelihood which could have been done only for proper reasons after complying with the principles of natural justice. 25. Now let me judge the action of the 2nd respondent in the light of the principles enunciated in those decisions. Exts.P2, P4, P5, P6, P7, P8 and P9 would conclusively show that the petitioner was appointed and was holding the post of professor of Library Science after approval from all authorities under the Kerala university Act. In fact, even after the disposal of the writ appeal, which is stated to be the immediate reason for passing Ext.P14, the University has in Ext.P12 counter affidavit justified the continuance of the petitioner in that post. Without any doubt, removal of the petitioner from that post entails civil consequences to the petitioner and as contended by him affects his right to livelihood. Without any doubt, removal of the petitioner from that post entails civil consequences to the petitioner and as contended by him affects his right to livelihood. In such circumstances, whatever be the reason for removal from service, the same could not have been validly passed without giving him a notice to show cause and a hearing. In this connection it is worth noticing that in Ext.P17 one of the reasons stated for the dissent of some of the Syndicate members is that the decision of the Vice Chancellor is against natural justice. Admittedly no notice or hearing has been granted to the petitioner. On the other hand, the University’s contention is that no notice is necessary. Therefore, Ext.P14 order has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice and therefore violated Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. 26. Then comes the question as to whether Ext.P14 is tainted by mala fides. The counsel for the petitioner points out that in all proceedings prior to Ext.P14, the University has steadfastly supported the petitioner’s appointment at all levels from the Registrar upto the Syndicate. The departure came after the government nominated 5 members to the Syndicate by the middle of 2001 and the Registrar and the Vice Chancellor changed. According to the petitioner, the present Registrar, the 3rd respondent herein had an axe to grind against him. Earlier, pursuant to his involvement in malpractices as Secretary of the Selection Committee in the matter of selection to the post of last grade servants, which selection was set aside by this court which decision was confirmed by the Supreme court, disciplinary action was initiated against him. At that time, the petitioner was holding additional charge of Registrar the University. In that capacity the petitioner was closely associated with the enquiry proceedings against the 3rd respondent. Later the 3rd respondent was appointed as Private Secretary to the Minister for Education. On termination of his service as P.S. to Minister for Education, he rejoined as Registrar on 28.11.2002. (It is submitted at the bar that the 3rd respondent was reinstated after the disciplinary proceedings). By that time the Constitution of the Syndicate also changed, five new members nominated by the government joining the Syndicate in 2001. Just before the 3rd respondent took charge as Registrar, the former Registrar Dr. (It is submitted at the bar that the 3rd respondent was reinstated after the disciplinary proceedings). By that time the Constitution of the Syndicate also changed, five new members nominated by the government joining the Syndicate in 2001. Just before the 3rd respondent took charge as Registrar, the former Registrar Dr. M. Dasan, filed Ext.P12 counter affidavit dated 14.5.2002, fully justifying the continuance of service of the petitioner despite Ext.P10 judgment of this Court in the W.A., which is now cited as the reason for passing Ext.P14. In October 2002, the Vice Chancellor also changed and the present Vice Chancellor took charge who passed Ext.P14. order on 30.1.2003. The counsel for the petitioner would argue that these circumstances would speak for itself in the mater of spelling out mala fides of respondents in passing Ext.P14. 27. No doubt there is no direct evidence in this case to prove mala fides. But the Supreme Court has spoken on the standard of evidence required to prove mala fides, in the decision of Indian Railway Construction co. Ltd. Vs. Ajayakumar reported in (2003) 4 SCC 579, at paragraph 23 as follows:- “23. Doubtless, he who seeks to invalidate or nullify any act or order must establish the charge of bad faith, an abuse or any misuse by the authority of its powers. While the indirect motive or purpose, or bad faith or personal ill will is not to be held established except on clear proof thereof, it is obviously difficult to establish the state of a man’s mind, for that is what is employee has to establish in this case, though this may sometimes be done. The difficulty is not lessened then one has to establish that a person apparently acting on the legitimate exercise of power has, in fact, been acting mala fide in the sense of improper motive should be established only by direct evidence. But it must be discernible from the order impugned or must be shown from the established surrounding factors which proceeded the order. If bad faith would vitiate the order, the same, can, in our opinion, be deduced as a reasonable and inescapable inference form proved facts. (See S. Partap Singh v. State of Punjab.) It cannot be overlooked that the burden of establishing mala fides is very heavy on the person who alleges it. If bad faith would vitiate the order, the same, can, in our opinion, be deduced as a reasonable and inescapable inference form proved facts. (See S. Partap Singh v. State of Punjab.) It cannot be overlooked that the burden of establishing mala fides is very heavy on the person who alleges it. The allegations of mala fides are often more easily made than proved, and the very seriousness of such allegations demands proof of a high order of credibility. As noted by this Court in E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N. courts would be slow to draw dubious inferences from incomplete facts placed before it by a party particularly when the imputations are grave and they are made against the holder of an office which has a high responsibility in the administration.” (Emphasis supplied) Let us see whether the petitioner has succeeded in discharging his burden in accordance with the principles laid down in the above decision. 28. First let us see how the allegations in the O.P. are dealt with in the counter affidavit. In this connection, I may note a very distressing fact. The petitioner has impleaded the Registrar, Sri. T.K. Ummer against whom allegations of mala fides are raised, in his personal capacity, as the 3rd respondent. The University is defending an order of the Vice chancellor after the earlier man in office as Vice Chancellor and Registrar had supported the very same action which is now annulled by Ext.P14. It is improper, if not illegal that the very same 3rd respondent, Sri. T.K. Ummer, files a counter affidavit on behalf of respondents 1 and 2 also which fact would also to some extent support the petitioner’s contention on mala fides. I am of opinion that prudency required that the university filed its counter by some other responsible officer, if not by the Vice Chancellor himself. 29. The allegations of mala fides are contained in paragraphs 14 to 16 of the original petition as follows:- “14. While the matter stood so the Government nominated 5 members to the Syndicate of the University in the middle of 2001 and the combination of the Syndicate changed. The Vice Chancellor who was in office also retired and new Vice chancellor namely Dr. Syed Iqbal Hasnain assumed office. The powerful Unions and Sri. Raju. While the matter stood so the Government nominated 5 members to the Syndicate of the University in the middle of 2001 and the combination of the Syndicate changed. The Vice Chancellor who was in office also retired and new Vice chancellor namely Dr. Syed Iqbal Hasnain assumed office. The powerful Unions and Sri. Raju. M. Mathew who could not legally oust the petitioner from service and who could not get any favourable orders from this Hon’ble Court influenced the Vice Chancellor to see that the petitioner is sent out of service for one reason or other. 15. In this context it is also relevant to note that the present Registrar of the University Sri. T.K. Ummer is nursing grudge against the petitioner. Sri. Ummer while holding the post of Registrar has committed serious malpractice including falsification of records in the matter of selection of last grade servants in the service of the University. Large number of writ petitions were preferred before this Hon’ble court challenging the selection and this Hon’ble Court found that there is large scale malpractice including correction of the documents in the matter of selection process to the posts of last grade servants in the University and this Hon’ble Court was pleased to set aside the entire selection. Though the matter was again taken before this Hon’ble Court was pleased to set aside the entire selection. Though the mater was again taken before this Hon’ble Court, the Division Bench also affirmed the decision of the learned Single Judge and the matter was further taken before the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court also dismissed the same. 16. The Syndicate of the University on consideration of the entire aspect was of the matter issued memo of charges against Sri. T.K. Ummer who was the Secretary of the Selection Committee by virtue of his office of Registrar. A detailed disciplinary enquiry was ordered against him and a Retired District and Sessions Judge, Sri. Narayanan Nair was appointed as Enquiry Officer. The Enquiry officer found that Sri. T.K. Ummer is guilty of the misconduct alleged against him. During the enquiry proceedings Fri. Ummer was requested to avail long leave and he availed leave. During the absence of Sri. Ummer the petitioner was functioning as Registrar in charge of the University for a short time and he was closely associated with the enquiry proceedings. Thereafter, Sri. T.K. Ummer is guilty of the misconduct alleged against him. During the enquiry proceedings Fri. Ummer was requested to avail long leave and he availed leave. During the absence of Sri. Ummer the petitioner was functioning as Registrar in charge of the University for a short time and he was closely associated with the enquiry proceedings. Thereafter, Sri. T.K. Ummer was appointed as Private Secretary for Minister for Education. On terminating his service as P.S. to Minister for Education, Sri. Ummer rejoined as Registrar of the University of Calicut on 28.11.2002. On joining duty of Sri. Ummer the then Registrar Dr. Dasan who was originally having a lien as Professor in English in Kannur University was relieved. The present Registrar who is in office also having personal grudge against the petitioner.” In the counter affidavit these allegations are dealt with in paragraphs 14 and 15, which read thus:- “14. The petitioner’s contention in para 14 of the O.P. that combination of the Syndicate change is sufficient to point a needle of suspicion with regard to the petitioner’s high voltage of influence he had with the authorities before the so called combination of the Syndicate change. He, with his powerful influence not only managed to misinterpret this Hon’ble Court’s direction but also succeeded in gaining the status of a Professor by a mere clubbing of two posts in the pretext of austerity compulsions. The petitioner’s contention that the new Vice Chancellor, Dr. (prof) Syed Iqbal Hasnain, immediately after assuming office in order to oust him from service bowed to the pressure tactics of the powerful unions of the University, and Sri. Raju. M. Mathew (petitioner in O.P.No.5117/2002) is absolutely baseless and hence denied. 15. The averments contained in paragraphs 15 and 16 are totally irrelevant in this context. The then Registrar Dr.M. Dasan was believed exclusively on his request from the University of Calicut and it was after Dr. M. Dasan’s relief the present Registrar Prof. T.K. Ummer, the then P.S. for Minister for Education requested to rejoin the University of Calicut canceling his deputation. The then Registrar Dr.M. Dasan was believed exclusively on his request from the University of Calicut and it was after Dr. M. Dasan’s relief the present Registrar Prof. T.K. Ummer, the then P.S. for Minister for Education requested to rejoin the University of Calicut canceling his deputation. The petitioner’s contention in para 17 that consequent on the de-linking of the integrated post, the petitioner was directed to hand over the charge of the University librarian to Smt. Rosamma Joseph, the Deputy Librarian with immediate effect is false as it was on his request he was relieved from the charge of the University Librarian as is evident from Ext. R1(a).” 30. Not only is there any specific denial of he allegations in the O.P., the third respondent even questions the propriety of the clubbing of the two posts as ordered by the Synidcate. In fact, the imputation is that the petitioner managed himself to get the University to combine the two posts and to have him posted in that post illegally, not realizing the fact that the decision was taken by the very same Syndicate, that too not only in respect of the two posts in the Department of Library Science but also in two other departments as evidenced by Exts.P4 and P5. 31. In the counter affidavit, in his anxiety to deny the petitioner any relief, at one place he even questioned the validity of the combined post, in the following words (at page 13), “Further, the combined post of Professor of Library Science & University Librarian has not been instituted by the Senate in accordance with the statute (sic) 1 of Chapter 3 of CUPS 1977. The Academic Council has not framed any specific qualification or mode of appointment for the post as laid down in Section 25(iv) & (ix) of Calicut University Act, 1975.” Little realizing that the decision was taken by the Syndicate itself with whom the executive powers of the University vests and who also had the powers to make ordinances and to amend or repeal the same. Neither the vice Chancellor nor the Registrar has the power to question the validity of any action of the Syndicate. Neither the vice Chancellor nor the Registrar has the power to question the validity of any action of the Syndicate. The syndicate had only taken the decision to combine two posts into one and post a person who had the qualifications to hold both posts and who actually held at one time or other each of the two posts. The contentions in the counter affidavit are in fact directly contradictory to the contentions in Ext.P12 counter affidavit filed in O.P.No.5117/2002 which was filed challenging the continuance of the petitioner in the same post. 32. In paragraph 20 of Ext.P12 counter affidavit in O.P.No.5117/2002, the University stated thus in regard to the merger of the order in the C.M.P. with the final judgment in W.A.No.686/1994. “20. The contention of the petitioner that C.M.P. was dismissed by this Hon’ble Court does not hold good at all as it was disposed of along with the writ Appeal and it merges with the main order issued in the Writ Appeal. The petitioner is attempting to mislead this Hon’ble Court on this aspect. The averment made by the petitioner may found good to layman but not to a law man. It is highlighting that a C.M.P. which is disposed of along with the writ appeal 686/1994 that the petitioner has made a press statement that the appointment of the 4th respondent was set aside which is absolutely incorrect. It is ignoring that the specific petition filed by the petitioner to appoint him to the post in the place of the 4th respondent stands dismissed. The averment in the O.P. does not entitle the petitioner to get regularized his service in the post of Reader.” But in Ext.P14, the 2nd respondent takes a different stand thus:- “Subsequently the University by a special petition sought permission of the Hon’ble High court to withdraw the writ appeal submitting that though the proceedings were issued on the basis of the order dated 6.6.1988, it is not being given effect to. Accordingly, the Hon’ble High Court in its judgment in writ appeal Nos.476/1994, 543/1994, 686/1994 825/1994 (O.P.No.9346/90) disposed of the writ appeals on 8.11.2001. The Hon’ble High Court on the same date in a separate judgment also dismissed its order on CMP No.5804/1998 in W.A.No.686/1994 which permitted the University to post Dr. Accordingly, the Hon’ble High Court in its judgment in writ appeal Nos.476/1994, 543/1994, 686/1994 825/1994 (O.P.No.9346/90) disposed of the writ appeals on 8.11.2001. The Hon’ble High Court on the same date in a separate judgment also dismissed its order on CMP No.5804/1998 in W.A.No.686/1994 which permitted the University to post Dr. M. Bavakkutty as the Professor of Library Science Provisionally.” The third respondent town the same line in paragraph 4 of his counter affidavit in this original petition thus: “ ………… Hence in the light of the judgment of the Hon’ble division Bench dated 8.11.2001 dismissing the order in CMP NO.5809/1998 in W.A.No.686/1994 permitting the University to appoint petitioner provisionally as Professor of Library Science, his authority to hold the redesignated post also stands null and avoid……” 33. Further the distorted version of the orders of this court which appeared in the newspaper reports produced as exhibits in Ext.P11 (which was noted by the University as evidenced by paragraph 15 of Ext.P12) would go to show that forces were at work against the petitioner in the matter as alleged by him in the original petition. The sequence of events shows that there was an absolute turnabout on the stand of the University after the change of the ‘constitution of the Syndicate in 2001, after the new Vice Chancellor took charge in October, 2002 and the third respondent took charge on 28.11.2002. Lastly, as I have already held, the 2nd respondent has invoked emergency clause in s.10 (13) and passed orders without any notice or hearing which also are pointers to the state of mind of the Vice Chancellor while passing Ext.P14 order. It will not be amiss to conclude that the 2nd respondent had been misguised by others to pass Ext.P14. Hence I am convinced that mala fides can be deduced as a reasonable and inescapable inference from the above proven facts. Therefore, I hold that Ext.P14 order is vitiated by mala fides also. 34. Lastly, I come to the question as to whether the petitioner was in fact holding the post of Professor of Library Science validly. For deciding this, I need not look far, but only into Ext.P12 counter affidavit filed by the then Registrar of the University, Dr. M. Dasan in OP. No.5117/2002 in which the very continuance of the petitioner in that post was challenged. For deciding this, I need not look far, but only into Ext.P12 counter affidavit filed by the then Registrar of the University, Dr. M. Dasan in OP. No.5117/2002 in which the very continuance of the petitioner in that post was challenged. It will be advantageous in this regard to extract some portions of Ext.P12. Paragraph 11 goes like this:- “11. Pursuant to the interim order the 4th respondent was appointed as Professor in Library Science while he was holding the post of University Librarian. He possesses all the qualifications for being appointed to the post of Professor in Library science and further that he has been selected by a duly constituted selection committee also. There is no irregularity or illegality in seeking permission to fill up the post of Professor in Library Science. During the relevant time the posts of Professor in Library Science and University Librarian were not combined. ………….” Paragraphs 15 and 16 read thus: 15. It is submitted that on integration of the posts of “professor in Library Science’ and ‘University Librarian’ ceased to exist and combined emerging post was created. The Syndicate on the recommendation of the senate of the University accorded sanction for the appointment of the 4th respondent in the integrated post of professor in Library Science and University Librarian. On integration of the post of the University Librarian with that of Professor in Library Science the post notified in 1988 is ceased to exist. In this circumstances, when the Writ Appeal came up for consideration it was brought to the notice of this Hon’ble Court that notification issued in the year 1988 has lost its relevance and University is not intending to proceed further with the selection process as the post is no more in existence. Recording the above submission writ appeals were closed. But the petitioner does not stop the matter there. Though he was fully aware of the circumstances under which the Writ Appeal was closed, he caused publication of large number of news items in various news dailies and started making representations before various forums and even gone to the extend of publishing news item stating that the appointment of the 4th respondent in the integrated post of Professor in Library Science and University Librarian was set aside by this Hon’ble Court. That resulted the 4th respondent filing a review Petition as R.P.No. and the division Bench was pleased to clarify the position. 16. It is submitted that the petitioner has not challenged neither the integration of 2 posts or the appointment of the 4th respondent to the integrated post in this O.P. and for that matter the petitioner cannot also challenge the same at this belated stage. It is submitted that integration of post was done on 7.12.2000 and the 4th respondent was appointed. In the year 2002 the petitioner cannot challenge the same. It is further submitted that the petitioner has also filed large number of petitions before this Hon’ble Court staking his claim for promotion which has been rejected by this Hon’ble court. The averment of the petitioner that the 4th respondent was appointed to the integrated post based on the interim order of this Hon’ble Court is not correct. He was appointed to the integrated post as per the decision of the Syndicate which has been approved by the Senate – the highest body of the University. Paragraphs 21 and 22 are also relevant in this regard. “21. Referring to the averment of the petitioner that the 4th respondent is appointed to a non-teaching post and he is holding the post of Professor in Library Science and University Librarian which is a non teaching post, he is not entitled to continue upto the age of 60, it is submitted that being a teaching post the 4th respondent is entitled to continue upto the age 60. The averment of the petitioner that the 4th respondent is never appointed to a substantive teaching post is absolutely incorrect. It is submitted that while holding the post of University Librarian he was selected for being appointed to the post of Professor in Library Science. This Hon’ble court earlier was pleased to set aside the selection solely on the ground that the Syndicate cannot constitute a screening committee for screening the application of the candidates. A writ appeal was preferred against the judgment by the University so also the 4th respondent and the Division Bench closed the Writ Appeal recording that the notification issued by the University in the year 1988 lost is relevancy in view of the integration of posts. A writ appeal was preferred against the judgment by the University so also the 4th respondent and the Division Bench closed the Writ Appeal recording that the notification issued by the University in the year 1988 lost is relevancy in view of the integration of posts. The continuance of the 4th respondent in the integrated post which is a teaching post and there is no illegality as stated by the petitioner. 22. The averment of the petitioner that though the 4th respondent was provisionally appointed based on the permission granted by this Hon’ble Court and subsequently the 4th respondent was selected and appointed to the integrated post of professor in Library Science and University Librarian as per the decision of the Syndicate which is approved by the Senate. The petitioner cannot challenge the same. The integration of posts was after due application of mind. Without challenging the decisions of the Syndicate and Senate the petitioner cannot challenge the integration of posts as it is bad in law. Further averment that there is no appointment order is issued appointing the 4th respondent to the integrated post is not at all correct. The averment of the petitioner that the appointment of the 4th respondent as Professor in Library Science and University Librarian is illegal is wholly unsustainable. It is submitted that it is within the prerogative of the University to integrate any posts in the service of the University and appoint persons to the post. It is the syndicate of the University that made appointment of the 4th respondent to the integrated post. The U.G.C. guidelines has not application in the service conditions of the university Staff. May be the petitioner is aged 55 he cannot content that he should be appointed as Professor in Library Science even when he is continuing in the post of Reader based on the interim order issued by this Hon’ble Court. 35. During the course of arguments, I specifically asked the counsel for the University to explain the conflicting stands taken by the University in respect of the same subject matter in two different original petitions. He expressed helplessness and requested this Court to decide the issue on the basis of the actual facts emerging from the pleadings and evidence. 36. The University has no case that the petitioner does not possess the qualifications for the post of Professor of Library Science. He expressed helplessness and requested this Court to decide the issue on the basis of the actual facts emerging from the pleadings and evidence. 36. The University has no case that the petitioner does not possess the qualifications for the post of Professor of Library Science. In fact from, 1988 till Ext.P10 on 8.11.2001 the University steadfastly maintained that, as the only person possessing the qualifications pursuant to notification dated 6.6.1988, the petitioner is entitled to be appointed to the said post. It is also an admitted fact that before the was appointed to the post of Professor of Library Science he was holding the post of University Librarian. The University decided to combine these two posts and to post the petitioner to the said combined post. When the Syndicate decided to delink the two posts, the petitioner was allowed to hold the post of Professor of Library Science. Therefore, I am of the opinion that at the time of Ext.P14 the petitioner was not holding the post pursuant to interim orders of this Court dated 6.11.1998 in C.M.P.No.5804/1998 in W.A.No.686/1994. Much water had flown under the bridge since then. His subsequent appointment by the Syndicate to the combined post changed the character of his appointment. Thereafter when the two posts were delinked he was allowed to hold the post of Professor of Library Science. In any event, the University which is the author of all these orders, which were approved at the level of the Syndicate, cannot dispute its authenticity now. If the University is allowed to change its stand as and when personnel at the helm changes that well spell doom not only to the employees but to the University itself. Therefore, I hold that the continuance of the petitioner in service in the post of Professor of library Science was perfectly in order and in accordance with law. 37. In the result, for all the above reasons I quash Ext.P14 order of the 2nd respondent as also the subsequent ratification of the same by Ext.R1(c) as modified by Ext.P17. the respondents will reinstate the petitioner forthwith and pay him all service benefits with arrears as if he had continued in service uninterrupted by Ext.P14. He will be allowed to continue in that post till he attains the age of 60 years as the post is a teaching post. the respondents will reinstate the petitioner forthwith and pay him all service benefits with arrears as if he had continued in service uninterrupted by Ext.P14. He will be allowed to continue in that post till he attains the age of 60 years as the post is a teaching post. Because of my finding regarding mala fides and the contradictory stands of the University, the petitioner will be entitled to costs in this petition, which I quantify at Rs.10,000/-, which shall be realized from the persons responsible for the state of affairs. The original petition is allowed as above.